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ABSTRACT
The main emphasis of this study is on the 
economic activities of the English East India Company 
in Bengal from about 1650 to 1720. The Companyfs trade 
in Bengal at the beginning of this period was not very 
important quantitatively* But the main significance of 
the Bengal trade in the commercial complex of the Company 
was that it was an expanding trade which soon exceeded 
the Company* s trade either in Madras or Surat* This 
development was a natural outcome of the growing demand 
in England and on the Continent for cheap Bengal products.
The Company*s trade in Bengal was plagued 
throughout the period by several factors, of which the 
two most important were the chronic shortage of liquid 
capital, and the exactions by local potentates who often 
challenged the Company*s alleged freedom of customs - free 
trade* The problem of inadequate capital was further 
accentuated by the poor demand for the English manufactures 
in Bengal. However, the enormous increase in the export 
trade of the Company during the period indicates that it 
was successful .*in dealing with all these three problems.
The internal organisation of the Company* s trade 
in Bengal depended on the indigenous merchants, and inspite 
of the close connection between these merchants and the
Company, the former succeeded in maintaining their 
independent credit and influence. The specialised 
activities of a class of merchants, and the refinement 
and development of the existing machinery for credit 
and exchange indicate that merchant capital and 
commercial organisations were capable of quite 
sophisticated operations in Bengal*
In the internal economy of Bengal, the 
activities of the European Companies gave an impetus 
to production and led to certain commercial and 
industrial innovations. But despite the increase in 
the production of export, commodities, the condition of 
the actual producers,., weavers in particular, probably 
remained unchanged and poor.. The only class which 
profited from the increasing trade, it- seems, was the 
merchant — middlemen. Though the expanding e^qport trade 
brought, in its train a large import of bullion and specie 
to Bengal, it had hardly any impact on the price level* 
Most of this treasure was drained towards upcountry by 
the local potentates and the big merchants.
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PREFACE
\
The aim of this work Is twofold : first, to
make a specific study of the various economic activities
of the European Companies, specially the English East.
India Company, in Bengal, and secondly, to cast light- on
the indigenous trade and commercial organisation, and
the interaction between the two. The period 1650 - 1720 -
when Bengal was exposed to the powerful impact, of the
European merchant capital - provides a convenient field
for the study of the responses of the commercialised sector
external
in the indigenous economy to a positive/stimulus. The 
region selected is suitable for such a study because Bengal 
had attained a high degree of commercialisation within the 
broad framework of an agrarian economy, and because its 
products were among the chief pivots of Indo - European 
trade in the second half of the 17th century.
The English East India Company1 s trade in Bengal 
developed quickly in magnitude. There was indeed a 
phenomenal increase in the Company's trade, both in value 
and volume, in the course of the period under study. The 
vast increase in the Company*s export trade from Bengal 
indicates that it was reasonably successful in overcoming 
the difficulties connected with the structure and organisation 
of its trade in that, region. Though the English trade in
7Bengal during the period was not yet very important, 
quantitatively, its main significance during the period 
was that it was an expanding trade and was fast emerging 
as the most important branch in the trade complex of the 
Company in India.
Pew attempts have so far been made to analyse 
the trading activities of the Indian merchants and examine 
the nature and character of their commercial organisation 
vis-a-vis the European Companies trading in India* The 
present work provides a study, though sketchy because of 
the lack of detailed information, of the responses of the 
traditional merchants in their methods and organisation 
of trade to the new situation arising with the appearance 
of the European Companies of monopolistic merchant, capitals
The present study is mainly based on the voluminous 
records of the English East India Company preserved in the 
different libraries of the United Kingdom and supplemented 
by the records of the Dutch East India Company preserved at 
the Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague. I have modernised 
the spellings in all the extracts quoted from the 
contemporary records.
I have received hel£ from many sources in writing 
this volume. I am gratefully indebted to Dr. K.N. Chaudhuri 
of the School of Oriental and African Studies for his
8inspiring guidance and sympathetic help throughout the 
course of my work, I must, record my thanks to the 
Commonwealth Scholarship Commission for awarding to me 
a scholarship for three ye^rs which enabled me to carry 
out my research. My thanks are also due to the Central 
Research Fund, University of Londonf for giving me a 
grant to procure photo-copies and microfilms of some of 
the records of the Dutch Company preserved at the Algemeen 
Rijksarchief. Finally, I would like to thank the University 
of Calcutta for granting me study - leave throughout, the 
course of study abroad.
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Chapter I
Introduction
♦The Paradise of Nations1 - thus Aurangzeb 
was said to have styled Bengal.1 No official farm an, 
par wan a or other official papers of the Mughal Empire 
ever mentioned Bengal without adding ’the Paradise of 
India’, an epithet - according to Monsieur Jean Law, 
the chief of the Prench factory at Kasimbazar in the
2
♦fifties of the 18th century - given to it par excellence.
Bengalrs wealth in mediaval period was legendary and
the cheapness of wares there was attested by most of
the foreign travellers who visited the region in the 
3
17th century.
Geographically the term Bengal is used here 
in its contemporary sense to denote the territories 
included in the Mughal suba of Bengal. . Broadly speaking 
this area comprised the modern provinces of Bengal (East
1. The author of Riyaz - us - Salatin calls Bengal *Jinnat
- ul - biladt or /Paradise of Provinces1, vide, Ghulam 
Husain Salim, Riyaz - us - Salatin, text ed. Maulavi 
Abdul Hak Abid, p. 4; Trans. Maulavi Abdus Salam, p. 4* 
Humayun bestowed on Gour in Bengal the epithet f J innate - 
Abad’ or rthe realm of Paradise’, vide, AbulL Pazl, Ain
— i — Akbari, Text. Vol. 1, ed. Blochmann, p.390; Trans. 
Jarrett, Vol. H, pp. 122-123; A1 Badaoni, Muntakhab -
al - Tawarikh, Text ed. Maulavi Ahmed Ali, Yol. I, p.349; 
Trans. Raiiking, Yol. I, p. 458.
2. S.C. Hill, Bengal in 1756 - 57» Yol. m, p.160.
3* Thomas Bowrey, A Geo^aphical~~account; of countries round 
the Bay of Bengal, pp.l93-ff4; Sebastian Manrfque, Travels. 
Yol.I, pp.54-55; P. Bernier, Travels in the Mogul Empire, 
pp. 438-39; Linschoten, The Voyages of ...., p7~93>
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an d pf est), Bxhar and Orissa. The Sub a - _i_ - _P an gal a 
which was incorporated in Akbar’s dominion between 
If76 and 1582 excluded Chittagong. In 1666 3haista 
Khan conquered Chittagong and annexed it to the Bengal
(suoa)
suba* The whole of Bengal was administered as a province/ 
by the governors (subadars) appointed by the ] ugbal 
emperor.
The structure of provincial administration in 
Bengal during the period under review was based on the 
same model as it was in the time of Akbar. The 
administration was divided into two distinct parts - 
executive and revenue - and both were independent of 
each other. The fo-T-mer was the responsibility ok the 
nazim, also called sub ad at? and the latter was under the 
diwan. Pot1" the officers were appointed by imperial ord^r 
and. were guided in the affairs of administration by rules 
and regulations laid down in Dastur - al - amal or code
4 "
of procedure nssued by the emperor’s order.
"Despite the distinct division of the spheres of 
authority of the nawab and diwan, frequent conflict arose
between the two. Plaji Safi Fhan who was the diwan in
s
167p. was not on good terms with the nawab Fidai Zhan.
4. Riyaz - us - Salatin,Tr. op.cit., pp. 247-48; Salimullah, 
Tarikh — i — Bangla^ Tr. Gladwin, pp. 30—31.
5 • sa pi us tad 1 ban, 7 aasir — i — Alamgiri, p. 153; trans. 
J.F. Sarkar, p. 105•
e o
other* Their relation "beeame so strained that after
the death of ‘^idai Khan, ^is son left Bengal in fear
of the diwan Haji Safi Trhan. The English factors
reported that Haji Safi Khan’s son fled from Onttack
through fear of Eidai Khan’s son, hubammed. Salah, the
new snhadar of Orissa as ^idai Khan was a great enemy
of Haji Safi Khan. At the end of our period only,
the two offices of rawah and diwan were conferred nr.
onQ person - namely • nrshid Quli Khan.
Though most of the imperial officials in
Kenya1, as in other parts of the T ughal Empire, were
7
subject to transfer after three years of service, the 
period, under study witnessed three long viceroyalties. 
Shah shrja governed the province for 21 years (1639-59) 
with a caretaker during his absence for two years in the 
middle. Shaista Khan ruled for 23 years (1.664-1688) 
with a two years1 break under two short term successors. 
And the r'ovemorshin of PT»iuce ?• u.hammed Azim extended ove 
ten years (1698—17^7)* thonnh mostlv through his son as 
dormt~r. muo ion- neriods of bpiT’ -nil a mprg c-Teatlm 
re soon si. hi o -snr* the fact that tv,o r^ovince eriovedj. - . a.— X" ■ ■ v  O
6. nac t. Bee ords, Hugli, Vol. 7 f ff• 8Q, 90, 98.
7* Tavernier refers to s. custom of the I up’hal Hmuire 
according to which a snhadar was expected to return 
from a province after three years, vi.de , Tavernie^,
Travei s in Ind. 1 a, Vol. U  , p. 612).
14
urusu ally lory peace * At oiler* factor, of course,
contributed ■towards this. Chese three viceroys were
-nea^  kinsmen of the Emperor and their position was
much stronger th an the ordinary servants of the or own
who had ruled before thera, Hence they could enforce
obedience at home in full confidence of being hacked
hy the sovereign, *T,ocal opposition soon found itself
powerless against them, rivals felt their intrigues at
the imperial Court against these Bengal viceroys futile*.
Consequently, Bengal enjoyed peace and relative political
stability compared with most other provinces of the T ugbal 
8
Empire•
As the imperial officials in Bengal, as in other* 
subas, were temporary and transferable, most often they 
were devoid of any long term' interest in the region they 
governed and were only eager to maximise their immediate 
income without any regard for the consequences. Extortionate 
demands of the local potentates and their monopolistic 
design were a familiar phenomena of the 17th century India, 
and Bengal was no exception to that. As we shall see later, 
at least three of the Bengal nawabs - ]■ ir Jumla, Shaista 
Fhan and Prince Azim - tried to mo: opoiise some sectors 
of the province* s economy. It seems that posting in Bengal 
8, J ,1 . Sarkar (ed), History of Bengal, Vol. H, p. 216,
15
was considered lucrative, and ’hence even the nawabs or 
subadars tried to extend their stay in the province by 
presenting the emperors with gifts in kind and cash.
Thus it was reported by the English factors in ! overnber
I.679 that Shaista khan -got back the goverorship of Pen gal
9
by a present of 3 crores of rupees to the emperor, Again
in February 1.702 they reported that Prince Azim retained
10
the office by giving 3° lacks of rupees to Aurargzeb.
Sometimes the office of the fanjdar of some important
port - towns like Fugli or Palasore was sought by many
who offered large sums to the nawab. In 1672 Falik }assem
secured the governorship of Bala.sore ’by expense of three
11
score thousand rupees’. In 1677 several persons tried
to get the office of the ’buxbardar1 of Fugli. Aziz leg
offered 12 elephants and 10,000 rupees, huderam, a local
merchant, was also ready to pay a handsome sum of money
while Imam Quli stood, ’fairer chance offering more money
than any’. Put ultimately Ai i F ao i ’was made Puxbandar of 
12
Fugli’. It is significant to note that sometimes the 
Europeans could influence the appointment of these officials 
or even could get rid of -those who hindered their trade, 
by bribing the provincial authority. Thus it was reported 
2. Home Fisc., Vol. 803? f* 154.
10. n.o., 4 Feb. 17°2, ro. 7852, Yol, 63; Fact. records, ■ isc., 
Yol. 3A, entry of 4 Feb. 1702.
II. Fact, records, Hugli, Yol. 4, pt. I, f. Ik.
12. Fact, Records, Fugli, Yol. 7, pt. H,ff. 5? 21.; pt.m, 
f. 61; Buxband.ar means divisional port but it seems the 
English. factors used the term to mean the office of the 
f an i dar.
16
in 167? that ' alik Qassem., the governor of Hugli, was
turned out of his office by the Butch who paid Rs,13^,000
13
to the nawab and °s,^0,0^0 to other imnerial officers.
■r--------------------------- ^  / U.
In July 1672 the Dacca factors wrote that ’! alik Massem
is intended for Balasore, hut hope we may, if you please
1 A
to rive us leave and power, prevent it’.
However, the ■ ughal conquest ushered in Bengal 
an era of peace and prosperity. It helped to re-establish, 
that contact with ITpper India - and through Upper India by 
the land route with the Central and Western Asian countries— 
which Bengal had lost when its . uslim rulers shook off the 
overlordship of Delhi. The imperial conquest led to an 
increase of the province1s maritime trade. The Portuguese 
and I'" agh menace which hindered indigenous traders in the 
16th century were removed completely tg the expulsion of 
t' e Portuguese from Hugli in 1632, and the con quest of 
Chittagong in 1666.
Bengal, like the rest of India, had a predominantly 
agricultural economy. It’s raw silk and textile industries 
were organised as cottage industry. The natural products 
of juerral were profusely abundant. T the beginning of theX  KJ V_-
13* fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 4, pt.I, ff, 4-7; Vol.7, pt.I, 
f, 81.
14• Pact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 7, pt. I, f. 82,
17th century Pyrard de Laval found that Bengal exported
rice ’rot only to other parte of India as well to Goa
and 1 alabar’, hut even to ’Sumatra, the I oluceas and
all the islands of Simla to all of which herpal is a very
nursing mother who supplieth them with their er. tire
ip
subsistence and food’• ' hernier was inclined to believe
that the ’pre-eminence ascribed to Egypt (which had been
represented throughout the 1 id rile Apes as the finest and
most fruitful country in the world) was rather due to 
16
_engaleT . Pice from j^enpal, as the Prench traveller 
tells us, was supplied to Patna, Masulipatam and. many 
other parts on the Coromandel Coast as also to Ceylon 
and the ■ aldives, Penpal sugar was not onl" sent tn 
lolconda. and the Carnatic, but to Arabia and I'esopotamia 
through the towns of 7‘oka and Basra, and to Persia by way
1 y
of Bandar - Abbasi. " Bernier was also eloquent in 
describing the industries of ‘''erval - ,fTn regard to 
valuable commodities of a nature to attract foreign 
merchants, I am acquainted with no country where so great
a variety is found..... there is in penpale such a quantity
of cotton and silks, that the Kingdom may be called the
common storehouse for tv>ose two kinds of merchandise, not
15* Pyrard de Laval, $he Voyages of Vol. I, p. 327*
. l.P. ' eilink Roelofz, Asian Trade and European 
Influence, p * 68.
18
of Hind oust an or of the Umpire of tie Great bogul only,
1 8
hut of aid. the neighbouring Kingdoms, and even Durope*1.
In craftsmanship also e-mrjbab 1 e position,
’The inhabitants (of Lengal), both men and v;omen, are 
wonderously adroit in al1 such manufactures such as of 
cotton, cloth and silks and in needlework such as 
embroideries which are worked so skillfully down to the 
smallest stitches that nothine prettier is to he seen 
anywhere1 .
Till the ’ seventies of the 16th century Satyaon
was the most important port which from ancient times was
the chief emporium of trade in the western part of I>ergal*
It was the advantageous position of Satgaon - on the river
laraswati in the loop formed by it before it falls into
the Granges - that made it ’the great port of lenral for
ocean - yoinL ships in the middle Ames*. It’s wealth was
the theme of mediavel Pengali poetry and foreign travellers’
tale. According to the poet 1 ukundaram, it used to attract
so much foreign trade that the merchants of Satgaon never
20
left their home town.. It was the royal port of ^engal 
till the emergence of Fuvli in the last quarter of theW  mim
’sixteenth century, and the latter prospered so rapidly 
that made the former ’hide its diminish’d head* in the 
18. Ibid,, p. 439
19* Pyrard de Laval, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 329*
20. h. . ] ukherjee, Economic I istory of India, p. 122*
\
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2 1
beg:inring of* the 17th century. As the chief* mart
of* Bengal, it attracted merchants from different parts
^  22 
of India and diverse other countries* It was the chief
emporium of Portuguese trade since 1537? and popu1ariy
known to them as ’norto piqueno1, hven in 1567 Caesar
^ederici found Satgaon* a remarkable faire cite’ where
’every year they lade thirty or five and thirty ships,
great and small, with rice, cloth of Bombast and of
divers sorts, "'-acca, great abundance of Sugar, > irabclans
dried and preserved, long pepper, Oyle of Perz e line and
23
many other sorts of merchandise’.
But the historic port of Satgaon began to 
decline from the middle of the 16th century mainly due to 
the freak of nature. The river Saraswati ou w^ich it was 
situated and through w ich flowed the main current of the 
Hugli be gar silting up and was navi •* able only bj si a 1 • 
vessels. The months of the feeders of the Canges became 
h^oVed. with sand and the water sxrrmly diminished till atu. . v
1 ast only the tidal Ganges remained navigable, and the 
Saraswati duied up into narrow channels, thereby rendering 
navigation by merchantmen and large vessels very difficult;
21• -iyaz-us-3alatin, text,op.cit., p.33; Trans.op.cit., p•29; 
Crawford, _A. brief History _of Fugli histrict, p.2; Hunter, 
a , Vol. m ,  p . 9 pg ; G-. Toynbee,
A. Sketch of the Adminic,+atTon oh the Ho°ghl.y hi strict, p 2 
22♦ Campos, History of the Por^ug^ese in Bengal, p. 113; §.^ey, 
Hooghly Past and' Present, p". 150.
23. Caesar de ',1ed'erici, "Hxtracts of. . .his eighteen year 
Indian observation,p.114.
even the smallest craft could not ply except for a few
weeks in the monsoon. This sounded the death - knell
24of Satgaon as an important port. The Saraswati actually
had been silting up from the beginning of the 16th century.
Be Barros found Satgaon in 1532 fnot....so convenient
25for the entrance and departure of shipsr. Even in 1540 
the harbour of Satgaon was becoming difficult to the access 
of big ships. Though in 1567 Satgaon was described as a
reasonably fair city abounding in all things, its importance
96
as a port was visibly declining.
Apart from the natural cause, the activities of
traders, specially the Portuguese, also helped the decline
of Satgaon and the rise of Hugli as the principal port of
Bengal. The Portuguese were the dominant seapower in the
Indian Ocean in the 16th century, and it seems that a great
part of the seaborne trade of Bengal was concentrated in
their hands. They began to frequent- Bengal from the 1550*s,
and had important settlement at Satgaon. In the * sixties of
the century they felt it necessary to build temporary
24* Salimullah, op.cit., Tr.p.87; Campos, op.cit., pp.22,57; 
S.. Bey, op.cit., pp.9»150; Hunter, op.cit., p.299; S.K. 
Mitra, Hugli Zelar Itihas — o - Banga Samaj. pt.It, p.639 
A. Karim. Iviurshid Quli Khan and his times, p.214; R.K.- 
Mukherjee, op.cit., p.l22; J.N. Sarkar, op.cit., Vol.2, 
pp. 318, 364.
25. Quoted in S. Bey, op.cit., p. 113.
26. Caesar de Federici, op.cit., p*115; C.R. Y/ilson, Early
Annals of the English in Bengal. Vol. I, pp. 134-36;
Crawford, op.cit., p.2.
21
quarters at a place downstream during the trading seasons 
as their big ships could not reach Satgaon, and they burnt 
those villages when thev left Bernal every r^ear after brisk’ W W  t/ C/
27
trade activities, gut they found making and unmaking of
villages did not lead to either comfort or economy, and. so
were anxious to shift their ’porto piqueno1 to a convenient
place ’on a navigable river with sufficient anchorage1, ihus
their choice fell on Hugli which soon supplanted Satgaon as
the principal port of Bengal. Hot only the Portuguese, even
the merchant princes of Satgaon who once boasted that they
sat at home and grew rich while all the world came to them
to trade, were forced, one after another, by the declining
importance of Satgaon to leave the place and seek, livelihood
elsewhere. The great majority of them moved only a short
distance and settled down in. Fugli which rose to the position
of the chief port of Bengal and remained so throughout the
28
17th and early part of the 18th century.
The external trade of Bengal, and through Bengal 
Upper India thus deserted. Satgaon. and was diverted to 
Hugli where the Portuguese mastered the major portion of 
the overseas trade, albeit the limited activities of a few 
Talaya, A.rab and Indian traders. Even the inland t^ade was 
mostly diverted to Hugli, though Satgaon remained the royal
27. Caesar de Federici, op,cit,, p, 115.
28, C.H. /ilson, op.cit., Tol.l,p,135; I.H. Sarkar, op,cit,, 
Yd . H, pp. 36 4-65.
po^t and the seat of the governor and the Imperial
Customs house till 1632 when Hugli took its place
pQ
officially as the royal port.'" This natural change 
of fortune aroused the jealousy of the Hughal officers 
at Satgaon, and was misunderstood hy the court historians 
who called it ’stealing away of "business and wealth of 
the royal port hy the treachery of the Feringis’. Vbdul 
Hamid hahori, the official historian of Shah Jahan, states:- 
"During the rule of the Bengalees a party of Feringi merchants 
inhabitants of Sandip, used to frecent Satgaon and 
populated (i.e. colonised) a place on the estuary one kos
heyond Satgaon...... In course of time, owing to the stupidity
and carelessness of the rulers (governors?''' many ‘R'eringis 
assembled *here....In due course a la^^e town rrew un hereV  Jm
and it came to be known as Hugli Bandar. It became the
practice for ships from Parang to call at this port and
carry on their trade; so the market of gat^aon declined and
30
lost its splendour and use".
The Hugli port, founded by the Portuguese towards
31the close of 1379?" developed with amazing rapidity under 
them. It soon rose to the position of ’the richest, the
29. Crawford, op.cit., pp. 188-82? J.F. Sarkar, op.cit.,
Vol. H, p. 318; Hunter, op.cit♦, Vol. m ,  pp. 229-300;
'• °- : op.cit., p. 2; s. hey, op.cit., p. 18.
30. Vbdul Hamid Hah or i, P ad. sh ahn am a, Text. Vol. I, p. 434?
Hlliot and 'I)o,wson, H1 story of India as told by its owr 
:iistorians, Vol. VH, p.31? «T> ♦Sarkar, op.cit.t Vol.2
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most flourishing and the most, populous* of the various 
’bandels* or trading ports in Bengal, It, became the 
common emporium of trade where, as John Cabral wrote on 
12 Nov* 1633* the vessels of India (Portuguese India),
China, Malacca and Manila repaired in great numbersf The 
Portuguese missionary further says — "Not only the natives 
of the country, but also Hindustanis, the Moguls, the
32Persians and the Armenians came there to fetch goods'1.
Van Linschoten, who visited India between 1583 and 1589 
wrote that * there is great trafficke used in those partes 
by divers ships (and merchants which all the year divers 
times both go to and from all the Orientall Ports.* Ralph 
Pitch, the English traveller, who visited Hugli in 1588
■*4
stated that Hugli was the ‘chief keep* of the Portuguese.
According to Ain - i - Akbari, completed in 1596-97* Hugli
35was a more important port than Satgaon. Thus it appears
that at the end of the 16th century Hugli became the premier
port, in Bengal, and fully deserved to the called, not *Porto
piqueno*, but *Porto G-rande* (the Great Haven), the name by
which Chittagong was known to the Portuguese.
32. Manrique, op.cit.» Vol. IE, p. 392.
33* Linschoten, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 95.
34* Quoted in Campos, op.cit., p. 55*
35* Abul Pazl, Ain - i - Akbari, Tr. (Sarkar & Jarret,}.
Vol. IE, p. T5T.
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Though, the T uvhals were theiulers of the 
country, the Portuguese Ri^ reip.ac^  in. Hugli was soU / <— A  w ’
strong that it rendered the Fughal authority content 
merely with collecting; customs duties and market dues.
The Portuguese enjoyed almost absolute independence; 
even the Fughal governor of iuengal could enter the 
Portuguese town of Hugli only with their consent and 
the T ughal ships had to submit to various regulations 
enforced in the port. Even as early as 1535; Rebello 
had forbidden any alien ship from touching Satgaon 
without nermission. In fact the suueuiority of the—  a. xJ
Portuguese vessels over those of the Indians and other
foreigners made the enforcemen li of the principle - that
any ship without a Portuguese pass would be treated as
enemy ship and hence liable to capture and confiscation -
practicable. In order to destroy the ’moorish* trade,
they applied the rule to Bengal.' Even the fleets of
the viceroy of j^ engal, as Cabral states, had to submit
37to certain formalities while entering Hugli.' This
very supremacy of the Portuguese in Hugli rendered the
task of opening trade with Bengal very difficult for the
Dutch and English East India Company* The English factors
36. Campos, op. cit., pp. 62, 112.
37* anrique, op.cit. , Vol. U, p. 393♦
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at Surat wrote ir Feb. 1616 that fhitherto they had
not found, it practicable to open a trade in the countries
bordering. on the Ganges, the Portuguese being in. exclusive
58
possession of the commerce in this part of the Peninsula’.
The ‘Dutch also found that any substantial trade with Bengal
was impossible so long as the Portuguese were firmly
3Qentreached there•""
The palmy days of the Portuguese in Bengal came
to an end in 1652 when gasim Hban captured Eugli after
inflicting a crushing defeat on them, Fugli was then made
the royal port of Bengal, and all the offices and records
were removed to Fugli where Eughal authority was firmly 
40established, ‘ Though the Portuguese were allowed to<w*
return to Fugli in 1635, the blow was too revere for them- 
to revive; they lost their pre-eminent position in Bengal 
trade for good. Despite their decline, trade however 
flourished unabated in Eugli. It now became the seat of 
considerable maritime trade on the nart of the indigenousJL v—-
A]
merchants. ‘ ' Soon after, the Dutch and. English Fast India 
Company established their factories in Eugli and started, 
trade directly with Bengal.
SB, Ji11iam Poster (ed.) Petters Received from the Servants 
of the Bast India Company, Vol. V, IT* 119-120,
59. T. Rayohau5huri, J an H ompany In C o r omande1 , pp. 79-76.
40, S. Pey, op. cjt, , p7 18; Hunter op. cit. , Vol. Ill, p. 500;
G-. Toynbee, op .cit. , p. 2; 0?T alley h IT, T« , Chakraborty , 
Eugli Pistrict Ga.zetteer , p. 51*
41. 0 *I.Hamilton, The Trade Relations ^etween Fng land and 
Iridia» 1;'on-l U 6 , p.31. O'ralTeyU Ohakraborty, <ro,oit., 
PP.53, 182. ----
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The merchants of Bengal had a long established
tradition in overseas trade and kept it alive throughout
the seventeenth century. They owned big ships which
traded to different Asian countries - from the Red Sea
ports of Aden and Jedda in the west to Sumatra and Malacca
in the east. Indeed the merchants of Bengal were quite
powerful and influential*. The first attempt of the Butch
Company to open up trade with Bengal after the fall of the
Portuguese in 1652 was frustrated by the opposition of the
42muslim merchants of Hugli.
Thus in the middle of the 17th century when the 
European Companies established their factories in Bengal, 
trading activities were brisk there. Provisions were cheap, 
much cheaper than in other parts of India. The region 
enjoyed political stability which fostered the growth and 
development of trade and commercial activities. Its economy 
was self - sufficient and hence the import market was 
strictly limited. The export had to be paid by importation 
of bullion and specie - the only items in demand during the 
period. It was against this background that the English 
S^i-I^i^-Qompany began its trade in Bengal.
42. T. Raychaudhuri,; op.cit*, p. 76*
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Chapter H
Foundation of the English East 
India Companyrg Trade In Bengal
The English East India Company was officially
1
founded by a royal charter dated 31 Dec* 1600. Generally
four sets of arguments are put forward to account for
the foundation of the Company - namely, the exclusion
of the Dutch and English merchants from Lisbon by Philip IL
after 16B5, thus debarring them from the Portuguese spice
markets, the growing conciousness of the maritime strength
of England and the great impulse to the spirit, of enterprise
following the defeat of the Spanish Armada, the fear of the
Dutch monopoly of spice supplies and finally, the desire to
2
find new markets for English woollens. But recent, research
points out, that the circumstances leading to the foundation
of the English East India Company in 1600 can be traced
back rto that movement of diversification in the direction
of English foreign trade which began with the stoppage of
commercial relations with Antwerp in the last quarter of
3
the sixteenth century*.
However, the First (1601-3) £uid the Second (1604 
-6) Voyages were made, not to India, but to Achin, Bantam
1. W. Poster, Englandrs Quest of Eastern Trade, p. 150;
C.H.I., Vol. V, p. 77.
2. K.N. ChaudhurT, The English East India Company, p.10.
3. Ibid., pp.10-14; Por the movement referred to here, see, 
Ibid., pp. 5-7.
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and the Moluccas, the immediate aim being the acquisition
4
of the spices and pepper of the East Indies. The first
English ship anchored in the road of Achin in 1602 but,
found that the port was too well - frequented by Indian
shipping to make the purchase of pepper anything but:
5
expensive. The English, however, found that pepper was
cheaper in Bantam, and hence established a factory there 
6
in 1603* But they could find no satisfactory market, for 
English manufactures, specially woollen cloth, in the 
Malayan Archipelago while they discovered that Indian 
textiles were universally accepted as the medium of exchange 
for spices. This trading pattern prompted the English East 
India Company to secure Indian calicoes for barter against 
its export commodities from the spice Islands# Hence when 
the Third Voyage (1606 - 7) was in preparation, it was 
resolved that the fleet, on its way to Bantam, should attempt 
to open up trade at Aden and Surat. Accordingly, Hawkins 
arrived at Surat, in 1608 and proceededto Agra where he was 
graciously received by the Mughal emperor Jahangir# But 
the suspicion: of the Portuguese and their influence with 
the merchants of Surat - who represented that, commerce with 
the English would mean a rupture with the Portuguese and the
4. C.H.I., Vol. V, p. 77.
5. B.K. Bassett, The Factory of the English East India 
Company at Bantam, 1602-1682, Unpublished thesis, London 
University, 1955f p. 7.
6. Ibid., p. 8.
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consequent ruin of their trade - prevented the
establishment of a factory* In 1613, however, a
permanent factory was established at Surat following
7
a farm an from the emperor.
In the early years of its trade in India,
the English East India Company had no intention to
begin a direct maritime trade with Bengal. This might
be due to a twofold reason - first, the Company was
still in its infancy and naturally its trade with India
was on a very small scale which made too many factories
hardly necessary; secondly, the fact that the Portuguese
were then the absolute masters of the Bengal ports might
have acted as a deterrent in the opening up of the Bengal
trade by the English Company. The first indication that
the Company was desirous of starting a direct trade with
Bengal is to be found in Sir Thomas Roers despatch to the
Company dated 24 November 1615* He wrote - "It is thought
requisite that you seek trade in the territories of the
Mogtil in Bengal. I will inform myself of the fittest port
8
and procure a farman for residence of your factors..•'
But Roe, too, was not very enthusiastic, it seems, to 
venture a maritime trade with Bengal. He suggested to 
the Surat factors that an attempt should be made overland
7. C.H.I., Vol. V, pp* 77 - 79.
8. B.M. Addl. Mss., 6,115, f*63a; W. Poster, The Embassy 
of Sir Thomas Roe to India, p. 79.
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to open trade with Bengal, * so desired by the Company
and impressed into me by Captain Keeling* • But Kerridge
and his colleagues at Surat doubted the advisability of
such an attempt. "Bengal generally", they argued "is a
hot country, the most of the inhabitants very poor Gentiles,
and upon the sea coast, where there is any hope of benefit,
the Butch and PortingaHs have trade, whereby we conceive
that the transportation by land thither will be more
hazardous and chargeable than the benefit by the sale of
q
a small quantity can answer". Roe retorted to this, saying 
fthat Bengala should be poor I see no reason; it feeds this 
country with wheat and rice; it sends sugar to all India; 
it hath the finest cloth and pintadoes, musk, civitt and 
amber, (besides) almost all rarities from thence, by trade 
from Pegu*.^0 The Surat factors were, however, little 
convinced and replied - "We deny not but that Bengala brings 
wheat, rice and sugar to India, makes fine cloths, etc......
Yet it followeth not that cloth will therefore sell, which 
in those hot countries is spent in quantities by princes 
and gentry only. Of the first there is none, and of the 
latter very few. We acknowledge transportation by water
9. Pact. Records, Surat, Vol. 84» pt. I, f.83; Letters 
Received etc.. op.cit.> Vol. IV, p.314*
10. B.M. Addl. Mss. 6,115» f* 105; W* Poster, The Embassy of 
Sir Thomas Roe, p. 193*
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thither is cheap, yet we think it were, better to rot-
in Ajmer without further charge and disgrace than after
expense of time and moneys to return it thither to no
11
other purpose1 •
The matter, however, rested for a time and the
Surat Council wrote to the Company on 2 November 1616 that *
despite their desire to make trial of 1porto piqueno* for
the settling of a factory, they could not attempt it for
12
want of small ships fitting that purpose* Roe, too,
was little inclined to settle a factory in Hugli for ’it
will vent no commodity, neither is there any mart from
13Cathay or Tartaryf. He admitted that Bengal made fine
cloth but thought that the Company need not settle a
factory to buy that commodity which could be supplied at
cheaper rates at Masulipatam and Gujarat* The ambassador
was
further argued that Bengal sugar/’base’, ’not worth freight’
and the wax fin no plenty’, and though the best commodity
was raw silk and pretty stuff made thereof, they were all
14
available in Agra* In answer to the Company’s letter,
Roe wrote in December 1616 — "Whereas You write for new
11* Pact* Records, Surat, Vol. 84, pt*I, f*114; Letters 
Received etc., op.cit., Vol. IV, p*327
12. Pact. Records, Surat, Vol. 84, pt.I, f* 227; Letters 
Received etc., op.cit., Vol. IV, p. 342.
13* Roe’s Knowledge of ’porto-piqueno’ or Hugli, as perhaps 
it was from heresay, was scanty and not authoritative.
He wrote to the Company on 24 Nov. 1616 that ’there* is no 
mart nor resort of merchants’.c.f., B.M.Addl. Mss.6,115* f.337 
14* B.M.Addl. Mss. 6,115, f.137; Roe’s embassy, op.cit., 
pp. 308 - 9.
Q9O  hJ
factories except the Silks of Bengala require it
(which yet in. my opinion is had cheaper at Agra
than yon will find it there to maintain a factory
for it, heing this people travel and live ,hardlyerf
than yours can), I am of opinion your residences are
15sufficient and best chosen as they are”v The Surat 
factors, being conscious of the Portuguese menace in 
Hugli, suggested opening up of trade with Pipli *which 
report affirms less dangerous and more useful for sale
of our commo(dities)’,, and requested Roe to procure a
16farman to that effect if he approved the venture. But
after enquiry from lmen of knowledge’* Roe reported
that it was an ’ill harbour’ with little hope of sale
except of spices, nor can warrant the transport up of
17there by river to Agraf • He, however, failed to obtain
a farman for trade in Bengal - though promised by Asaf
Khan of assistance to that effect - mainly due to the
MughalsT fear that the English would then leave SuraU
and would thus weaken its trade, and secondly, ’for the
trouble like to ensue by our dissention with the Portlftgalls
18
in those seasf. Rather in disgust he wrote to the Court 
of Committees on 14 February 1618 - ’'Bengala hath no ports 
15* Q.C., 1 Dec. 1616, no.411, Vol,4j Roe’s embassy, op.cit.,
p.320.
16. Fact, Records, Surat, Vol.84, pt.I, f.264; Roe’s embassy, 
op.cit., p. 309.
17. B.M. Addl.Mss. 6,115, f.l82a; Roe’s embassy»op.cit.tP.309.
18. Roe’s embassy, op.cit.* pp. 309,377-78, 385,417,419.
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but such as the PorVingalls possess for small shipping;
it will vent nothing of f  ours. The people are unwilling
in respect of the war, as they suppose like to ensue in
their seas and the Prince hath crossed it, thinking we
19
desire to remove thither wholly....
Though the first attempt to open up trade with
Bengal thus failed, the Company never gave up the idea
completely. Gradually it felt the increasing necessity
of settling a factory in Bengal. Methold wrote to Roe
in December 1618 that fif any innovation or hopes of
trade to Bengalis shall occur it cannot but be. somewhat
20hopeful to our proceedings'. Besides the Company's
21'desire of great store' of Bengal silk, the pressing
necessity of procuring more and more quantities of calicoes
or cotton piece - goods (which,, being much cheaper than
linens imported from the Continent, had been at once taken
into favour in England) for home markets, made English
Company more eager to begin commercial intercourse with
Bengal.• In 1619 the Company ordered a largely increased
supply of calicoes and their provisions to be made in such
places 'as give best hopes, as well for attaining quantity
19*. O.C., 14 Peb. 1618, no. 610, Vol. 5; Roe's embassyr op.cit.<
p. 434; E.P.I.,; 1618-21, p. 14. ----
20. Egerton Mss. 2,086, f*45a; E.P.I., 1618-21, pp.49-50.
21* G.C., 15 Dec. 1619, no. 827, Vol. 7; E.P.I., 1618-21, p.161,
uas also for their procuring to beat; advantage for
22price, condition etc1. This order, coupled with
the manifest impossibility of providing sufficient-
quantities in Gujarat, made the Surat Council scrutinise
carefully all the possible sources of supply. Their
immediate attention fell on Sam ana (±n Patiala) and
Patna; on the latter place because the. "amberty* calicoes
recently procured at Agra from Bihar traders were looked
upon with favour. Thus resulted the first major attempt
to open up trade with Bengal.
The task of establishing a factory at Patna
was entrusted to Robert Hughes who reached the place on
3 July, 1620 with not merchandise but only bills of
exchange to the value of Rs.4,000. He realised that a
factory at Patna would be fto good purposef and forthwith
advised Surat and Agra Council thereof, and entreated
them to send an assistant with some English merchandise 
more 23
and/money to proceed with the provision of goods * On
his arrival Hughes was warmly received by the governor
Mukarrab Khan, and with the latter*s assistance a house
was secured in the principal part of the city. John
Parker joined Hughes in September with a quantity of
22. Pact. Records, Patna. Vol. 1, f. 16.
23. Ibid., Vol. 1, f. 16; E.F.I., 1618 - 21,- p* 212;
R.C. Temple, "Documents relating to the first English 
Commercial Mission to Patna, 1620-21," Indian Antiquary, 
1914, p.83*
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English goods, and they soon started with the business
of providing suitable investments for Europe* In the
beginning it seemed that the main objective of procuring
investment in raw silk and calicoes, which prompted the
Company to attempt the Patna expedition, would answer
well. After a few days of his arrival, Hughes wrote to
the President and Council in Surat that fit (Patna)
promises plenty of commodity and doubtless will to good
24
purpose be established a factoryr. He found that
Luckwar, in the neighbourhood of Patna, could amply supply
the Companyrs requirements in calicoes, and that Bengal
silk was to be had in Patna in large quantities at 35 per
25
cent cheaper than at Agra. He further recommended that
the best and cheapest course for the investment of calicoe;
would have been to buy it raw from the weavers and then
bleach it. So far as raw silk was concerned, he bought a
stock and set a staff of 30 men to reel it off into suitable
skeins,, and intended, if approved by the Company,, to employ
two or three hundred silk winders to work in the house
26
throughout the year. But soon in deference to the opinion
of the Surat Council* he desisted from providing Bengal silk,
though he was still convinced that it could not, but; prove a
24* Pact. Records, Patna, Vol. I, f. 1; R.C. Temple, Indian 
Antiquary, op.cit., p. 72*
25* PactT Records, Patna, Vol. I, ff. 2-3; R.C. Temple,
Indian Antiquary, op.cit., pp.70-71; E.P.I., 1618-21, 
pp. 192,194.
26. Pact. Records, Patna, Vol. I, f.5; R.C.Temple, Indian 
Antiquary, op.cit., p.74; E.P.I., 1618-21, p*198*
27profitable commodity in England*. The two factors
reported that Luckwar could provide infinite quantities
of amberty calicoes and they would be easily able to procure
ten or fifteen thousand pieces per year, and at Patna
they hoped to provide three hundred maunds of Bengal silk
yearly*. They wrote that amberty calicoes and raw silk, are
28
the rtwo main props which must uphold this a factoryr*
But a somewhat discouraging report from Agra
materially abated the hopes of the factors*. The silk was
found to be unskillfully wound, and although the raw
material could be procured at cheaper rates at Patna than
at Agra, when the cost of transport and charges of the
factory was added to it, the. result, on the whole was
discouraging. The remedy, as suggested by Hughes and
Parker, was to send factors to Murshidabad where silk
could be provided in great quantity and at least 20 per
cent cheaper than in any other place in India. They
further pointed out that there were innumerable silk
winders and expert workmen at Murshidabadr and labour
29there was cheaper by a third than elsewhere. However, 
despite the fact that calicoes were cheap and of excellent 
quality, the Company was doubtful whether it would not be
27. Fact. Records, Patna, Vol. 1, f.15# R.C.Temple, Indian 
Antiquary, op.cit*, p.81.
28. Fact. Records, Patna, Vol. 1, f.18; R.C.Temple, Indian 
Antiquary, op.cit*, p*83; E.F.I., 1618-21, p.213.
29* Fact. Records, Patna, Vol. 1, f*21; R.C.Temple r Indian 
Antiquary, op.cit*, p.98; E.F.I., 1618-21, p.230*
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better ultimately to buy them at a higher rate at
Agra than to maintain a factory only for that, commodity
alone* These considerations, coupled with a double
misfortune sustained by the factors, resulted in their
withdrawl from Patna* In March 1621 the house occupied
by the English was completely burnt though they could
save themselves and the greater part of their goods*
Secondly, Prince Parviz who succeeded Mukarrab Khan as
governor evicted the English from their new house in 
30June* Under these circumstances, the enthusiasm of
the factors cooled down and the decision of the Surat
Council to close the factory was not at all unwelcome
to them. This decision of the Surat Council was partly
due to the death of Fettiplace and the consequent
promotion of Hughes to the chief of Agra factory, and
partly to an intimation from England that 3r*000 or 4,000
pieces of amberty calicoes yearly would meet; all their
requirements and that Bengal silk was not to be sent to
England in future*^ The Surat Council, however, directed
30* Fact* Records, Patna, Vol. 1, ff. 24,25,29; E.F*I., 
1618-21, pp. 246-47,256.
31• Fact* Records, Surat, Vol. 1, pt* I, f* 17; E.F.I.*
1618-21, p. 234#
Fact. Records, Patna, Vol. 1, f.30; E.F.I., 1618-21, p*257 
Fact. Records, Misc., Vol. 1, f.116; E.F.I., 1618-21rp*327
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in a second order that Hughes should proceed towards
Agra, leaving Parker at Patna till the arrival of
Young, another factor from Agra* But the two factors
acted so promptly on the first order that they closed
accounts and converted their capital into goods for
the carriage of which all arrangements had been made,
and so they ventured to disregard the second order of 
32the Company* Thus the first, expedition to settle a 
factory at Patna resulted in vain.
Twelve years later, by a strange, mistake on 
the part of the Surat Council who wrote ’Patna1 while 
they really meant ’ Sam ana’, Peter Mundy was sent, from 
Agra to the former place on a similar errand* In fact,
Mundy realised that the whole proceeding was the result, 
of a mistake, and was strongly averse to the undertaking*
He was so utterly convinced of his reasoning that, he 
drew up a ’memorial of his Reasons against, the Journey 
to Patna’ in order to clear himself of blame, if the 
expedition would turn out as he expected*^ However, the 
motive which prompted Fremlen, the chief ©f the Agra factory, 
to endeavour such an expedition to Patna, was twofold* First,
a market for the quicksilver and 
32* Pact* Records, Patna, Yol* 1, f* 35; E.P.I., 1618-21,
p* 268*
33* R.C* Temple (ed*), The Travels of Peter Mundy in Europe 
and Asia, Yol* IE*Travels in Asia* pp. 138-41.
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vermilion * lying dead* in Agra, and secondly, the
Surat Council was looking for a fresh source of supply
34of coarse cotton goods for England* The glut of
quicksilver and vermilion was caused by the great
quantities brought to India by private traders in 1631
rto the Honourable Company*s extraordinary loss and
hindrance*. In 1632 a consignment was sent from Surat
to Agra to reduce the commodities to their 1 pristine
esteem and valuation* • But it hardly improved the
situation and the commodities failed to realise a good
price. So Fremlen was eager to diminish the quantity
by sending it to Patna, and thus *to cause the price
35of the residue to rise** The Company*s search for a 
fresh source of supply for cotton goods originated from 
the effective decrease in the investment of that commodity 
in Gujarat which had been ravaged by the great famine of 
1630-32.
Mundy*s arguments against the expedition to
Patna were that prices obtainable for quicksilver and
36
vermilion at Patna were not known, and that in any case
34. Ibid., pp. 138-39.
35. Ibid*, p. 138.
36. So far as this assertion was concerned, Mundy was not 
correct, for he himself stated that Fremlen was 
encouraged to send the commodities to Patna by *NurharJ 
(Narahari ?) Virji Vora*s Cthe merchant prince of Surat) 
factor and others who certified that quicksilver and 
vermilion were worth Rs. and 4^ per seer at Patna,, c.f. 
Peter Mundy, op.cit., Vol. IE, p.138*
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the price of the commodities could not rise in Agra 
as the factors leading to such rise were in the hands 
of the dealers in Agra who controlled it throughout 
Hindusthan. So far as investment of cotton goods at 
Patna was concerned, Mundy argued that the time allowed 
for completing the business was only 75 days, of which 
40 to 45; days would be spent on the journey, making it 
impossible to carry out the investment in the remaining 
time. Moreover, Patna provided no other cotton goods 
except amberty. So he sensibly concluded that Patna 
was not the place, intended by the Surat Council but some 
other place like Paryabad or Khairabad within a few days’ 
journey from Agra.
However, on reaching Agra in September 1632, 
Mundy applied to brokers for the provision of amberty, 
the coarse cloth desired by the Company. They brought 
a few pieces-whiehi proved too dear and unfit ffor our 
turnst. As no more brokers came to offer the commodity * 
Mundy sent two messengers to Luhkwar (on 29 Sept,.), where 
most of the cloth was woven, in order to procure an 
investment: at reasonable price. On 5 October, one of the 
messengers returned with G-angaram, ’the chiefest. broker 
in these parts for coarse linen1 who stated that a 
satisfactory investment in amberty cloth might be made
41
but about forty to fifty days would be required to
effect itr for more than a month was required for
bleaching the cloth* So Mundy decided that it was
impossible to perform ’ anything this way’, except, to
37carry some samples of goods desired* With regard 
to the disposal of quicksilver and vermilion^, Mundyrs 
efforts met with as little success* The absence of
any great demand for these commodities and their prices
0
falling everyday forced him ultimately to get rid of
those at a low price
Though Mundy could not wholly refute the
utility of establishing a factory at Patna, his considered
opinion was that it was against the Company’s interest
fat present’ for several reasons* First, amberty or
white coarse cloth was then dearer than the usual price
because most of the weavers were engaged in making fine
linen for the royal household* Moreover, the cloth
required several months for preparation and finishing,
and above all, it would probably not equalise that of
Gujarat ’which is now returning to its former estater
better known and allowed of both for goodness and
cheapness than this is’. As for the rest of the country’s
commodities such as raw-silk, indigo, gumlac and saltpetre,
37* Ibid* , pp* 145-46*
38. Ibid*» pp. 147-49*
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they could be procured much better and cheaper elsewhere* 
Secondly, the transportation of goods from Patna, as 
Mundy stated, was rextraordinary far, dear and dangerous1. 
The goods, of course, might be sent down the river Ganges 
to the Sea or else by land but danger lay botfiisays, for 
the fcountry swarms with Rebels and theives'• Thirdly, 
no secure trading was possible at Patna because of its 
governor, Abdulla Khan, who being of a cruel and covetous 
nature spared none, with little regard to law, trade or 
humanity. So Mundyrs obvious conclusion was that it was 
most expedient to defer the settling of a factory at Patna
until such time as samples be examined and premises
* 40 considered.
Meanwhile under the direction of the President
at Surat, the Masulipatam factors sent the ship Hopewell
to the Bay in July 1631, her ultimate destination being
Pipli. But this voyage failed of its expected success
mainly due to bad weather, though it was held to be rlaid
41a good beginning to a future hopeful trade*. Uext year 
the ship Pearl had been ordered to follow up the attempt 
made by Hopewell but bad weather again prevented it from 
getting into a Bengal port. The Company, however, did not 
give up the attempt to explore the possibility of the
39. Ibid., p. 151#
40. TEui.. pp. 151*52.
41. O.C., nos. 1411,1421, Vol. 13; E.F.I., 1630-33,pp.183, 
203
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Bengal trade* When Thomas Joyce was appointed to 
succeed Norris as Agent on the Coast, he was specially 
instructed to enquire into the necessity of retaining 
Armagon to push on the Bengal trade* In 1633 the Company 
made two more ventures to open up trade with Bengal* On 
the one hand, finding little employment for the ship Swan, 
the Masulipatam factors decided to send her to Bengal, and 
on the other, a party of eight Englishmen - including Ralph 
Cartwright, Merchantr and Thomas Colley, Second - were 
despatched in a country junk to Bengal* These attempts, 
it seems, had a more ambitous object than tha*fc of the previous 
voyages - namely, the settling of a permanent factory or 
factories in Bengal*
Here we can well pause a little and try t® answer 
a logical question - why the Company delayed this action
in. B m tja l
for so long, specially when the cheapness of w are s^  and the 
possibility of a large investment there wa3 not unknown to 
them* Moreover, the English were hardly ignorant of the 
lucrative trade derived by the Portuguese in Bengal, and 
the profitable voyage made by the Dutch and Danes in the 
Bay* The reasonable answer seems to be tha*t the commodities 
sought by the Company during this period were mainly calicoes 
of Grolconda and other southern countries* The Bengal goods, 
if, at all desired, were readily available at Masulipatam*
So there was hardly any need to venture out to Bengal in
44
quest of these goods at the risk of being surprised by 
the Portuguese war vessels* Again, the enlargement, of 
English trade, it appears, was effectually hindered for 
a time by the trouble at Masulipatam from whence, they 
were forced to withdraw in 1628* On their return in 
1630 there followed a change of policy, resulting in an 
increasing interest in the Bengal trade due to several 
factors. The soaring price of all staple commodities 
as a consequence of the great famine had rendered the 
coastal trade in rice, sugar and butter extremely 
remunerative, and the general dearth of piece - goods 
resulting from a heavy mortality among the weavers made 
raw silk and cotton of Bengal more valuable in the eyes 
of the English factors at Masulipatam. Another factor, 
which appears to be less obvious but equally effective, 
was the prospect of a lucrative private trade offered to 
the factors who, in the then state of affairs, had hardly 
any opportunity for investing their own capital* Furthermore, 
the capture of Hugli from the Portuguese by the Mughals in 
1632 and the supposed intention of the Mughal emperor to 
stamp out their trade was a great inducement to the English 
factors who concluded that time was opportune for planting 
English trade in Bengal*
Resuming our story * the endeavour made in 1633 
to begin direct commercial intercourse with Bengal was not 
wholly unsuccessful like the previous ones. The six
45
Englishmen sent in the country junk, anchored off a place
called *HarssapoQre* (Harishpur) on 21 April. A few days
later Cartwright with two other Englishmen proceeded to
Cuttack to meet the nawab, of the province (Orissa), Aga
Muhammed Zaman who granted them a parwana to trade free of
42
all customs and to build houses or ships* Armed with
this, they came down to Hariharpur, a place half way between
Cuttack and their port. They summoned all the persons left
at Harishpur, and started building up a factory at the 
Atformer place. Later on in that year Cartwright with two
other Englishmen set out for Balasore. Meanwhile the Swan
arrived at Balasore and finding no erne there proceeded towards
Balasore where Cartwright had already established himself*
It is explicitly clear from the letter of Thomas Joyce and
Nathaniel Wyche at Masulipatam in 1634 that the English
44established their factory at Balasore in 1633* They 
reported that the settlement of the • Bengala factory* was
42* William Bruton, News from the East Indies or A Voyage to 
Bengalis, pp. 3-21; Bruton was one of the six Englishmen 
who took part in the expedition and his narrative is. the 
main source of information for this venture.
43* That Hariharpur had been the first factory of the English 
in Bengal and established in 1633 was corroborated by 
Walter Clavell in 1676, vide, Master*s Diary, VoL. 31, p.84< 
44♦ Yule lays down 1651 as the date when the English settled 
their factory permanently at Balasore, which does not, 
seem to be quite correct (e.f.,) H. Yule, The Diary of 
William Hedges, Vol. m,p. 194; Wilson, however, gives 
the date of establishment of Balasore factory, as 16339
e.f. C.R. Wilson, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 13*
the * first thing of note that was acted after our coming 
unto this OoastJ* The motives which prompted them to 
settle the factory and the justification for maintaining 
it, as enumerated by the factors, were several* First, 
the scarcity of cloth and the extremely high price (which 
had gone up by 50$ to 100$) of piece - goods was the prime 
motive for settling the factory in Bengal where cotton 
cloth ris said to be wondrous cheap* • Besides, they found 
that the coastal trade between Bengal and Masulipatam or 
Coromandel Coast, in rice, butter and different other 
commodities would not only produce a sufficient profit to 
clear the charge of such small vessels as would be employed 
in executing this trade, but also would fraise an able 
overplus to quit, the great expense* yearly incurred by 
the Company in the factories of Masulipatam and Armagon* 
Further Bengal would provide white cloth at cheap rate for 
not; only Europe - trade, but the Persia trade and Southern 
trade too* Bengal sugar would be a profitable commodity in 
the Persian trade and would also help the Company to lade, 
the ships with it in Bantam* Gumlac and sticklac would be 
cheap and suitable commodity for Macassar and Persia as for 
England* Silk could be bought in a large quantity, and also 
different commodities for Persia as tShashest , * stuffs,f, 
rallyjahs* and fine white cloth* So Bengal would enable the 
Company to carry on Europe - trade as well as Inter - Asiatic 
trade* Moreover the Company thought it would provide them
47
with a good market for European commodities though
only in vain* Most of the broadcloth and lead sent
to Balasore for trial lay unsold for a long time and
was then sent to Patna where too the result was not
45very encouraging *
However, despite the great expectation and
the latent possibility of a brisk trade in Bengal, the
progress in the early years was hardly satisfactory*
Thomas Colley, who was left in charge of Hariharpur
46
factory, died on 25 Aug* 1635* In one year alone 
altogether five of the six factors in the Bay fell victim 
to the climate* Besides, the Arakanese pirates who 
frequently haunted the Bay harassed the English boats.
The Portuguese, their recent, reverse notwithstanding, 
still retained a hold on the trade of the country, and 
the Butch opposition too was there. But it seems that 
the Portuguese hostility mainly stood, in the way of an 
extensive ESoglish trade in Bengal, as is evident from 
the letter of John Poule who succeed Thomas Colley at 
Balasore. "Those Portingalls", he wrote, "‘who (were) 
expelled (from) Hugli hath found great favour with Shah
47
Jahan..** so that our expectation (of) Hugli is frustrated". 
Owing to these various difficulties * Cartwright could
45. O.C., 23 Oct.1634, no*1536, Yol* 15; E.P.I.,1634-36,pp*40- 
43.
46. Bruton, op.cit*, p* 26.
47. O.C., 17 July 1633, no. 1510, Yol. 14; Hedges1 Diary,
Yol. HI, p.177; E.F.I., 1630-33, p. 308.
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not do more than establish factories at Hariharpur1 and 
Balasore, which remained as the main stations of the 
English in Bengal for about; a decade. All hopes of 
fresh settlements at rJagannathr (Puri} and Dipli had 
to be abandoned. The expulsion of the Portuguese from 
Hi^li in 1636 and the consequent decay of Pipli, however,
gave the English a fresh opportunity to develop the trade-
48
in Bengal* But the Company failed to take advantage of 
it. Despite repeated appeals to the. Court of Committees 
to send out properly qualified factors and two or three
’pinances’ such as the Dutch had, neither men nor boats
49
ever came.
Even after the English had established their
first independent station at Port St#. George in 1640,, and
thus a new impetus had been given to the Company’s trade,
Bengal trade seemed of so little consequence that the ship
50
Diamond was sent, in 1641 to the Bay to pay off debts and
51
fetch away the factors. In 1642 the factory at Hariharpur
seems to have been closed partly on account of the silting
up of the river, and partly due, to the difficulties of
52 Balasore
sending goods there by sea. But Prancis Day who came to/
on a visit of inspection gave a report to the Company on
48. Master's Diary, Vol. H, p# 84*
49* O.C., 25 Oct. 1634, no. 1536, Vol. 15; Hedges.* Diary,
Vol. m ,  p. 179.
50. The debt of the English in Bengal exceeded Rs.8,000, vide, 
E.P.I., 1637-41, p* XXXVI.
51. O.C., 1641, no. 1787, VoX.18; Hedged’ Diary, Vol. m ,  p. 181.
52. E.P.I., 164,2-45, PP•JXTLL, 126 f.n.l; Master’s Diary,
Vol. H, p.84.
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3 Nov,. 1643 deprecating its abandonment. fIl think
Balasore with the adjacent places," he wrote, "is
not to be totally left, for it is no such despicable;
place as is voted it being an opulent Kingdom and You
having been already at great- charges in gaining the
free custom of all sorts of goods, believe it. if you
had but an active man, two or three in these parts,
you would find it veiy profitable if you double (the)
53
stock (in) the Coast". It is interesting to note
here that the unwillingness of the factors to put. an
end to the Bengal trade was not- so much inspired by the
interest of the Company as by their own personal profit
54
derived from extensive private trade. Be this as it
may,: it seems Day*s recommendations were carried into
effect, and we find from the correspondence of Fort- St.
George in 1644 that Mr. Olton was sent to manage business
in Bengal with the assistance of two other factors. The
Company1 s stock in Bengal, however, at this period did
55
only exceed a little over £2,000.
53. O.C., 3 Nov. 1643, no. 1797, Vol. 18; E.F.I., 1642-45, 
p. 65; Hedges* Diary, Vol. m ,  p.182.
54. An illustration of the huge private trade by Day and 
other Masulipatam factors is revealed by Trumball in 
1644, vide, O.C., 1784, Vol. 18; E.F.I., 1642-43, p.72.
55-* O.C., 8 Sept. 1644, no. 1885, Vol. 19; Hedges* Diary, 
Vol. m ,  p.182; E.F.I., 1642-45, p.191.
50
But still the Company* s Agents in India 
could not decide for themselves whether they should 
continue the Bengal trade or notr and hence referred 
the matter to the Court of Committees in London for 
decision. In the meantime, however, there were several 
new factors which made the Bengal trade a necessity for 
the Company, and left hardly any douht as to the utility 
of this "branch of trade. The famines in the adjoining 
districts of Madras and Masulipatam coupled with desultory 
wars Between the petty rulers had almost ruined the 
Coromadel trade, and as such the English were forced to
56
search elsewhere for a new opening to feed their commerce.
Obviously enough their attention fell on Bengal* !Ehe
Company finally resolved to radvance and increase* its
57
trade in Bengal, and for that purpose establish a factory 
at Hugli, inland up the ganges. Accordingly, the ship 
Lioness was sent to Bengal in 1650 under the command of 
Captain Brookhaven with three other factors. The Company 
ordered the Lioness to go up the Canges to Hugli but the 
Madras Council, considering the hazard in such an attempt 
due to the dangerous character of navigationr decided that 
she should not venture beyond Balasore Road, *but for the
of the goods or settling a factory
56. J.Bruce, Annals of the Honorable East India Company.
Yol. I, pp. 402,410, 424, 450.
57# O.C., 14 Dec* 1650, no. 2186, Vol. 22; E.F.I., 1646-50, 
p.552; Hedges* Diary, Vol. Id, p. 184«
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at Hugli with acquisition of Princess farm an for free
trade, was wholly referred to the said Captain1 s 
58
discretion* * The factors designed for Hugli- were
to proceed thither in a hired vessel* The Lioness
sailed on 28 Aug* 1650, and on reaching Balasore, the
factors were busy with lading her* In the middle of
December, when the ship was ready to depart, preparations
were made for proceeding towards Hugli*
Brookhaven sent Bridgeman as chief, with two
other factors to Hugli and drew up an instruction for
59their guidance* These instructions clearly indicated 
that the Company was mostly interested in procuring 
three commodities in Bengal, namely saltpetre, silk and 
sugar, but not so much in the beginning in piece - goods 
which were particularly important in the early stage of 
European commerce with the East Indies* So it can 
reasonably by argued that the English trade in Bengal was 
more necessary for the investment of Europe - trader and 
not for the bartar trade with the spice Islands which was 
the main motivation behind early Dutch and English settlements 
in the Eastern Coast of India*
58* 0*C., 18 Jan. 1651, no. 2200, Vol. 22; E.F.I., 1651-54, 
pp. 16 - 17; Hedges* Diary, Vol. ]U, p* 187.
59. O.C., 14 Dec. 1650, no* 2186, Vol. 22; E.F.I., 1646-50, 
pp. 332-34; Hedges* Diary, Vol. IE, pp. 184-86*
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However, according to Brookhaven* s instructions, 
the. factors, after reaching Hugli and establishing a factory 
there, were to proceed to Bajmahal, the then capital of 
Bengal, and through the assistance of Gabriel Boughton, 
the English surgeon, (who was high in governor Shah Shuja* s 
favour)' to obtain a grant for special trading privileges*
In the absence of any information regarding the proceedings 
of the Hugli factors, it could be assumed these instructions 
were carried out, and from various letbers in the series 
known as ’Original Correspondence*, it can be ascertained
that the English established Hugli factory in the beginning
60of 16§1* The foundation of the factory In Hugli was an 
important landmark in the history of the English Company’s 
trade in Bengal* It became and remained almost, throughout 
the seventeenth century the nucleus of English trade there, 
and i.t was the springboard from which they penetrated further 
inlandr established factories at Patna, Kasimbazar, Dacca 
and Malda, and in due course derived an extensive trade in 
Bengal*
60* O.C., 2219, 2208, 2228, Yol. 22; 0*C., 2360, Vol. 23; 
E.P.I., 1651 - 54, pp* 45, 63# 84*
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Chapter HI
Growth and Development of the Company»s Trade
The growth and development of the English
Companyrs trade in Bengal, like the opening up of its
trade in that region, was a slow, steady and gradual
process. Right from the beginning as also throughout
the period under review many factors, namely - private-
trade of the Company*s servants, Interlopers, official
rapacity, wars and chronic shortage of capital - continued
to plague the Company in Bengal, as in other parts of
India. But despite these hindrances, the Company was
able to drive an extensive trade which resulted in a
remarkable increase in the value of English trade in
Bengal. In the early years, of course, the English
Company1 s investment was almost, insignificant, compared
to that of the Butch Company whose extensive trade
operations in Bengal dwarfed those of their rival Company.
But in the course of only three decades of the inception
of its trade, the investment of the English Company was
1
reported to have exceeded that of the Butch. Quantitavely,
however, the English trade in Bengal was not yet very 
significant, though by the close of the century it was
1. Pact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 8, pt. m , f .  13a.
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becoming the most important branch of trade derived by 
the English Company in India* The main significance of 
Bengal in the trade Complex of the Company during the 
period was that it was an expanding trade - ’the risingrst
2
trade in India’,- to quote the Company’s factors in Bengal* 
The growth and development of the Company’s 
trade can be studied under .several aspects — First, the 
relationship of the Company with the local rulers and 
the problem of securing trading privileges; secondly, 
the control and organisation of factories as necessary 
prelude to the expansion of trade, and thirdly, the 
expansion of Bengal trade, taking as an indicator the 
value of annual investments, and the associated factors 
responsible for the level of such investments*
Relationship with Local Eulers and the Problem of securing
Trading Privileges
Prom the beginning the Company tried to obtain
an invidious trading privilege giving it an obvious
advantage in competition even with the local merchants.
It claimed that it gained these differential advantages
through various farmans, nishans or letters-patent, and
tried to maintain these privileges throughout the period.
2. O.C., 23 Nov* 1659, no. 2830, Vol. 26; E.P.I., 1655
60, p. 296.
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This, however, led often to disputes with local 
authorities who frequently challenged the authority 
and bonafide of those claiming such concessions - a 
common phenomenon which, in its turn, was in essence 
exploitative rather than an effort on the part of the 
officials to enrich the royal treasury, The English,, 
on their part, tried to resist such bureaucratic 
exploitation, when they felt it went beyond a certain 
limit, by open recourse to arms. Thus at one stage 
war broke out between the Company and the Mughals but 
the settlement which followed the war saw the final 
consolidation of the Company and the steady growth of 
its trade in Bengal.
host writers on the early history of English 
trade in Bengal have repeated, with varying degrees of 
reservations, the picturesque story according to which 
the concessions that enabled the Company’s servants to 
establish factories and to trade duty - free in that 
province were obtained through the magnanimity of a 
surgeon named C-abriel BoLighton who cured first an imperial 
princess and then one of the consorts of Prince Shuja, 
the viceroy of Bengal. He dedLined to receive any 
personal remuneration but asked that in lieu thereof his 
countrymen might be granted the commercial privileges
56
3they had long desired* There are verious versions of the
4
story which differ from one another in details. A careful and
critical analysis of the different narratives makes it;
clear that G-ahriel Boughton got the concession of free
trade for himself only, and not for the English in general.
Bowreyfs account represents that the concessions of free
trade was general to the English while others imply that
they were special concessions to Boughton himself, though
they were made to cover the transaction of Brookhaven in
his first voyage. The latter version is more likely and
this is corroborated by the instructions to James Bridgeman
and other merchants whom Brookhaven was sending up from
Balasore ( in Dec. 1650 ) to start a factory in Hugli. In
these instructions, stress was laid upon the necessity of
a farman from Shah Shuja for trade in Bengal - a clear
proof that no general concession had yet been obtained
from the Prince - and reference was made to certain promises
5
secured from Boughton of assistance therein. That the 
privileges granted by Shah Shuja were personal to
5. Charles Stewart, History of Bengal, pp. 251 52;
Robert Orme, History of the Military transactions of 
the British Ration in Indostan,' p.8; Hedges* Diary,
Vol. 1117  p. 167; For Boughton’and Privileges of the 
Company, see, William Poster, "Gabriel Boughton and 
the C-rant of Trading Privileges to the English in 
Bengal11. Indian Antiquary. Sept. 1911, pp. 247-57.
4. Bowrey, op.cit., pp. 253 - 34; Orme Mss. O.V. 12, ff.3-10; 
Fact. Records, Port St. George, Vol XXX, ff. 35 - 40;
Home Misc., Vol. 68, ff. 27 - 34*
1650, no. 2186, Vol. 22; E.F.I., 1646 - 50. 
p. 333. ’
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Boughton and not general to the English, we know for
certain from the traditional account of English privileges
6
in Bengal, written in Feb. 1685 allegedly by John Beard,
the Company’s Agent from Oct. 1684 to August 1685, where
it was stated - "He ( Prince Shuja ) offers hr. Boughton
that if he would trade, he should be free from paying of
custom and all other duties, and gave Mr. Boughton two
7
nishans to that end". It is true, however, that the
account goes on to say that in 1650 Captain Brookhaven’s
ship ’upon the account of Mr. Boughton’s nishans was free
of all duties’; but this, if true, might have been due to
the factors’ making out that their goods belonged to 
8
Boughton.
It is clear that the first nishan or letters - 
patent for the Company’s trade in Bengal was obtained by 
James Bridgeman from Shah Shuja in Aug. 1651, and it was 
founded upon a farm an procured by Davidge from Shah Jahan
9
a year earlier. The obvious meaning of the latter document. 
was merely to free the Company from the payment of rahdaries 
or road - dues on their goods collected in Oudh, Agra, etc. 
and sent down, to the we stern, coast for shipment ; it could
6. William Poster, Indian Antiquary, op.cit., p. 255*
7. Pact. Records, Port St. George, Vol. XXX, f. 36; Orme Mss., 
O.V.12, ff.3 - 10.
8. Pact. Records, Port St. George, Vol. XXX, f.36; Orme Mss., 
O.V.12, ff.3 - 10.
9. B.i . Addl. Mss.24,039, £.5? E.F.I., 1655 - 60, PP#414-415.
58
never have been intended at Delhi, even by the wildest
extension of the meaning of the farman, to exempt the
English from paying the usual customs duties on their
goods exported from Bengal, nevertheless, Bridgeman
succeeded, by giving a present of Rs.3,000, in obtaining
a nishan from Shah Shuja which adopted the English contention
that the imperial farman had freed them from all duties
in Bengal.^ The English factors reported — "... if it
( the privilege ) can be maintained in its full vigour
will in short time quite ( quit.) the charges".^ In 1656
the English obtained another nishan from Shah Shuja which
12
confirmed the privileges enjoined in the previous one.
The CompanyTs chief concern was to establish 
exclusive and preferential trading privileges in the face 
of multiform bureaucratic exploitation. Hence much of its 
subsequent effort was directed towards acquisition and 
extension of such privileges as an aid to their all-out 
attempt to secure an exclusive control of the local market. 
The eagerness of the political authorities to attract the 
Europeans in local trade appears to have been ubiquitous.
10. B.1,1. Addl. Mss. 24*039» f.6; E.E.I., 1655 — 60, p.Ill*
11. O.C., 14 Jan. 1652, no. 2246, Vol.22; E.P.I., 1651 - 54, 
p. 97.
12. B.M. Addl. Mss. 24,039, £»7; home Misc. Vol. 629, ff.5-*B; 
■E.P.I., 1655 - 60, p.Ill; Pact. Records, Misc. Vol. XIV,
f.346; Hedges* Diary, Vol. Ill, p.189; Master’s Diary, 
Vol. 11, p. 21.
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Accordingly concessions involving immediate sacrifice 
of revenue were granted with the expectation that it 
would yield in the long run an increased revenue from 
the expanding trade. But the local potentates, often 
without any long — term interest in the region which 
they governed only temporarily, and always desirous to 
maximise their immediate income, offered various 
hindrances in the exclusive enjoyment of those privileges 
by the Company. But the general suggestion that these 
officials were eager to treat the foreign traders as 
’milch cows’ could hardly be accepted in its entirety 
though there was sorne truth in the exploitative nature 
of the former. There were several aspects which complicated 
the question of privileges of the Company. So long as 
the Company’s trade in Bengal was small, the Mughal 
officials were not greatly concerned at its exemption 
from customs duties* And if any difficulties were raised, 
these were removed by presents or bribes. The situation, 
however, changed when the trade increased considerably 
and private English ships appeared in Bengal in great 
numbers. The issue was further complicated by the 
indigenous merchants’ attempts to cover their own goods 
with the Company's dustuck, thus illegally securing
13* T. Ray Chaudhuri, Jan Company in Coromandel, p. 16.
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exemption of duties for those goods. Moreover, one 
of the main causes of the conflict between the local 
officials and the Corap any was essentially one of trade 
rivalry where the former was backed by political power 
which they exercised indiscriminately. Most of these 
local potentates in the second half of the 17th century 
took active part both in inland and overseas trade, and 
often tried to monopolise some sectors of trade which 
the foreign Companies, themselves strongly monopolistic, 
tried to foil* Again, the trouble arose quite frequently 
due to the ambiguity of the concessions which the rival 
parties interpreted in different ways to suit their 
respective interests. However, there is no denying the 
fact that the English Company had to face extortion from 
local faujdars and other officials.
The first open conflict between the English 
Company and the Kughals in Bengal started in the time of 
Mir Jumla who held the viceroyalty of Bengal from 1660 to 
1663. By the end of the ’fifties of the 17th century 
certain changes had taken place in the government of India 
and of Bengal. Hollowing the illness of Shah Jahan a 
fatricidal war had broke out among his sons, and ultimately, 
his third son Aurangzeb succeeded in defeating his brothers 
and became the emperor of Mughal India in 1658. He appointed
61
Mir Jumla as viceroy of Bengal in 1660. The new governor
had an extensive private trade on his own account, hoth
inland and overseas, even when he was in the service of
the Sultan of G-olconda. He had previous "business
14transactions with the English Company too* But in Bengal
he began to give tro\ibles to the Company from the beginning
on the pretext of demanding payment of customs. It. seems
that Mir Jumlars real intention was to monopolise some
sectors of the province’s trade, and in fact he offered in
1660 to supply the English every year with as much saltpetre
15
as they should require which the Company refused* These
extortionate demands of the local officials and their desire
for monopolising the local market were familiar phenomena
in the 17th century trade history of India. Though Mir
Jumla, on the representation of Jonathan Trevisa that the
English goods were free from all duties by imperial farman,
16
had given the Company a parwana for freedom of trade, he 
soon stopped all the saltpetre boats which came down from 
Patna. The Agent at Kugli, seeing that the Company was 
vexatiously'' hampered on all sides, at last seized a country 
vessel belonging to Mir Jumla in 1661 fas a security for the 
recovery of the debts1• The viceroy was greatly incensed
and_demanded_immediate reparation for the offence, and
14. O.C., 25 May. 1661, no* 2886, Vol. 27? Pact. Records, 
Port. St. G-eorge, Vol. XIV, f. 93? E.F.I. ,1661-64, p.61.
15. Pact. Records, Port St. G-eorge, Vol. XIV, f.196; E.P.I. , 
1661 - 64, p.67.
16. B.M. Addl. Mss. 24,059, f.8; E.F.I., 1655-60, p.416.
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threatened to destroy the inland factories and expel
the English from the country. Somewhat alarmed by the
violence of Mir Jumla's threat, the Agent wrote to
Madras for instructions and was directed to return the
boat and apologize to the viceroy. Agent Trevisa submitted 
17accordingly. But this dispute with Mir Jumla marked 
the beginning of a new period in the history of the 
Company in Bengal, The English now began to consider 
seriously how best they could protect themselves and 
their trade irrespective of the favour of the local 
officials, and in the quest of this search finally decided 
to protect their trade by open recourse to arms whenever
18necessary, thus,abandoning the policy of fpeaceful trade'♦
The change of policy precipitated the conflict of the
1680’s. The factors, who had apologised in 1661 for
seizing a small boat, waged open war against the Mughals
in 1686, capturing indigenous ships and burning ports.
The Company's relations with Shaista Khan who
came to Bengal as viceroy in 1664 was again far from
cordial, hike Mir Jumla, he also at times tried to
19
monopolise some sectors of the province's trade. Though 
he confirmed in 1672 the nishan of Shah Shuja enjoining
17. Bruce, op.cit., Vol. 1, pp. 560-61,
18, See Infra, p. 6$ , for change of Policy.
19* O.C., 21 June 1664> no. 3029* Vol. 28; Pact. Records, 
Hugli, Vol. 1, Consult. 11 July 1664*
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the English freedom of trade,20 the order was very 
little observed in practice, When he left Bengal in 
1677 — only to come back at the end of 1679 - the new 
nawab Pedai Khan and diwan Safi Khan altogether 
disregarded it. However, in 1678 the English procured 
fresh nishan from Prince Muhammed Azam who succeeded 
Pedai Khan as governor of Bengal. But the Company was 
not content with this practice, and considered it very 
expensive and troublesome. that they would have to 
procure a fresh order for freedom of•trade from every 
succeeding governor. It was apparently such considerations 
which caused the Company to ask for an imperial grant 
giving them the freedom of trade. But it seems doubtful 
whether the English Company had at any time obtained such 
a farman. As noted earlier, Shah Jahan's farman - on 
the basis of which the English contended that they were 
exempted from paying customs - could never have been 
intended to give the Company the entire freedom of trade 
in Bengal. It was specifically clear in its terms, and 
it only exempted English goods collected in Oudh, Agra 
etc. from road duties. Moreover, there was hardly any 
reason why the English should be exempted from CListoms 
while all the merchants, indigenous or foreigners, were
20. Pact. Records, Misc. Vol. 3* f.159, Home Misc; Vol. 
629, ff.43-46; O.C., 21 June,1664, no. 3029, Vol.28.
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bound to pay it. Even some of the Company's factors 
doubted the alleged privelege of customs - free trade.
In 1669 Joseph Hall, the then chief of Balasore factory* 
wrote - "It's wonder that after so many year's trade 
the Honrble Company should write out to know the privileges 
they enjoy, which as yet I never could see any more than 
which their pesheashes yearly hindered the Kawab and 
Governor to demand sight of their pretended' farman, but. 
their eyes being yearly thus blinded, they are willing to
if 21
believe what the English affirm. Again a passage in the
Court minutes of the English East India Company raises
further doubts as to the bonafide of the concessions claimed
by the English. According to this - submitted to the Court
on 4 Sept. 1674 in the form of a report by a committee
specially appointed to investigate the question of trade
in Bengal - the privilege was first procured by Gabriel
Boughton and 'gave the English only a liberty to trade,
paying custom according to the King's farman but was altered
22
and made to pay no custom according to the King's farman'. 
The English position regarding trade - privileges was 
perhaps best expressed by the author of the traditional 
account of its trade in Bengal, who stated - " ... we have
21. O.C., 12 May 1669, no. 3275, Vol. 30.
22. Court Book, Vol. 29, 4 Sept. 1674, f-72; Sainsbury (ed), 
Court Minutes of The Bast India Company, 1674-76, p .81.
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had privileges continued from time to time......... with
much struggling and great bribes".^
However, the English succeeded in obtaining an
imperial farman from Aurangzeb which they received in
1680* But the farman was interpreted differently by the
factors of the Company and the local officials, and led
to frequent disputes. The farman was particularly addressed
?to all present and future1 governors of Surat and the
relevant clause ran as follows -"... it is agreed of the
English nation besides their usual custom of two per cent
for their goods, more one and a half per cent jizyah or
poll money, shall be taken. Wherefore it is commanded
that in the said place, from the first day of Shawwal, in
the twenty-third of our reign of said people, three and a
half per cent of all their goods, on account of custom or
poll money, be taken for the future. And at all other
places, upon this account, let-no one molest them for
24
customs,rahdari, pesh—cash, farmaish. and other matters by
the Emperor’s court; forbidden, nor make any demand in these 
25
particulars™• Read as above with a full stop after ’for 
the future’, it would appear that the farman was intended 
to exempt all English goods from customs duties at Surat
25* Fact. Records, Forst St. George, Vol.XXX, f. 40; Orme.
Mss., O.V.12, ff.5 - 10.
24. Rahdari - road dues; Peshcash - tribute; Farmaish - 
Commission for goods.
25* Fact. Records, Fort St. George.Vol. XXX, f.38; Wilson, 
op.cit., Vol. 1, pp. 78-79#
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and in all other places* But if the full stop is placed 
after rand at all other places*, the meaning is completely 
reversed* The Company’s factors tried to interpret the 
farman in the former sense as it was to their own advantage, 
which in the proper context, seems to he wholly incorrect*
AiS;. Sir J*E* Sarkar observed ~ "Payment of duty on the goods 
landed at Surat could by no exercise of ingenuity exempt 
from duty a different cargo that had come from Home or 
China not through Surat but directly to Bengal and which 
therefore could not have paid duty at Surat* The English 
traders in Bengal had no reason to claim exemption from a 
law of the land, which merchants of all other nations had to
o c
obey". Even some factors of the Company were well aware 
of the real intentions of the farman. The traditional 
account of English privileges, written in 1685, stated -"When 
the farman came, though there was a dispute upon it, yet,
Haji Safi Khan, being our friend, a parwanai, was obtained 
of the Hawab and said Haji Safi Khan for free passing our 
goods upon the farman, interpreting the said farman in our 
favour". It further went on to add that the next diwan 
Bulchund pointed out; that the farman did not at all concern 
Bengal, it being directly addressed to the governors of 
Surat and the ’meaning was that those that paid custom at
26* . J.H* Sarkar, History of Aurangzib, Vol. V, p*322*
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Surat should not he molested in any other place*. The 
diwan also asserted that if the English could have a 
re wan a or receipt in a merchants name that they had
27
paid customs at Surat, he would not demand it from them.
Again, shortly after the receipt of the farman, the Dacca
factors reported that it was 'not speaking very clearly
as to that point ( customs free trade ) without some
28adequate bribe given*• In 1700 Edward Littleton, a
member of the Bengal Council and later on the President
of the hew Company in Bengal, wrote about the farman
that it was rso ill penned in favour of the English that
some if not most were then of opinion it had been better
29
stifled than produced and made use of....'# That the
farman was never meant to exempt the English in Bengal
from customs duties was confirmed by the emperor in 1682.
In April that year the English came to know that Haji Safi
Khan, the diwan, had received orders from Aurangzib
requiring the English to pay 3if': customs on all goods
30exported from or imported to Bengal. The controversy 
and conflict regarding the privileges dragged on until 
the outbreak of war in 1686*
Fort St. G-perge---
27* Fact. Records, / ' „ vol. XXX, f.38; Rewana - paying
customs in a merchant's name. __
28. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 2, pt.ll* f*99*
29. Rawl. A 302, f.207* ___
30. Fact. Records, Fort St. George, Vol. XXX, ff.38-39> 
Fact. Records, Dacca. Vol. 1, pt 3JL, f.32.
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The first advocate of an open conflict with
the Ivughals was C-erald Aungier who became President at.
Surat and governor of Bombay in 1669 and recommended a
’severe and vigorous* policy to ensure the stability of
the Company*s trade in India* "Justice and necessity of
Your estate now require11, he wrote to the Directors in
1677, "that in violent distempers, violent cures are only
successful; that the times now require you to manage your
31general commerce with your sword in your hands"* The 
advice of Aungier fell on willing ears of the Company which 
under the gLiidance of Sir JosiahChild as governor in 1681 
was resolved to take resort to a ’forward policy* in India. 
Similarly, for some years Agent Hedges in Bengal and Sir 
John Child at Surat had repeatedly urged the Company to 
have fortified settlements for the protection of English 
trade in Bengal and elsewhere. The former had thus expressed 
his opinion on one occasion —"The Company’s affairs will 
never be better but always grow worse and worse with 
continual patching till they resolve to quarrel with these 
people and build a fort....#. If this be not speedily taken 
in hand by us, there is no doubt to be made but it will soon 
be done by the Dutch who talk of it freely as often as we - 
meet with them; and then we must expect to be soon turned
, 51. 0.0., 22 Jan. 1677, no. 4258, f*8, Vol. 37.
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32out of this country"* Though the Court of Directors
7 7
raised objections to the suggestion of a breach with 
the Mughals, it is evident from the course of their 
correspondence that they did not hold to these seriously 
and in their succeeding letters they dealt time and again
3
with the subject of the acquisition of a fortified settlement.
They obtained permission from James 11 to wage war on the 
35Ivughals and thus the conflict finally broke out in 1686. 
Though the supposed motive of the war was to retaliate 
against injuries and oppressions inflicted by the Mughal 
officials, the real intention was the acquisition of a 
fortified settlement in order to ^frustrate the alleged 
design of the Dutch to drive the English out of India.
Indeed, after the bitter experience of 1682 in Bantam, 
the main concern of the English Company was to prevent
32. Hedgesf Diary, Vol. I, pp. 133-34, 161.
33. Briefly these are 1) it would be too expensive.
11) would enrage the Mughal who in revenge might- seize 
all the Companyrs effects not only in Bengal but. at 
Surat etc. Ill) The Dutch might join the Mughals against 
the English. IV) An attack on Bengal might not be 
effective since overseas trade there was small while an 
attack from Bombay would stop vast amount of Indian Trade 
to the Red Sea ports, Persia etc. which was worth about 
2 or 3 million pounds, vide, D.B., 21 Dec. 1683, Vol.90, 
ff.240-241.
34. D.B., 2 July 1684, Vol. 90, Mf.322; 17 June 1685, Vol.90 
f.492; 14 Jan. 1686, Vol. 91, f.62.
35. Rawl. A. 257, ff.255,257; D.B., 14 Jan.1682, Vol.91, 
ff. 59,62.
the Dutch from repeating the event in India. In most
of their correspondence of the period, the Court of
Directors urged their factors to try the acquision of
a fortified settlement in a hid to defeat the Dutch 
36
design. In all probability, it was the fear of the 
Dutch rather than active enmity with the Mughal Empire 
that was responsible for the .precipitation of the war 
in 1686.
The Directors made extensive preparations for
the war and sent to Bengal the largest force which they
had yet displayed in the Indian seas. Nicholson, who
was appointed Admiral, was despatched first to proceed
to Balasore, and having brought away the Company’s men
and goods, he was to send an ultimatum to the nawab, and
if, as was probable, no satisfactory answer was received,
the bulk of the force was to proceed to Chiitagong and
capture the ’town, fort and territory’. The squadron
designed for Bengal had consisted of six ships but only
half that number reached their destination when the
skirmish started in Hugli in October 1686. The English
subsequently retired to Sutanuti, 26 miles down the river
from Iiugli. negotiations went on but with little result.
Soon they burnt the imperial salt houses, stormed the
Thana fort and seized the island of HijH. The Mughals
36. Home Misc., Vol.803, f.507; Rawl. A.257, f.254; D.B.,.
3 Oct. 1684, Vol.90, f.385? 17 June,1685, Vol.90, f.492
14 Jan. 1686, Vol. 91, ff. 46, 62.
failed to expel the English from HijH and opened
negotiations. Meanwhile a fresh naval force was
»
despatched to Bengal under the command of Captain
Heath. The Mughal emperor, Aurangzeb, was at this
time busy in his Deccan wars and had little time to
give attention to a trifling matter in a distant
province like Bengal. When he learned of the events,
as the English factory reported, ’the King only ordered
an exact map to be taken of Hugli etc. and to be sent
to him1. H o w e v e r ,  while the negotiations were still
continuing, Heath and Charnock with their men attacked
Balasore and set sail to seize Chittagong which they
found strongly defended. Then the English offered their
services to the King of AraKan against the Mughals but
were received coldly by the King. Consequently they
38
decided to return to Madras in Feb. 1689*
The English Company came back to Bengal in- 
1690 following a peace settlement. They were invited 
and welcomed by the ’good worthy nawab’ Ibrahim Khan^
39the new subadar of Bengal. The emperor accepted the
37* O.C., 25 June 1687, no. 5606, Vol. 47.
38. For detailed account of the war preparation^ and the 
course of the war, see, Hedges’ Diary, Vo].. 11, pp. 50-; 
Wilson, Vol. I, pp.94-125; O.C., Vols. 46,47,48;
D.B. , Vols 90,91; Rawl. A. 257, ff.253-267.
39. O.C., 1 Feb. 1690, no. 5698, Vol. 48.
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’repentance1 of the English and wrote to the Bengal 
nawah that since the English had ’made a most humble 
submissive petition that the ill crimes they have done 
may be pardoned’, they should be allowed to trade freely 
as formerly only paying Rs.3,000 in lieu of customs.
^ne hasb - ul - hukm or imperial order was issued in
40
1691 under the seal of the imperial diwan Asad Khan.
The Bengal factors wrote jubilantly - "( we ) received... 
from Dacca... the copy of the King’s hash - ul - hukm 
for being freed from custom only paying in yearly peshcash 
of Rs.3>000 which is ar unexpected favour and of what 
considerable advantage to that Rt. Hon’ble Company no 
person can be insensible”.^  The Company now settled 
its headquarters at Sutanuti, the nucleus of the future 
city of Calcutta, leaving Hugli for good.
The Company’s quest for a fortified settlement 
in Bengal was successful as a result of an unexpected
development at the close of the 17th century. The rebellion
of Sobha Singh, a zemindar of Chandrakona in Kidnapore, 
in 1696, joined later on by Rahim Khan, an Afghan Chief 
of Orissa, shook though temporarily the 1 ughal authority
40. O.C., 5702,_J5704, Vol. 46; Pact. Records, Calcutta,
Vol. 1, pt.ll, ff. 93 - 94; Pact. Records, Dacca,
Vol. 1, pt.ll, ff. 17 - 22.
41. Pact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 1, pt. 11, f. 63.
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42in Bengal, But it gave the English Company the very 
opportunity for which it had so long waited. The Company 
from the Beginning remained uncommitted to either side 
and took a ’most prudent method’ in maintaining a friend­
ship with both the parties in such a manner that ’the
Raja doth not suspect them and yet the Hawab sends them
43
thanks for their assistance against the Raja’. ' The
unimpeded progress of the rebels received its first rebuff
from the Dutch who drove them from Hugli and who like the
French had already declared themselves against the Raj a.^
The Dutch, like the French at Chandannagore, had already
fortified themselves at Chinsurah near Hugli taking
advantage of the general permission to the Companies to
45fortify themselves. The English also seized the 
opportunity to fortify their factory at Calcutta. The 
Calcutta Council reported in April 169b - "The nawab having 
given large liberty for securing ourselves and effects 
against the Raj a, we think we never had so fair an opportunity 
and plea for building a fortification as this accident
42. For the rebellion and its impact on the trade in general, 
see, 0*C., 6231,6279,6311, Vol. 52: O.C., 6408,6425,6485, 
Vol. 55; Fact. Records, Calcutta. Vol. 6j_ pt.l, ff.20-21, 
38-42, 55-54, 53-59, 81, 85, 86-88; pt.ll, ff.5-4,6,10,17, 
25-24, 52, 55-56, 39, 55, 85.
45. O.C., 50 Sept. 1696, no. 6279, Vol. 52.
44. O.C., 50 Sept. 1696, no. 6279, Vol. 52; 5 Dec. 1696, no.
6511, Vol. 52.
45. Om PraKash suggests (The Indian Social and Economic History 
Review, Vol. IV, no. 5, Sept." T9b7, p.28^7 that there is
no reference of Dutch fortification in the records of the
Dutch Company. But it has been mentioned in more than one 
place in the records of the English Company, vide,Fact. 
Records,Calcutta, Vol.6, pt.l, f.42;0.C., 5 Dec., 1696, 
no. 6311, Vol. 52.
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occasioned, a matter of great consequence and aggreeable
for our Rt. Bon’ble I asters1 inclinations the which may
be managed withont any great noise and built in the nature
of a factory but equivalent to a strong fort »i#4b
course the Company could not build any ’regular fortification*
because, as the factors explained, it could not be expected
that the government would allow the erection of a castle or
any impregnable stronghold. But what they have done ’will
answer the Hon’ble Company’s expectations to keep us from
the former abuses of the hawab and f aujdars of Bengal, their
blocking up our factories and demanding unreasonable and
47unlawful sums of monev from us*. ‘ ' However, the fortification
was followed in 1698 by the purchase of the zemindari of
the three villages - Sutanuti, G-ovindapore, and Calcutta -
which gave the Company a definite revenue regarded by Sir
48
Josiah Child as a ’foundation of power*.
Despite the fortified settlement, the Company 
however could not secure its trade against occasional 
molestation by local officials in the early years of the 
18th century. For many years Aurangzeb had been angered 
by the depredations of pirates who not only harassed the 
sea - borne trade in the eastern and western seas of India 
but also the pilgrim-traffic from Surat to Mecca. The local 
merchants and officials held the European Companies
46. Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 6, pt. I, f. 42.
47. Ibid., pt XI, f.56.
48. D.B., 12 Dec. 1687, Vol. 91, f.472.
7
responsible for these outrages and petitioned the
emperor who was greatly incensed specially by the
inroads into the pilgrim traffic. The emperor issued
a proclamation at the end of 1701 prohibiting trade
of the Europeans and ordering arrest of all of them.
Accordingly there followed in Bengal a stop of all
49
trade of’batmen*, At the beginning of 1702 the
servants of the Old Company at Patna, Rajmahal, and
Kasimbazar were seized with all their effects. But
the blow was more severe to the New Company which at
50
one stroke lost not less than Rs. 62,000. The Old
Company retaliated, as a remedy, by detaining all
’moors1 shipping* bound for Surat and Persia for nine
days ’which so alarmed the merchants in Hugli that
they presently represented the case to the government*•
The action had its desired effect; the government soon
51waved off the prohibition.'
The most important development in the annals 
of the Company’s trade in Bengal in the first two decades 
of the 18th century was the grant of a farman by the new 
emperor Parrukhsiyar for free English trade in return for 
a payment of only Rs.3*000 yearly as pesheash. For a long
49* O.C., 24 Dec. 1702, no. 8097, Vol. 65.
50. O.C., 7996, Vol. 64; Hedges’ Diary, Vol. 11, pp.105-6; 
Bruce, oo.cit., Vol. Ill, p.506.
51. O.C., 24 Dec. 1702, no. 8097, Vol. 65.
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time tine English were anxious to secure one consolidated 
farman enjoining free movement of their trade in the 
country. The sentiment of the English was expressed in 
Pitt’s ( Governor of Madras ) letter to ’Zeuay Khan*,
Lord High Steward of Shah Alam*s household, whose help 
the former sought for obtaining such a farman. In Bengal, 
as Pitt wrote, they had the King’s farman and the Prince’s 
nishan with several Hawah’s parwanas for being customs 
free upon paying three thousand rupees per annum. But 
still obstructions were put on the English trade at various 
inland factories. So he expressed the hope that a way 
might be found in a farman to remove their difficulties 
in future which would ’lead greatly to the honour of the
52King and the augmentation of the riches of his country’.'
At last, however, Surman embassy which was sent to
Earruksiyar was successful in procuring the much - desired
53
1 arm an in 1717. The farm an is regarded as the Magna
54Carta of the English trade in Bengal." It gave de jure 
recognition to the privileges which the English claimed 
to have enjoyed since the reign of Shah Jahan.' It
32. Home Misc., Vol. 69, f. 184.
53. Por Surman embassy, see, Home Misc., Vols. 69-71; Pact. 
Records, Misc. Vols. XIX, XX*
54. S. Bhatt acharya, The East India Company and the Economy 
of Bengal, p. 29... .... ......
55. Por the provisions of the farman, see, Home Misc., Vol. 
69, ff.130-31; S. Bhattacharya, op.cit., pp.28-29; Abdul 
Karim, Murshid Quli Khan and his times, pp.166-67.
contained such significant provision as - "That all
the goods and necessaries which their factors ....
bring or carry away either by land or water .... are
custom free, that they may buy or sell at their pleasure’-
a concession which, as the English claimed later on, gave
56
them unqualified rights of trade in Bengal. The free
trade of the English on the payment of Rs.3,000 per annum
was confirmed but it was limited to export and imports
only. The provision therefore seems to have excluded the
inland trade and also probably private trade of the servants
of the Company. The different interpretation of the farman
again led to serious conflicts between the Company and the
officials in Bengal later on. Many of the provisions of
the farman, however, were not observed and several of them
were soon challenged by the diwan and subadar Lurshid Ouli 
57Khan. But still it can be said that the f arm an opened 
the way for the establishment of commercial and political 
supremacy of the English in Bengal.
Control and Organisation of factories
Any study in the growth and development of the 
Company’s trade in Bengal is incomplete without an account
56. Home Lise., Vol. 69, f• 130.
57. For Murshid Quli and the working of the f arm an, see,
S. Bhattacharya, op-.cit. , pp. 30-68; Abdul Karim,
op.cit., pp. 166-191•
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of the methods of control and organisation of different
factories* Already by the early ’fifties, the Company
had organised two factories in Bengal - namely, in Hug11
and Balasore, both of which were port towns. But as the
trade increased both in volume and variety, the Company
found it necessary to establish more inland factories to
facilitate the procurement of cargoes for home bound ships.
Consequently, another factory was established in 1658 at
Kasimbazar - the famous centre for silk- for providing
58silk and piece - goods.' Next year the factory at Patna
59was settled for the procurement of saltpetre."'
In 1668 another factory was established at Dacca. 
In the early years of the ’sixties of the 17th century the 
Company was in no mood to increase the number of factories 
in Bengal. On the contrary, it intended to close down all 
the factories in the Bay except the one in Hugli in a bid 
to cut down ’vast charges’. In December 1663 the Directors 
wrote that the Balasore factory should be dissolved as it 
was ’altogether useless’, and the factory at Kasimbazar to
be discontinued since prices of taffaties were high there,
and little profit accrued from their sale in London. They 
ajso thought that permanent residence at Patna was needless
53. O.C., 2673, 2685,2691, Vol. 25; occasional agency seems 
to have been employed at Kasimbazar as early as 1653 or 
1654, vide, O.C., 2435, Vol. 24.
59. O.C., 2590, 2691, Vol. 25.
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and that saltpetre could he procured by sending there
factors in proper season.^ Next year they complained
of the high prices of taffetas, sannoes and ginghams
sent from Bengal and that their sale in the London
market did hardly give any encouragement to prosecute
61
the Bay trade. The Bengal factors replied that as
for reducing the number of factories in Bengal, those
at Patna and Kasimbazar could not be given up without
losing the trade in saltpetre arid taffetas. For each
of the commodities advances must be continually made
beforehand and the goods came ’dribbling in all the
year’. To send factors to these places, as the Bengal.
Council reported, for a few months only would not suffice;
nor would it be safe to reckon on purchasing supplies in
Eugli, as there would be no certainty of getting the
necessary quantities, while the prices there would be 
f) ?very high. It may be profitable at this point to look 
at the investments in different factories and the relative 
importance of these factories in the trade structure of 
the Company in Bengal. In 1664 the Bengal G-eneral Letter 
provided the following particulars of commodities which 
might annually be provided in the Bay ’having a whole stock, 
at least ^5 left in the country* after the despatch of
•u- 6 3Europe ships '-
60. D.B., 16 Dec. 1663, Vol. 86, f. 344*
61. D.B., 21 Dec. 1664, Vol. 86, f. 458.
62. O.C., 1 Sept. 1669, no. 5069, Vol. 29.
65. Pact. Records, Misc., Vol.5, ff. 45-46; Pact. Records,
Hugli, Vol. 1, Consult. 20 June, 1663.
Balasore-:
G-inghams ..
ooc•• pc s . * . . at Rs .80 p. corge. . . .Rs.24,000
Cotton Yarn 500 mds.... " it 16 p. md.... it 8,000
Sticklac... 500 It M .... it 4 " " . . . . it 2,000
Sannoes... . pcs.... " it 80 p. corge. it... 24,000
Cowries....
cc#• mds.... " it 10 p. md.... it 9,000
Hugli-:
Cossaes....
oooLTv•• pcs..from Rs • -r* c+ O 00 V 35 O • • •
ooo•s
O♦
Solampores or
Sannoes it n • # it 3 to 4" fl. . . it 16,000
Sannoes•••• .. 5,000 n it 20,000
Dacca-:
Cossaes.... pcs..from Rs .4 to lOp.pc. . . .Rs .56,000
Sannoes.... If I • • it 4 to 8 " ". I• • t 30,000
Eumhums I ri • • it 6 to 12" ". I• • • 18,000
Kasirabaszar-:
Taffetas
Superfine.... 1,000 pcs... at P.s.12 p.pc..... . . .Rs 12/300
Do Pine.... .. 5,000 If I• •tt it C it it it 45,000
Do Ordinary ..15,000 I I • • • • "4 to 4i p.pc.. it 67,500
Silk - of 'what fineness and quantity1 desired 
Patna-:
Saltpetre......Twice boiled, 20,000 mds. with charges
about Rs. 2 i p.md...Rs.50,000
64Baftaes, Amberties.............. A large quantity.
b4• There is a note at the end of this account which runs thus 
"prices shown are what they may be bought for at the begin 
ing of the year, but the same sort and goodness to be 
bought at the time of the arrival of the ships will be 30^ 
to 405 dearer", vide, Pact. Records, Misc., Vol. 3, ff•45- 
lb ; Pact. Records, Kugli, Vol.l, Consiilt. 20 June, 1663*
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The main intention of the Court of Directors 
for establishing a factory at Dacca was not the provision 
of piece - goods for Europe. In 1664, in answer to the 
Bengal Agency’s enquiry whether they should start invest­
ment at Dacca, the Directors asked them to find out whether 
any quantity of broadcloth and other English manufactures 
would be saleable there, and if so, that only ’will be 
the more encouragement for us to order you’ to establish 
the factory there.^ One of the main concerns of the Company 
throughout the period was the very small and limited market 
in Bengal for European manufactures, and hence it had to 
import a large quantity of specie and bullion to pay for 
its increasing investment. So when the Court was informed 
that Dacca would buy large quantities of English products 
and that best cossaes, mulmuls etc. might be procured there, 
they gave permission to start a factory at Dacca. They hoped
that the sale of considerable quantity of English manufactures
66at Dacca would bear the charge of the new factory.
The ’sixties of the 17th century also witnessed 
the inauguration of a policy by the Court of Directors to 
encourage sailing of their ships up the river Hugli, which 
hitherto came upto Balasore only. Unlike the Dutch, the
65. D.B., 21 Dec. 1664, Vol. 86, f. 460.
66. D.B., 24 Jan. 1668, Vol. 87, f. 123.
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English Company did not take their ships right upto
Hugli for loading and unloading of cargoes. The
English Company procured all the export commodities
at the various inland factories and brought those
mostly through waterways to Hugli. These merchandise
were then despatched in sloops to Balasore where the
sea - bound ships were laden. Similarly, the commodities
imported by the Company were transhipped at Balasore and
were taken in small boats to Hugli from whence they were
distributed to various inland factories. Thus upto the
1 seventies of the century Hugli served mainly as an
entrepot port. This caused unnecessary delay in the
departure of ships and incurred extra expenditure in the
transport of cargoes to and from Balasore. I oreover, the
small vessels used for the transhipment of goods were
vulnerable to rough weather and were often lost in the
6 Vcourse of the journey. Again these boats, whether private 
or belonging' to the Company, were sometimes requisitioned 
by the local faujdars or nawabs for their own use, thus 
making quick loading and unloading, as also speedy departure 
of ships, impossible. In a letter to the I. adras Council 
in 1665 the Hugli factors reported that one hindrance to
67. D.B., 21 Dec. 1664, Vol. 86, f.458.
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the speedy loading of the ships was the fact that the
hoats built the previous year at Hugli had been
’ commandeered1 by the governor to fetch the nawab* s
salt and that ’formerly boats might have been procured
here freight, now few or none, arising from ill government
of this place*, They suggested that if the ships from
England would come into the Hugli river, these difficulties
68
would largely disappear.
The first English ship intended for Hugli was 
the Lioness despatched in 1650 but fearing' the passage 
to be full of danger, the Agent at Madras did not permit 
her to attempt navigation of the river upto Hugli, and
£ Q
accordingly she went only upto Balasore Road.'^ The Court
of Directors frequently urged the Bengal factors to see
that the ships should go upto Hugli instead of being
discharged and reladen at Balasore and thus their business
in the Bay would be ’brought into some decorum’• As an
inducement, they decided in 1663 to pay 10 shillings per
ton extra to the chartered ships for all goods carried
direct to Hugli but, as the Court reported, the owners and
7ncommanders of the ships were still averse to it.,w Seeing 
that the Dutch ships of 600 tons performed the feat of
68. 0.0. , 1 Sept. 1665, no. 5069, Vol.29; E.F.I., 1665 - 67.
pp. 138-39.
69. 0.0., 18 Jan. 1651, no. 2200, Vol. 22.
70. D.B., 31 Dec. 1662, Vol. 86, f. 181; 2 Jan. 1663, Vol.86,
f.203? 21 Dec. 1664, Vol. 86, f. 458; E.F.I., 1661 - 64, 
pp. 290-91; Stevens. 1 The Port of Calcutta", Journal of 
gtociety of Arts,Vo1.~CIVll, p.635; A.K.Ray,"A Short History 
of Calcutta", Census of India, 1901,Vol.Vll, pt.I, p.113,
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sailing up and down the river, one Captain Elliot
ventured to essay the task but was prevented by Agent
Trevisa who considered the risk too great, much to the
chagrin of the Court of Directors, The Captain,however,
left a memorandum in Hugli stating that the passage up
the river Hugli was hazardless and it was proposed that
the vessels should in future go direct to Hugli and
that Balasore should be abandoned. This was what the
Court had desired for so long and what even the Bengal
71
Council accepted in principle*1 So the Directors made
though
fresh offers but without much success. The local argents,y
aware of the advantages to be gained, sent no ships up
the river as they had no pilots. The local pilots were
too expensive and the owners refused to risk their ships
without proper pilots or charts to indicate the ’depths
and sound.in: ' . The Directors, however, we re of opinion
that the commanders of ships would not attempt it till
the prevention of the great private trade the latter were
72
driving at Balasore. In 1667 the Court built a small
vessel, the Diligence, 60 tons, for the purpose of
surveying the river and also sent six apprentices to be trained
7bas pilots to navigate in the Hugli river. ' In 1671
71. D.B., 2 Jan. 1663, Vol. 86, ff. 202-3; O.C., 11 Sept.
1669, no. 3344, ff. 9-10, Vol. 30. Fact. Records, Fort 
St. G-eorge, Vol. XIV, f. 177*
72. D.B., 12 Dec. 1677, Vol. 88, f. 516.
73. D.B., 24 Jan. 1668, Vol. 87, ff. 120-21; 20 Nov. 1668,
Vol. 87, ff. 202 - 3.
85
they raised the offer to 20 shillings per ton extra,
74
besides ordinary freight for all goods carried to Hugli.
The renewed offers of the Company gave an. increased
impetus to the navigation of the river and in 1672, in
accordance with the order of the Directors that ships
should go up the river, the Rebecca, a vessel of 200
tons, assisted by the sloop Diligence and chief pilot
Samuel Hacon, made the journey up and down the river in 
75safety. But it took the Company a few years more to
make the ships come right upto Hugli for actual loading.
In 1676, in his report of the trade in Hugli, Walter
Clavell was very insistent on the advantage possessed by
Hugli in its navigable river and urged the importance of
up
having trained pilots to bring the Company’s ships/ to the
76
town, thus avoiding trans-shipment of cargoes at Balasore.
In 1673 the ship Halcon piloted by the sloop Arrival got 
safely to Hugli with a cargo of bullion and goods valued 
at 140,000. But three other ships - Williamson, I.athaniel, 
and Society - which came in the same year to Balasore did 
not adventure up the river for want of necessary orders 
from their owners, though they were requested to do so by 
the Council in accordance with the wishes of the Company.
The commanders of these ships, however, came to Hugli on
74* D.B., 18 Dec., 1671, Vol. 87, f. 508.
75* Pact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 7, pt.I, f. 52; E.F.I., new 
series, Vol. 11, f. 542.
76. Pact, Records, lisc. Vol. XIV, ff.320-21.; S.P.I., new 
series, Vol. TT, ff,82-83...
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sloops and were satisfied with the navigability of the 
r i v e r ' It seems that from the 1 eighties of the century 
it became a general practice for the Company’s ships to 
load and unload in Hugli instead of at Balasore which was 
henceforward abandoned in favour of Hugli, The navigation 
of the ships up the river to Hugli was considered very 
advantageous to the Company as it had ’excellent conveniences 
for carrying the European commodities up into the inland 
town and the cities and the like for bringing down the
78
commodities purchased in this or some other kingdoms’•
The Company had to open a new factory at Malda
to meet the increasing demand for calicoes. The inception
of the factory at Malda in 1676 was mainly due to the
initiative and commercial instinct of Streynsham I aster who
was sent to Bengal to reorganise the factories there. The
Company’s servants who had been sent to Rajmahal to superintend
the coinage of the English bar silver in the Mughal mint
there, had, during their leisure hours, explored the
neighbourhood. They reported that ’Malda on the other side
of the G-anges, where the Dutch have lately built a factory’
was a place eminently suitable for the provision of coarse
7q
goods for Europe, Ivlaster seized upon this information as a 
chance of carrying out the clause in his commission allowing
77. Fact.Records, Hugli, Vol. 7, pt.I, ff.111-16; E.F.I., new 
series,Vol. IV, pp. 166-67; D.B., 12 Dec. 1677? Vol. 88,f.522,
78. Bowrey, op.cit,, pp. 166-67.
79. Fact. Records, Disc, Vol. TIT? ff. 136-36; Master’s Diary, 
Vol. I, p.398; Fact. Records, Kasimbazar, Vol.I, Consult.
14 Oct. 1676.
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him to purchase any goods suitable for the home markets
80not hitherto imported into England, ~ He proposed that 
several hundreds of rupees should be invested in samples 
of goods to be procured at I alda and that these samples 
should be forwarded for the Companyfs inspection and 
approval. He asked Richard Edwards, who was bound for 
Rajmahal in charge of the Company’s bullion, to provide 
the samples at 1 alda and to find out how the trade of the 
place was conducted so that the Council might judge the
O 1
advisability of making a settlement there. The proximity 
of I alda to the mint was an important factor in the eyes 
of the Council, for should the place prove to be commercially 
valuable, it would be definitely more convenient to consign 
the bar silver' there than to send it to Rajmahal where it 
had to be carefully guarded until the Ivughal officials were 
pleased to coin it,
Richard Edwards sent samples of goods as also a 
report on the trade of I alda. He stated that 1 alda drove 
a thriving trade in Cossaes, mulmuls, elafches etc. with 
merchants from Gujarat, Agra and Benaras, the goods being 
conveyed both by land and water. He detailed the lengths 
and breadths of the various kinds of goods usually rnaae but 
added that there would be no difficulty in getting the local
80. Taster’s Diary, Vol. I, up.204*216; D.B., Vol. 88, 
ff. 287, 295.
81. Fact. Records, I ise> Vol. TIT, tf.136; Master’s Diary,
Vol. I, pp. 398-Pg.
weavers to make cloths of different dimensions and
patterns if desired. But he held out very little
hope of trading by barter, 1 the vend of imported
gooas1 being very inconsiderable; neither did he
consider the soil of the district suitable for making
saltpetre. On the whole, his report on I alda as a
centre of cotton goods was sufficiently favourable to
82
warrant the settlement of a factory there. As regards
the settling of the factory, the Court asked the Bengal
Council whether trade there would * answer the charge’
and their business might not as effectually be done by
sending some persons at the proper season to make
investment without being at the charge of maintaining
factors there all round the year. The Directors wrote
 ”--- for by experience we find that the multiplying
of factories doth augment our charge, divide our stock,
and cause many debts”. But the particular inducement for
which the Court was inclined to settle a factory at I alda
was that ’the ( I alda ) goods of which you sent us musters
are very well liked of here and therefore we have ordered
a large quantity thereof to be provided, to which end we
order that you invest there of the stock we now send you
in the goods we write for to the value of 80 or 100,000 
83
Rupees”... " The official commencement of the factory was
82. Ract. Records, Misc., Vol. XIV, ff. 334-37; Master’s 
Diary, Vol. I, pp. 395-402.
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made in December 1679 when Master made Fytche Nedham
the chief of the factory there and in 1680 the Company
84established a permanent factory there.
As noted earlier, when the Company returned
to Bengal in 1690 after the war, it settled its headquarters
at Calcutta, leaving Hugli for good. As a centre of
English trade, Hugli had several limitations. It was
separated from the sea by a long and dangerous river
journey; secondly as it stood or the west bank, it was
open to attack from land. Calcutta, on the other hand,
was much nearer to the estuary and free from the operations
of the European rivals as well as the Marathas and the
nawabs of Bengal. Moreover, the position of Calcutta
at the lower reaches of the river made deep water channels
and anchorages available which were lacking in Hugli.
The settlement of the English at Sutanuti, however, led
to resentment among the local merchants and officials who
thought, perhaps not wrongly as later developments proved,
that this would utterly ruin ’Bunder Hugli by drawing down
the whole trade from thence’. The English tried to appease
local officials by pointing out that there were several
merchants such as the Dutch and Drench sufficient to keep
84* Fact. Records, Malda, Vol. 1, Consult. 22 April, 1680.
The assertion of Yule (Hedges Diary, Vol. Ill, p. 195) 
that the factory was built in 1676 is wrong, vide, 
Master’s Diary, Vol. TT, p.537; Fact, Records, Hugli,
Vol. 2, pt 11, f.14; O.C., 4632, Vol. 40; Firminger,
"1 alda Diary and Consultation Eook", J.A.S.B, new series, 
XXV, 1918, pp.3-4.
the trade running in Hugli, They tried to justify
their withdrawl on the ground that the factory and
ground in Hugli was too small for them, that the
passage up the river was difficult for their ships
to navigate and that the proximity of the governor’s
house to their factory was a source of constant trouble.
However, in 1700 the Company made Fort William (i.e.
Calcutta) as the seat of a new Presidency independent
of Madras and the Bengal trade was now pursued with 
86
a new vigour.
Expansion of Bengal Trade
After the establishment of the factory in
Hugli in 1651, the factors of the Company began trade
operations on a serious scale. But as yet they were
not well informed of the behaviour of the local markets
and the commercial methods. As Captain Erookhaven
instructed James Bridgeman and others in Bengal - ”
Whereas it is the design of our Masters, the Honourable
Company, to advance and increase their trade in these
parts of Orissa and Bengal, you are by all possible means
to endeavour more and more to inform yourselves how best
87
and most profitably to carry on the trade thereof1'. At
85* Fact, Hecords, Calcutta, Vol. 5, pt. I, ff.28-22•
86. D.B., 20 Dec. 1699, Vol. 93, ff.249-51.
87. O.C., 14 Pec. 1650, no, 2186, Vol. 22; E.F.I., 1646- 
50, p.332.
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this time the Company was interested mainly in the
procurement of saltpetre, silk and sugar, hut not so
much in piece - goods for Europe investment. Particular
directions for investment in these commodities were
also given, specially to invest money in the best time
of the season. 1 oreover the factors were instructed to
invest at least half of their stock only in saltpetre
and try to refine it in Hugli. They were further asked,
in case they ran into debt, to do so for this commodity
only, though the Company preferred to avoid debts because
88
of the high rate of interest in Bengal. Besides salt­
petre, they were to invest the other half of their stock
in sugar ,
in the following manner - /6 in silk,/ /6 in cloth (specially 
sannoes and addaties). Soon the Company bought a country 
vessel of 70 tons, renamed it as Transport, which was to 
sail to and from Hugli for carrying saltpetre and other 
commodities. But in these early years the Company’s stock 
in Bengal was very small. To obviate the difficuly of 
small stock for investment, the Company instructed Pegu 
factors to raise money on their goods and transmit the 
proceeds to Bengal by bills of exchange. In 1652 the 
stock intended for Bengal was only £7,000 which was to be
8Q
invested in commodities half for England and half for Pegu.
88. O.C., 14 Dec. 1650, no. 2186, Vol. 22; E.P.I., 1646-50, 
pp. 332-54*
89* O.C., 14 Jan. 1652, no. 2246, Vol. 22; E.P.I., 1651-54,
P*97.
For some years in the early stage little
benefit resulted to the Company from its
Bengal trade mainly due to the large amount of private
trade carried on by its servants* However, its
importance began to grow once the Company and its
factors realised that Bengal commodities were in great
demand in Europe* The factors themselves were, as
always, hopeful of driving an extensive and profitable
trade in Bengal* In 1654 they wrote home - "These
places of Bengal and Orissa sufficiently manifest that
there is room for the employment of a very great stock;
where although the Butch invest at least 200,000
sterling yearly, nevertheless Your Worships supplying
this place with stock sufficient and honest men to
manage it, will soon find as great business and as
much profit"• They were shrewd enough to realise the
prospects of Inter - Asiatic trade which would nay for
the charges of maintaining factories in Bengal. They
further wrote that with a largely increased commerce
it would be easy to gain the favour of those in authori
and secure the trade from interruptions whereas ’mere
residencies without funds to emply, though the charges
90
are heavy, produce nothing but disappointment’.^
90. O.C*, 28 Bee. 1654, no, 2439, Vol. 24; E.F.I., 1651 
54, p. 304-
iBut in 1655 came the partial collapse of the 
Company in England; orders were sent out for the abandon­
ment of the factories in Bengal, The Madras Council 
complained that the sums Bengal factors had paid for 
exemption from customs would counterbalance the profits 
of the trade and would he a benefit to the latter’s private
91trade rather than to the Company’s investment," In fact,
Bridgeman and his colleagues in Bengal were acting
irregularly and dishonestly* When called to account, two
of them, Bridgeman and Blake, deserted the Company’s service
92without offering any explanation. In 1657, the year the 
Madras Council was thinking of withdrawing from Bengal, the 
Company of merchant adventurers was amalgamated with the 
original Company in England* The grant of a new charter 
by Cromwell in that year put new life into the Company 
and enabled an effective trading stock to be raised, A 
commission was appointed in Bengal to enquire into the 
misderr®amours and corrupt practices which had been going 
on there, and to prevent further irregularities, private 
trade on the part of Company’s servants was prohibited and 
their salary increased. In their letter of 51 Dec. 1657, 
the Court of Directors made Bengal an agency independent
91. 0*C., 18 Jan* 1654, no. 2560, f.8, Vol. 25; Bruce, op,cit, 
Vol. I, p. 485; Wilson, op.cit., Vol.I, p. 28.
92. 0.0. , 10 liov. 1656, no. 2579, Vol. 25; Wilson, op,cit. ,
Vol, I, p. 28; Hedges’ Diary, op.cit., Vol. Ill, pp.187-88.
94
Q3
of Fort St. Ceorge.'" At first all seemed to ? o well
with the Oom any’s trade ir Penpal. 1 Bengal,1 the
factors wrote V'ome, Mis a rich province. Paw Silk is
abundant. The taffaties are various and fine. The
saltpetre is cheap and of the best quality. The "bullion
have
and pagodas you have sent/had an immediate and. most 
favourable effect or the trade: the goods have been sold 
at great advantage. Our operations are growing so 
extensive that we shall he obliged to build new and
QA
1^rge warehouses"."‘ The stock furnished ^or investment
also began to nise suite considerably. In 1658 it amounted 
95
to £23,000.
Throughout the ’sixties of the 17th certur^,• w  * ' u  7
the brightening prospect o^ the Company’s trade in Benval 
steadily increased owing partly to the Company’s resolution 
to enlarge their operations in the Bay and partly to the 
growing demand for Bengal goods in England and Europe. In 
England, the restoration of the Stuarts in 1660 ushered in 
a period of political support for the Company. The new 
charter in 1661 granted them exclusive and monopolistic trade 
with the East Indies and emnowered them, to erect fortifications
96
"within their limits’. There was a steady increase in the
93. D.E., 31 Dec. 1657, Vol. 84, f. 387.
9 4. Bruce, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 544, 550, 560; Vi Ison, 
op.cit., Vol. I, p. 34.
95. 0.0., 11 Sept. 1658, no. 2665, Vol. 25? E.B.I., 1655-60, 
p.l®L.
96. Bruce, op.cit., Vol.I, pp. 556-58.
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inflow of stock for investment in Bengal* In 1662 stock
furnished amounted to £25,000; in 1668 it was valued at
£54,000 besides the permission given to take up to £10,000
at exchange. Next year it rose to £40,000, and in addition
07
liberty was given to take up £10,000 at exchange." But 
even this stock was considered insufficient by the factors, 
and frequently they complained to the Court of Directors of 
the general smallness of stock available for investment in 
Bengal. The factors of the Dutch Company wrote home in 1660 
that the English trade was of small importance and that they 
were not apprehensive of an effective competition by the
98
English Company as the latter was "always short of money’ .
The English factors were insisting on larger stock to keep
the weavers and saitpetremen in ’constant employment* as
otherwise they would be lured away by the Dutch whose trade
99
was yet much larger than that of the English." Ieanwhile
the factors complained of oppressions and exactions by the
new nawab Shaista Khan to please whom they had to give
expensive presents. They requested for larger stock as they
thought ’greatness of the expense might be buried in the
100
vastness of investment’. As to the want of stock and of
97. D.B., Vol. 5, f. 92; Vol. 4, ff. 201, 505-4.
98. Dutch Becords, (India Office Library), Vol. 25T, Letter 
no. DOLL.
99. O.C., 1 Sept. 1665, no. 5069, Vol. 29; 16 April 1669, 
no. 5265, Vol. 50; E.F.I., 1668-69, p. 515.
100. O.C., 12 April, 1666, no. 5168, Vol. 29; E.E.I., 1665-67, 
PP. 257-58.
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credit to supply it, tie Directors replied that the
extraordinary expense and presents to local officials
’ate up’ most of the stock intended for investment in
commodities.^ ^
The two decades following 1670 were of
considerable significance in the annals of the Company’s
trade in Bengal, There was an enormous increase in the
trade handled Toy the Company which, after its expulsion
from Bantam in 1682, concentrated more and more on trade
in India, specially the Bengal trade. Even in 1672 the
Dutch trade was far greater than that of the English
had
Company. But after ten years English trade/ so much
increased that it was reported to have exceeded that of 
102the Dutch. Of course, there were factors which
inhibited the Company’s investment in Bengal. As early
as .1670 the Directors wrote to Hugli that ’India - goods
are much fallen in price due to the great striving for
103India trade by European nations’, ?oreover the Company’3
trade was hindered by extensive private trade by its servants 
as also by the great Interloping activities in Bengal.
Yet on the whole, during these two decades there was a 
definite progress marked by extensive trade activities. In
101. D.B., 7 Dec, 1669, Vol. 87, f. 303- ___
102. Eact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 4, f. 5; Vol. 8, pt 111, f,13a
103. D.B,, 29 Nov. 1670, Vol.84, f. 404.
1671 the stock furnished, for Bengal was valued at £57,000
besides which permission was given to borrow money at
interest from local merchants, if the factors failed to
procure bills of exchange. However, the Company asked
them to avoid, if they could, taking up money at a high
rate of interest. ^  ^  In 1675 the stock intended for Bengal
was £85,000 and next year it increased to £110,000. In
1051677, however, the Directors reduced it to £92,000*
On June 28, 1676 they wrote to Surat - “Bor some years
past we have endeavoured to drive as full a trade for
India as the market in Europe would bear, not only for
our own advantage but for increasing the trade of the
nation......... But we now by experience find that
should we continue the bringing home such quantities as
we do expect and had advised for, we cannot possible have
vent for them in Europe, specially considering the
competitions we have in that trade and the great war and
106
troiibles n From 1678 to 1680 the stock sent to
107
Bengal was on an average about £110,000 yearly*
A new impetus to English trade in Bengal was 
given by the Directors in 1681 when they declared that 
they designed ’a great encouragement of our trade in the
104* Ibid,
105* D.B,, Vol.88, ff. 155, 257 - 58, 590.
106* D.B., 28 June, 1676, Vol. 88, f, 509.
107. D.B,, 12 Dec. 1677, Vol. 88, f. 521; 5 Jan. 1679,
Vol. 89, ff. 25, 56; 51 Dec. 1679, Vol.89, f. 146.
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Bay and yearly to increase therein1„ In that year a
vast stock was sent to Bengal amounting to £150,000
which ’is a far greater stock than ever went from
Bngland into those parts’. Besides, the Bengal factors
were given liberty to raise money at interest to the
108value of £50,000 - £40,000. ' Of this stock, £80,000
was ordered to he sent to Kasimbazar alone - ’it being
a trade that we can with more advantage expatiate in
( specially in Raw Silk, and black and coloured baffaties )
log
than in any trade of India whatsoever’. " In its letter
of Nov. 1681, the Court made Bengal a distinct agency
independent of fort St. G-eorge and decided to send £250,000
to Bengal for investment in the year 1682. They further
at interest
asked the factors to take up money/upto the value of 
£100,000 to be invested only in raw silk. The total 
stock was to be distributed to the different factories in 
the following manner -
Kasimbazar - £140,000
Patna - £ 14,500
Malda - £ 15,000
Ballasore - £ 52,000
Dacca — £ 16,500
Hugli £ 12,500 
£250,500
108. D.B., Vol. 89, ff. 270-72, 277, 530.
109. D.B., 5 Jan. 1681, Vol. 89, ff. 278-79.
110. D.B., 14 Rov. 1681, Vol. 89, ff. 594-95, 404, 419; 
Bengal was made a soperate agency in July 1682 with 
the arrival of Agent Hedges, vide, P.O., 4850, Vol.42.
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And. the remaining part of the stock was to be invested
111in raw silk at Kasimbazar. The motive behind the
enlargement of the Bay investment was also for obviating
112
’the designs of the interlopers and the hutch’. The
Directors further intended to increase the Eengal stock
to £500,000 or £600,000 in future for ’We know very well
that full purses and well stored warehouses are the most
admirable tools that anyone can use to abate interest in
India*. But it seems they did not succeed entirely in
sending such a large stock to Bengal. They asked the
Bengal factors to take up as much money at interest as
they needed and to keep the weavers and saltpetremen in
’constant employment’ lest the latter be enticed by the
113Dutch or other merchants. ' The Company was well aware 
that a ’double stock* in any part of India was profitable 
specially in the Bay where t^ere was such a variety of 
commodities and the rate of interest so very high. But 
as the Directors pointed out, two factors inhibited such 
a venture - absence of ’an infallible security of out 
estate and privileges from the governors or force of the 
Dutch, and lack of fidelity and truth of the Chief and 
Council’. In 1686 the stock sent for Bengal was small.
The reasons for so little stock, as the Court of Directors
111. D.B., 18 Nov. 1681, Vol. 89, ff. 422-23.
112. D.B. , 18 Nov. 1681., Vol. 89, f. 425*
113. D.B. , 6 Sept. 1682, Vol. 90, f. 35; 30 lay 1683,
Vol. 90, f. 159.
114. D.B., 21 Dec. 1683, Vol. 20, f. 246.
explained, were that they were apprehensive of a conflict
with the Mughals in Bengal and so did not want to risk
any ’considerable value1; secondly, there was vast quantity
of different kinds of goods upon the Company’s hands and
now that the Interlopers were ’perfectly subdued’, it did
115
not want to burden itself with multitudes of goods,
Bengal trade was so lucrative that the Company
could hardly withdraw totally from it. Even during the
war it tried to procure Bengal commodities at Ahmedabad
and I adras through Armenians and other indigenous merchants
116
as also through European free traders. In 1689 the
General and Council of Eombay wrote that the Bengal trade
was of ’great import to our Masters’ and that it was ’so
117choice a jewel in the Company’s trade’. The directors
thus admonished the Bengal Council in 1691 - "You have
almost ruined us soon after the last war by lying still
and treating and talking and spending a great deal of
money and time while you might have loaded the Beaufort
and Rochester home to us .... which if you had done at
that time the profit of those two ships arriving here
would have defrayed half the charge of the war on that
118side of India though it was very great". “ So it is
115. D.B., 14 Jan. 1686, Vol. 91, f. 52.
116. D.B., Vol. 91, ff. 303-4, 395-96, 424,470,577; Vol. 92, 
ff.148,179,197.
117. 0.0., 4 Dec.. 1689, no. 5686, Vol. 48.
118. D.B., 18 Peto. 1691, Vol. 92, f. 147.
obvious that the Bengal trade was extremely profitable
to the Company. In 1698 the Court of Directors decided
to send £200,000 to Bengal for investment in different 
119commodities. " But at the close of the century rivalry
and animosity among Englishmen at home led to the birth
of a new Company, popularly;- known as the ’English Company’
as opposed to the Old Company which was now obliged to
assume the title ’London Company’. In 1698 the New
Company was promulgated by a charter as an exclusive Company
trading on a joint stock under the name of the ’English
120
Company Trading To The East Indies’• The two separate
Companies now tried to ingratiate themselves in official 
favour and to outbid each other in trade with separate 
factories in Calcutta and Hugli. The English Company sent 
3ir William Morris as ambassador to emperor Aurangzeb to 
secure trading privileges but with little success.1^1 
However, the two Companies were amalgamated in 1702 as the 
’United Company of Merchants of England Trading To The East 
Indies’. Finally the union of the two Companies was 
consummated by the award of Gotiolphin in 1708-9•
119. D.B., 28 Oct, 1698, Vol. 93, f. 120,
120. For the circumstances leading to the birth of the new 
Company, see, Bruce, op,cit; Vol. Ill, pp. 251-60; 
Wilson, on,cit., Vol. I, up. 151-52; Hunter, History 
of British India, Vol. II, pp. 306-10, 319-20. ~
121. For Morris Embassy, see, H. Das, The Morris Embassy 
to Aurargzib, 1699 - 1702,
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Despite occasional hindrances to English trade 
referred to earlier, the investment of the old and new 
Companies was almost steady without any remarkable reduction 
during the first decade of the 18th century. On an average 
the old Com'oany (as also after the amalgamation of the two
122
Companies) invested over £200,000 yearly in Bengal commodities.
Sometimes, of course, the Company had to reduce tonnage and
investment in Bengal due to unfavourable circumstances in
Europe or England. In 1706-7 the Company sent a small
quantity of tonnage in comparison to what was usually sent
and the sum for investment too was considerably reduced.
The reasons for such reduction in tonnage and investment as
the Directors stated, were the heavy duties on almost all
sorts of goods, the dullness of market in Europe, and the
12^scarcity of silver. ' An interesting feature of this
decade was that more and more emphasis was put on the Bengal
trade with a corresponding reduction of the Fadras trade.
The point is illustrated by the fact that in 1708 out of
a total stock of £500,000 for Coast and Bay investment,
£210,000 was alioted to Bengal, while the remaining £90,000
was sent to Madras. Next year, similarly out of the total
amount of £500,000 for the Coast and nay, £240,000 was for
124Bengal, while £60,000 was alloted to Fadras.
122. D.B., Vol. 95, f.311; Vol. 94, f.447; Vol. 96, ff.94,
255 465 652.
125. D^b !’ 18 Jan. 1706, Vol. 95, f.512.
124. D.B., 7 April 1708, Vol. 96, f.255; 4 Neb. 1709, Vol.
96, f.465.
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In the second decade of the 18th century there
followed again a progressive development of the Company’s
trade in Bengal* The investment of the Company throughout
this decade was on an average well over £200,000 yearly,
The following table would indicate the expansion of the
Company’s trade in Bengal and the emphasis given on this
125
branch of trade as compared to that in Madras -
Stock sent to
Year Bengal Madras Total
1710 £180,000 £ 80,000 £260,000
1711 £180,000 £ 90,000 £270,000
1712 £170,000 £105,000 £275,000
1713 £120,000 £ 98,000 £218,000
1714 £150,000 £100,000 £250,000
1715 £200,000 £110,000 £310,000
1716 £200,000 £100,000 £300,000
1717 £270,000 £130,000 £400,000
1718 £250,000 £138,000 £388,000
1719 £257,000 £121,000 £448,000
1720 £150,000 £150,000 £300,000
1721 £200,000 £100,000 £300,000
1722 £270,000 £120,000 £390,000
It is clear from the above table that Bengal was gaining 
more and more importance in the trade complex of the Company. 
Indeed by the end of our period the trade of the Company in 
Bengal surpassed and far outshadowed that in either Ladras 
or Surat both in value and magnitude. As a matter of fact,
125* Collected from D.B., Vol. 26, f.652; Vol. 97, ff.124,431, 
769; Vol. S3, 192,452,778; Vol.99. ff.73-74, 362,632;
Vol. 100, ff.136, 179,565; Vol 101, f.132.
right from the beginning of the 17th century the Company 
was giving more and more emphasis on the Bengal trade.
In Surat - political instability, Maratha threat, oppression 
of local governors coupled with and aggravated by the enmity 
of the indigenous merchants - and in Coromandel - local feuds 
and internecine wars - injected an element of uncertainty 
in the trade of those two centres and a corresponding 
stimulus to trade in Bengal which enjoyed a relative political 
stability. In fact, the chief importance of the Bengal trade, 
so far as the English Company was concerned, was that it was 
an expanding trade. The Dutch who were the most formidable 
rival of the English Company in. Bengal in the second half 
of the 17th century failed to keep pace with the expansion 
of the English trade in the early 18th century. The steady 
growth of the demand for Bengal goods in the E\iropean markets 
was yet another inducement for the English Company to 
concentrate more and. more on the Bengal trade. The culmi­
nation of the English trade in Bengal was precipitated after 
the battle of Plassey which gave them political suzerainty in 
Bengal through which they had at their disposal the entire 
resources of the country for the establishment afacommercial 
and political hegemony.
Bengal Ferchants and Commereial Or gandsation
An attempt is made in this chapter to
analyse the trading activities of the Bengal merchants
and examine the nature and character of their commercial
organisation vis - a - vis the English East India Company
trading in Bengal, The appearance of the European
Companies gave rise to a new situation in the commercial
life of Bengal in the second half of the seventeenth
century. These Companies entered the market as Buyers
their
and sellers of goods and created problems in/supply and 
delivery. There is evidence to show that the quantities 
of goods entering trade flows were now greater than before, 
and the increased demand put great pressure on supplies. 
Again, the Bengal merchants, w^o had a long experience of 
dealing with individual traders from various parts of Asia, 
had to deal for the first time with foreign Companies of 
monopolistic merchant capital during this period. It will 
be our aim to study the response of the traditional merchants 
in their methods and organisation of trade to this new 
situation.
The activities of the jjengal merchants had certain 
distinct features. They acted as brokers to the European 
Companies which could not deal directly with the producers
for provision of goods for Europe. But they were not 
merely brokers but also traders operating exclusively 
with their own capital. All of them were primarily 
merchants - buyers and sellers of different commodities, 
and their business extended to any class of goods which 
was expected to 3rield a profit. They also acted 
simultaneously as shroffs or money - changers and bankers, 
received deposits and arranged remittances by means of 
bills- of exchange or letters of credit on their various 
agents in the different trade marts of Bengal. Occasionally 
they served as middlemen, specially in the transactions 
between the European Companies and the ruling class. These 
Companies, on their part, on various occasions made use of 
the merchants* influence with the ruling nobility to win 
favour or privileges for them. But despite that, the 
European Companies most often mistook the Bengal merchants 
as mere brokers and tried, though unsuccessfully, to coerce 
them into submission following trade disputes. Time and 
again they tried to break the rin0s and bargaining position 
of the Bengal merchants, specially their monopolistic 
designs but only in vain. Throughout the period the Bengal 
merchants maintained their credit and influence quite 
independent of the European Companies.
The term ’Bengal merchants* is used here in a 
wide sense and includes all the indigenous merchants trading
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in Bengal as opposed to the Europeans. We shall discuss 
the subject under the following heads- 1. Bengal Tenchants 
and the English East India Company. 11. Bengal merchants* 
trade on their own account i.e. their overseas trade. 111. 
some estimate of their wealth and iv. finally our conculsions.
Bengal Merchants and the English East India Company
In this section we shall discuss the activities 
of several important merchants in different trade marts 
of Bengal, specially with reference to their relation and 
transaction with the English East India Company. Every 
important merchant, it appears,had one main centre for 
his activities thoLigb he managed his commercial organisation 
through a network of gomastas or agents in almost all the 
trade centres of Bengal.
The two Balasore merchants, Khemchand and 
Chintarnan Shah, played a significant role in the commercial 
life of Bengal in the second half of the seventeenth century. 
These two merchants were generally referred to in theV-' o
records of the English Company as fChimeham* and 1Chintamund 
Saw*. They were the most influential merchants at Balasore 
on their own account, taking a prominent part both in the 
internal and external trade of the country, sometimes trading 
jointly and at other times on separate accounts. For many 
years they were the principal brokers to the English Company
at Balasore for providing commodities for the investment 
of the Company* But their role as independent traders 
and merchants was no less important than that as brokers 
to the Company. Perhaps that was the reason why they 
could bargain effectively with the Company, even in the 
face of the threat of being deprived of their position 
as chief brokers.
Of the two merchants, Ehemchand seems to have
enjoyed greater repute and better position than his
partner and colleagueChintarnan. As early as 1663 Ehemchand
entered into an engagement to supply goods for the Company's
investment. ' G-enerally this investment at Balasore at this
period consisted mainly of such piece - goods as sannoes,
nillaes, and ginghams, and occasionally, if cheap and of
2
goodoquality, doreas and cossaes also. Ehemchand was 
mentioned in the records of June that year as ’chief 
merchant of Balasore’. But soon the Company became concerned 
at the high rates charged by him, and the Hugli factors 
wrote in October 1670 that they endeavoured ’to redress 
by drawing the provision out of Ehemchand’s hands, whom 
we find not fitting to be much longer employed in your 
business’. However he still enjoyed in 1672 the title
1. O.C., 28 lay 1669, no. 3282, Vol. 30: 12 Oct. 1669, 
no. 3552, Vol. 30.
2. The Company made an. agreement with the Balasore merchants 
on 2 Oct. 1680 for the provision of 10,000 ginghams, 
14,000 nillaes and 15,n00 sannoes, vide, Pact. Eecords, 
Balasore, Vol. 1, Consult, 2 Oct. 1680.
3. Pact, Hecords, Fisc., Vol. 3, f* 140.
of chief broker and merchant to the Company. In that
year when Safsi Khan succeeded Safi Khan as the governor
of Orissa, Ehemchand and two other merchants, Earicharan
and Jairaj Shah, accompanied Boremull ( ? Puranmall ) to
Cuttack to obtain a parwana for the English trade in that 
A
province,
The financial position of the Company at Balasore 
was precarious throughout the year in 1673* On the onehand, 
the provision of cargo for an unusually large number of
5
ships which had arrived at the end of the previous year"
had depleted the sources of the Balasore factory, on the
other, due to the Butch war, no money was available on bills
of exchange from the Butch who usually provided funds to
the English Com'pany in this way. The Balasore merchants
provided the commodities for the Company's investment
accepting; payment half in Europe - goods and half in ready 
6
money. But now Ehemchand was unwilling to provide any
investment for the Company without an advance of cash. The
disappointed factors reported-'Ehemchand keeps aloof off
and seeing we have no money to advance here is unwilling
7
to take off our goods', However, the Company was finally
4. Pact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 7, pt. 1, ff. 34-40; E.F.I., 
new series, Vol. TT, p. 339*
5* Six ships came to Bengal in 1672 and left with a cargo 
valued at about Rs. 347,718, vide, E.P.I., new series, 
Vol. TT, p. 343. ___
6. Fact. Records, I isc. , Vol. XIV, f. 324; Easter's Diary, 
Vol. JJ,p£6.
7. Fact. Records, Eugli, Vol. 4, pt. 1, f. 54.
110
able to barter some of the lead and broadcloth for
piece - goods but this resulted in a financial loss
*8of about 2 0 f for the Company.
Ehemchand was seldom subservient to the Company
end owed his position as a merchant and banker independent
of the English. Streynsham Master, who was in Bengal
during 1676 - 80 to reorganise the Company’s trade, reported
that Ehemchand and Chintaman were the only ’money’d men
amongst the merchants’ at Babsore and that there were ’no
other merchants so able and capable to procure the said
o
goods or that can undertake them cheaper’." He stated on
30 August, 1676 that Ehemchand was ’very high and indifferent
10whether he dealt with the Company or not’ . however, in 
order to prevent bad debts by which the Company suffered 
considerably at Balasore, faster entered into a contract 
with the Balasore merchants in which he insisted that for 
all money ’advanced on account’, the leading merchants, 
Ehemchand and Chintaman Shah, should be mutual securities, 
both for their own transactions as well as those of their 
less wealthy colleagues. According to this agreement, the 
investment was to be divided into ten parts, viz, four 
parts to be assigned to Ehemchand, two to Chintaman and the
8. Ibid., Vol. 4, pt. I, f.4.
9. O.C., 1 Sent. 1679, no-. 4647, Vol. 40; Master’s Diary, 
Vol. I, p. 101; Vol. 11, pp. 217,219.
10. Pact. Records, Misc., Vol. XIV, f. 48; Master’s Diary, 
Vol. I, p. 303.
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remaining four among the smaller merchants at the 
joint discretion of the Chief of the factory, Ehemchand 
and Chintaman* These merchants obliged themselves, in 
return for a full advance on the whole investment, to 
repay any arrears within a month after the departure 
of the ships for Europe, and in default, to pay 1-1 p.c. 
interest until the arrears were settled* Eailure to 
supply goods contracted for entailed forfeiture of the 
merchants’ share or shares, as the case might be, in 
the investment. The contract was to remain in force 
during the Company’s pleasure ’unless the merchants
11
through their defaults shall cause a breach thereof’*
A careful analysis of this contract between 
the Company and the Balasere merchants brings to light 
certain interesting points*Ehemchand was, with little 
doubt, the most influential merchant and the chief 
broker to the Company in Balasore and was responsible for 
providing 40; of the Company’s investment* Chintaman 
was only next to Ehemchand in influence and credit 
providing 20, of the investment. In the selection of 
other merchants for providing investment, both Ehemchand 
and Chintaman, besides the chief of the factory, had
11* B.i . Addl. Mss., 14,125, ff* 45a - 44a; O.C.,_5 Sept*
1672, no. 4643 Vol. 40; Master’s Diary, Vol. 11, pp.222-4.
an effective voice* But they had no right to terminate
the contract, even if they desired to do so, and were
thus tied down to the Company* Thus Las ter sought to
protect the Company hy this contract from loss through
’persons of small or no estates employed in the investments’
by taking security of Khemchand and Chintaman on behalf
of other merchants.
Notwithstanding the contract, Khemchand and
Chintaman could, however, exert their independence, as
they refused, to the surprise of the Company’s factors,
to stand security for three merchants ’since their
12
affairs were esteemed desperate’. Again they refused
to give security for some merchants fearing the latter
would supply inferior goods. The Hugli Council appreciated
this stand of Khemchand and Chintaman which is evident
from their letter of Oct., 1679 - "We admire Khemchand
and Chintaman should refuse to be security for those
persons who provide any goods of the investment enordered
with you....* The security desired, you may tell, was for
persons, which, when they have considered, we suppose,
15
they will not be so scrupulous as you now represent’•
The Hugli Council gave permission in 1676 to
a
Khemchand and his fellow merchants to build/warehouse
12* O.C., 1 Sept. 1679, no. 4647, Vol. 40; Master’s Diary, 
Vol. I, p. 101; Vol. n, p. 219.
15. O.C., 1 Oct. 1679, no. 4659, Vol. 40.
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in the Balasore factory rat their own charge’ for
various goods for investment to he stored in ’until
they were priced’, The main condition attached by
the Council for building this warehouse was that the
merchants had to do it in the Company’s name, and that
they could bring or put no other goods therein except
in case of ’very great exigency and then to advi.se and
have licence from. Hugli for their so doing’ ♦ 1 ■
Khemchand not only provided investment for the
English but sometimes he used to purchase Europe - goods
from the Company for trading in those articles in the
country. At one time he proposed that he might be
allowed to buy the entire supply of broadcloth (which
formed quite a substantial part of the Company’s imports
to Bengal) imported yearly by the Company, He made this
proposal to the English as early as 1675 but nothing seems
to have come out of it, and in 1677 the Company rejected
his offer and entered into a contract with. Sukanand Shah,
an eminent merchant and shroff at Kasimbazar, who bought
1 5
all the broadcloth imported to Bengal. Khemchand, however, 
had to accept Europe - goods in part payment for the 
Company’s investment and he used to sell these commodities
14. OaC., 15 Kov. 1678, no. 4522, Vol. 39; Eact, Records, 
Hugli, Vol. I, Consult. 14 Kov. 1678,
15* Eact, Records, Kasimbazar, Vol. I, Diary 8: Consult.,
28 I ay, 16 June, 9 Aug., 13 Aug. 1677; Eact. Records, 
Balasore, Vol. I, Consult,, 28 July, 1677.
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16
in the inland markets, though sometimes the 1 clogging 
of them’ in the hands of the Indian merchants (as these 
articles had little sale in Bengal) was a positive 
deterrent for their continued sale to the traders by the 
0 ompany,
That these two Balasore merchants were very
influential is evident from the fact that they acted as
Brokers between the Company and the prospective buyers,
specially when the latter were high officials of the
state. In 1673> in order to avoid difficulties in financial
transaction, the Hugli Council instructed Hall in Balasore
that if Malik Qasem (at that time faujdar of Balasore)
wanted to buy guns from the Company he must pay cash, or
Ehemchand should buy them, for him. The Company decided
that Khemchand could buy as many guns as he wanted at
eight rupees a maund, but Raja I- ansingh, another prospective
customer for whom Khemchand was acting as a broker, would
17have to pay nine rupees per maund. In 167S Chintaman 
approached the Balasore factors with a letter from Malik 
Qasem desiring to provide the latter with a quantity of 
iron ordnance. The factors declined to deal with the
16. In 1677 the Kasimbazar Diary noted that Khemchand used 
to send Europe - goods there for sale through his 
gomastas, vide, Pact. Records, Kasimbazar, Vol. I,
Diary, 18 Sept. 1677.
17. Pact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 4, pt. 1, f. S3; E.P.I. , 
new series, Vol. II, p. 365.
11
governor except through the brokers and finally
transacted the business through Khemchand and 
IBChintaman. In the same year in regard to a
dispute with the Dutch concerning a house and a
piece of ground in Balasore, the factors were
directed to get the guanungo1 s chaup, if necessary,
1 0by means of Khemchand or Kalyan Ray. "
Khemchand and his fellow merchants often
formed rings and bargained effectively with the
Company which had to yield, though very reluctantly,
to their terms. In 1630, inspite of all persuasion
and threats used by the Company, the merchants
T obstinately refused to give amy.vmore than 208 (rupees)
for 100 p. Rials....unanimously joining together and
20
with one consent declaring as much...*’ The Balasore
merchants were shrewd enough to realise that time v;as
on their side and that the Company would have to yield
if it did not want to lose the full investment for the
year. The Company ultimately surrendered with the
following remark1,... delay in a business of such import
being of consequence, we having well weighted the thing
..... (as) the investment of this year enordered on
Balasore may be much retrenched, if not wholly lost,
18. Pact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 7, pt. Ill, f. 43*
19• Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 5, pt. \ jl f 41-42.
20. Ract. Records, Hugli, Vol. 2, pt. 11, f. 95.
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those people appearing resolute at this pinch of time
as well knowing our necessity of taking their goods,
21
we judged best to give order....'.
The Company's investment at Balasore for
1681, mainly in nillaes, ginghams and sannoes, amounted
22
to Rupees 138,000. An advance of Rs.25,000 was paid 
to the merchants and distributed among them according 
to their respective shares in the following: manner-
Khemchand ....... Es. 12,000
Ivimdas   " 1,253
Hira Shah ....... 828
G-oculchard  1 1,875
Syed 1 yamatullah.. " 875
Enayat Khan  " 875
G-angaram ........ " 1,656
Sibram ....... "
Bihary   ” 575
Kilu Shah   " 575
Bhikary Shah  1 1,011
Es. 25,000
It is clear from the above list that Khemchand was still 
by far the most influential merchant at Balasore providing 
48? of the total investment of the Company there. However, 
when the Company decided to enlarge the investment for that 
year by an additional amount of about Es. 35,000, Chintaman
21. Eact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 2, pt. 11, ff. 95-96
22. In 1677 the Company's investment at Balasore amounted
to Es. 187,000 and in 1682 it was for Es. 198,700, vide, 
Eact. Records, Hugli, Vol, 7, pt* 11, f» 21; O.C., 17 June 
1682, no. 4823, Vol. 42.
23* Eact. Records, Balasore, Vol. I, Diary & Consult., 21 
June 1681.
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Shah (who was excluded earlier) was allowed to have a
share in the investment, hut it was small, and though
greater than that of other merchants, not comparable
24at all with that of Khemchand,
Chintaman Shah, who was even in 1679 referred
25
to as 1 one of the Company’s chief merchants’, received 
a severe reprimand in July 1680 from the Hugli Council
2 g
for ’boggling’ about a debt he owed to the Company,
He was excluded from any share in the investment for 1681
for three reasons - his dealing with the Interlopers, his
being in ’serious debt’ (as Sir James Fawcett says), and
27his engagement with nawab Rashid Khan. The Balasore 
consultation of 21 June 1681 states that the Hugli Council 
gave ’express order* not ten employ Chintaman anymore as he 
was acting for the nawab, This seems a curious and small 
reason for his exclusion, the Company generally considering 
trade with rival English Interlopers or bad debts as the 
principal reason for discontinuing the services of a 
particular broker, The actual debt owed by Chintaman to
24* Fact. Records, Balasore, Vol. I, Diary & Consult.,
22 Aug. 1681. __
25• Master’s Diary, Vol. 11, p. 236.
26. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 6, pt. I, ff. 21-22.
27. E.F.I., new series, Vol. IV, p. 272. Sir James Fawcett 
c om.pl etely ignores Ch in t am an ’ s eng ag era en t wi th th e
Nawab as a reason for discontinuing his services as a 
broker by the Company, c.f., E.F.I., new series, Vol. IV, 
p. 272. Chintaman occasionally acted as agent or gomasta 
to nawab Rashid Khan of Orissa, vide, 0.C,, 25 1 arch 1681, 
no. 4726, Vol. 41; Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 3> pt. I,
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the Company could hardly he considered serious, since
28
it stood in the Company’s hook at Rs* 5,729:3:4 only* 
Ehemchand, however, came forward and put pressure on 
the Company hy saying that without Chintaman*s help he 
would not he ahle to go through with the investment,
2S
and he also offered to stand security for his colleague* *
Chintaman, too, as security for his deht gave an obligation
for R.s.5,000 owing to him hy the factor of the Fing of
Siam, the interest of which stood at ahout 600 rupees.
The Hugli Council left the whole matter to the Balasore
factors ’who seemed willing to give another imprest to 
31Chintaman’ ,
It is interesting to note that the Company at
this time hegan to realise the disadvantages of depending
too much on the syndicate formed hy Ehemchand, Chintaman
and their fellow merchants for providing Company’s
investment at Balasore. Early in 1679 I athias Vincent, the
Agent at Hugli, v/rote that the Balasore goods would not
come down to their usual prices till Ehemchand and ’those
32
that hang on him or side with him would he thrown off’ *
28* Eact* Records, Balasore, Vol. I, Diary & Consult*,
21 June 1681*
29* Eact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 3? pt. I, f. 44; O.C.,
8 July 1631, no. 4742, Vol*. 41; ^act. Records, Balasore, 
Vol. I, Diary 8: Consult*, 21 June 1681.
30. The King of Siam had a regular trade with Bengal during 
this period. In 1682 four of his ships came to Bengal 
with different commodities of which elephants comprised 
the main hulk, vide, E.A., Vol. 1267, f. 1398,
31. O.C., 3 July lb3T7“no. 4742, Vol.41; Eact. Records, Eugl 
Vol. 6, pt. I, f.29j Eact. Records, Balasore, Vol.I, 
Diary 8: Consult., 21 June 1681.
32. 0*0., 9 Eeh. 1679, no. 4576, Vol. 39.
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In 1681 the Hugli Council resolved that the best way
of providing the investment at Balasore was not hy
3 3
’these great merchants'.' As a result and in accordance
with the Court's order to encourage and employ new
merchants 'who depend not on any of the Knott of Khemchand 
34
etc', the Balasore factors entered into a contract on 
27 Sept. 1681 with 'Rewadass & Company' for providing 
such goods as were wanting to complete the full investment 
for the year and distributed an advance of Rs.20,000 
amongst these merchants in the following manner—
Rewadas  Rs. 5,500
Eulchund .... ,f 3,500
Shyamdas .... " 5,750
Abhiram  " 5,250
Rs.20,000
The Hugli Council was glad that fRewadass & Company'
agreed to supply goods at a more reasonable rate than
Khemchand and his fellow merchants. This belied ■ the
apprehension of the Balasore factors that the merchants
there were too afraid of Khemchand to enter into a
36
separate contract with the Company. However, it did 
not diminish in any way the influence and position of
33* Fact, Records, Hugli, Vol. 3, pt. I, f. 44*
34* B.B., 5 Jan. 1681, Vol. 89, ff. 256-57; Fact. Records, 
Hugli, Vol. 6, pt. I, f. 29.
35• Fact. Records, Ealasore, Vol. 1, Diary & Consult.,
29 Aug. 17 Oct. 1681.
36. Fact. Records. Hugli, Vol.6, pt. I, ff. 41-42.
Ehemchand and Chintaman as principal merchants of 
Balasore* Even in 1632 Ehemchand was still in a 
position to dictate his terms to the Company,though 
hy then, it appears, he had lost the title of chief 
merchant. The investment for that year, amounting 
to Rs.128,700, was proportioned hy the Hugli Council 
in the following manner - Khemchand and Chintaman 
Rs.55,000 (Chintaman Rs.20,000), Rewadas Mahta and 
I ahmud Hussain Rs.37,500, Rajaramdas Rs.21,COO, Kira
573hahRs.20,000 and the rest among 13 other merchants*
Ehemchand immediately declared that he would not accept
any share in the investment unless he might he allowed
such a part of it as in ’proportion to his late title
of chief merchant’ and that he would receive no ’imprest*
38money nor make any provision of goods for the Company*'
The Hugli Council directed the Balasore factors to
distribute g.hemchand * s share, in case of his refusal to
accept it, among others or new merchants, and they
resolved not to have a chief merchant in any factory ’on
3°whom the rest shall have dependence’. The factors at. 
Balasore were not happy with the decision of-the Hugli
37* O.C., 17 June 1682, no. 4823, Vol. 42; Eact. Records, 
Hugli, Vol. 6, ot. I, f. 57.
38. C.C., 17 June 1682, no. 4823, Vol. 42; 27 June 1682, 
no. 4824, Vol. 42; Eact. Records, Vol. 6 , pt. I, f. 58. 
3S« O.C., 17 June 1682, no. 4823, Vol. 42: Eact, Records, 
Hugli, Vol. 6, pt. I, f. 58.
1 2 1
Council, They wrote hack that ’the resolution would 
he of ill consequence and much to the prejudice of the 
Company’s affairs’, They reported that a ship on private 
account had already arrived at Balasore while several 
others were expected and that Khemchand still persisted 
in his refusal knowing well he would find other customers 
(e.g, the Interlopers) for his goods. Actually, as the 
factors stated, he had made an investment for rupees one 
lakh and sent gomastas to different inland marts to secure
'Of* i . ■
as many weavers as they could and purchase all the goods
’they meet with’. The Balasore factors concluded - "it
will he very material and requisite he he continued in
this year’s business, if not, we doubt the moity of the
40
goods enordered here will be not got in".
By 1684, however, Khemchand1s position was
definitely on the wane, at least, in the eyes of the
Company’s chief factor at Balasore, who stigmatised him
as ’an. encourager of Interlopers’, ’a base unworthy person*,
’not worth a cowry of our Company’s investment’, and that
41he ’fell short in the investment which is considerable’.
As such, it appears, he was replaced by Chintaman Shah as
4 2the Company’s chief merchant, Chintaman began to gam
40. O.C., 14 July 1682, no. 4829, Vol. 42.
41. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 10, ff. 11-12.
42. B.P.I., new series, Vol. IV, p. 344; Fact, Records, 
Balasore, Vol. 1, Diary, 13 March 1684; Fact, Records, 
Hugli, Vol. 6, pt. TT, f,9♦
confidence of the Company from 1682. In that year 
his gomasta lent Rs.10,000 to the Company at Malda 
at 1 per cent interest per mensem (general rate being 
Izf to 1 p.m.). In I arch 1684- the Company procured
hills of exchange from both Khemchand and Chintaman,
43in each case amounting to Rs.8,500.
Both Khemchand and Chintaman Shah had regular
transactions with the Interlopers who visited Balasore
during this period, albeit the Company’s warning ’not
to have any dealings’ with them, directly or indirectly,
under ’pain of incurring the Honourable Company’s
44
displeasure and forfeiting their employments’.’ We have 
already noticed that Khemchand was branded as ’an 
encourager of Interlopers’, and perhaps that was the 
reason for bi_s losing the title of chief merchant of the 
Company at Balasore. Time and again the Company attempted 
to dissociate the Bengal merchants from the Interlopers 
but with little success. In 1683 the Hugli Council directed 
the Balasore factors not to fail in reassuring and confirming 
their promises to Khemchand and the rest of the merchants 
that they would have ’considerable and sufficient’ investment 
for that year from the Company, and to impress upon them 
that it would be ’an everlasting discredit to leave their
43. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 10, f. 47; Fact. Records, 
Balasore, Vol. 1, Cash Account of I arch, 1684.
44. Fact. Records, Balasore, Vol. 1, Mary & Consult.,
2 Oct. 1680.
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old masters, Toy whose employment they have most of
46
them got their estates’. ' In another Instruction
o'p the same year the Balasore factors were asked to
he ’frequent in minding’ Khemchand and Chintaman of
their promise and obligations not to trade with the
Interlopers ’in hopes that shame may work upon them,
esteeming them persons that make so great scruple to
break through all obligations when they stand in-
46
competition with their interest’• But all these 
efforts were to prove ineffective. The Balasore 
merchants never refrained from their dealings with 
the Interlopers. Even in 1684 Chintaman’s gomasta 
was found buying a considerable quantity of piece- 
goods in Dacca, presumably for supplying the Interloping 
ships and to the great prejudice of the Company’s 
affairs. Though the Hugli Council declared that they 
would not encourage ’such villains in making preparations 
for Interlopers’, they could hardly prevent these 
transactions between the Bengal merchants and the
47Interlopers.
Despite the pronounced displeasure of the 
Company with the activities of Khemchand and Chintaman,
45. O . C 2 May 1683, no. 4941, Vol. 43•
46. O.C., 30 May 1683, no. 4947, Vol. 43.
47. O.C., no. 5264, Vol. 44? Pact. Records, Hugli, Vol.6, 
pt. 11, f. 195*
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it conId hardly dispense with the services of these
merchants. Their assistance was essential not only
for providing the full investment at Balasore, hut
for keeping up good relations with the ruling class,
as these merchants had great influence on the latter.
In April, 1685 the Hugli Council directed the chief
of the Balasore factory to employ Chintaman Shah to
negotiate with Mahmud Khan and thus to please Malik
Burcoordar, the faujdar of Hugli, who seemed to have
become incensed with the Company at the time. Again,
in that very year Khemchand and Chintaman were employed
’as Company’s merchants’ to clear up an affair with
48
the government ’for peace sake’.
By the close of the ’eighties of the century,
both these merchants had lost their influence and power
49
to a great extent. Khemchand died in November, 1687 
and the Company took summary proceedings against his 
partner and colleague, Chintaman Shah following doubts 
about his solvency. Chintaman was alleged to be 
considerably indebted to the Company and there being 
little likelihood of recovering his debt, the Company 
decided' to recover it by seizing his ships. Accordingly,
48. O.C., 2 April 1685. no. 5555, Vol. 45; 9 Fay 1685, 
no. 5578, Vol. 45.
49* paet. Records, Hugli, Vol. 11, f. 187.
when a ship arrived in November, 1686, of which
Ohintairman was a pari owner, the other being; Hhemchand,
50
Oapiai.n Hicholson capirured it* The Balasore factors
51
wrote in 1687 that Ohintaman was not fworth anything1.
But it appears from later records that until his death,
Ohintaman traded considerably on his own account. In
1691 he offered to buy the English ship B eng al her ch. an t
52
for Us.17,000. In the same year, at least two of his
ships sailed on trading voyages to Tenasserim and the 
55Maldives. Even in 1695 his ship Eateohund f ourthen
54
10,000 mdsf. sailed for the I aldives. If ter his death 
in 1695? the Company put a peon (on the pretext of a 
debt amounting to Rs.10,138 which Ohintaman owed to the 
Company) on hgs ship which came from the Maldives with 
Rs.16,000 worth of cowries, and several other commodities, 
thus preventing its sale or letting on freight. His son- 
in-law, Ham Hoy, pleaded on the basis of his papers that 
Ohintaman1s loss through the seizure of his ships and 
tbeir cargoes by the Company during the war amounted much 
more than the debt he owed. However, the Company found
50. Hact. Records, Balasore, Vol. 1, Consult., 16 Rov, 1686.
51. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 11, f. 189*
52. ^act. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 1, pt. 11, ff. 95?127?
Vol. 5? pt. 11, ff. 132,142.
53* Hact. Records, Calcutta? Vol. 1, pt. II, ff. 31?36; One
of these ships was named Jagganathprosad
54. Hact. Records, Calctitta, Vol. 9? pt. 11, ff. 19?45*
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other creditors of Ohintaman clamouring for satisfaction
out of the ship and finally made a settlement with Ram
Roy who agreed to pay Rs.700 yearly till the debt was 
55cleared*
Turning to Hugli, we find I athuradas was the
chief merchant of the Company there at least from the
’seventies of the century, though his name as chief
merchant can only be traced from 1680 onwards. It is
apparent from his own statement that he rose into prominence
56
as a merchant through his dealings with the Company.'
Idke IChemchand and Ohintaman at Balasore, he played a
significant role in the commercial life of Bengal not
only as the chief merchant of the Company but as the
most influential merchant on his own account in Hugli.
■ike other Bengal merchants of the time, he handled a wide
variety of commodities, buying Europe - goods from the
Company and also providing investment for Europe. In
1675 the Company made a contract with him for 6,000 pcs. of
romalls, valued at Rs.30,000 payable to him half in money
and half in goods. In the same year, be >: bought 1,500
57
tolas of gold from the Company for about Ps. 00,000. ! ext
year the Company agreed to sell him 13 chests of treasure
55* Pact. lie cords, Calcutta, Vol. 2, pt. I, ff. 162,195;
Vol.9, pt. 11, ff. 89-90, 105,124; Vol.10, pt.I, f.3.
56. 0.0. , 14 Bee." 1694, no. 5949, Vol. 50.
57. Pact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 2, pt. I, ff. 68,95-96.
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(11 chests of fine bar silver and 2 of rials valued 
at about 1 Lakh of rupees) on the same terms and 
rates as in the contract with Sukanand 3hah of 
Easimbazar, ^ ;
hike Ehemchand and Ohintaman Shah, Mathuradas 
was not simply a broker to the English Company but a 
merchant of considerable credit and influence, quite 
independent of the Company, wv,o traded on his own 
account and also with other Europeans, notably the French 
and the Interlopers. He operated his business, much to 
the annoyance of the English Company, with monopolistic 
designs. The Easimbazar factors complained in 1682 that 
I athuradas stayed there for about a month giving con­
siderable sum of money for raw silk and even endeavoured.
59
to entice away some of the Company’s picars. In the 
same year they reported that the picars demanded 
unreasonable -prices and two of their ring leaders, 
ChaturTyiai and Govindji in collusion with I athuradas, 
succeeded in luring away a. great number of picars who 
promised (on penalty of Rs.1,000) not to deal with the
58. Fact, Records, Hugli, Vol. 2, pt. f. 9S. The 
value of 15 chests of treasure is calculated on the 
basis of the data found in Factory Records, Hugli, 
Vol. 2, pt. 11, f. 101 and A.G-.D. , Range 11, Vol.41# 
ff, 21,26.
59. Fact. Records, Easimbazar, Vol.2, Diary. 2 June 1682,
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Company. I athuradas offered these picars, as the
60
factors reported, ’a great price*• The Court
directed the Bengal Council to free itself from
the monopolising clutches of F athuradas and others
by forming a joint stock of a hundred merchants hut
the Company failed to organise such a joint stock 
61
in Bengal. In 1684 I athuradas, still the chief 
verchant of the Company, was found buying up cloth 
around Bacca, much to the displeasure and hindrance
/“ O
of the Company.'^ The Company was further displeased 
with him when he was found very ’importunate* to get 
hack his principal of Rs.14,000 with interest from the 
Company.
As a result, perhaps, when the Company resettled
in Bengal after a brief withdrawl following the war of
1686-88, it tried to get rid of 1 athuradas. Job Charnock,
the Agent in Bengal, wrote to Stanley in Fugli to contract
with Sudanand, Chaturmal and other merchants and not ’to
have anything to do with Fatbura, that notorious villain*,
63
and to ’utterly reject him* . He advised. Charles Eyre
at Jacca to procure from the nawab ’as much as possible
-------------------  Vol.4, pt.I, f.29•
60. Fact. Records, Easimbazar, Vol. 2, Diary.17 June 1682;/
61. D.B., 3 Sept. 1683, Vol. SO, f. 21£. "  ^ '
62. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 6, pt 11, f. 152;Vol.10,f.207. 
63* Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 5, pt. I, f. 7.
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that he (T athuradas) may he discountenanced in such a
64-
manner as to leave Bengal’ . It appears that the 
English received a par wan a from the nawah on Ali Akbar, 
the faujdar of Fugli, warning 1 athuradas that if he 
indulged in future in his ’ill behaviour’ to the English, 
it would result in his total expulsion from the country.
But it was hardly put into effect, the obvious reason
65being the credit and influence enjoyed by } athuradas.
The fanjdar, as the factors reported was severely 
displeased with the parwana and wrote to the diwan that 
a person who brought Rs.18,000 to the King’s treasury 
could hardly to be turned out of the country/' The 
Company also soon realised that it was not possible to 
procure full investment in Bengal without the cooperation 
of I athuradas who by 1691 had. become one of the most 
influential merchants in Fugli. The Court directed the 
Bengal Agency to adjust all differences with I athuradas 
and to hold a ’fair correspondence’ with him. They further
64. Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 5, pt. I, f. 15. Similar 
instructions were issued frequently by Job Charnock to 
different factories, vide, Fact. Records, Calcutta,
Vol. 1, pt. I, ff. 21,30,41? Vol. 9, pt. I, f*40*
65* Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 9? pt. I, f. 76.
66. Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 9, pt. I, f. 150. As the 
Hindus generally paid 5; as customs during the period, 
the value of Fathuradas’ annual trade (exclusive of the 
investment provided for the Company, since these 
commodities for the Company’s investment were exempted 
from customs duty and carried by the Company’s dastak) 
could not be less than about 4 lakhs of rupees.
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wrote that they had reports not only from Englishmen 
hut from Indians and Armenians that he was ’competently 
rich’ and ’his masters in 'Dacca are men of very great 
estates, money’d men and who can upon occasion take up 
what money they please at small rates under 6 p.c. per 
annum and make very great investments beforehand in 
whatever goods you shall order either at i alda, Dacca,
Patna- or Benaras’* The Company knew it could not buy 
commodities from Mathuradas or cause him to nrovide goods•i. w
altogether so cheap as it could by giving out money in
advance to picars. But now as the Bengal goods were
’fetching’ a very good price in England and on the Continent,
the Company’s main concern was for a greater investment
and therefore it asked the Bengal Council to enlarge
investment even by allowing Mathuradas 10 to 12 p.c.
commission if he would provide sufficient commodities
6 7for the Company. In. August. 1693 Mathuradas visited
Sutanuti factory and undertook to provide commodities
68
worth more than rupees one lakh with his own money.
Later in that year the Court directed the Bengal Council 
to ask Mathuradas to provide as much raw silk as he 
could, allowing him ’competent profit to his content’,
67. P . B . ,  22 Jan. 1692, Vol. 92, f. 179.
68. 0.0. , 19 Aug. 1693, no. 5886, Letter no. 22, Vol. 50.
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it (siIk) being 1 the very best commodity tbat e ould
69
be sent from India* *
A.part from Fathuradas* monopolistic designs,
the great concern to the Company was his dealings with
the Interlopers and the French who frequented Bengal
during this period. Occasionally, he acted as broker
70
to the French Company also. It can be assumed that 
his attempt to buy raw silk or niece - goods in theJ~ O Jte. s—'
inland marts was motivated mainly by the desire to supply 
the Interlopers and the French. In fact, he was the 
mainstay of the Interlopers in Bengal as is evident 
from the Court1s letter in 1693-*.*Mno Interlopers, if 
they could (meaning if the Bengal Council could reconcile 
!'■ athuradas) , would adventure to Bengal., their hopes and 
confidence of male inn a vovage being singly in that man”.
W  W  W  w  v
In order to frustrate the activities of the Interlopers 
in Bengal, the Court gave instruction to settle all. 
quarrels ■ ith ! athuradas and reconcile him by allowing
71
a substantial profit in his investment for the Company.
I' athuradas was a typically shrewd merchant, always aiming 
at maximum bargains, even ready to go back on his words 
when there was a chance of a nreater orofit. The Bengal
69. D.3. , 27 Oc.t. 169?, Vol. 92, ff. 297-°8.
70. Pact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 6, ^t. 11, "f. ?Q.
71. P.P., in Vpril 169?, Vol. 92, f. 256.
Council reported in 1693 that though he had entered into
an agreement with Agent Ellis to provide an investment
of Es.70,non; with the arrival of the french as prospective
buyers, HatTvuradas informed the Council that he was not
going to comply with the contract, Thomas Pitt, the
great Interloper (who later on "became the governor of
72
Port St, G-eorge) , was a friend of I athuradas,
Though I athuradas was the chief merchant of the
English Company in Hugii and provided a large part of the
Company’s investment, he was not in the least subservient
to it. '"/hen implored by the Company not to deal with the
Interlopers, he shrewdly replied that being a merchant in
the’King’s country’, he was free to correspond and deal
73
with anyone he liked. The Company, however, tried 
repeatedly to dissociate him from the Interlopers but 
with little success, A very interesting report in this 
respect was sent by the Bengal Ooi;uei'L in 1694 which is 
worth quoting here in length -,r. . . we sent for ] athuradas 
from Hugli and made him many fair promises by way (of) 
encouragement in order to the withdrawing him. from the 
Interlopers, telling him how that he had no occasion to creep 
to such a sort of people whose residence and trade was
72. O.C., 14 Oct. 1693? no, 5886, fetter no. 84, Vol. 50;
B.W.Addl. Mss., 22,842, Vol. 1, f. 74._
73. Hact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 3, pt. RL? 130,
but for a year, that our house was the most safe and
securest hold and more for his reputation and credit
to he concerned with so ancient a people as the Rt.
Hon1hie Company who were able to protect him from any
affront or injury he might at one time or other receive
74
from the government, that we would always keep his7 u.
hands employed and he concerned with him so far as he 
could he able to manage«... provided he would not deal 
with the Interlopers, Your Honours* enem ie s, and many 
more expressions to this effect, upon which he made 
many solemn deprecations that he knew no other house
UluS
than ours and that his first rise^from us whom he would 
serve to the utmost of his power, that he had no occasion 
to serve a new people*s interest when the old was so 
potent and fresh in his memory, that he would endeavour 
to disengage himself from the Interlopers as soon as 
possible, and much more to this effect was his disclosure, 
hut notwithstanding all his promises, we cannot hut acquaint 
your Honours, he was proved false to your interest by 
continually corresponding with and assisting the Interlopers
74» The Company claimed, in 1697 of * giving him all 
assistance in. our power which was not a little 
serviceable to him with late troubles by securing 
him from the claws of the government when a more 
eminent merchant than himself felt the smart’* vide, 
Hact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 6, pt. TT, f. 51* The 
trouble referred to here was probably caused by 
hathuradas’ transactions with Sobha Singh who rebelled 
against the hughals in 1696.
13-4
in all their designs....he is a person whose convetoneness
"blinds all other considerations whatever which makes him
75
rich at all....". A.s the Company could not dispense
wi th th e s e r vi c e s of Math, nr ad as, th e B en g al C ounc i 1
continued to carry on as friendly a correspondence with
him as uossible, and at the beginning of 1694 gave him an
76
advance for goods amounting to Rs.170,000. The Court 
advised the Bengal Council in 16g6 that inspite of all 
the allegations against Fathuradas being true, they should 
keep him in employment as fhe has a great stock and potent 
friends1 and asked them to send his goods with a distinctive 
mark so that the Company could know for itself the quality 
of goods supplied by him. In the same letter, however, 
they pointed out that the last' consignment of goods 
delivered by him to Captain Dorill ’was very good and some
77of such sort of which our factors could never send*.
The question might be asked here why I athuradas 
was suddenly considered so indispensable to the Company 
after all the dispacing remarks made about him earlier.
The obvious answer is that the Company knew he was a 
merchant of very large credit and influence who could 
assist it not only for providing investment for Europe
75* O.C., 14 Dec. 1694, no. 5949, Vol. 50.
76. Fact. Records, Fisc., Vol. 5A, f. 268; 0.0., 14 Bee.
1694, no. 5949, Vol. 50.
77* D.B., 14 Fay, 1696, Vol. 92, f. 494.
but also supplying money at low rates of interest*
In 1696 the Court wrote to Bengal - MIf your stock
should fall short, we may reasonably expect that
I’ athuradas should he willing to assist you at *
moderate interest, we being well assured he can
have credit of the great men in Dacca at 4 p.c, per 
78
annum". Perhaps this was why the Company could
not get rid of him* He even attempted to monopolise
the sale of some of the Burope - commodities imported
to Bengal* Quite a few times he offered to buy all
the broadcloth imported yearly by the Company. In
1698 he was about to enter into a contract with the
Company to buy silver worth rupees two lakhs but
ultimately abandoned it fearin- exactions from the 
79nawab *
Put the Company was gradually becoming more 
concerned at his ’monopolising temper’ and the hindrance 
created by his formation of ’rings’ with other merchants 
It seems that the Bengal Council was really exasperated 
when in 169? I athuradas, in collusion with two other
73. D.B., 14 hay, 1696, Vol. 92, V. 49?.
79. Pact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 3, pi. h  f* 121.
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eminent merchants, U day char an and O-oculohand, refused
to accept the Company’s dadney or advance, unless his
two compatriots Nainsook and Prananath (who were debtors
to the Company) were reinstated as merchants to the
Company, and G-olohray (whose father was alleged to he
his enemy) was turned out of the Company’s service. ,,fihis
insolence in I athuradas", the Calcutta factors reported,
"is greatly owing to the countenance he hath had from
this Agency, for upon Captain Dorill’s arrival he was
at the brink of destruction, his credit ruined, and could
not have subsisted above a year longer, but the erroneous
account that was given of him to the Rt. Hon’ble Company
gained their esteem and got him credit again after he
80
received their imprest money". The Company, however,
did not comply with his demands and when the Council
found that he had made no application for dadney, divided
the ’imnrest1 money designed for him to the amount of
81
Rs.250,000 amongst other merchants. Put soon I athuradas
reconciled himself with the Company and received dadney
82
for the investment amounting to Rs.100,000. In 1700 
I' athuradas seemed to have been assisting the hew Company
80. Pact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. pt. TT, ff, 128-29
81. Pact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 3, pt. TT, ff, 140-41
82. Pact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 3, pt. 11, :"f. 155
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more actively ard atood security for it for the payment
of customs if it failed to procure the Emperor’s farm an
85
for a free trade in Bengal, " Early that year, following
his failure to obtain a nighan from the Prince, the Old
Company’s factors reported that he had become ’the ridicule
of the province’ , ’his reputation sunk’ , and that he became
84
entirely the New Company’s ’creature’. But by 1702,
as the Port William General Letter reports, 1 athuradas was
’grown very old and going off the stage who hath been a
bird raised unto pick (peak*5 at your own eyes’. It adds
further - 1 Although he is grown very rich since the New
Company’s settling in Hugli, yet without the interest of
the English within'five years would be brought to as low
85an ebb as he was on Captain Dorill’s arrival” • In that
very year in which this letter was written he was turned
out of the lew Company’s services, and he and his brother
86
Bullubdas were replaced by Jay Krishna as broker. But 
this apparently did no harm to the trading activities of 
Tathuradas’ firm. With his brother, two sons, Bittuldas 
and Dwarakadas, and two other friends, Paran and G-ossairam, 
he traded considerably maintaining gomastas in all the
85. Pecords of Port St. George, betters to Po^t St. George,
1692-1700, p. 42, ~ ~ _ _
84. Ibid., p. 41; Pact. Records, Calcutta, Pol. 7, pt.ill,P.14
85. O.C., 24 Dec 1 1702, no. 8097, Vol. 65.
86. 0,0., 28 Aug. 22 Sent. 29 Sent. 1702, no. 7913, Vol. 64;
24 bee. 1702, no. 8097, Vol/65.
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■trading centres of Bengal. Even In 1708, after the
■union of t^e two Companies, the Court of Directors
were still so apprehensive of his credit and influence
that they wrote "his monopoUsing temper hath been
87
such as to make us look upon him (as) dangerous".
r athuradas* real crisis and actnal ruin came 
not from the withdrawl of the patronage of the English 
Company, but from his speculation in revenue farming, 
The English factors reported in 1705 -"•** that family 
has suffered much by Mathuradas his engagement with%J w>
government and farming revenues which involved them in
many troubles from vhich he has not been able to free 
perfectly
himseIfj though his endeavours have cost him a great 
e x p e n s e  of time and money1• H e  d i e d  in 1706, Tworth 
hut little money* and it was said that his family *was 
near ruined b e ^ o ^ e  he d i e d  T r r his e u ^ ' a n e m e ' n - t  to t’ne%J ' w  w
88
r overnment* •
Among the Easimbazar merchants, the two most 
influential ones were Sukanand and Chaturmal Shah. Both 
of them, it appears, we^e mainly shroffs or bankers, 
though more frequently than not, they traded in other
87. D.B., 26 Eeb. 1701, Vol. 95, f. 58.
88. O.C., 23 ' D e c .  1705, no. 8416, Vol. 68*, 29 Dec. 1706, 
n.o. 8408, ff. 27,56-57* Vol. 68.
commodities and provided part of the Compares investment 
in Bengal. 'The names of both these merchants were 
mentioned frequently in the records of the Company as 
eminent merchants of Fasimbazar. Before his death in 
1680, Sukanand Shah was definitely a merchant of greater 
influence and credit than Chaturmal. He used to buy 
quite a substantial part of the treasure imported by the 
Company and most often lent money to the Company for its 
investment in different factories. He performed the 
function of a banker too, issuing bills of exchange or 
letters of credit in favour of the Company whenever it 
needed them. A few examples of his transactions of this 
nature with the Company can be cited here. In Fay 1677 
the Company procured from him letters of credit on hps 
gom.asta at Patna to pay Job Oharnook what money he 
required at the usual rate of interest. In March 1679 
the English factors borrowed Hs.30,000 from Sukanand for 
sending to Patna. In October that year, he issued bills 
of exchange for Es.20,000 each to Patna and Dacca in 
favour of the Comuanv. T'Text r^ear his vomasta Par am an and
•*- w_._--------------
Shah gave Rs.20,000 to the factory at h alda and the Company
89
further requested Sukanand to supply it with m o r e  money.
8°. Pact. Records, Fasimbazar, Vol. 1, Diary t Consult.,
28 Fay 1677; 23 Parch 1679? 15 Oct.. 1679? 15 Jan. 1680;
Pact. Records, I alda, Vol. 1, Diary, 13 hay 1680.
That he was a great shroff whom the Company relied 
k T»eatl.y is evident from, a Fasimbazar letter - "Wew  ' U
finding no market for our treasure unless dispose of
it underrate much to the disadvantage of the Honourable
Company, our chief and ablest shroff (Silk an and) being 
°0dead"♦
Though mainly a shroff, Sukanand traded in 
other com: odities as well, sometimes making attempts 
at monopoly, specially of Europe - goods imported to 
Bengal. In 1677 he proposed to buy all the broadcloth 
and silver that eame to Bengal yearly. Though Fhemcband 
had made the same proposal to bi;iy broadcloth two years 
earlier, the Company ultimately negotiated with Sukanand 
and agreed to sell all its broadcloth to him. But he did 
not get the exclusive monopoly to buy all the silver. As 
late as 1680, a few days before his death, he again made
91an offer to buy all the silver.
Ohaturmal was another eminent shroff of Fasimbazar 
who had substantial transactions with the Company. From 
time to time, he used to buy treasure from the Company and 
sometimes managed the affairs of the Company at the mint at
90, Fact. Records, Fasimbazar, Vol. 2, Diary t Consult.,
24 Sept. 1680.
91. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 1, Diary & Consult., 28 July 
1677? 9 Aug. 1677; Fact. Records, Fasimbazar, Vol. 1, 
Diary & Consult., 28 Fay, 16 June, 9 Aug., 13 Aug. 1677
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Rajmahal. He had an efficient gomasta there whose
92
help was frequently sought by the Company. His
son Domurmal and several gomastas like Udayehand and
Fatechund helped him in his multifarious trading
operations. Occasionally he used to buy lead, tin,
copper plates etc. from the Company,whenever he found
93the transaction profitable. He had close correspondence 
with Mathuradas, and seems to have assisted the latter 
in his various investments. We have noticed earlier 
that the Company had complained once that he and Mathuradas 
were the ringleaders who incited the silk picars at 
Fasimbazar to refuse to deliver silk at the Company*s 
price and offered them lucrative prices if sold to 
Mathuradas •
Throughout the period, the rings formed by the
merchants and their bargaining position were^great concern
for the Company. Despite the fact that they also acted
as brokers to the Company, the Bengal merchants could
effectively bargain with the Company which in most cases
had to submit to their terms as we have seen earlier. Those
were definitely not isolated instances. Even as late as
1702, the Company had to yield to the pressure of the
92. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 6, pt. It, f.154; Fact. Records, 
Fasimbazar, Vol. 4* pt.I, f.30*.
93* Fact. Records, Fasimbazar, Vol. I, Diary & Consult.,
13 Aug. 1677; 5 Jan. 18 Jan. 1678.
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Armenian merchants. The Council in Calcutta reported
that, since the Armenian merchants were ’holding; together
to beat down1 the freight of goods for Gombroon and Basra,
they contracted with Khoja Surhaud Israeli who offered
thirty eight thousand, rupees ’to have the whole ship for 
04
the voyage’.' The Company, however, tried many times to 
break such rings and the bargaining position of the Bengal 
merchants, specially their monopolistic designs, by fostering 
the formation of a joint stock in every factory in Bengal.
The advantages of such a joint stock were well summed up 
by the Court in 1684 - First, it would save the Company 
from making any bad debt; secondly, it would make it easier 
to dispose of Europe - commodities by distributing those 
annually among the joint stock merchants at the time of 
the contract and thirdly, in case of the late arrival of 
ships from Europe and the consequent shortage of funds 
(which occurred quite frequently) the joint stock merchants
94* Fact. Accords, Calcutta, Vol. 4, f. IB.
Khoja Surhaud Israeli was one of the most influential 
Armenian merchants in Bengal during the ’nineties of 
the 17th and early part of the 18th century, trading 
extensively on his own account, as also providing 
investment for the Company. In 1697 the Company 
contracted with him for the provision of commodities 
worth Rs.250,000, vide. Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol.3,
pt. TT, ff. 228-29*
would provide goods with their own funds. From the
early ’eighties of the century directions were sent to
different inland factories to form a joint stock of
merchants, with about 100 shares, each amounting to the
value of Rs.5C0 or Rs.1,000* These merchants, it was
proposed, should choose from among themselves a chief
merchant who was to he the president and seven or eight
to he his council. This body was to handle the whole
96
business of the joint stock. The model was obviously
borrowed from I adras where the Company had already
fostered such a joint stock of merchants in 1680, though
such a system was actually first organised in Pulicat
97sometime earlier.' In Bengal, however, the Company
95. B.B., 5 Par, 1684, Vol. 90, ff. 260-61.
£6. D.B., 21 Bee. 1685, Vol. 90, f. 245? 0.0., 4 Sent.
1684. no. 5190, Vol. 44.
97* Records of Fort St. Oeorge, Mary and Consultation Book, 
1680 - 81, p. '4%
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failed to organise a joint stock* It may well be 
asked why the Company failed in Bengal when it could 
organise, such a joint stock in Madras* In the absence 
of any direct evidence, it may be argued that the 
influence, power and credit of the Bengal merchants- 
who perhaps apprehended that a joint stock, with its 
various obligations to the Company, would reduce their 
independence and curtail their bargaining position and 
monopolistic designs - frustrated the attempts of the 
Company* It is interesting to note that in Madras, too, 
there was considerable apathy among the great merchants 
to join a joint stock and only by
98* It is interesting to note the different observations
on the question of forming a joint stock from different 
factories in Bengal* From Dacca -"••• this can never
be done here, the people are as wicked and envious.
sort of people as the world affords and they are for 
destroying (not assisting)/ one another, they will be. 
and are sometimes 2 or 3 at most (and will be not, more)/ 
in partnership, all equal"• From Malda - "We do not 
apprehend which way it will make for Hon’ble Company’s 
interests to have the country merchants jointly...they 
yearly joining hand in hand for their own interests, will 
leave no stone unturned whereby they may raise the prices 
of what goods are to be provided and lower what goods are 
to be sold.....It is observed the best policy in this 
country is to deal distinct, not having one merchant 
present at contracting with another by which means may 
bring them to comply at cheaper and more reasonable 
terms"* From Patna- "We much doubt, of bringing our old. 
or new petremen to it, we knowing by experience, they 
are unwilling to trust their own brothers, much less to 
be securities for one another which makes us fear, the. 
abler sort will not be brought to it", vide, Fact.Records, 
Hugli, Vol. 10, ff. 165,182-83, 195.
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offering Pedda Yenkatadry the post of first and chief
merchant and giving 25 out of 100 shares to the13ompary1
of Yenkatadry and Cussa Muddo Yerona, while 7 other chief
merchants had only 2 if shares each, that the Company 
oo
succeeded^""Of course, the social and political factors 
in Madras were quite different from those in Lengal. The 
strong caste affiliations of the merchants in Madras and 
the fact that they lived there under the Company*s rule 
made it easier for the Company to organise them into a 
joint stock. Lut the position in Lengal was quite 
different. There were too many great merchants Like 
Khemchand, Ohintaman and Mathuradas who could easily 
defy the Company and carry on their own business which 
Yenkatadry and his fellow merchants in Madras perhaps 
could not. The fact that during the ’eighties of the 
century, the English Company’s trade in Lengal was greater 
than that in Madras precludes any suggestion that a joint 
stock was essential in Madras for a greater investment 
there than, any where else. In Surat, too, though the
investment was not as big as it was in Lengal, the Company
/
did not or perhaps could not organise a joint stock of
merchants. In the beginning of the 18th century, however,
the Lengal Agency wrote to the Court that a joint stock of
99. Lecords of Port St. George, Diary and Consultation Look, 
TT PE q ' r .-15, 13.
116
merchants would not work to the benefit of the Company 
100
in bengal. The reasons for such assertion cannot
be traced in the records of the Company.
fee, pal r erchar; ts* overseas trade
It has already been suggested that the ^engal
merchants were active both in the inland and overseas
trade on their own account, irrespective of their business
with the Company* Ir fact, the merchants of Bengal had
 ^long - estab1ished tradition in overseas trade and
kept it alive throughout the 17th century. The Portuguese
traveller, Barbosa found in the beginning of the 16th
century many merchants in the fport of Bengala* who owned
ships and traded to halabar, Cambay, Pegu, Tenasserim,
101
Sumatra, Ceylon and Malacca. At the end of the 15th
sailed
century, every year four or five ship3/from Bengal to
^102
Malacca or Sumatra with provisions and textiles* Bengal
1
ships also traded with the Red Sea ports of Aden and Jeddah 
At the' beginning of the 17th century, Pyrard de Laval found
100. P . P . ,  5 Mar. 1702, Vol. 9 3 ,  f. 342.
101. P. 3arbosa, The Book of......   (ed.), M.L. Barnes, Vol
p. 145
102. M.A.P. ! eilink Roelofz, Asian Trade and Buropear 
Influence, p.3
103* H .L . Chab1ani, The Bconomic Condition of India during 
the Sixteenth Century. p. 'SO.
147
Bengal merchants in the Island of Maldive and named
one Mohammed rCoca’ as an honourable, rich and discreet
104
merchant of Bengal* At the time of the Mughal attack
on Hugli in 1652, there were at least 12 or 15 local
105
merchants there who operated with a large capital*
The first attempt of the Butch Company to open up trade
with Bengal after the fall of the Portuguese was frustrated
106
by the opposition of the muslim. merchants of Hugli. In
1645 the Danes seized several ships of the Bengal merchants
hy way of reprisal for injuries stiffered at the hands of
the local authorities in Bengal* In 1665 out of 12 muslim
107
ships to Achin, 4 "belonged to the merchants of Bengal.
.<hen Bowrey visited Lengal in the 1 seventies of the century
the ¥. aw ah and the merchants of Hugli, Balasore and Pipli
had ahout *20 saile of ships of considerable burthen that
108
annually traded to sea’•
As regards the activities of the several merchants 
discussed in the previous section, in the external trade of 
the country, we can have some idea of the ventures of the 
two Balasore merchants. Both Fhemchand and Ohintaman 
took an active part in overseas trade during this period.
104* Pyrard de haval, op.cit., Vol.I, pp. 256,25?,532-53•
105. Sebastian kanrique, op.cit. , Vol. II, p. 5917 *
106. T. Baychaudhuri, op.cit., p. 76.
107. Dagh Register, 9 or 10 March 1.665, quoted in P..F ,
? ukherjee, Economic History of India, p. 15°.
108. Bowrey, on * cit * , pp. T?>8, 17$-80.
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They owned ships which sailed on trading voyages to 
different countries and sometimes these ships were 
owned jointly by them. It is a great pity that the 
Balasore factory records, which could have given us 
a graphic picture of the foreign trade of these two 
merchants, are extant, only for the years 1679 to 1687* 
and that too with many gaps in between. The records 
of the Butch Company which are more detailed in their 
information fail to give us an unbroken series of lists 
of ships with their cargoes that either left or arrived 
at Hugli and Balasore. The Butch factors claimed that 
they collected these lists yearly from the customs house 
in the ports of Bengal. Since it will give an unreliable 
picture if only one consolidated list is drawn up 
chronologically of the trading vessels of the two Balasore 
merchants by combining the two sources, it would be better 
to consider the two tables derived separately from the two 
different sources.
TABLB 1 On the basis of Balasore Factory Recordss-109
Owner
Khemchand
Khemchand
Khemchand
Ohintaman
Khemchand
Khemchand &
Ohintaman
Khemchand &
Ohintaman
Ohintaman
Khemchand &
Ohintaman
Arriving from Commodities Bate of entry
Tenasserim
Tenasserim
Tenasserim
Achin
Cochin China 
Tenasserim 
♦Coringo* (?)
brought
21 elephants 
elephants
elephants
elephants, 
chanks,cloves 
elepahnts
elephants
20 March, 1680 
29 Jan. 1684 
29 Jan. 1684
5 Feb. 1684
21 Mar. 1684 
1 April 1684
5 May 1684
6 May 
15. Hov.
1684
1686
109* The,:' list is prepared from the Biaries of various dates 
in the Factory Records, Balasore, Vol. I.
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TABLE 2 (On the basis of the records of the Butch East
India Company) 110
A. Outbound Ships 
Owner Bestination
Khemchand Tenasserim
Commodities Bate of
Sail
Name of 
Ships
200 mds.ghee,100 7 Jan.,1682 Guruprosad 
mds.oil,piece- 
goods*
Khemchand Gale (Ceylon) 500 mds.rice, 28
piece-goods
Khemchand Gale 1,000 mds.rice, 4
-goods •
Ohintaman Jaffnapatam 700 mds.rice, 25
10 mds .cummin,
Jan*1682 Bhagabatprosad
Feb*1682 rModiaheddy' 
Feb.1682 Krishnaprosad
Khemchand Gale
Ohintaman Maldives
Khemchand Gale
100 mds.long 
pepper,4 mds. 
opium, 50 mds. 
peas,piece-goods.
1,400 mds.rice, 21 Feb. 1685 Bhagabatprosad 
piece-goods.
600 mds-rice, 25' Feb*1685 Keshari 
50 mds .butter,
525 piece-goods.
7.000 mds .rice, 5 Mar. 1685 ,Moemeddyr 
5 mds.candy sugar,
piece-goods.
Ohintaman Maldives 5,500 mds*rice, 18 Feb.1684
50 mds*011,50
mds • but ter, 800 
piece-goods.
600 mds.rice, 21 Feb.1684 --
piece-goods.
15.000 mds.rice, 9 Mar.1684 -- 
400 mds.sugar,20 
mds* sugar,2,200 
piece-goods.
9.000 mds.rice, 9 Mar.1684 —
800 md s.sugar,50
mds.silk,10 mds. 
opium,250 mds.oil,
150 mds.saffron,500 
mds.butter,120 mds. 
cummin,lOOmds. peas.
110. The list has been prepared from K.A., Yol. 1267,ff*1358 - 
1341, 1399-1402; Yol.1276, ff.ll78vo, 1264vo,1266;Vol.1292, 
ff. 498vo, 555; Vol.1505, ff.309vo - 510*
Chintaman Gale
Khemchand Gale
Khemchand Achin
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B. Inbound. 
Own^r
Eli e in eh and
Eh ewehand 
Ehemehand
Chintarnan
Ehemchand 
Ohintawan
Ehemchand
Chintaman 
Eh ewehand
Shins
Arriving
from
Tenasserim
Commodities hate of
Entry
i ay.1682
Eame of 3^ips 
Guruprosad
Gale
Gal e
22 elephants, 6 
50 mds,staff 
copper,4-0 mds. 
spelter,20 mds. 
tin,2 casks of 
porcelain,
7 elephants, 10 Aug,1682 Shagahatprosad 
40 mds.arrack,
12 lbs.nutmeg.
11 elephants, 12 Sept,1632 ’Iosiaheddy * 
225 mds,arrack,
2,000 coconuts,
800 ’cahan’ 
cowries,
Jaffnapatam 5 elephants, 21 Sept, 1682 Pro sad 
4000 cowries,
1 md. nutmeg, 
i  md.mace, 1-fr 
md,cinnamon,
12 elephants,
50 mds.tin.
1,800 fcaban* 
cowries,500 
coconuts.
Tenasserim 
Mai di ve s
Gale
11 ] ay.1683 
1 Sept,1683
Gale
..chin
1.4 elephants, Oct. 1683 
1000 f cahand 
cowries,200 mds. 
arrack,10 mds, 
c i nn. am o n , 8m d s. 
nutmeg.
2 elephants,
750 mds, arrack,
36,000 cowries.
22 elephants, i ay.168 5
18 seers gold
I arch.1685
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The two tables, specially the second one, 
help us to form a fairly good idea of the direction 
and composition of the external trade of the two Lexical 
merchants. It is apparent that in overseas trade as 
in inland trs.de, Ehemchand was more active than his 
p ar tn e r and. c o 11 e agr. e Chint am an. Zh e me h and1 s trade 
was mainly with Gale in Ceylon, though ho traded at 
th e s am e t in e wi th T er as s er im and Ic M r  also, 0h in t am an 
was more concerned with the Island of Faldive, though 
his trading vessels went to Jaffrapatam and Gale also.
The commodities exported by these merchants to the Eastern 
Islands Cot prised mainly rice, hr tier, oil, sugar, gh e e 
and piece-goods. Besides these, they also exported long 
pepper, opium, silk, saffron , little peas etc. The most 
important item of import was elephant, Fo ship of t^es0 
merchants came home without elephants. Obviously elephants 
were arite a profitable commodity to sell to the Fawabs, 
zemindars and other high officials of the State, Other 
items of import consisted of tin, cowries, cinnamon,copper, 
nutmeg, spelter#, arrack, porcelain and even jold. The 
two merchants confined their overseas trade to the islands 
in the Eastern leas and had no trade with the Western Coast 
of India. This was perhaps dre to the fact that they 
could hardly withstand the competition of the Srrat
152
merchants who were the principal participants in this
branch of trade. It seems that Bengal-Surat trade was
a monopoly of the Surat merchants. Out of 10 indigenous
ships that sailed from Bengal for Surat between Dec. 1681
and January 1684, all except one (which belonged, to
Zulphicar Zban, the Siamese King’s gomasta in Bengal)
belonged to Surat merchants and not a single one to Bengali 
111
merchants. Even the ships of the great Surat merchant,
Abdul G-of fur traded with Bengal and as this branch of trade
was quite profitable the Surat merchants tried to exclude
112
other competitors from it.
Except -for tathuradas, we do not have any evidence
of other Bengal merchants’ (discussed in the previous section)
overseas trading activities which probably implies that
they did not take part in it. But I athuradas took part
in the external trade of the country, though it seems, on
a limited scale. As early as 1.683 his gomasta at Patna,
Ramdas, was reported to be procuring goods for a ship
113
intending to sail for Surat. In 1700 a ship belonging
to him was captured by the Portuguese for want of a pass
114and taken to G-oa. It seems Thomas Pitt, who was then
111. F.A., Vol. 1267, ff.1357v o-1340j Vol. 1276, ff. 1176vo; 
Vol. 1292, ff. 498vo, 499, 533-534vo.
112. FA A., Vol.1276, f.!264vo: Vol. 1292, f.498vo.
113. Pact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 9, f• 151.
114. B.M. Addl. Mss., 22,842, Vol.l, f.74.
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governor of Fort St. George, assisted him in his
overseas trade ventures* Sometimes he freighted
English ships, as in 1702, together with Armenian
115
merchants for trading voyages to Surat. But it
is quite certain that his activities in the external
trade of the country was not as extensive as those of
his fellow merchants, Ehemchand and Chintaman.
An interesting feature in the composition
of Bengal merchants engaged in overseas trade in the
17th century was the presence of subadars, faujdars and
other members of the ruling class in Bengal. As early
as the ’forties of the century, we find the subadar of
Bengal, Shah Shuja, had his own ships engaged in overseas
trade. lie even tried to monopolise some sectors of the
province’s external trade and made himself the sole purchaser
of elephants, one of the chief items of the Butch Company’s
116
import to Bengal. In 1651 a ’junk* belonging to the
fauidar of ^wli went to gombroon with different merchandiseU -- o
117
and to bring back horses as a return cargo. In 1654 
the Butch Company refused, many applications made by
1 governor Jafter’ tor mu. slim vessels to Ehedda., Colombo
115. 0.0., 21 Bee. 1701, . k no, 7607. Vol. 63;
27 Jan. 1702, no. 7837; Vol. 63.
116. T. Raychaudhuri, op.cit., p. 76.
117. O.c., 8 lay 1651, no. 2219, Vol. 22; E.F.I., 1651-54 
p. 63.
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and Cochin. But the Company wa.s, however, obliged to 
rant two passes tor two of the 1 awah1s vessels to 
Tenasserim and Achi? , and. one for the f an jd ar * s to the 
Island of T'aldive. Che Dutch also issued three more 
passes for the vessels of nawah Fawazish Eh.an, the
118
f an j d ar o f Ra j m. ah. al and Ahme d Rev, e x-f auj d ar o f Hiig It* 
Igain in 1656 the faujdar of F.ugli appealed for a pass 
for hie vessels to Colombo and Shah Shuja had ashed for 
es for Coi ombo, n
of
these requests were politely refused because/ Shah Shuja*s 
attempt to monopolise some sectors of the province*s 
external trade. Che Dutch Company similarly refused a 
request for the services of one of their mates for a ship
11 o
sailing for Persia.
A cursory glance at the list of the Bengal ships 
that were engaged in overseas trade between 1682 and 1684 
reveals that except the ships of the two Balasore
merchants, all the others belonged to the members of the
118. Translation of Dutch Records, Vol. 18T, no. DL.
The possession of a pass from a Company rendered the 
ship of an individual, merchant immune from seizure and 
confiscation by the ships of that uarticular Company.
119. Ibid,, Vol, 1ST, no. DL.
e pass system, its impact on the coi ition, extent 
and direction of the foreign trade of the merchants of 
Bengal, and the various objects tor which the European 
Companies enforced it, has been discussed by Om Prakash, 
,TThe European Trading Companies and the T enchants of 
Bengal, 1650-1725", Indian h qi ic and Social >story 
Review, Vol. I, Fo. 5, 19 b 4.
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ruling class* In fact, Buzurg ITmeed Khar, the nawab
of* Patna, sent "between December 1681 and December 1683,
four ships to Tenasserim, 0-ale and Siam with different
merchandise. T'alik Qasem, the fan.jdar of Eugli (for
sometime also of Bale sore) despatched four ships between
Jan. 1682 and Jan* 1683 to Tenasserim, Cfale and the Islands
of 1 aid i've (2). Between Jan. 1682 and I arch 1684 > four
ships of nawao Nurullah Khan of Orissa traded to Pegu
and aldives* Even n aw ah Shaista Khan, the subadar of
Bengal, had a share in this branch of trade* In January
1682 one of his ships sailed for the Island of Faldive
and a* other for Tenasserim. 1 asib Khan, the shah ban dar
of Balasore, who was referred by Bowrey as an eminent 
120
merchant, sent between Jan. 1682 and Jan. 1683 three
ships to the Islands of Kaldive (2) and Tenasserim. The
next Shahbandar, Sbuia Khan, was equally interested in
overseas t r a d e  and sent f o u r  ships between Jan. 1 6 8 3  a n d
121
Beb. 1684 to the Islands of I aldive (2) Achin and Gale* 
Though the evidence cited above is fragmentary in nature, 
nonetheless it helps us to form some idea of the extent, 
direction and composition of the external trade of the 
nobility In Bengal. It appears that most of the trading
120. Bowrey, ou.cit., to. 74*
121. K • A. , Vo 1*. T267, ff. 1336-1338vo, 1341; Vol. 1276, 
ff. 1176Vo - 1172; Vol. 1222, ff *498vo-B33vo-535•
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voyages of "tine rulinc class were corf ire d “to "the Easternfj o “* “* ^
seaports* The main items of export and import varied
little from those handled "by the two Balasore merchants.
A. mood idea of the size of the various ships of the Bengal
merchants can he found from the details of several ships
seized by the Company during the war (1686-88) in Bengal*
The English Company captured a ship named Balasore, 500
tons, belonging to Kalik Bnrcoordar, the fan,1 dar of Eugli.
The English further seized, and appropriated as prize
several other shirs of the Bernal merchants - ITovli 600
tons, ic^in herohant 500 tons, Dacca I erohart- 400 tons,
and gathering 270 tons, besides .Poorea Poulat 400 tors,
122belonging to tne King of Siam. Bowrey stated that he
saw a. ship of l.asib Khan, the shahbandar of Balasore, which
125
was about 500 or 600 tons. So it can be safely asserted 
that at least some of the ships of the Bengal merchants 
were of the same size as the big si ins of the European 
Oomranies engaged in Irdo-Errone an trading voya es.
«L w' V— • JL W  V  w
The nobles and the members of the ruling family 
also -freighted their goods in the ships of individual 
merchants or the European Companies* Thus as early as 
1653 vs find that the faujdar of u li sent 11 Vio.ig s of
122. O.C., 18 Arril, 24 1 ay, 1 Kov. , 6 Pec., 12 Pec. 1687, 
no. 5576, Vol. 47.
125. Bowrey, op.cit., p. 74.
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goods in one of* the Ungli o s* alik
Qasem, a f auj dar o * li, also transported his goods in
125
1672 on a Companyrs ship* The nobles often, acted
through their agents oi gomastas* Ha j i "ohammed, ar
agent of ’ alik Qasem, made a trip to G-ambroon v/ith sugar
and. other coir- odities vendible there in ore of the English
shins. As return ; cargo he broright besides 4 horses - hing
7 bales, tobacco 7 bales, rose water 1 chest, attar 10
chests, fruits 29 jars, almonds 150 mds,, arrack 2 chests
and 8 sheep. The Company brought all these commodities
freight free, except the horses and assisted : alik Qasem’s
agent with, money in Gombroon as it expected to gain *a
126
profitable influence in Hugli out of it’ , In 1687 tbs 
English captured a Spanish ship carrying considerable
quantity of goods belonging to the nawab of Cuttack from 
i 27Tenasserim, It seems that from the ’nineties of the
17th century freirhting of European ships by gengal 
merchants for trading voyages to Surat and Persia became 
a general practice, Important larval merchants like 
genarasi Seth, Janardan Seth, TThoja Surhaud Israeli used 
to freight Company’s ships for such, ventures•
124* E.F.I., 1651-54, p. IBS,
125* E.F.I,, new series, Vol. 31, p«345*
126, He cords of Port St, George, Hi. ary $ Consultation look,
1672-78, Pp. 43-44. *
127. 0.0., 12 Dec. 1687 no. 5576, Vol. 47.
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health of the Bengal P.'erchants
It is not possible to give a precise idea of 
the wealth or working capital of the Bengal merchants 
due to the complete absence of any evidence of that kind 
in contemporary records, except for some fragmentary 
evidence and there revardi.no- the total value of
the contract made b~r the English Coilmanv with these merchants%J •— * •£ XJ
or the total value of the poods of a particular ship 
belonging to a particular merchant. To rely on this 
kind of evidence for making even a conjecture about the 
wealth oh the merchants would be not only unscientific but 
also ridiculous. But it may be possible to have some very 
rough idea of the wealth of at least one of the mereh ant s 
namely, Ehemchand. There is little doubt that he was a 
rich merchant and perhaps the richest at Balasore during 
the ’seventies and ’eighties of the century. That explains 
why v.e was quite often mulcted of quite substantial sums 
by the greedy and oppressive faujdars of Balasore or nawabs 
of Orissa. A.s early as 1672 Safshi Khan, the governor of 
Orissa, arrested Ehemchand who accompanied Boremull 
(Puranmall ?) with two other merchants, Eari Oharan and 
•Jairaj Shah, to the rawab to obtain a uarwana for the 
English. The nawab imprisoned Ehemchand only, without any 
serious charge against him, and it seems only to extract
159
some money from him, Ehemchand had to buy his release
by complying end giviry security to pay Rs.10,000 in 17
128
days and Rs,20,000 i^  three months. Bnt this did not
appear to have affected in any way the financial position
of the wealthy merchant. The English factors wrote -
"Ehemchand notwithstanding his present troubles, he
hath estate sufficient to indemnify our masters which is
sufficient for our proceeding in delivering him this day
129
his share of the 25,nOO rupees being 7*500". ' Thomas
Bowrey gives a vivid description how nawab Rashid Eh an 
extracted a large sum of money from Ehemchand in 1674*
The hungry nawab, as Bowrey relates, fell on Ehemchand,
’ a great Ban j an merchant’ and ’great broker to tl e English 
Bast India Company’ and demanded rupees one lakh from him. 
Before he appeared in front of the nawab, Ehemchand took 
off his gold turban, jewels and rings, put on ’mean clothes’, 
’thereby to plead poverty’. Thenhe beyan to ’bemoan’ his 
sad accident and loss he had lately received (referring 
to the robbery of Rs,1500,000 while going to the county, 
for marrying his daughter - the truth of which was attested 
b^ r Bowrey). But the nawab was little moved by the storys %J O
and he declared that he was well satisfied now that the
128, Pact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 7, pt.I, ff.39,43a; E.R.I., 
new series, Vol. IV, p.330*
129• Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 7, pt. I, f. 45a-*
1 6 0
report of Kb emcb ar <5.’ s we al t h was no t untrue * Af t er
many apologies, and feeding the na.wab * s courtiers , he
130
rot off by paying ^s.Sn 000. If we beleive Bowrey,
_ o  t/ ^  *  * %j 1
it is any one’s guess how wealthy Khemchand was who 
could part with fifty tboinSCbnd rupees in oash to satisfy 
tbe rav/ah and spend fifteen lakhs of rupees in one daughter’s 
rnarria^  e only, while be bad several ofber children—specially'—  KJ 7 A.
hearing in mind that none of these transactions hampered 
his normal activities either in in"! and trade or overseas 
tro.de o'f' tbe country. But as we have noticed earlier,
Kbonehand’s fortunes declined considerably at the close 
of the ’eighties of the century. Still at the time of 
his death, as the English factors at Balasore reported, 
he ’left clear in money and goods ninety odd thousand
, 131rupees’»
There is mo doubt that tbe Bengal merchants 
carried on their trading transactions with large capital, 
though their fortunes never gave rise to such fabulous 
tales as tbe wealth oh Virji Vora or Abdul G-of fur of 
Surat, We have some evidence as to the size of particular 
transactions of some of the Bengal merchants. Colap Boy, 
who was mainly a shroff in Dacca and once stood security
130. Bowrey, op,cit. , pp. 132-6.
131* Pact. Hecords, Hunli, Vol., 11, f. 187•
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^or the customs to he paid "bp the English Company,
was accepted hy the nawah as security for Es *35Q,Oco
132
for the Raja of Coochbehar» In 1699 the share of the
investment designed for 1 athuradas hy the Cornu any amounted
1 33
to Rs*250,000* ' Bearing in mind that he used to provi.de
investment not only for the Old and the Pew English East 
India Companies "but also for the French and the Interlopers, 
it mieht well he said he wag worth several lakhs of rupees.W  J*i
I h o j a Surhaud, the Armenian merchant, had once contracted
134
with the Company to supply goods worth Rs.250,000, though 
his main trade was independent of his contracts with the 
Cornu any. Janardan Seth, who was the Company ’ s broker at
135
Calcutta, was reported to he worth several lakhs of rupees* 
Conelusion
It may rightly be concluded on the basis of
evidence and discussion made earlier that the Bengal
merchants throughout the period held fast to their
traditional organisation, though they had to extend the
methods generally practised but there was hardly any
innovation to encompass the new situation arising with
the appearance of the Europeans. At the same time it
132, ^act. Records, Hugli, Vol. 10, f. 119*
133* Pact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 3? pt. IT, ff•140-41*
134* Pact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 8, ut. H, ff. 228-29
135. D.B., 13 Jan. 1714, Vol. 98, f. 196.
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car be assented that the commercial aptitudes of the
Bengal merchants were certainly not inferior to those
of the Europeans. The former could perhaps claim to be
what Adam Smith called a speculative merchant who ’enters
into every trade when he foresees that it is likely to be
more than commonly profitable and quits it when he foresees
that its profits are likely to return to the level of other 
3 36trades’. It is very difficult to make an estimate of
the ^ate of profit in order to measure the incentive to 
trade in Bengal during this period. Still it may be said 
that the merchant traded on profit—motive and hence the 
rate could not be less than the current rate of interest 
which was roughly 15? to 2Of during the peniod under study.
So it mav he coniectured that the rate o^ not, -profit was atU v
least 25; to 3 ;^ • ? ff not mor^, vfe find the f au j dar of
liugli once borrowed three lakhs of rupees at 25f from the 
137
nawab and surely the fauidar expected some substantial~ A,r-'-  ^ - - w----
profit after paying"so high a rate of interest*
An analysis of the trading activities and methods 
jveals the keenest competition among 
buyers and sellers, au eager search for exclusive information,
136. footed by T-u.cy S. Sutherland, A condor her chant, 1695—
1774 p. 1°.
137. oVor! 28 fay 1669, no. 3282, Vol. 30.
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the organisation of rings and commercial monopoly which 
the European. Companies t^ied to foil by fostering the 
formation of joint stock associations of local merchants 
but only in vain, 3. An a s ar a tn am ’ s contention that 
such joint stocks flourished and were established in 
almost every important factory of the Dutch and the English 
Companies and that supply through these joint stock partner­
ships had become the norm by 1700 does not seem, tenable at 
all so far as Aerial is concerned, though it may be valid 
for Coromandel* In. Bengal the tirade or business was the 
concern of individual s rather than of f roups acting in. 
common interest, thouph we hear about such joint ventures 
c , C : • ’’Cot _ any1 or lower down the
i das and ’ Company* at Balas *» or Ramitetrain,
vaghunath and 1 company’ in I-.ugli - which were exceptions 
rather than rules. In Penpal, as in other parts of India, 
t1 e mere" ants operated with their own capita1 and there was 
hardly any close financial link between the merchants and 
the pub^ .ic, as for example it was already developing in 
En.pland in the 17th century throiiph the joint stock 
Companies. In fact, it can be asserted that as a result 
of the prowth of the joint stock Companies, the ownership
138* 3. Arasaratnam, r Indian Merchants and their Trading 
methods (cirea 1760)11, I_ ’ Lc and Social
history Aeview, arch l§b6, Yol . TTfg no. 1, p. 36,
of capital was divorced from management ir. ^r.gland and
these O^mar.ies cot1 Id und er t ak e commercial, ventures with
limited liability to individual merchants, These joint
stock associations may rightly he called the precursors
of modern industrial type of organisations. In India,
however, commercial venture was mainly the risk of individual
merchants. It is true that sometimes the merchants acted
as depositors of funds or even traded with, capital supplied
"by the nobility for investment in the tra.de but the risk
of any disaster or loss was his own.
The specialised activities of a large class of
merchants, specially the shroffs and. the remarkable growth
139of a financial machinery for credit and exchange, 
inescapably lead to the conclusion that merchant capital 
and commercial organisation was highly developed in Bengal. 
Again, though the European Companies froTF time to time 
dominated the markets for particular commodities, it cannot 
be said that they even dominated t e commercial outlook - 
that position was held by individual Bengal merchants who
139* Tavernier's general statement (Tavernier, T'^ ave1 s ir 
India, ed. Ball, vol. I, pp.28-29) that Tin India a 
village must be very small if it has not a money 
changer or shroff who asts as banker to make remittances 
of money and issue letters of exchange’ seems to hold 
good for Bengal in the 17th century.
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•through their wealth and abilities might also he said
to control the entire wholesale trade within the area
of their operations. Of course, it is true that none of
the Benyal merchants ever held the position comparable
fin ere e to that enjoyed "by Virhi Vora,
the ere at merchant prince of Surat, Noll a. Abdul Oof fur,
or tbe Parrack family of Surat or even the Malaya family
of Ooromandel but, nonetheless, they played quite a
significant ro'i e in the oommercial life of Perm al. Finally,
it is of re at interest to note that most of the prominent
^enmal merchants duriny our period were not local people
but outsiders mainly from Gujarat and Raj asthan as their
names, and in case of Ehemchand and Chintaman, their 
140
signatures, suyyest* This is rather peculiar since 
both in Surat and Madras all the prominent merchants were 
local people, and this only historically traces the fact 
that Ben-alis had never been and are stivi not business- 
minded.
140. 0.0., 3 Sept. 167?. no. 4648, Vol. 48; 13 'ar. 1684, 
no. 3110, Vol. 43? ? S'eTo. 1686, no. 3471, Vol. 4?.
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CHAPTER V.
STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION OF EXPORT TRADE
The success of the English East India Company's trade 
in Bengal depended on several factors other than the purely 
economic ones of supply and demand. Of these factors the most 
important was the Company's organisation of its commerce and 
certain aspects of those industries producing some of its 
export commodities from Bengal. The Company encountered certain 
problems which may broadly be divided into two categories - 
first, financing the investment and secondly, procurement of 
goods for England and Europe. Throughout the period under 
review, the Company in Bengal, as in other parts of India, 
suffered from a chronic shortage of funds for investment.
The problem of inadequate working capital was accentuated by 
the poor demand for Company's European imports in Bengal.
Though the quantity of merchandise imported by the Company to 
Bengal was not generally large, the market for even this small 
amount was strictly limited. The only item for which there was 
a steady demand in Bengal was bullion and specie. But as their 
supply was seasonal and often limited, the Company had to 
explore additional means for financing its investments. The 
extensive credit market in Bengal and the coastal and freight 
trade to various Asian ports ultimately played*a significant 
role in reducing the Company's shortage of inadequate liquid 
capital. The success of the Company1s trade also depended on
167
the effective procurement of goods suitable for England and 
Europe, and their timely despatch from Bengal. As the 
Company could not deal with the producers in most cases, it 
had to employ certain merchant-middlemen or brokers in each 
factory for the provision of goods for the return voyage of 
the ships* The problems faced by the Company in the procurement 
of goods were various - bad debts arising out of the failure of 
these brokers to provide goods against advances paid at the 
time of contract, frequent losses due to the attempts on the 
part of the merchants to force goods on the Company which 
were not up to the samples attached to the contract, the 
delay in despatching ships owing to the non-compliance of 
the merchants to provide goods within the specified time, 
the competition from other buyers in the market, the formation 
of rings by indigenous merchants to raise the price of 
different commodities and finally, the lack of funds for 
providing dadney or advance for goods at the proper time of 
the season. The organisation of industry, too, was a matter 
of great importance for the success of the Companyfs trade 
in Bengal. As the Company was catering for buyers in England 
and on the Continent, it had to adjust the colour, pattern 
and size of various piece-goods and silk according to the 
taste of these consumers. Hence at various times it sent to 
Bengal dyers, throwsters, painters and weavers to instruct 
the indigenous weavers and producers in dyeing, painting
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and weaving of silk and piece goods to suit the demands^:6f 
the markets in England and Europe* Also the Company had to 
organise the saltpetre industry, specially its refining*
Here we shall analyse the various problems connected with 
the Company1s finance for investment, the procurement of 
return cargoes, and the organisation of industry, and how 
it dealt with those problems during the period under study* 
Financing Company1s Investments*
The story of the English East India Company in Bengal 
was essentially one of expanding capital investments for 
procuring cargoes for the English and other European markets. 
The actual financing of the trade was always a complicated 
and difficult matter for the Cpmpany* During the early 
voyages in the beginning of the T7th century, the Company1s 
practice was to buy the Eastern commodities, mainly spices, 
with gold and silver. But the mercb&ntilist theory and a 
limited supply of precious metals inhibited large exports of 
bullion and specie which could be shipped to the East Indies.
As a result, the Company was obliged, specially in the later 
period, to send out along with bullion English manufactures and 
goods which were in little demand in the Asian markets* There 
was, however, one commodity, namely Indian cloth, which was 
readily acceptable to the producers of spices and hence, if 
procured in adequate quantities, could make up for the shortage 
of bullion and specie. This urged the Company to exchange
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cheap Indian cotton goods with the spices of the East 
Indies# Thus trade ceased to be bilateral - between England 
and the East Indies - and became multilateral or triangular# 
This was the familiar pattern of the Eastern trade during 
the first half of the 17th century# But after that, as the 
spice trade was monopolised by the Dutch, there was no need 
for the English Company to exchange Indian cotton goods for 
the spices of the East Indies. The English Companyfs 
requirements for spices were now met by the small number 
of factories on the western coast of Sumatra and those in 
South India# Indian cotton and silk piece-goods and saltpetre 
now became the principal attraction of the Eastern trade to the 
English Company# These commodities had gained a substantial . 
market in England and on the Continent# And despite the 
agitation waged against it, the export of bullion increased 
gradually along with the export of English manufactures# But 
the growing demand for Indian goods in England gave rise to 
clamours for protecting English industries against the 
onslaught by the former# At the same time the agitation 
against the export of bullion and the difficulty of procuring 
it induced the Company to explore additional or alternative 
means of financing the Indian investments#
There were in general several factors which complicated 
the issue of financing the investments in India# The first 
and foremost was the anti-monopolist group in England which
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wanted a slice of the cake - a share in the lucrative
Eastern trade from which it was debarred by the Company* s
monopoly. This group, led by some leading merchants and
politicians of the day, tried time and again to foil the
monopoly of the Company and utilised every opportunity to
put hindrance in the way of its trade and commerce. Secondly,
the mercantilists - who wanted a conservation of national
wealth measured in terms of its stock of gold and silver -
agitated against the export of bullion by the Company,
which they considered a sectional gain at the cost of the
nation. They believed that the country suffered from acute
shortage of coins and also from fluctuations in the rates
1
of exchange on account of the drain of bullion. Thirdly,
the industrialists and manufacturers of English woollens and
other products were alarmed by the steady demand for Indian
cloth and silk which successfully competed with their own
2
products and led to the general decline of trade. Finally, 
as England like other European countries depended mainly on 
the Spanish American colonies for the supply of gold and 
silver, any political rift between herself and Spain added 
to the difficulty of procuring precious metals.
1. K.N. Chaudhuri, f,East India Company and the Export of 
Treasure in 17th Century,” Economic History Keview. 2nd 
series, Vol XVI, Aug. 1963 pp. 23-2^,28; H.R.H. Groome 
&R.J. Hammond, An Economic History of Britain, pp.88,89.
2. E. Lipson. The Economic History of England. Vol II,
pp . Lxxxiii, XC. A Anderson, Origin of Commerce of the 
British Empire. Vol.II, pp. 528, 61+6.
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The Company and its supporters argued that the 
monopoly of the Eastern trade was essential for its success 
because of the Company1s large investment of capital in its 
factories in the different parts of Asia and for securing 
grants and concessions from the ruling authorities there* 
They pointed out that it was because of their monopoly that 
the Company could procure Indian goods at reasonable prices, 
overcoming the keen competition of other European and Asian 
merchants, and bring them to the consumers in England and 
on the Continent at competitive prices* They further argued 
that the Company was instrumental in conserving a large 
quantity of bullion which otherwise would have been spent 
on the purchase of Indian and other Eastern commodities at 
higher prices from European markets to the detriment of 
the nation and the consumers who would be at the mercy of 
the foreign merchants* Moreover, the re-exports of 
considerable proportion of Eastern goods to the Continent 
enabled the Company not only to increase English trade and 
commerce but also to bring in substantial amount of bullion 
in return* Since the Company procured its gold and silver 
from its agents on the Continent, it was not directly 
responsible for the shortage of bullion in England either 
for coinage or for the fluctuation of the rate of exchange 
which was inherent in the bimetallic currency system.
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Finally, the substantial statutory export of English 
manufactures and goods to India and other countries proved 
the Company1s patronage of the national industries and its
3
concern for their welfare#
There were several methods adopted by the Company 
to finance its expanding investments in Bengal during 
1-650-1720. Throughout this period, the ocport of bullion and 
specie was the normal means of financing the Bengal trade#
The capital available for the purpose of investment was,
however, limited in the early years of the Company*s trade
*
in Bengal. But this did not pose a serious problem as
the volume of export from Bengal was small during those early
years. The main difficulty faced by the Company was in provid
ing funds for the investment in the proper season which
1+
generally started after the shipping season was over. As 
the price of most of the commodities went up considerably
5
(sometimes by kO% to 50%) during the time of shipping, 
the Company had to start investment for goods just after 
the departure of Europe-bound ships i.e. generally from 
February or March, and hence it always needed a stock to be 
left for such investments in India after paying for the
3* L.S. Sutherland, The East India Company in Eighteenth
Century Politics* pp. 22. 36: A. Anderson, op.cit. Vol.II 
pp. 506-9, 655; K.N. Chaudhuri, Economic History Review# 
op.cit.. Aug. 1963, pp# 23-28.
if. The shipping season in Bengal was generally from 
September to January#
5. D#B., 28 Jan. 1659, Vol. 8if, f.ifll.
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previous years goods. As early as 1651, the Company
resolved to keep the factories supplied with 'a competent
stock beforehand1 and the factors wrote that 1 this was the
6
only way to make the trade flourish1 . But generally
throughout our period the factories were left with hardly
adequate stock after the ships had left. To obviate the
difficulty the Company sent in the early years stock to Bengal
by bills of exchange from other factories. Thus as early
as 1651 the Bay factory received nearly Hs.6,000 from
7
Pegu in bills of exchange. Again in January 1652 the 
Bengal factors were asked by the Surat factory to provide 
sugar and gumlac and they were asked to draw bills of
exchange for the purpose on the Agra factors to the extent
8
of Rs. 15,000 or else borrow to that amount. In December
1652 the Agra factory was again asked to send Rs.10,000
to begin sugar investment in Bengal as there was about bO%
difference between prices in February and those at the time 
9
of shipping.
The supply of capital, however, was gradually on the 
increase and as the export from Bengal.grew steadily in volume, 
so did the import of bullion and specie. Throughout our 
period the investment in Bengal was dependent to a large
6. O.C., 18 Jan. 1651, no. 2200, Vol.22; E.F.I., 1651-5^,
pp. 13-l^*
7* O.C., 18 Jan. 1651, no. 2200, Vol.22.
8. O.C., 27 Jan. 1652, no. 22**2, Vol.22.
9. 0?C., 10 Dec. 1652, no. 2297, Vol.22.
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extent on the Company1 s export of bullion from England and
was seldom independent of such financial assistance. Besides
the problem of inadequate supply of bullion, the Company had
to face some peculiar problems in Bengal in converting the
bullion into local currency required for investments.
Generally during this period, the Company converted the
bullion, whether silver or gold, either by selling them to
local shroffs or money-changers or by coining them in the
mint at Rajmahal. Sometimes, of course, when conversion
was not possible by either of these two ways due to the
shortage of time required for sending and coining the bullion
in the mint, or absence of substantial merchants to take off
the bullion, the Company had to pay for its investments
partly in foreign silver or in gold. Thus in 1678 the Hugli
Council persuaded the merchants to take silver rials as part
10
payment against investment. Next year the weavers in
Kasimbazar were paid in silver and the silk merchants in 
11
gold# Even the most prominent merchants were often thus
paid by the Company. In 1679 Mathuradas received 1,500 tolas
12
of gold as barter for his goods supplied to the Company.
But the merchants generally preferred payment in cash thus 
making the problem of investment more complicated for the 
Company.
10. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 1, Diary, 26 Sept. 1678.
11. Ibid. Vol. 1, Diary, 15 Feb. 1679, Vol. 2, f.17.
12. Ibidj. Vol. 2, ff. 95-96; Master*s Diary, Vol. 2, pp.258-59.
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In 1678, both in Hugli and Dacca, the merchants could
be persuaded to take only half of the value of the contracts
for piece-goods in rials and the rest had to be paid in
13
cash within 8 to 10 days.
Of the precious metals sent to Bengal, the Company1s
factors preferred silver to gold since the former had a
better market in Bengal. Silver rials, popularised by the
Portuguese throughout Asia, were in great demand. It was
easier to convert the rials into local currency than any other
specie and hence they were more easily accepted by the
merchants against contract for goods. In 1677 the merchants
in Hugli complained that they could not sell cruzadoes
timely enough to start investment and asked for rials 
lb
instead. The attitude of the Bengal merchants in this 
respect was quite rigid. The Kasimbazar factors reported 
in 1679 that ‘merchants will give much more for coin both 
of gold and silver known to them than for ingots which
15
are or at least specified of the same finish.1 As the 
gold market in Bengal was not profitable and as the 
Company had to suffer losses in converting gold whether 
by selling or minting, the Bengal agency always discouraged 
the export of gold from Europe for the purpose of investment
13* Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 1, Diary, 2? Sept. 1678; Vol.7 
pt. II f. 115.
lb. Ibid. Vol. 1, Diary, 18 Sept. 1677*
15. Ibid. Vol. 7, pt. II, f. 33.
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in Bengal. In 1678 when the Company ordered £10,000
as 1quickstock* for Bengal - the greater part of it in
gold and only a small quantity in silver - the factors
wrote that it would certainly occasion a great loss for 
16
the Company. Again the Hugli factors wrote in 1680 -
,!We always looked upon gold as merchandise it being so even
when in mohars but silver is cash or sooner converted 
17
thereunto11. During this period, Dacca was the chief
market for gold where it was reported to have produced
18
10$ more than anywhere else. Minting the gold entailed
a loss of 20/S for the Company. The court of Directors
reported that even in Dacca one ‘great ingot* was disposed
of in 168? at a loss of about 0^% and in another similar
transaction at Patna the loss ranged between 12 to 14- per 
19
cent. As usual, they attributed this loss - with little
justification it seems - to the dishonesty of their
servants in Bengal. As to the low price of gold and mohars.
the factors wrote in 1679 that it was due to the little
demand, ‘the government being as yet poor and not arrived
20
to the hoarding age*•
16. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 1, Diary, 1 Aug. 1678.
17. Ibid. Vol. ?, pt.II f. 112.
18. D.B., 12 Dec. 1677, Vol. 88, f.522; Fact.Records,Hugli, 
Vol. 1, Diary, 1 Aug. 1678.
19. D.B., 11+ Jan. 1686, Vol. 91, f. V8.
20. Perhaps referring to the temporary governorship of Prince 
Azam. Generally after stabilising their position, these 
governors started amassing vast fortunes.
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The market price of gold mohars appears to have been
subjected to sharp fluctuations from time to time as it is
21
evident from the following table -
Date. Place• Price of sold mohar
Early 1670 Hugli Rs.15 - 2an. to Rs.l? - if an
Feb. 1677 Kasimbazar Rs.13 - 1*4 an.
April 1677 it Rs.13 - ll+an.
July 1677 11 Rs.13 - 10 an.
Aug. 1678 Dacca Rs.13
Dec. 1678 Kasimbazar Rs.12 - 13 an.
Sept. 16814- Mai da Rs.12 - 6an. to Rs.12 - 8 an
Sept. 1711 Hugli Rs.l? to Rs.l? - 8an.
Sept.1711 Calcutta Rs;14 - 8an. to Rs.l5 - 8 an
In 1679 the Bengal factors reported that the Company would
lose 22 per cent on the sale of gold, and in order to reduce
22
the loss, they asked for larger supplies of silver# The 
low price of gold and gold mohars which characterised the 
late 1 seventies continued to embarrass the Company, and the
21# Fact# Record, Hugli, Vol.2, f.l*f; Fact. Records,
Kasimbazar, Vol.l, Diary, 1? Feb, 2b April, 2? June,
27 July 1677; Fact# Records, Hugli, Vol.l, Diary,
1 Aug. 1678; Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol.10, f.l8?;
B.M# Addl.Mss., 3^,123, 2a, 3a. For the price of
gold and gold mohar. see, Irfan Habib, The Agrarian 
System of Mughal India, pp. 38*4-87, K.N. Chaudhuri, " 
"Treasure and Trade Balances, the East India Company1s 
Export trade. 1660 - 1720." Economic History Review. 
Vol. XXI, 1968, pp. i+86-90.
22. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 2, pt. 1, ff. 1*+, 17.
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Directors resolved in 1686 to send henceforth only 
rials to Bengal which might be 'exchanged into Rupees 
without the trouble, charges or prejudice of the mint and
23
become much sooner useful for investments.1 The exact 
mechanism of price fluctuations of gold is not clear*.
However, the reasons for such fluctuations may be traced 
to the larger supply of gold by the Company, the imposition 
of a 5% duty for coinage in the mint, the payment of 
soldiers in mohars sometimes during this period, and the 
freauent change of subadar in Bengal during the late
2b
1 seventies*
Tiough silver was in greater demand in Bengal, the 
Company quite often encountered difficulties and losses in 
disposing of or converting it. Coining in the mint yielded 
more but in the early years the Company preferred selling 
silver to the shroffs because of the hazards involved 
and time required in the former process. Generally 100 
pieces of silver rials fetched about 206 to 209 sicca rupees,
23. D.B., Ilf Jan. 1686, Vol.91, £• .b&.
2b. D.B. 12 Dec. 1677, Vol. 88, f.?22. (In this letter 
the Company wrote to Bengal that it sent a greater 
quantity of gold than formerly); Fact. Records, Hugli, 
Vol.l, Diary, 1 Aug. 1678; Shaista Khan left Bengal in 
1677 pnly to come back in 1680 while in the interim 
period two subadars Fidai Khan and Prince Azam ruled 
Bengal. The factors reported in 1677 that 'the 
Prince at Pata lately paid his soldiers in gold mohars 
which is reason they are so much fallen that uncoined 
gold is dearer than coined gold1.
vide , Fact. Records, Kasimbazar, Vol.l, Diary, 27 July
1577.
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sometimes as low as 205 and at the most 210 rupees
throughout our period, though in the mint they produced
219 to 221 sicca rupees excluding the charges and customs,
25
The net yield from 100 rials was about Rs. 213 - 1^ an.
The fluctuation of silver price depended mostly on the 
rates of exchange to Agra. Any decline in this rate of 
exchange had its immediate effect on the price of silver 
in Bengal and resulted in a consequent fall in the latter 
and a contraction in the silver market. John Kenn gave an 
interesting report on the mechanism of the exchange operation 
in 1661. He wrote - nTo pay money in Kasimbazar and receive 
it in Patna, upon Bill of Exchange a month after date, always 
yields profit. I have known it from 1 to 6 p*c., when 
the silk sells well at Agra, the produce is usually sent 
to Kasimbazar in money overland, which is the reason that 
when great sums of money come from thence the exchange of
25«
money to Patna in one day doth sometimes fall 2~h to 3 p.c.u
In 1678 the Kasimbazar factors reported that 1 exchange to
Agra is much fallen from 99 to 96 rupees the 100 and
leave came to the Gujarat merchants to draw thither which
makes us fear our silver will not sell so soon as otherwise
26
it might have done1• Next year they wrote that the rise in
25* Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol.l, Diary, 16 Nov. 1677; Fact. 
Records, Kasimbazar Vol.l, Diary, l8Aug., 3® Aug. 1677> 
16 Sept., 29 Sept., 20 Oct., 1679; D.B. 1*+ Jan. 1686, 
Vol.91, ff* W-49; D.B., 8 Jan. 1718, Vol.99, f«372* 
25a. B.M. Addl. Mss., 3*+>123, f. *f2a.
26. Fact. Records, Kasimbazar, Vol.l, Diary, 17 Aug. 1678.
180
the exchange from Agra caused Abatement* in the price 
27
of silver. Besides the rates of exchange to Agra, other
contributory factors for the fluctuation of silver price
were the supply brought by the Interlopers and other
merchants, and the imposition of a 5% customs on all
treasure coined in the mint. The Company*s factors in
Kasimbazar wrote in 1682 that the low price of silver was
1 occasioned by the Interlopers1 treasure being sold here at
underrates besides 5% custom upon all treasure at the mint
28
imposed lately* by the King,. The problem of selling
silver was accentuated by the fact that substantial merchants
were not often available in most of the factories to take
off silver with ready money even at the price which entailed
a loss for the Company. This was specially the case in
Hugli and Malda factory. In 1678 as also in I68lf and 1685
the Hugli factors reported that they could not sell either
29
silver or gold at all. The report of the Malda factors in
30
1682 similarly conveyed their inability to sell any treasure.
27* Fact. Records, Kasimbazar, Vol.l, Diary, 29 Sept. 1679. 
28. Ibid. Vol.l, Diary, 7 Sept. 1682.
29* Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol.l, Diary, 25 Sept. 13 Oct.
1678; Vol.6, pt.II f. 165; Home Misc., Vol. 803, f.i+58.
30. Fact. Records, Malda, Vol.l, Diary, 17 Oct. 1680.
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As a result, the general pattern for the disposal of 
the Company1s treasures was to send them to Kasimbazar 
which was the only substantial market for precious metals
31
throughout our period. The obvious advantage at
Kasimbazar was that it was the main trading centre and
the resort of great indigenous merchants, and the mint was
nearby. If the treasure could not be sold, it could
conveniently be sent to Rajmahal to be coined there. But
even in Kasimbazar, as the factors reported in 1682, it
was sometimes difficult to find any merchant to buy the treasure
32
for ready money. Again, most often the shroffs who bought 
the treasure only paid half in ready money and the other 
half in a month1s time. This is evident from the 
transactions between the Company and the important shroffs 
and merchants like Sukanand, Chaturmal, Haridas Nagar,
33
Goculchand, etc. during this period. To obviate all these 
diff"iculties connected with the sale of silver, Master 
entered into a ffirm and lasting contract* in 1679 with 
the great shroff and merchant, Chaturmal Shah, who agreed 
to take all the bullion imported by, the Company at a fixed
3*f
rate.
31* Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol.l, Diary, 25 Sept., 13 Oct. 1678
32. Fact. Records, Kasimbazar, Vol.2, Consult., 7 Sept. 1682.
33* Ibid. Vol.l, Diary, 28 Aug., 3& Aug., 16 Sept., 29 Sept.,
2 Oct., 1679.
31*. Master* s Diary, Vol.2, pp. 306-8.
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According to this contract, Chaturmal would pay 210 
rupees sicca for 100 rials, and 13 rupees sicca for each 
gold mohar besides various rates for other kinds of 
bullion and specie* The bullion was to be weighed and 
delivered, and 'tjie risk of the same to Rajmahal and of 
money from thence to Kasimbazar to be upon the Company1 s 
account at Chaturmal^ charge and at his risk while at 
Rajmahal1 • This was a satisfactory arrangement, and 
relieved the Company of the uncertainty in obtaining cash for 
investments, and reduced the chance of loss through violent 
fluctuations in the prices of bullion* But unfortunately 
for the Company, the contract did not last long as 
Chaturmal failed to comply with the agreement due to the
35
loss he suffered through it*
The coining of bullion in the mint at Rajmahal, 
though it yielded more than their sale value in the open 
market, was no smooth affair. Still the Company had to 
take recourse to coining its treasure after being disappointed 
with the bullion market in Bengal. In 1685 the Hugli 
General letter to Madras stated that the Bengal Council 
had stopped the sale of silver there. But the coining of 
the Company1 s treasure in the Mughal mint involved many 
problems and hindrance* The road and the distance from
35* Pact. Records, Kasimbazar, Vol. 1, Diary, 2b Dec. 1679; 
21 Feb. 1680 ; 2 March, 8 March, 1680; 27 Aug. 1680.
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Hugli to Rajmahal via Kasimbazar were hazardous with the
attendant risk of losing the whole boat-load of treasure or
money on its way to or from Ra^ma&al due either to bad
36
weather or robbery* Again coining in the mint took 
considerable time, often more than a month and sometimes two
37
or three months* Another inhibiting factor against coining
in the mint was the imposition of a 5% customs on all
38
treasure in 1677• Otherflindrances too were there* In
1683 Bulcha^nd, a local faujdar. sent a great quantity of
copper to be coined which took up so much time at the mint
that it was commented that the English could have coined
39k lacks of rupees during this time* Next year the
English were threatened by Rafiuzzama, the fau.idar of
Rajmahal and Malda, that the Company would be forced to
sell all its gold mohars in the mint to him at his own 
1+0
price*
36. Fact, Records, Calcutta, Vol.7, pt.l, f*ll; D.B., l*f Jan 
1686, Vol.91, f*if8; D.B., 12 Jan* 170?, Vol.95, f*389.
37. Home Misc., Vol. 8O3, f.*f58; D.B., 7 April, 1708, Vol.96 
ff. 262-63.
38. Fact. Records, Kasimbazar, Vol.l, Diary. 2k Feb. 1677; 
Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol.l, Diary 1 Aug. 1678. Fact. 
Records, Kasimbazar, Vol.2, Diary, 7 Sept. 1682. In I683 
the Kasimbazar factors reported that they were advised 
from Rajmahal that a general parwana came from Dacca 
fixing the customs as follows - (vide, Fact. Records, 
Kasimbazar, Vol.3, Diary, 31 Jan. I683)
of the English - 3^ /0 of the Hindus -5$
of the Dutch - kfo of the Armenians - 7 2%
of the Muslims - 2%%
39. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol.9, f.76.
k0. Ibid. Vol.10, f.185.
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In order to obviate the difficulties connected
wLth tie coining of bullion , the Company finally resolved
in the early years of the 18th century to coin all the
bullion imported in the mint at Madras, and then despatch
them to Bengal* In 170? the Court of Directors wrote to
Bengal that they had sent silver to Madras from where it
was directed to be sent to Bengal after being coined in
the Company1s mint therfe, thus saving the time and hazard
1+1
of sending the bullion to Rajmahal* It seems that fromsth&n 
onward It became the general practice to coin all 
the bullion in Madras from where it was despatched to 
Bengal. In 1707 the Directors wrote they were glad that 
the Bengal factors did not send any silver to Rajmahal, 
and asked them not to alter the practice except in case
k 2
of urgent necessity. The Madras rupees, though claimed 
by the Company to be of equal ’weight and matt* as the 
siccas or current rupees of Bengal, were deemed two 
per cent worse than the siccas by the shroffs. This, as 
the Company thought, was due to the intrigues of the 
shroffs who wanted to make a profit. In 1708 the Madras 
rupees in the Bay were current at 9 p*c* discount and 
the siccas at The Directors expected that the
1+1. D.B. 12 Jan. 1705, Vol. 95, f.389 
1+2. D.B. 7 Feb. 1707, Vol. 96, f.98a.
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difference between the siccas and Madras rupees would be
less when the latter were once fvery current1 in Bengal*
Even if it did not, they thought, coining at Madras was
much more advantageous considering the cheapness, speed
and safety of coining at the fort as against the hazards
and risks involved in sending the bullion to Rajmahal.
But in 1709 when the government refused to accept Madras
rupees into the King*s treasury, their batta sharply fell
1^1^,
from 9 to 7 p.c. Alarmed at the loss the Company would 
thus incur, the Calcutta Council wrote to Madras to send, them 
henceforth all the uncoined silver which they now designed 
to coin at Murshidabad for which, as they claimed, ^ e ^  
had already obtained a parwana from Murshid Quli Khan*
But the Directors did not accede to this proposal considering 
the advantages of coining at Port St* George - namely, saving 
the duties of the mint as also the hazards of having the 
bullion seized, lost or stopped by the troubles in the 
country* The Company knew that the best solution, so far
^3* D*B. 7 April 1708, Vol. 96, ff. 222-23, 260.
Beng. Pub. Consult., Range 1, Vol. 1, f.?28; D.B.,
5 Jan. 1711, Vol.97, f.12?.
b5• Beng. Pub. Consult., Range 1, Vol.l, f.?28. It seems 
by 1708 Murshid Quli had established another mint at 
Murshidabad, vide. D.B. 7 April 1708, Vol.96, ff.262-63.
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as tie coining of bullion was concerned, was to have a
mint of its own in Bengal as it had one in Madras, or at
least to have the liberty of the freeuse of the mi&ts in
Bengal. As early as 1687 the Company asked for permission
to establish a mint in Hugli in one of the clauses of
the proposed treaty between the English and the Bengal 
*+6
subadar. Then onward it asked the Bengal factors 
frequently to try to get the liberty of a mint in Calcutta. 
Though in 1717 Emperor Farrukshaiyr1 s far man gave the 
English the liberty of a mint, it was only in name. Murshid 
Quli in collusion with the great indigenous banker Jagat 
Seth prevented the Company from enjoying the liberty of
h 7
free coinage in the mint at Murshidabad.
Besides bullion and specie, the exportation of 
which seemd always to fall short of the Company*s actual 
requirements throughout our period, the Company had to 
import different English manufactures and goods to pay for 
the increasing exports from Bengal. But this did not help 
the Company very much in solving the problem of financing
*+6. O.C. 18 June 1687, no. 5618, Vol.V7; Home Misc., 
Vol. 68, f.35.
b7* 3. Bhattacharya, op.cit.. pp. 31-33•
f 1
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the investments since there was very little demand for
these commodities in Bengal. Nevertheless, the Company had
to import these wares to Bengal due to the unabated
agitation against exportation of bullion or precious
tf8
metals from England* Again, as a greater exportation 
of English manufactures would provide the Company with 
the most formidable weapon against its critics in England, 
it always urged its factors in Bengal to find a greater 
fvend! of English manufactures* The Hugli Agency, urging 
the Balasore factors to find a greater *vendf for Europe - 
goods, wrote in 1681+ that it would be a great service to 
the nation in general and the Company in particular *who 
have so many enemies at home upon pretence of their not 
transporting any considerable quantity of Europe goods, 
that its their only support if they can find a vent for 
them* • The Company tried to boost the sale of its 
merchandise by providing the Bay with large inventories 
and sometimes even by reducing prices drastically. The 
Court*s policy was always directed more towards finding 
markets for English manufactures and goods than securing;
M3* By an act of l69*f the Company was ordered to export 
goods valued at least £100,000 a year to the East*
lf9. O.C., k Sept. 1681+, no. ?190, Vol.l+lf.
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large profit. The records of the Company decisively
prove that it did all it could to increase the export
of its European wares to India throughout the period.
As early as 1681 the Court of Directors wrote -
Bit being our earnest desire that such commodities as we
send you from home specially Broadcloth may find a large
50
consumption in all parts of India.11 A year later we 
find them expatiating on the advantages of vending 
broadcloth ‘which is the chief manufacture of this nation*• 
In 1675, in answer to the Bengal letter discouraging 
the import of broadcloth and other woollen manufactures, 
the Directors wrote - “They being the staple commodity 
of this nation, you and we must use our greatest industry 
to procure a vent for them, and if selling of them cheap
51
would affect it, we give you liberty therein." • Even in 
1711 one of the Company's main concerns was to find greater 
'vend1 of English manufactures in Bengal.# In that year the 
Directors advised the Bengal Council that they would be 
extremely pleased 'if by your management a much greater 
quantity of our woollen goods or other English product 
were yearly vendable at both or either places, as it would 
prove a common benefit to our country and lessen our
50. D.B., 27 March 1661, Vol.86, f.18.
51. D.B., 2b Dec. 1675, Vol.88, f.232.
exportation of bullion and if the lessening of profit 
upon such goods would increase their consumption anything 
considerably, we should willingly submit thereto being
52
more desirous of a large annual sale than a great profit1• 
But throughout the period Bengal markets with their 
limited demands for imports reacted very feebly to such 
blandishments.
The English manufactures and goods imported to 
Bengal generally comprised woollen cloths of different 
varieties - such as broadcloth, perpetuanoesrashes, 
velvets and scarlets - metals and paints such as lead, 
tin, copper, iron, vermilion, quicksilver and brimstone etc. 
Most of these commodities were not readily saleable, and 
hence the Company had to face great difficulty in disposing 
of them. Though there was some demand for some of the 
metals, their price was often too low due to large imports 
from the East Indies. Thus, although tin was in some 
demand, most often its price was low owing to a 1 great 
glut of them in town from Siam and other parts of the
53
South Seas'. Indigenous merchants as well as other
52. D.B., 5 Jan. 1711, Vol. 97, f.130.
53. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol.5, pt. 1, f.52.
European Companies and traders brought to Bengal large 
quantities of tin, lead, copper, vermilion, quicksilver etc • 
thus overstocking the already limited import market, and made 
their sale by the English Company a formidable one# The 
problem for the Company was accentuated by the fact 
that none of the imported merchandise could be sold for 
ready money# Most:., merchants who bought these
commodities paid only at three or four month* s time from
5 h
the date of purchase. The Bengal factors wrote in 1669 
that 1 nothing is in request but money; some commodities may 
sell but readily in small parcels unless a large
55
proportion of money accompanies them in barter.1
As the woollens, besides bullion, formed the bulk 
of its imports to Bengal, the Company’s main concern 
throughout the period was to dispose of them at any cost.
So it urged the factors time and again to boost the sale 
of broadcloth by all possible means. As we have seen 
earlier the chief inducement in opening a new factory at 
Malda in 1680 was the possibility of finding there a good
56
market for broadcloth. In 168^ the President in Bengal 
made an agreement with the Balasore merchants to take every
5k* O.C., 30 June, 1669, no, 3303, Vol. 30.
55* Pact. Records, Misc., Vol. 3, f.100; E.F.I., 1668-69, 
p.311.
56. Supra, chapter III.
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year in Europe - goods to the amount of one third of
57
whatsoever money sho&HL be delivered them. In order to
keep up the sale and price of broadcloth the Company even
tried to sell the commodity to one particular merchant 
58
only* In 1717 it attempted a novel device for
increasing the sale of broadcloth* The court of Directors
asked the Bengal Council 1 to oblige your merchants and
those who are concerned with you in buying or selling
goods always to appear before you during the winter season
in our English cloth*1 "This”, as the Directors hoped,
!,if rightly managed may contribute very much to the larger
vend because their example is likely enough to extend itself 
59
further*n Blit it was of no avail* The merchants could
not be prevailed on to wear garments made of English cloth
because ’it was not their forefather’s custom*.
Reduction in the price of broadcloth also failed to
60
increase their sale. Selling them to one particular 
merchant helped the Company very little either in 
maintaining the price or increasing tieir sale* Benarasi Seth, 
who bought all the broadcloth from the Company in 171^,
57. O.C., 22 Dec, l68!f, no. 5288, Vol.Mf.
58. Beng. Pub. Consult., Range 1, Vol 3, f.18.
59. D.B., 18 Jan. 1717, Vol.99, ff. 7V-5.
60. Coast & Bay Abstract., Vol. 2, f* 126.
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reused to purchase any more next year on the plea that
he had -^60 bales in Hugli and Calcutta, and another 100
61
bales at Patna. Of course, right from the beginning, the
Company's factors were aware of the little demand for the
European wares in Bengal. As early as 1669 they requested
the Directors not to send more than \ of the total
62
investment in English manufactures and goods. But even 
this comparatively small amount of Europe commodity could 
hardly find a favourable market. The factors wrote in 
great disappointment - 1 it is of little or no demand in 
the Country and therefore of low price; the truth is we 
have no people for trade, they knowing little or nothing
but the taking of the Honourable Company1 s money and there
63
with picking up cloth among the weavers11.
Generally speaking in the early years the Company 
bartered English goods for its investments in Bengal.
Most of the merchants were obliged to take 2 the vilue of 
Europe-investment in English manufactures and goods. But 
this practice often led to frequent disputes and ill-will 
on the part of the indigenous merchants who were sometimes
61. Bengal Pub. Consult., Range 1, Vol. 3, f. 18.
62. Fact. Records, Misc., Vol. 3, f. 100; E.F. I., 1668-69,
p. 311.
63. Home Misc., Vol. 803, f. b56.
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saddled with unsaleable goods. The Company, too, 
on its part suffered loss through such barter, sometimes
( h
the loss running as high as 20%. Moreover, the goods which 
the Company received against bartering Europe commdoities 
were often of inferior quality. Hence at one time the 
Court disapproved of the barter system. In 167*+ the 
Directors, 'desiring to keep the reputation of the Indian 
commodities for their goodness', asked the Hugli Council 
not to barter but to sell and buy goods for money unless
65
they could barter for as good as those bought for money.
Similar was the vein of their letter in 1677 - flWe observe
the reason you give for dearness of cloth we compalined
of and do wholly dislike that way of barter and therefore
66
we recommend you to sell our goods for money". But as 
the bullion fell far short of the amount and also as the 
market for English wares was very limited, the Company 
could hardly do without bartering imported goods for Bengal 
commodities. It obliged the reluctant merchants to take off 
a quantity of Europe-goods along with cash against their 
investments for the Company. The problem of disposing of
6*+. In 1672 the Company bartered broadcloth, lead etc., for 
goods provided by Khemchand and other Balasore merchants 
but at 20% loss, vide. Pact. Records, Hugli, Vol.if, 
pt. 1, f. If.
65. D.B. 23 Aug. 167*+, Vol. 88. f.153*
66. D.B., 12 Dec. 1677, Vol. 88, f. 520.
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English manufactures and goods was aggravated in 1702 
when the Company was required to send one tenth of its
67
total export in the product and manufacture of England#
The Court directed the factors to increase 1 the vent
thereof for we continue in the same mind rather to have
it disposed of in greater quantities than for great 
68
profit#1 But all the same, the demand for European
wares remained highly inelastic and the market hardly
expanded# Quite often the Company asked the factors to try
to sell broadcloth at Patna and the neighbourhood where it
expected to find good market for it# But because of its
dearness, broadcloth could not compete with similar cloth
produced locally# The Company asked the factors to fbeat 
said
out the/cloth1 by selling its ware cheaper, but it seems
69
hardly with any success. As Patna was the only
prospective market for English woollens, it was mofct often
flooded with that commodity brought by different merchants
who were obliged to accept it in part payment for the
70
Company1 s investment# The flogging* of the market by 
broadcloth was a common feature, specially during the first 
two decades of the 18th century. In 171*f the Bengal
67. D.B., 26 Feb. 1703, Vol. 9?, f.W.
68. D.B., 12 Jan. 1705, Vol. 95, f.389.
69. D.B., 18 Jan. 1717, Vol. 99, ff. 7^75.
70. Thus in 1705 hundred bales of broadcloth belonging 
to Benarasi Seth were lying unsold at Patna, vide. 
Bengal. Pub. Consult, Range I, Vol. 3, f.l8.
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Council reported that Patna was so glutted with
broadcloth that it was sold there at a lesser rate than in
Calcutta 1 wherefore Benarasi Seth sent 25 bales of
71
broadcloth on freight to Surat1• Very often the small
merchants who were obliged to receive broadcloth as part of
the payment by the Company sold them at a loss, sometimes
, 72
running up to 20%. The rich merchants, however, could 
hold out for a time and dispose of the merchandise at 
a more favourable time* But throughout our period even 
these influential and wealthy merchants refused on various 
occasions to accept broadcloth against the Company* s 
investment on the ground that they could not dispose of
73
what they had received earlier. The Company, however, 
had often tried to impose broadcloth on its merchants 
as it was the only means to get rid of that commodity 
without incurring any heavy loss. In 1719 Benarasi Seth 
prevailed on the dadney merchants to take 5% of the whole 
contract in woollen goods as part of the dadney or advance. 
Moreover to prevent a fall in the price of broadcloth 
resulting from too many sellers of the commodity at the
71. Coast.& Bay Abstract, Vol. I, f.529.
72. Ibid. Vol. 2, f. 233* cloth which the merchants 
bought at 60 rupees was sold at Rs. **8*
73- Khemchand refused in 1673 > vide. Fact. Records, Hugli,
Vol. pt.l, ff.5*f, 77; Benarasi Seth refusediin 1715 
vide. Beng.Pub. Consult., Range I, Vol.3, f.18.
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same time, one of the merchants was appointed to sell for
them as if in a joint stock, and divide the sale proceeds
7k
agiong them according to their respective proportion.
But all these devices could hardly increase the sale or 
raise the price of broadcloth. As a result financing the 
investment remained a great problem for tie servants of the 
Company.
To obviate the difficulties arising out of the 
shortage of fund, the Company*s factors in Bengal turned to 
other sources for supply of capital for financing the 
investments in the most appropriate season of the year.
In the absence of sufficient quantitative data, it is not 
possible to compute the precise amount by which the 
Company's capital supply fell short of the actual 
requirements in a particular year. It does not seem that 
the value of bullion and merchandise sent to Bengal in a 
particular year (except in those years when it was not quite 
possible to send ships directly to Bengal because of wars) 
fell much short of the amount required for investment. But 
as we have seen earlier, the conversion of bullion whether 
by selling them to merchants or coining in the mint took 
considerable time^ Again most of the imported merchandise
7k* Beng. Pub, Cunsult., Range I, Vol. If, ff. 110, 110a.
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lay unsold for a long time, thus aggravating the problem 
of providing working capital for the different factories# 
But perhaps the most important factor which induced the 
Company’s servants to turn to other sources for supply 
of money was the fact that the proper time for giving 
out advances for investment lay between February and June 
or July# But by then, after paying for tie previous yearfs 
investment, the Company was hardly left with any 
substantial sum to start investment for tie ensuing year# 
Moreover, the Company often remained indebted to the 
merchants for past investments even after the departure of 
Europe ships. The Kasimbazar factors reported in 
November 1700 that they were indebted by about a lack of
75
rupees for the previous year’s investments. The Bengal 
factors frequently wrote to the Court of Directors insisting
on the advantages of a double stock which should be left in
76
Bengal after the departure of Europe ships# The
Directors seem to have appreciated the benefits following
from such a * stock left beforehand* but did never actually
77
put it into practice* Hence throughout the period the 
factors had to seek alternative sources of supply for
75* Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 10, pt. Ill, f*2.
76. O.C., 18 Jan. 1651, no. 2200, Vol. 22; E.F.I., 1651-5*8,
pp. 13-1*+; O.C., 8 Jan. 1702, no. 7820, para 11L, Vol.63;
O.C., 2b Dec. 1702, no. 8097, para 15, Vol. 65.
77. D.B. 28 Jan. 1659, Vol.81+, f.J+11; D.B., 18 Jan. 1706, 
Vol. 95, f. 518; Rawl. A. 302, f.250.
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making investment in the proper season.
Of the various additional or alternative sources
of supply, the most useful and easily available was
the local capital market which the Company found to
be efficient and adequate for its purposes. Throughout
the period the English Company borrowed money from local
merchants and thus provided investment in the proper
season. It is, however, not possible, in the absence
of any systematic account in the Company1s records,
to compute the amount borrowed annually by the Company
for such purposes. Still some idea could be formed from
scattered information in the records. The following
table indicates the amounts of the Company1s debts to
the indigenous merchants in different factories under
78
certain specific dates.
78. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 9, ff. 63.1??; Vol. 10,
ff. 109,l61+; Fact. Records, Kasimbazar, Vol. if, pt.l, 
ff. 71>llf?; Fact. Records, Misc, Vol. 3^>^*392$
Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 6, pt. 1, ff.6 - 7>
26, Vol. 10, pt. Ill, f. If3; O.C., If Feb. 1702, 
no. 78?2, para 3? Vol. 63; O.C., 1? Aug. 1702, 
no. 7996, Vol. 6k.
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Date Place Amount owed by the Company
to local Merchants
18 May 1683 Kasimbazar Rs.250,000
29 Oct. 1683 Kasimbazar Rs. 350,000
11 June 168*+ Kasimbazar Rs.100,000
15 Sept. 1685 Dacca Rs. 80,000
27 April 1685 Kasimbazar Rs. 270,000
6 Oct. 1685 Kasimbazar Rs. 250,000
21 Dec. 1695 Calcutta Rs. 11*7,000
29 Feb. 1696 Calcutta Rs.300,000
15 Feb. 1700 Calcutta Rs.300,000
26 May 1701 Kasimbazar Rs.250,000
1+ Feb. 1702 Kasimbazar Rs. 200,000
15 Aug. 1702 Calcutta Rs. 700,000
Generally the Company used to borrow money mainly from 
Kasimbazar and from there send out money to different 
factories, specially to Patna and Dacca by bills of 
exchange or letters of credit on the issuing merchant* s 
agents. The Company also borrowed money regularly in 
Hugli, Balasore and Dacca. In other words, wherever they 
needed money, and it was found available in the local 
market, they resorted to borrowing. But it seems that by 
borrowing at ICalsimbazar, the Company gained certain 
advantages. Besides being the resort of numerous shroffs 
and merchants, Kasimbazar*s proximity to Rajmahal enabled the
200
Company to. pay off the debt after coining its treasure, 
thus saving interest charges which were always very high. 
As a result the Company sent out a higher, proportion of 
its treasure and merchandise to Kasimbazar for sale 
there. But later on, specially during the first two 
decades of the 18th century when Calcutta rose to 
prominence and became the resort of important indigenous 
merchants, the Company, it seems, bar rowed mainly in 
Calcutta* It would have been of great interest if it 
was possible to compute the amount of money supplied 
yearly by the Kasimbazar merchants to the Company. But 
here again the paucity of detailed information stands 
in our way* However, we can compile the full amount of 
the Company* s debt for one year from March I683 to 
February l68*f. In these twelve months the Kasimbazar 
merchants provided the Company with about Rs* 200,000. 
During February 1683 and January 1681+ Rs. 168,000 were paid 
by the Company to the Kasimbazar merchants as payment of 
debts while another Rs.76,000 remained unpaid. During 
these twelve months the Company paid out about Rs.20,000
79
toathe Kasimbazar merchants as interest for debts. Some 
idea regarding the amount of money borrowed at other
79* Compiled from Cash Accounts of Factory Records, 
Kasimbazar, Vol. 3.
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factories can be formed from information scattered here
and there in the records* In 168^ - the Hugli Council asked
Balasore factory to take up Rs.100,000 at interest not
80
exceeding 1 per cent per month* In 1699 the Company1 s
treasurer received Rs.l+0,000 at interest from Metersen
(Mitra Sen or Mathura Singh?)* In the same year the
Calcutta Council agreed to borrow another Rs.50,000 from 
81
him* As early as 1682 the Company borrowed Rs.50,000
82
from Dacca from the same merchant. Only at Patna, it 
seems, the Company did not borrow much locally though 
it is not possible to ascertain any reason for it. The 
Patna factory was generally provided with money from other 
factories. As early as 1679 the Kasimbazar factors took 
up the Rs.30,000 at l£ p.c. per month from Sukanand Shah
83
and sent the same amount to Patna.
Though the local (capital market in India helped 
the Company to overcome the difficulties resulting from 
a shortage of fund for investment in the proper season, 
there were certain factors which inhibited the Company 
from borrowing freely in India. The chief deterrent in this 
respect was the high rate of interest prevailing in Bengal
80. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vdl.10, f.86; Fact. Records,
Balasore, Vol. 1, Diary, 22 April, 1684-.
81. Fact. Records, Calutfca, Vol. 3, pt.II, ff. 51-52, 61.
82. Fact. Records, Dacca, Vol. 1, pt. II, f.57*
83. Fact. Records, Kasimbazar, Vol. 1, Diary, 25 March, 1679*
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during this period, and which ranged between 12 to 
18 p.c. per annum. This rate was rightly considered 
very high by the Company as money was available at
85
8 p.c. per annum in Madras or 9 p.c. at Surat. As a
result, the Court urged their factors in Bengal not to
borrow money locally-unless it was absolutely necessary.
As early as 1677 they wrote to Bengal - ** we desire
what may be (necessary) to avoid paying interest which is
so high in the country but when you see there is absolute
necessity for it for a little time till our own stock can
be coined, we leave it unto you to do what may be
86
requisite therein”. The exorbitant rate of interest in 
Bengal was regarded by the Court as the 1 rank poison1 to 
their commerce and hence they asked the factors to prevent 
running into debt * the interest of which eats deep and
87
insensibly* . But as the Company could hardly avoid 
borrowing money altogether, it accepted it as a necessary
8lf. Fact. Records, Kasimbazar, Vol. 1, Consult. 15 Oct. 1679 
Vol. 3, Consult. 8 Feb. 1683; Vol. if, pt. 1, f.l5*f;
Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 6, f. 161*5 Vol.10, ff.86,
99-100, 108, 2l+S; Fact. Records, Balasore, Vol. 1, Diary,
22 April, lo8if; Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 2, pt. 1, 
ff. 16, hi; Vol. 3, pt. 11, f.1+9; Vol. 6, pt. Ill, f.lif; 
Vol. 8, pt. II, ff.71-72; Fact. Records, Dacca, Vol. 1, 
pt. II, f.57; Rawl. A. 302, f.250; O.C., Nov.l68if, no.526^, 
Vol. 1*1*; D.B. 13 Feb. 1685, Vol.90, f.l+36.
85. July l682> Yo1' 90, f*8> 12 Jan> Vo1* 95,
86. Ibid. 12 Dec. 1677, Vol. 88, f.520.
87. Ibid. 5 July 1682, Vol. 90, f.8: Ibid. 18 Jan. 1705,
Vol. 95, f.519.
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evil and tried to beat down the rate of interest by various 
means. In the early 1 eighties the Court claimed to have 
reduced the rate of interest in Surat to 6 p.c. by sending- 
'great stocks of money1 there. They reported - "... money 
was grown so plentiful there that any man in full credit 
might take up what he would at 1+ p.c." Such a rate was of 
considerable advantage to the Company which asked Surat 
to go on buying goods throughout the year by which it would 
save about 20 J^ in the price of goods while the interest for 
such a period (six months at the most) would be only 3 p«c. 
With the expectation of such advantages, the Bengal factors 
were asked to reduce the interest of money as it was in 
Surat or to 7> 8 or 9 p# cent at most 'by any contrivance 
or diligence or by any contract with the great moneyed men 
of the Bay1• The Court further wrote, presuming such rates 
would be available in Bengal, that it would' probably be our
88
advantage to be always in debt there £100,000 or thereabout*•
88. D.B. 5 July, 1682, Vol.90, f.8, There is little doubt 
that large stock sent by the Company to Surat greatly 
reduced the rate of interest there. The Surat 
General letter stated in I683 - ''It is very true that 
the large stocks Your Honours sent out lately annually 
was the real cause that the rate of interest fell and 
not unlikely but at sometimes when Your Honours or the 
Dutch's occasions require no money, men of good 
reputations might for small sums procure after the rate 
of If p.c. per annum." Vide . 0.C.,30 Nov.1683,no.5661, 
Vol. 3^
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In 1682 the Court asked Bengal Council to begin an 
indigenous bank with a capital of £260,000 from the
89
indigenous merchants there. But it seems the Company
a
did neither send^sufficiently ■?. large stock to Bengal 
in an attempt to reduce the rate of interest as it did 
in Surat nor could it form an indigenous bank to relieve 
it from borrowing money at exorbitant interest. It also 
tried unsuccessfully to form a joint stock of merchants 
who would provide investment with their own money*
The problem of financing the investment was made 
more difficult for the Company because of the fact that 
the rate of interest as also the availability of money 
depended to a large extent on the rate of exchange to 
Agra, If the latter rate was high, money would become 
scarce in Bengal and consequently the rate of interest 
would also be high. Sometimes even at this high rate of 
interest, it was difficult for the Company to procure any 
money. In 1682 the Kasimbazar factors wrote that the
place was 1 unprovided of cash by reason the exchange to
90
Agra is so exceeding high1 • This was the pattern of the
89. D.B., 28 Aug. 1682, Vol. 90, f.22.
90. Fact. Records, Kasimbazar, Vol. 2, Consult., 7 Sept.1682.
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credit market throughout our period. Even as late as
1700 the factors in Kasimbazar reported - nVJe cannot get
money at interest here being very little ready money in
the country and the exchange current from hence to Delhi
and Agra is but 6 per cent and the shroffs make use of
91
what ready money they have that way.” Again the
merchants or shroffs who lent money to the Company would
often demand it back when the exchange to Agra took a
sudden rise so that they could employ it more profitably.
In l68*f the Kasimbazar factors reported that the merchants
demanded their principal and had become fvery importunate
with us for it*.They further wrote - nWe cannot well avoid
paying now, the exchange running high aloft which is the
reason they want it to employ that way to their better 
92
:advantages* • Any rise in the rate of exchange to Agra 
also impeded the sale of treasure by the Company. In 
1678 the factors in Kasimbazar reported that they failed 
to come into contract with Gujrati merchants for sale of 
treasure as the latter employed all their money in exchange
91. Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol.10, pt. II, f. 92.
92. Fact. Records, Kasimbazar, Vol.. l+, pt. I, f.l.
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93
to Agra, following a sudden rise therein. The
mechanism of this operation can be understood as follows.
A favourable rate of exchange on Agra causes the Indian
merchants in Bengal to engage in arbitrage transactions
thus causing a temporary tightness in the local money
market. Since the sale of the Company*s silver required
liquid funds, the merchants were obviously not in a position
to offer attractive prices in view of their operations
in bills of exchange.
There were other factors which hindered the Company
from borrowing money locally for financing the investment.
Sometimes the official exploitation of the Company in
other parts of India led to its loss of credit in Bengal.
Thus in 1702 Janardan Seth, the Company1 s broker, failed to
borrow money on behalf of the Company from Hugli where a
report was current that the Dutch and the English
factories in Surat had been plundered by the Government to
the extent of above six lacks of rupees to make satisfaction
for the piracies committed on the ^occo1 (Mocha? or Mecca)
9b
and Malacca shipping in the previous year. The late
93* Fact, Records, Kasimbazar,Vol.1, Diary, 17 Aug.1678. 
9^ f. Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 8, pt.II, f.?^.
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arrival of Europeships also sometimes led to the loss of 
credit for the Company. The Calcutta factors wrote in 
1702 that Fatechund Shah refused to accept their letter of
credit to pay the English ten thousand rupees at Patna as
95
•no ship was yet arriving from England*. Again most 
oftem the merchants clamoured for their money as soon as 
the ships arrived from England, thus aggravating the 
Company*s problem of finance.In a general report in 
1669, the Company*s factors wrote - "If we chance to get 
into the merchants* debts, they call for their money as 
soon as our ships arrive and nothing will serve their turns
but silver, they will not stay the coining it, because
96
they will have the advantage themselves." Sometimes the 
merchants who lent money were factors or agents of other 
merchants and demanded payment of their money when their 
masters asked for it, thus putting the Company in an 
awkward position. In 1685 the Kasimbazar factors reported 
that three of their merchants to whom they owed Rs.50,000 
at interest had been *very importunate* with them for
97
their money as the latters* masters * called upon them for it*#.
95. O.C., 15 Aug, 1702, no. 7996, Vol. (k.
96. Rawl. A. 302, f. 250.
91* Fact. Records, Kasimbazar, Vol. if, pt.l, f.108.
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In the same year Sibram Poddar and others who were
1 poddars1 to the Dutch, and to whom the English Company
was indebted for Rs.60,000, demanded their money back,
part of which, as the factors believed, belonged to the 
98
Dutch. But despite all these limitations, the credit 
market in Bengal was the most important as an additional 
source of supply for financing the Company’s investments.
Apart from indigenous credit market, the Company 
often turned to other sources to replenish its finance in 
Bengal. Of these the Dutch were the most important source 
of supply for the English Company, especially in the early 
years of its trade in Bengal. The servants of the Dutch 
East India Company generally remitted money to Europe 
through the English Company. The general practice was that 
these factors deposited their money with the Company in 
Bengal and received a Bill of Exchange which their agents 
or correspondents cashed in Europe. In 166^ the Court of 
Directors made an agreement with John Lethieulier, a London 
merchant, to receive Rs.20,000 - 2?,000 from Jan Velters 
who was a factor of the Dutch East India Company in Bengal.
98. Fact. Records, Vol. i*, pt. 1, ff. 111-12
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Accordingly in 1665 Jan Velters paid Rs*25,000 to the
English factory at Hugli and took a bill on the English
99
Company at 2s. 6d. per rupee. Thisnwas obviously a
contrivance on his part for getting money remitted to
Europe without the knowledge of his employers. Similarly
other Dutch factors remitted money through the English
Company. The practice became so common that the Company
authorised its factors in Bengal in 1669 to take up from
100
the Dutch up to £10,000 regularly at exchange'. It was
not only the ordinary factors, but even the Chiefs or
Directors of the Dutch factories in Bengal seem to have
101
indulged in the same practice. The English factors in
Hugli reported in 1681 that the Dutch Director there
offered to pay Rs. 10,681 into the Company1s treasury and
to take bills as usual for it on the Company in England
102
and that they had agreed to the transaction. For obvious 
reasons, the Company preferred taking up money by this sort 
of exchange than borrowing locally, and in 10^ 1* the Court 
of Directors gave liberty to the Bengal Council to take 
up of the Dutch and draw upon them to the value of £20,000
99. D.B., 21 Dec. 166k, Vol.86, f f„ if60; O.C., 1 Sept. 1665, 
no. 3069, Vol.29.
100. O.C., 11 Sept. 1669, no. 33M+. Vol. 30.
101. Velters himself was the chief of the Dutch factory at 
Piply, videfK.H. Chaudhuri, Economic History Review,
Vol. XXI, no. 3, 1968, p.^92.
102. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 3, pt. 1, f.7.
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103
annually. However, it is not possible to calculate
precisely the exact amount of money which was actually
received from the Dutch factors in Bengal for lack of
quantitative data, except perhaps for one or two particular
years. In 1669 the English Company received Rs.65,000
101+
(£8,12?) from the Dutch against bill of exchange.
Again in 1673 the amount was Rs. 110,000 (£13,750) and
105
next year it decreased to Rs.60,000 (£7,511* 5s.).
But sometimes, specially during the Anglo-Dutch wars, the
Dutch source of supply was not available, thus aggravating
the Company*s already acute,problem of financing the
Bengal trade. In 1669 the factors wrote that the Dutch
had stopped further business with them in bills of 
106
exchange. Again in 167b it was reported that no money
was to be had- by exchange from the Dutch due to the war
between the English and the Dutch, despite all assurance
from the Company to honour and pay the bills as in peace 
107
time. However, it seems, up to the 1 eighties of the
103. D.B., 17 Aug. 167^, Vol. 88, f.131.
101+. O.C., 30 Nov. 1669, no. 3377, vol. 30.
105. D.B., 23 Dec. 167k, Vol. 88, f.153; Fact. Records,
Hugli, Vol. l+, pt. I, f. 111+.
106. O.C., 3° June 1669, no. 33°3, Vol. 30.
107. D.B., 7 July 1673, Vol.88, f. 1*8; 31 Oct. 1673, Vol. 88,
f. 75; 23 Dec. I67*f, Vol. 88, f.153*
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17th century, the Dutch factors provided a substantial
part of the Company1s finance in Bengal. Even in 1681
the Court directed the factors in Bengal to take about
1*0,000 or 50,000 rupees at the rate not exceeding 2s. 6d.
per rupee from John Lethieulier1 s correspondents who were
108
mostly Dutch factors in Bengal. But the Dutch sources 
seemi to have jdried up towards the close of the century 
when their trade was much reduced compared to that of the 
English.
Besides the Dutch, the English Company1s servants, 
free merchants and other Europeans also supplied the 
Company with money for the necessary investments in Bengal.
In the early years, however, the Company*s servants generally 
paid money into the Companyfs treasury not in their own 
name but in the name of indigenous merchants thus 
concealing their private fortune from the Company. In 
1679 Richard Mohun, a factor in Bengal, deposil^Md money
109
in a country merchant* s name and received a bill in return. 
Sometimes, however, these factors preferred to lend money to 
the Dutch Company as they deemed it more profitable. In 
l67*f the Bengal Agency reported that some factors found it 
to their greater advantage to lend what money they could
110
spare to the Dutch Company at 1^ p.c. interest per month.
108. D.B., 5 Jan. 1681, Vol. 89, f. 276.
109. O.C., 1 Oct. 1679, no. 1*660, Vol. hO.
110. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. pt. II, f.20.
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Generally the factors deposited money with the Company
against bills of exchange which they sent to their
correspondents in England. A few illustrations of such
transactions between the Company and its servants can be noted
here. Abraham Adams, who was accountant at Fort William,
on his departure for England in 1716, deposited Rs.27*728. 6. 3
and received a bill of exchange for £3*812.13* Id. (at
111
2s.9d. per rupee) on the Court of Directors. Even the
President of the Company!s affairs in Bengal remitted money
to England by bills of exchange on the Court. In
December 1717 the principal and interest of money
deposited by Robert Hedges, the President in Bengal,
amounted to Rs.l+O,§b5 for which he received a bill of
112
exchange on the Court at 2s.9d. per rupee. The 
succeeding President, Samuel Frake, paid Rs. 10,000 into 
the Company1s treasury in 1718 against a bill of exchange on
113
the Directors for £1,37? (at 2s.9d. per rupee). In 
the same year Henry Franfcland, storekeeper at Fort WilliAm
111. Beng. Pub, Consult., Range 1, Vol. 3, f.117.
112. Ibid. Range 1, Vol 3, f.lf60.
113. Ibid. Range 1. Vol. If, f. la.
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and a member of the Bengal Council, deposited Rs.80,000 
for which he received a bill of exchange on the Court for
m
£11,000 (at 2s. 6d. per rupee)* Besides the Company^ 
servants, other Europeans too lent money to the Company 
at interest* In 1699 Noel Argons, a Frenchman, offered 
to lend Rs.15,000 to the Company at 1 p.c. interest per
115
month. Derrickson, a free merchant, it seems, received
a bill of debt from the Company in 171? for his principal
116
and interest amounting to Rs.30 , 731* 6.
Apart from short-term direct borrowings which were 
really bridging finance, the Company also tried to explore 
other available sources in an attempt to create funds 
required for its investment in Bengal and thus engaged 
itself in several branches of Inter-Asiatic trade. 
Similarly in order to tap yet another source of income, it 
encouraged the freighting of its ships by indigenous 
merchants and carried goods of these traders to different 
Asian ports on freights. Thr Inter-Asiatic trade and 
freight voyages not only provided additional sources of 
funds for investment but they also saved the Company the 
demurrage of its ships while in Asia. These ships which
Pub. Consult, 
llif. Beng/Range 1, Vol. 1+, f. 3. 
llj. Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 3, pt. II, f.
116. Beng. Pub, Consult., Range 1, Vol. 3, f. 108a.
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failed to sail for England in the proper season were
obliged to stay on, thus incurring heavy demurrage* Under
the circumstances the Company asked its servants to use
their best efforts to employ those ships in Inter-Asiatic
commerce and freight voyages* These commercial ventures
eased, with little doubt, the problem of financing the
investment for the Company, though in the absence of
adequate data, any accurate estimate of the proceeds from
such ventures is not possible. Throughout the period, the
branch of the Inter-Asiatic trade in which the Company was
mostly engaged was the Bengal-Persia trade* As early as
1652 the Company decided to lade a ship in Bengal for a
117
voyage to Persia. In 1657 the Court directed the Bengal
factors to send one ship annually with suitable cargoes to 
118
Persia. The ship Ann arrived at Gombroon in 1659 from
Bengal with commodities on the Company’s account as well
119
as a considerable quantity of freight goods. But it 
appears that the Company never sent ships regularly on 
trading voyages to Persia. In 1682 the factors in Gombroon 
urged the Company to send one or two ships there regularly
117. O.C., 12 Feb. 1652, no. 2257, Vol. 22; E.F.I., 
1651 - 5b9 p. 111.
118. D.B., 31 Dec. 1657, Vol. 85, ff. 15-16.
119. O.C., 2 April, 1659, no. 2730. Vol. 26.
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toom Bengal. They pointed out that the Dutch sent that
year two ships from Bengal laden with cloth and sugar by
which they 1 seldom got less than 50 or 60 p.c.1 so that
one of the ships of 1+00 tons gained by one voyage from
Bengal at least fifty five or sixty thousand rupees, besides
120
the freight they got from Gombroon to Surat. In 1683,
however, the English Company sent two ships to Persia
from Bengal - one of them, the Hare, carrying 2,171 bags of
sugar, valued at Rs. 21,733 A* the other, Henry and William.
laden with 2,821 bags of sugar and various other goods
121
amounting to Rs.56,760. A large part of the profit
thus earned in Persia went to Bengal in the form of silver
abbasis and gold ducats. The freight voyages were generally
undertaken to and from Surat and Persia. Whenever the
Company failed to procure sufficient tonnage for freight
to Surat or Persia, it filled up th&hships with cargoes on
its own account. Thus in 1690, besides the freight goods,
about 200 tons were required to make up the full tonnage
of the ship Kempthorne and the Company ordered to provide
5,000 or 6,000 mds.of rice and 1,000 mds.of wheat to make
122
up her tonnage in a voyage to Surat. Individual Indian
120. 0?C., 16 May 1682, no. 1+820, Vol. 1+2.
121. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 6, pt. II, ff. 1+-5*
122. Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 1, pt. 1, f. 36.
216
merchants also quite frequently freighted Company* s
ships for particular voyage to Surat or Persia either
jointly or on their separate account* A few illustrations
of such freighting of ships by indigenous merchants would
not be inappropriate here* In 1701 several Hugli merchants,
namely, Mathuradas, Brindabandas, Khoja Padroes and Khoja
Phanous freighted one of the Company*s ships for a voyage
123
to Surat for Rs* 20,000* Again in 1702 Khoja Sarhaud 
Israeli, the famous Armenian merchant in Bengal, chartered 
the Company*s ship Colchester for a trading voyage to
12k
Gombroon and Basra for Rs. 38,000. Janardan Seth, the
Company* s broker at Calcutta, chartered the Hester in
125
1707 for Persia at Rs. 30,000. Khoja Sarhaud freighted the
126
Howland in the same year for Persia at Rs. 3^,000. The 
earnings from such voyages either on freight or on the 
Company* s own account were not negligible. In 171*+ the
127
ship Hanover* s voyage to Surat produced about Rs.59,5i+8.
The estimated profit of the Cardigan* s voyage to and from
128
Persia in the same year was above Rs.i+0,000. In 1717
the small ship Arabella* s earnings in her Surat voyage
129
remounted to well over Rs.17,000. Though the Company
123. O.C., 23 Dec. 1701, no. 7807, Vol. 63; 27 Jan. 1702, 
no. 783$» Vol. 63•12k* Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. k, pt. 1, ff. 18, 20-22.
125. D.B., 7 April, 1708, Vol. 96, ff. 255-56.
126. Beng. Pub* Consult,, Range 1, Vol. 1, f. if 11.
127. G. & B. Abst. Vol. 1, ff. 508, 52lt.
128. Beng. Pub. Consult,, Range 1, Vol. 2, f. 399a.
129. Fact. Records, Misc., Vol. 7, f* 37* ->
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discussed in various deliberations the possibilities
of deriving a lucrative trade from Bengal to China,
130
Japan, Achin and other parts of the East Indies, it 
had never effectively traded to those parts from Bengal 
during our period, though the China trade seems to have 
provided substantial sums for investment on the Coromandel
131
Coast.
Procurement
The procurement of the return cargo for England 
and Europe was no less a baffling task than financing the 
investment, and one was intimately connected with the other. 
It involved problems partly technical in character and 
partly inherent in the local administrative, social and 
political organisation. Securing commodities of the right 
quality as also pricing and sorting out these, for instance, 
required considerable skill and dealing with the local 
merchant - middlemen called for great tact and vigilance.
The machinery for the procurement of the investment had 
been organised, it appears, right from the beginning on a 
stable basis. For procuring the bulk of the return cargo, 
the Company had to depend on the indigenous merchant - 
middlemen as it could not deal directly with the producers
130. D.B., 25 July 1701, Vol. 9*f, ff. 301+ - 5; O.C., 8 Jan. 
1702, no. 7820, para 11, Vol. 63; 25 Jan. 1703, no. 8110. 
ff. 11-12, Vol.65; 29 Dec. 1701, no. 7810, ff.9-10,
Vol. 63.
131. R • IT.- Banerjee, The Commercial Progress and Administrative 
Development of East India Company on the Coromandel 
Coast during the first half of the 18th Century, pp 213-17
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Ota weavers. Money and merchandise were delivered to these 
middlemen in advance from four to six months before the time 
when the commodities were to be delivered# The 
middlemen in their turn gave ^advance to the weavers and 
saltpetremen# Thus a substantial part of the Company* s 
investment was procured through a system based on giving 
advances to indigenous merchants. Connectedvwiththe advance 
given to the merchants was the problem of bad debts which 
was one of the main concerns of the Company throughout our 
period. The Company provided the merchants with samples 
of calicoes and silk ordered from England, and both the 
parties agreed to a price at the time when the contract 
was made. The fixing of prices and sorting of piece-goods 
and silk often led to wranglings between the Company and 
the merchants. Moreover there were the problems of 
competition from other European Companies and indigenous 
merchants trading in Bengal, and attempts at monopolisation 
of certain sectors of local trade(especially the saltpetre 
trade as was done by Mir Jumla and Shiasta Khan). Besides, 
wars, famines and official rapacity accentuated the 
difficulties of procuring investment on advantageous terms 
for the Company.
In order to avoid buying commodities at scaring prices - 
as we have seen earlier, sometimes at even 1+0 to 50/2
more than the usual rate - at the shipping season, the
219
Company had to give advance to the middlemen in the
proper season for investment which was usually between
February and June. Again, some of the commodities were
not at all procurable sometimes without impress1 or
advance given earlier* Thus, in 1702, the Calcutta factors
reported that raw silk and floretta yarn were not to be
provided1without giving impress1. Moreover, though the
return cargoes were available for purchase with ready
money during shipping season, most often the quality and
the size were not up to the specification set out from
England. Hence advance or dadney for procuring investment
became an accepted norm in the pattern of the Company1s
trade in Bengal. For silk investment, advances had to be
given throughout the year. There were three kinds of silk -
132
namely Marchbund, Julybund & November bund - in Bengal for 
which the Company provided dadney. The advance for 
1 November bund* silk which was regarded as the best kind
133
of silk was to be paid either in December or January. 
Similarly for 1Julybund1 silk, which was next to 
1 Novemberbund* silk in quality, the 1 impress1 money was 
to be given in August or September, and for 1 Marchbund1 
silk in April or May. A3 silk formed an important item of
132. Band or Bund is a technical term for a cocoon - rearing 
season in Bengal (c.f. N.Mukherjee, Monograph on the 
Silk Fabrics of Bengal, p.10); in other words,1Bund1 
means silk from the cocoons of a particular season.
133. Fact. Records, Kasimbazar, Vol. 1, Consult, 36 Dec.l68l 
10 Jan. 1682; Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol.10,pt.III,f.2.
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the Compares investment in Bengal, inadequate capital 
for providing dadney at the proper time stood in the 
way of a full investment in that commodity. In 1699 the
factors reported - "......the best Kasimbazar silk is
procured in March and November, but we seldom get any of it 
for want of money to give them in time on contracts to
13*+
secure it." At Patna money was to be paid in advance 
to the saltpetremen in November for the provision of
135
saltpetre. Similarly at Malda sometimes dadney was to
be provided in January for piece-goods, specially in order
to prevent the 1 needy weavers1 from falling into the hands
136
of the Dutch and other competitors. So almost throughout 
the year the Company needed quite a substantial amount of 
money to provide advance against the provision of return 
cargoes.
From the beginning of its trade in Bengal, the 
Company, plagued by chronic shortage of working capital, 
took recourse to barter trade for procurement of return 
cargo. It seems that up to the 'eighties of the 17th 
century, bartering Company's imports for dadney or final 
payment against investment was a normal method of the 
Company's transactions in Bengal. As early as 1669 the
131+. Rawl. A. 3°2, 2?0.
135* Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 10, f.196.
136. Fact. Records, Malda, Vol. 1. Diary, 3 Jan., 8 Jan. 1681.
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Balasore factors wrote to the Court of Directors that 
goods there had for many years been provided with
137
European commodities which were bartered to the merchants. 
Sometimes only a part of the payment against investment 
was made in barter for European merchandise; at other 
times the whole amount, specially when it was small, was 
paid in barter for English goods. A few examples of such 
transactions between the merchants and the Company will 
illustrate our point. In July 1679 the Company agreed 
on a contract with Muthuradas Shah, a prominent merchant 
of Hugli, for 6,000 pieces of romalls for which the
138
Company was to pay half in money and half in Europe goods.
Similarly in I68*f the Company entered into a contract with
Rewadas of Balasore for cloth and other commodities for
which it paid half in ready money and half in English 
139
merchandise. Sometimes the whole amount of the contract
was paid in imported goods. Thus in l681f the Company paid
Chintaman Shah of Balasore for cloth amounting to
Rs.8,100 and Lalchund, also of Balasore, for his cloth
worth Rs. 17,000 fully in different commodities imported 
IkO
from England. As the import market was limited, the
137. Fact. Records, Misc., Vol.3, f.99.
138. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 2. pt. 1, f. 68.
139. Ibid., Vol. 10, f.76.
11+0. Ibid., Vol. 10, ff. 11,75.
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Company found it convenient to impose English merchandise 
on the merchants as part or full payment against investment. 
In I683 the Balasore factors wrote - "The only way we can 
contrive here or think on to put off our masters1 cloth 
to their most and best advantage is to put our merchants 
to be taking of cloth now and then upon the account of 
their investment". In that year the following contract
Ikl
was made with the Balasore merchants -
The merchants to provide: The merchants to receive in
English merchandise 
Nillaes - 25,000 pcs,Rs.1,06,250 Broadcloth Rs.20,000
Ginghams- 20,000 " 61,000 Quicksilver 3>600
Sannoes - 20,000 " 70,000 Vermilion 2,000
Sannoes - 3,000 » 18,850 Lead *+,125
Romalls - 2,000 " ______11,000 Copper plates 12,000
Rs. 267,000 Rs.1+1,725
But it ..as becoming increasingly difficult to impose
English merchandise and goods on merchants as barter for
investment. Quite often they refused to accept imported
goods or bullion against provision of investment. The
Court, too, disliked the barter trade as they thought that
it led to a loss for the Company. As early as l67*+> they
recommended to the Bengal factors 1 to sell our goods for
11+2
money so that you may buy all with money* . But the
H u q l t
mi # Pact. Records,^Vol. 9, f.127#
11+2. D.B., 12 Dec. 1677, Vol. 88, f.520.
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Company could hardly abandon the barter trade in the 
face of two factcwrs - the compulsion to export a 
substantial part of the investment in merchandise 
and the small demand for such commodities in Bengal. As 
late as 1719, one finds that the Bengal Council tried to 
impose broadcloth on the dadney merchants as advance for 
the procurement of investment 1through its broker at 
Calcutta# The merchants, as the Calcutta factors reported, 
showed the 1 utmost unwillingness by their obstinate and 
positive refusals1 against such proposals. As last, however, 
the broker persuaded the merchants to take 5 p.c. in
1^3
broadcloth at current market rates.
The Company was sometimes relieved of its shortage 
of cash by the local merchant - middlemen who provided the 
investment with their own money. Mathuradas, the chiief 
merchant of the Company in Hugli, provided 250 bales of raw
lM+
sillc with his own money in 1695. In 1696 the Calcutta 
Council asked the Dacca factors to enter into a contradt 
with Puranmal Shah for goods to be provided with his own 
money, allowing him about 20^ on the first cost of goods 
and exclusive of charges as brokerage etc. The demand 
of the merchants who provided investment with their own 
money was generally 20$ above prime cost for goods and
lk5
for charges. In Calcutta, however, when the Company
11+3* Beng. Pub, Consult., flange 1, Vol. if, ff.110, 110a;
Coast & Bay Abst., Vol.2,; f .233> para.lf9.
Ikb* Pact. Records, Calcutta, Vol.2, pt.l, f.95;Vol.3, pt.II,f.91 
11*5. Pact. Records, Calcutta, Vol.6, pt.III, f.o7*
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contracted with the merchants for the main bulk of the 
investment, the merchants, whenever required to provide 
goods with their own money, were to be allowed interest 
at the rate of 1 p.c. per month for their money until paid 
in full. The Calcutta factors reported in 1699 that they 
entered into a contract with several Moneyed merchants1 
who would provide the Company1s investment with their 
own money, allowing them interest until 1 the Company was in 
cash to pay them and give them full dadney1 • Explaining the 
considerations on which they thought the contract was 
convenient for the Company, the factors wrote - “though 
it may be said that these merchants having money will of 
themselves provide goods against the next season and 
deliver in them for ready money and we save the interest, yet 
on the other side, we find that of late years the merchants 
have seldom brought in their ready money goods of such 
goodness and sortments as were proper for the European 
markets, though of necessity we took them whilst goods 
bore such a great price.in Europe; for its their intent 
to lay their money out in goods proper for all markets
llf6
so that if one party will not, another will take them.”
As the Company could hardly afford to lose full investment 
for Europe ships, it had to procure goods through the
Ilf6. Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol.3, pt. II, f.91.
225
merchants who provided the commodities with their own
money for which the Company paid them interest* Manickchund
Shah offered in 1700 to provide goods worth 2 or 3 lacks
1 b7
of rupees with his own money* The factors reported in
1717 that as they had no money to give out dadney* the
merchants refused to contract for any goods until they
agreed to allow one percent interest per month for half
the amount of what they should contract for. The
Company gave each merchant a bill of debt at interest
for half the amount of what he obliged himself to provide.
The bills were to be paid with interest when cash was
1W3
available to the Company. The merchants were often paid 
against their investment by such bills of debts by the 
Company* But sometimes its effects were disastrous for the 
merchants, specially the less wealthy ones. The Kasimbazar 
factors reported in 1701 that in the previous year having 
failed to get money of the shroffs * they were forced to 
pay their merchants for goods by bills at interest. The 
merchants who needed money 'in a little time1, carried those 
bills 1 so plentifully to the shroffs that they were much 
undervalued and a great many of them sold for considerable
11+7• Fact. Records, disc •, Vol. 3A, f#392*
11+8. Beng. Pub, Consult., Range 1, Vol. 3, f.33?*
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loss1 , thereby ruining some of the merchants who, it was
11+9
thought, would hardly recover themselves again.
However, procurement through such bills of debt by the
Company appears to have been quite common from the
'nineties onward. Often the total amount of these bills
of debt given as dadney to the merchants at Calcutta for
one years's investment was quite large. In May 1695
the Company paid the merchants by bills on the mint
amounting to Rs.327>5>19 on account of that year's
150
contract for goods. Similarly in March 1703 the merchants
were paid by bills of debt for Rs.177*955* 7* 11 at
the usual interest of 1 p.c. per mensem as the payment of
151
the balance for the previous year's investment. The 
Company, occasionally it seems, paid the Armenian merchants 
for their goods by bill of exchange on the Court. Thus in 
1703 Khaja Sarhaud Israeli received three bills of exchange 
on the Company in London for £1,356.5* - for seven thousand 
rupees worth of goods supplied by him. The Armenians 
sometimes provided part of the Company's investment in 
Bengal. As a matter of fact, as early as 1688, their 
representative Khoja Phanous Calendar made a contract with
ll*9*Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 3* pt. Ill, f.lll
150.Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 2, pt. 1, ff.118,120,121.
l51*Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 1+, pt. 1, f.57*
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the Company in London to provide Indian goods for the
Company at a certain profit. According to this, the
Armenian merchants' goods were to be consigned to the
Company which would allow them 30 p.c. profit on the first
152
cost and charges. Again in 169*+ Khoja Phanous Calendar 
made an agreement with the Company in London to;provide, 
specially, Patna commodities as investment for the Company. 
All these merchandise were to be procured by the Armenians 
with their owiji money and brought down and delivered to the 
Company either at Calcutta or Hugli and they were to be 
allowed 15$ upon the prime cost and all other necessary
153
charges.
As we have already seen, the main bulk of the Company1s 
return cargo was procured through a system based on 
giving advances to indigenous merchants. The dadney 
given to the merchants at Calcutta for the procurement of 
goods was generally from 70 to 75 p#c. of the total cost
15>+
of the investment. It appears that the full amount of 
the dadney was not paid all at once but on instalments. 
Again sometimes only a part of the dadney was paid in cash, 
the rest by bills of debt. The balance of the cost of
152. D.B., 15 Feb. 1689, Vol. 92, f.25.
153. Home Misc., Vol. 36, ff. 81-82.
15^ +. Beng. Pub. Consult., Range I, Vol. 1, f.290; O.C., 2 Aug,
1707> no. 81+9*+, Vol. 69; 26 March, 1708. no. 85l+1+>
Vol. 69; Beng. Pub. Consult., Range I, Vol. 2, f f ^ W ^ W a ;  
Vol. 3, f.335.
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investment was not paid till accounts were adjusted
after the departure of Europe ships. The Court, however,
did not like the practice of paying dadney. specially at
such high percentage of the total cost of investment.
They were glad when in 1718 the factors reduced the dadney
to 60^. They wr6te in February 1720 - "We can't but approve
it (reduction of dadney) because it reduces a former ill
custom, for on the Coast we don't make such advance of
156
money beforehand'1 • The dadney was again reduced to 
50 p.c. in 1722, of which 20 p.c. was paid in cash and
157
the rest by bills.
The system of providing dadney for the procurement 
of return cargo involved the problem of bad debt which 
concerned the Company throughout the period of our study.
The Company incurred bad debts whenever the merchant - 
middlemen failed to comply with the contract for goods.
If the factors were careless in choosing the merchants for 
such contracts, there was little chance of secjurfihgi the 
goods ordered or recovering the money. As a matter of fact, 
sometimes even merchants of repute failed to provide goods
155* Coast & Bay Abst., Vol, 2, f.276.
156. D.3., 3 Feb. 1720, Vol. 100, f.225*
157. Coast & Bay Abst., Vol. 2, f.319.
according to the contract, thus augmenting the Company's
loss by bad debts. The recovery of these bad debts was a
tedious and hopeless task. In 1695 the Company even
attempted to make good its losses by seizing a ship
with her cargo belonging to Chintaman Shah, an alleged 
158
defaulter. As early as 1679, the Company tried to
secure itself from bad debts at Balasore by entering into
a contract with the merchants there, according to which,
the merchants were to be mutual securities for each other* s 
159
transactions. But this contract does not seem to have
worked for long. Time and again, the Court asked the
Bengal factors to organise the merchants in different
160
factories into joint stocks which, together with other 
advantages, would secure the Company from bad debts. But, 
as we have noted earlier, the Company failed to form any 
joint stock societies in Bengal. However, the Company 
always tried to secure itself from bad debts. In the 
'seventies or 'eighties of the 17th century, whenever the 
Company was required to appoint smaller merchants for silk
158. Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 2, pt. 1, ff.162,195; 
Vol. 9, pt. II, ff. 89-90, 105, 12*+; Vol. 10, pt. 1, 
f • 3. 
159. B.M. Addl. Mss. 3^123 fA7; O.C., 3 Sept. 1679, no. 1|-6W, 
Vol. 1*0; Master’s Diary, Vol. II, pp.222-lf.
160. D.B., Ilf Nov. 1681, Vol. 89, f. 398; 21 Dec. 1683, 
Vol. 90, f. 2lf5; 5 Sept. 1683, Vol. 90, f.219; 5 March, 
I681f, Vol. 90, f.260.
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investment, it made them provide eminent merchants as 
security for any such contract. Thus in 1677 and 1678 
Jaychund Shah stood security in the name of his son
161
Prananath for Jashodanandan, a silk picar or merchant.
In Mai da when the petty merchants and weavers made any
contract with the Company, they had to stand security for 
162
each other. In 1705 when the Company employed several 
weavers in Calcutta, it ordered - in order to prevent the 
danger of bad debts - that some merchants would stand security 
for all the weavers and that these merchants were to be 
allowed 3 P«c. on the value of the goods 1 on consideration 
that he must make good what sums shall happen to be lost
163
by any of the weavers that may chance to break or run away1 • 
Next year, the Company, thinking it hazardous to trust the 
weavers - who fell defaulters last year - any longer 
without any good security, made an agreement with Nityananda, 
who should act as supervisor over all the weavers in the 
three towns. He had to answer for all danger and loss that 
would accrue thereon according to his contract and obligation
161. Fact. Records, Kasimbazar, Vol. 1, Diary, 12 April 1677; 
25 March 1678.
162. Fact. Records, Malda, Vol. 1, Diary, 2h May 1680.
163* Bengal. Public. Consult., Range 1, Vol. 1, f.195*
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1 for which trouble and risk1 he would be allowed 3 P*c. on
16b
all goods procured from the weavers. However though bad
debt appears to be the Company1 s concern throughout the
period, it does not seem to have suffered heavily from bad
debts in Bengal. As a matter of fact the proportion of
desperate and ddad stock to quick stock was the minimum in
the Coast and Bay as compared with that in Company1 s other
factories in Asiawhich is evident from the following table
16^ +a
for January 1683 -
Factories Desperate Stock Dead Stock Quick Stock
Bantam £26,399 £2^,339 £112,006
Surat £18,78k- £139,393 £199,299
Coast & Bay £2lf,753 £18,336 £5W-,796
St. Helena   £10,000 -----
£69,936 £192,068 £853,101
Among other major problems which the Company had to 
face in the procurement of return cargo was the failure 
of the merchants to provide goods in due time and their 
non-compliance to fulfil the contract even after accepting 
dadney or advance. Not only were the merchant-middlemen 
frequently in arrear, but often they:failed to comply with
I6*f. Bengal. Public, Consult., Range 1, Vol. 1, ff.301, 301a. 
16^. Br. Mus. Addl. Mss., 22,185, f.*+.
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their contracts to deliver goods in due time* Again,
some of the merchants quite frequently sold their goods to
other European Companies or traders at lucrative prices,
though they were provided with dadney by the English
Company for providing the commodities for its investment.
To obviate all these difficulties, the Company took
recourse to various measures but hardly with complete
success. In 1678 the Company entered into a contract with
the Balasore merchants - Ramnarain, Ramchund and Ramjiban -
who were to provide different commodities by the end of
November, and in case they failed to bring these goods in
due time, they were to pay 25 p.c. 1for what money shall be
165
in their hands at that time1. The agreement with Khojia
Sarhaud Israeli in 1699 was of great interest in this
respect. Perhaps because he was such an eminent merchant,
the obligation to honour the contract was not only his but
also on the part of the Company. According to this contract,
he was to provide the Company with different commodities to
the value of Rs.250,000 and it was agreed if either party
relinquished the contract, it had to pay ten thousand rupees
166
to the other party. It appears to be the only contract in
165• Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 1, Diary, 2 Sept. 1678. 
166. Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 3? ff* 228-29*
which the Company bound itself to pay penalty if it
cancelled the agreement on its own accord* The jtenalty or
fine for delay in providing goods does not seem to have
been imposed on the Calcutta merchants before 1702# In
January that year, wheh several of the dadney merchants
failed to provide goods in due time, the Company demanded
interest for the money advanced 1 in consideration that
their goods were not sent home on the last year’s shipping1•
The merchants refused to pay any interest on the ground that
167
their boats were stopped at different Chowkies, and
that it was never practised either by the English or any
other European Companies* As last, however, they were
compelled to pay interest for six months on the sum
168
advanced to them for investment. Then onward such penalty
for arrears became normal in Calcutta. In 1707 the Company
169
charged 10 p.c. on the merchants who were defaulters* Even
the great merchant, Khoja Sarhaud, was obliged in 1709 to
pay interest for the money advanced to him because he failed
170
to provide goods in due time.
But the Company could not prevent the dadney 
merchants from dealing with the Interlopers or other
167* Customs Houses.
168. 0*C., 8 Jan. 1702, no* 7320, para. 3*f, Vol* 63.
169. Ibid., 2 May, 1707, no. Qk9b, Vol. 69.
170. D.B., 9 Jan. 1710, Vol. 96, f.662.
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European Companies. Most of the Company’s influential
merchants - Khemchand and Chintaman at Balasore, Mathuradas
in Hugli, and Chaturmal in Kasimbazar - had direct trade
transactions with the Interlopers. They often sold their
goods to the Interlopers or the French Company at higher
prices, thus hampering the English Company*s investment.
As they were all prominent merchants, the Company could
hardly censure them. But it tried to punish smaller merchants
were
Whenever they/involved in such transactions. In 1683
Sambhunath, who was ’factor general for all the dealers in
Malda1, received dadney from the Company as usual and then
carried all the goods to Hugli with the intention of selling
them to the Interlopers. The Company sought a parwana
from the local fau.idar to ’deliver Ghanashyam, Maniram and
other consorts of Sambhunath* up to the Company, and to find
out Sambhunath or ’to distress their families’. But the
faujdar not only declined to give any such parwana but even
protected all these persons from the Company. The Malda
factors ashed the Hugli Council to seize Sambhunath forcibly
and send him to Malda, 'which, if it succeeds, will break
the neck of this design and become a terror and disappointment
171
to the other combiners.1 But nothing to this effect could
171. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 9,
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be done by the Company. The Malda factors reported in
Wov. 1683 - “The bad example of Sambhunath running away
to gugli and underhand endeavouring (if not done) to sell
the Honourable Company1s goods to the Interlopers hath
caused all the picars etc. to whom money hath been given
172
out to abscond.”
Among the difficulties faced by the Company in 
the procurement of return cargo were the attempts by 
ruling authorities to monopolise some sectors of ther 
province*s trade and the frequent stoppage of the boats 
carrying the Company*s goods from inland factories to Hugli 
or Calcutta by local officials on various pretexts. We 
have already noted how Mir Jumla and Shaista Khan, the 
subadars of Bengal, tried to monopolise saltpetre trade 
much to the detriment of the Company*s investment in that
173
commodity. Even at the close of the 17th century Prince
Azim attempted to monopolise some branches of the local 
174-
trade. But these never posed a serious problem for the 
Company as none of the subadars or fau.idars ever pursued
172. Pact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 9, f* 176.
173* Supra. Chapter III; See also, O.C., 21 June, 1664“, no.3029
Vol. 28; Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 1, Consult. 11 July 1664-
17^* Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 3. pt. II, f. 87«
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these monopolies either systematically or for a long 
period* More . irritating and troublesome to the Company, 
however, was the fact that local authorities in different 
parts frequently stopped the boats carrying Companyfs 
goods on various pretexts. The stoppage of these boats 
at various chowkies often prevented the Company in 
loading the ships in due time and hence their departure 
was delayed. Though the Company always claimed that these 
stoppages arose out of the arbitrary acts of the local 
officials and were hence illegal and unjustified, most 
often they occurred because of the controversy regarding 
the payment of customs duties. The Company claimed its 
right, as allegedly granted by various farmans and nishans, 
of trading duty free which was frequently contested by local
175
authorities. Moreover the local officials often complained 
that the indigenous merchants frequently carried their own 
goods under the cover of the Company*s dastak or letters 
patent, thus depriving the Kingdom of its legitimate dues 
on customs. This reason was most frequently mentioned for 
the official stopping of the Company*s boats. Whenever 
confronted with such a situation, the Company took recourse 
to solicitations and offered bribes or presents to the
175. For discussion on this aspect, supra. Chapter III.
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authorities to take off the stoppage on the boats* At
least on one occasion the Bengal Council sent up soldiers
to clear the boats. Sometimes when the Company was
debarred from trading in the wake of a dispute with the
ruling authorities, it procured its investment through
eminent local merchants. Thus in 1711 when an embargo
was imposed on the Company’s trade in Kasimbazar, it
contracted with Fatehchund Shah, a prominent merchant there,
for goods worth Rs.83,000 allowing him 64fo commission.
According to this contract, he was to stand security for
all bad debts at the aurungs or places of manufacture
176
and to deliver the commodity at Calcutta. On occasions,
when its trade was prohibited, the Company sent its goods
to Hugli from other factories by Rewanna or paying customs
177
in the indigenous merchants1 hames.
The competition from other European Companies and 
the Interlopers as also from the indigenous merchants further 
augmented the difficulties of the Company in the procurement 
of Europe investment. V/e have already noted how the Company 
was affected by the dadney merchants1 sale of the commodities,
176. Beng. Pub. Consult., Range 1, Vol. 2, ff. 109, 112a:
D.B., 2 Feb. 1713, Vol. 97, f.783.
177* Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 8, pt. II, ff. 185-86; 
pt. Ill, f. If; O.C., 2b Dec. 1702, no. 8097, Vol. 65.
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for which they had received advance from the English
178
Company, to the Interlopers or other foreign Companies*
Whenever the Company had to deal with the weavers directly,
it had to face similar problems and the way of dealing
with these was to provide them with dadney in order to
keep them in constant employment so that they could not be
enticed away by rival Companies, specially the Dutch*
For example, the Malda factors repeatedly asked for money
to keep the weavers engaged and thus to prevent them from
going over to the Dutch. The factors were always apprehensive
of the Dutch, who according to them, were 1 daily practising
and using utmost endeavours to get them (the weavers)
179
from us* • This fear on the part of the factors of losing
their best weavers for want of dadney was not unfounded.
In 1682 the factors in Malda reported - "The Dutch (are)
calling on all our picars and weavers proferring them great
dadney if in case they will bring a writing to bring us our
remains and take no more dadney of us which causes a great
180
many (of) them to floxrk thither".
men
The Company even provided the saltpetre/with dadney 
all round the year in the face of the Dutch endeavour to
178. See ante, p p . 912T7—XB> 131—132.*
179. Fact. Records, Malda, Vol. 1, Diary, 17 Oct., 25 Oct. 1680
180. Fact. Records, Malda, Vol. 1, Diary, 20 April 1682.
181
entice them away from the Emglish. The Court of
2
Directors asked the Bengal Council in 1673 to go on
giving advance to the *petremen1 and weavers of taffeta in
order to keep them employed even when their demand from
Europe was restricted by wars so that they might not be
182
lured away by the Dutch. Another aspect of the problem 
created by the competition of foreign and indigenous 
traders was often a rise in the price of commodities 
which hampered the Company1s constant attempt to procure 
investment at as low rates as possible. In 1682 when the 
Directors ordered a1vast quantity of silk1, the Hugli 
factors reported that even if they could secure the full 
quantity of silk ordered, it would certainly1cause 
all manner of silk to rise, at least to keep its price which 
might and was appearingly falling* because of the Gujarati
183
merchants ’holding their hands* by reason of some troubles.
In 168if when the Interlopers failed to arrive, there was a
I8 lf
considerable fall in the price of saltpetre at Patna.
The Patna factors reported that when the Dutch left the
place, the price of saltpetre was redcued to one rupee and
18?
a half per mound. That prices of export goods in Bengal
181. D.B., 29 Nov. 1670, Vol. 87, f.Wl.
182. D.B., 7 July* r673,3?9lf.88f f.*+8.
183* Home Misc., Vol. 8O3, f.367.
I8lf. Pact, Records, Hugli, Vol. 10, f.23?.
18?. Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 11, pt. II, ff. 2-3.
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were very sensitive to foreign demand we can see from
another example in 1716 when the Company expected to buy
^oods at cheaper rates for ready money if no French ships 
186
arrived. On the other hand, whenever there was a 
competition from the Interlopers or other foreign Companies 
for whom the middlemen supplied the investment, there was
187
a sharp rise in prices.
In addition to all these problems in the procurement 
of return cargo, the examination and sorting of piece goods 
and raw silk and the fixation of their price were equally 
complicated affairs. The Company and the merchants often 
clashed over these complex issues. The general pattern of 
the procurement of Europe investment in three main centres 
of English trade in India - Bengal, Madras and Surat was 
practically the same. The Court of Directors generally 
sent separate lists of order by January or February of each 
year to the different factories in India. These lists were 
prepared about two years ahead of the arrival of goods in 
England in order to allow sufficient time for the despatch 
of the order, the negotiation of the contracts, and the 
procurement of goods through merchant-middlemen and their 
final shipment to England. V/hen the Bengal Council received
186. C. & B. Abst., Vol. 2, f. 71.
187* Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol.10, f.207$ D.3., 9 Jan. 1710,
Vol. 96, f.676; Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol 3. pt. 1, f.106.
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the consolidated list, it sent out individual lists to 
different factories for procuring particular item of 
commodities available in each factory. These factories then 
started negotiations with merchant-middlemen (and in some 
cases with delols and weavers as in Malda) who provided 
the investment according to samples and on agreed prices 
against advances given to them. The only difference between 
the system in Madras and that in Bengal was that in the 
former place the Council contracted mainly with the joint 
stock merchants, while in latter place, as no such joint 
stock organisation could be formed, it had to deal with 
individual merchants who were willing and able to undertake 
such contracts, l/hen the merchants delivered the commodities 
into the Company1s warehouse at the scheduled time, these 
were examined and passed according.to contract and sample 
in the presence of at least two members of the Council 
of which the warehousekeeper generally was one. If the goods 
did not come up to the sample delivered at the time of the 
contract, they were rejected unless the merchants agreed 
to a proportionate reduction in price. The Company's 
standing instructions regarding the sorting of goods 
according to the approved muster or sample were very exacting 
and strict. Two pieces of every sort of goods supplied by 
the merchants were always taken and sealed with the Company's
242
seal, one of which was sent each year to England with 
labels attached showing the agreed price and the number 
of pieces bought, besides the number of each sort packed 
therein. In accordance with the Company1s standing order, 
the warehousekeeper with the help of the sorters, who were 
mostly English or Indian assistants, examined and sorted the 
cloth in the Company1 s warehouses. The officials in the 
subordinate factories similarly sorted goods supplied by the 
local merchants. The strictness in sorting often discouraged 
the merchants and angered the leavers, both of whom made 
unfavourable comparison between the English practice and 
that of other European traders who, they claimed, took 
whatever goods they could lay their hands upon. The Council, 
too, often shared the same opinion and pleaded with the 
Directors on their inability in improving the standard of 
cloth owing to the keen competition from other European 
concerns.
The actual pricing of goods was nearly as complicated 
an affair as sorting. Often general economic and political 
considerations were cited by merchants as reasons for 
demanding a certain price for goodsiblivered to the Company.
The most common factors mentioned during price discussions 
were natural calamities and the consequent rise in the price 
of consumer goods. In 1677 the merchants declined to contract
for romalls at the previous year's price because,
they alleged, cotton was dearer than in the previous year
188
due to 'unseasonal rains1. The saltpetre merchants at
Patna demanded higher prices in 168J+ on the grounds that 
they had to face trouble from the nawab and his officers
189
in procuring saltpetre. Often the rings formed by the
merchants compelled the Company to pay higher prices for their
goods. Sometimes the question of pricing led to serious
controversy and conflict between the Company and the
merchants. In January 168^ the Malda factors reported that
they endeavoured daily to fix the price of goods at
'reasonable terms' but found it extremely difficult as all
the picars and weavers 'stood off1 at the instigation
of two merchants, Sambhunath and Ghanashyam, who tried by
to come
all means to have merchants of their own choie§/ and fix the
price of their goods. "If we should permit," the factors
wrote, "it would certainly ruin the factory for the future
190
and be an unspeakable damage to the Company." The picars 
however, managed to procure a parwana from Dacca urging the 
faujdar (Cremull Mullick - Srimal Mallik?) to cause the 
English and the picars to appear in the adalat or Court
188. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 1, Diary, 7 Aug. 1677*
189* Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 10, f.194.
190. Fact, Records, Hugli, Vol. 10, f.10.
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i9r
and to have the silk priced by the Xin^s Mockeem and Nerkee.
The Kasimbazar factors did not at all like the prospect
of the parwana being executed, which they thought would
be of dangerous consequence to all the Company1s affairs
in the Bay, and a disgrace and dishonour to the English in
general (specially appearance in the adalat). They wrote to
the Hugli Council - " to have our goods priced by the
King's brokers will occasion the loss of the privilege of
pricing any goods for the future not only here but in all
the factories which will be to the Company's unspeakable
loss, so that we shall not be able to trade with any
merchants unless they have what price they please of us ...."•
The situation was more embarrassing for the Company as
the muckeem at Kasimbazar who was to price the goods
according to the parwana. was. one Nainsook, a merchant and
one of the picars of the Company and a 'confederate' of
192
Sambhunath and the others. This particular controversy 
dragged on for months. The local qazi or judge, as the 
Company alleged, not only remitted the merchants of Rs. 150,000 
which they received from the Company but awarded Rs.1+3,000 
more to be paid to them by the Company. V/hen Job Charnock, 
the then chief of Kasimbazar factory refused to pay the sum,
191. 1 Hockfeem' and 'Nerkee' mean brokers.
192. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 10, ff. l+l,?0.
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tiie Picars obtained a parwaha from the nawab to send him
in person to Dacca^ Charnock refused to obey and fled to
Hugli, whereupon the diwan immediately proclaimed a
stoppage on the Company's trade and prohibited any weaver
193
or picar from dealing with the English. The Company, 
however, never gave up its right to fix the price of 
goods and held fast to this principle throughout the period.
An interesting report on the manner of silk and 
taffeta investment at Kasimbazar as also the manner of 
fixing their, price was submitted to Streynsham Master
19b
in 1676. According to this, the proper time for buying 
the best silk was in December when the 1 Hovemberbund1 or 
sortment came from the worm, and in April when the 
'Harchbund' was made. The other sort which came out in 
July was coarse and not so clear or good coloured as the raw 
silk of November and March. Of these two, again, 12Jovemberbund* 
was accounted the best. As to the manner of buying raw silk, 
the report stated, when the 'bund' was made, the factors 
wind of? a sample in the house and computed how much of every 
sort of thread it held out. Then they asked for the silk 
merchants or picars and contracted with them accordingly.
Every picar gave a bill for the quantity he agreed to bring
193• O.C., 19 Dec. l68*f, no. 5287, Vol. kb.
19*+# Fact. Records, Misc., Vol XIV, ff. 326 - 3°; Master's 
Diary. Vol. II, pp. 9-14-•
ot
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in, intimatingalso the time of delivery which was generally 
three months from the date of contract. For every bale of 
silk, the picar received Rs. 20 less than what it would 
amount to according to the contract so that in case of 'abate­
ment1 of price later on, the Company might have something 
in its hand. The Company took this precaution in order 
to avoid trouble in recovering its money back when the silk 
was priced and the account made up. If the account 
exceeded what was at first given out to the picars, they 
were paid the rest in full. As regards the fixation of 
price, according to the report, when a 'convenient quantity* 
came into the factory, it was opened in the presence of 
the chief, the second and the third factor or the 
warehousekeeper of the factory. Then two bales of k maunds 
of raw silk at a time of each sort of thread together xvere 
thrown before the three persons, each of whom examined 
5 or 6 skeins which he took from among the whole heap 
and thereby made a judgement of the whole, by comparing 
them with the sample on which the agreement was made with 
the picars. And as the parcel of silk appeared to each of 
them separately, everyone set down his price in a separate 
paper, 'whether equal with or how much worse or less in 
price than agreed on by muster*. When all the parcels were 
examined, the different prices of each picar's silk were
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compared and added together, the third part of which aggregate
was regarded as the price of the whole.
The method of taffeta investment and the fixation
of its price are also interesting and worth noting here.
The Company used to provide three different qualities
or sorts of taffetas - fine, ordinary, and brown or
unbleached - by sending round the town and adjacent places
for the weavers to whom money was advanced. If the advance
was for fine quality, the contract was that the •warp1
should consist of 2100 threads up and down and that both
•warp and woof1 should be, though of different threads,
of the best quality of silk called awwal namuna or first
Quality. The contract also laid down that they should
195
weigh 50 rupees sicca* each 20 covids in length and 
two covids in breadth and of such colours as agreed on$i 
which they would dye themselves. In the case of ordinary 
quality, the taffeta should weigh k0 or Jjijp rupee sicca* 
the warp not twisted but to be of good silk, the woofing 
something worse than that of the fine variety; the warp was 
to consist of 11+00 threads double or up and down. The 
colour also was agreed on contract but generally both in
195* !In general one third of a yard, though some are 27 and 
36 inches each1, vide * Home Misc., Vol. 68, f.133;
1 Formerly in use as the name of a measure, varying much 
locally in value. The word is probably an Indo-Portuguese 
corrupt form of the Portuguese covado* a cubit or ell?1 
Vide * Hobson - Jobson, p.268 .
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fine and ordinary sort, the weavers failed to supply right 
type of colour contracted for* The brown taffeta was to be 
of 50 rupees sicca weight, each 20 covids and 1400 single 
threads in the warp, to be made of a good sort of silk and 
made without Kan.jie (stiffening of rice starch) or any other 
sort of stiffening. All these varieties were to be brought 
in three to four months and were then priced according to 
their glossiness, weight, fineness and evenness. The 
method of fixing their price was that as soon as the 
weavers brought them in, each individual piece was measured 
and weighed in the presence of one of the factors who wrote 
down the particulars in a paper and delivered it to the 
chief. The factor took down in the paper the length of 
each piece, its weight, deficiency, if any, in length or 
breadth and the name of the weaver of that taffeta. The 
chief would enter these particulars into the weavers' 'waste 
book* and would then proceed to examine each piece gn&r price 
them as they lay in order before him, guiding himself 
by their evenness, both of silk and colour, as also by 
the±r*glossiness and weight.
A similar report on the method of providing cloth
at Dacca was submitted to Streynsham Master by Samuel Hervy 
196
in 1676. According to this, the best time for giving out
196. Fact. Records, Misc., Vol XIV, ff. 333-34; Master's 
Diary, Vol. II, pp. 14-15.
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money for cossaes, mulmuls etc. made in or about Dacca was 
the month of January. The delols or brokers, 'accustomed 
with and appointed by government to the business of cloth1 
would take four months' time for its delivery and within 
six months or thereabout would usually bring in the brown 
or unbleached cloth as it came from the weavers. The brokers, 
after receiving dadney. would deliver it to the picars 
who carried it to the centres of production and delivered 
it to the weavers. Thus the broker was ^ security for the 
Company's money while the picar was bound to the broker 
and the weaver to the picar. The samples and their price 
were agreed on before the money was advanced though the 
Asian merchants (mostly Arabs and Mughals as the report 
states) who traded in Dacca cloth did not fix at first a 
definite price but when they received the goods in due 
course, the delols or merchants of the town valued them 
according to the prevailing market price. When the Company's 
cloth was brought in, the brokers examined, sorted and priced 
it for which they received two per cent from the bicars 
by deduction. The chief and others in the factory 
interposed at the time of sorting and pricing 'with their 
judgment' demanding reductions in price and always 
receiving it (though not in exact proportion) for any short 
fall in length, breadth and goodness. But cloth much worse 
than sample was returned. Whatever money was agreed to be
paid 'upon abatement1, the delols usually made it good 
in specie unless they could pay it by cloth according 
to muster. If at any time it happened that the brokers 
seemed to be partial and overrated the goods, a merchant 
of the city was chosen by joint consent of the Company and 
the merchants to arbitrate and fix a reasonable price.
The practice of employing a broker became an integral
part of the Company's machinery for the procurement of its
return cargo in Bengal, particularly in Calcutta where
the Company contracted and made advances to merchants for
the main bulk of its export from about the close of the
17th century. The practice of using a broker who was
intimately connected with the investment of the Europeans in
India was, however, reported as being common by travellers
like Fryer and Ovington during the last quarter of the
17th century. Fryer stated that the brokers were allowed
2 p.c. on all bargains 'besides what they squeeze secretly 
the price or 197
out of/things bought1• According to Ovington, the brokers 
who were of the 'Banian caste* and skilled in the rates and 
values ofgoods, were appointed 'for the buying and more 
advantageous disposing of the Company's commodities' and
197» John Fryer, A Hew Account of East India and Persia, 
1672-81, Vol. 1, p. 217.
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were allowed 3 P«c. for their duties. In Calcutta the
Council contracted for the investment through the broker who
helped them in pricing and sorting of commodities brought
in by the merchants. As the Company's investment in Calcutta
199
was quite considerable, the office of the broker there
became an important and influential one. In Surat, where
the function of the broker was equally important, he had
to buy his office by offering a substantial sum while in
200
Calcutta no such custom was in vogue. The Court of 
Directors were often apprehensive of the duplicity of the broker 
who, as they suspected, in conjunction with Calcutta 
Council raised the prices of commdoities. They frequently 
asked the Council to have a strict eye on the broker's 
activities. Though the Directors' allegations were often 
exaggerated, there was little doubt that some members of 
the Calcutta Council made common interest with the broker 
for mutual advantages. Jaykrishna who was the Company's 
broker in Calcutta at a salary of Rs.1,000 per annum until 
1699, was dismissed for receiving dustoree or brokerage 
from the merchants who brought the Company's commodities.
198. J. Ovington, A Voyage to Surat in the year 1689+ p.^Ol.
199* In 1709 the intended investment in Calcutta, including
ready money goods for Rs. 200,000, amounted to Rs.1850,000; 
vide. Beng. Pub. Consult., Range I, Vol. 1, f.l+8la.
200. It was reported that Vithul Parrack paid Rs. 100,000 to
become the broker of the Company at Surat. Another broker, 
Rustomjee Maneckjee, paid Rs. 20,000 as customary present 
to the English Company, vide. O.C., 1*+ Sept. 1700, no.7222, 
para. If8, Vol. 58. The Bengal factors reported in 1703 
that 'it was never the custom here in Bengal for brokers 
to buy their places'.vide,O.C.25 Jan.1703,no.8l!0,Vol.65*
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As Early as 1 6 9 5 was accused of receiving dustoree
to the amount of Rs, ^,1+00 (at the rate of quarter of an
anna on every rupee) from the merchants, though it was
said to be 1 the custom for the chief broker and other
servants to take it for themselves1* He was, however,
cautioned not to take any more dustoree 1 on the pain of
loss of employment and disgrace1 as it was disadvantageous*
201
to the Company* After his dismissal in 1699> he was
replaced by Janardan Seth, whom the Council described
as the person best qualified for a broker* But as
Janardan was unwilling to accept the office on a salary
of Rs.1,000 per annum, the Company agreed to his demand of
£> brokerage on the value of total investment in Calcutta,
202
without the payment of a regular salary. Though a broker 
to the Company, Janardan was also a prominent merchant 
v/ho supplied a substantial part.of the Company* s investment 
throughout the tenure of his office till he died in
203
February 1712. The Court of Directors looked down upon 
Janardan as a villain who through the negligence of 
governor Russell monopolised all the trade. The Court*s 
allegations against the broker were numerous - that he 
took commission on all that was bought; by threats and
201. Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 2, pt. I, f. 133*
202. Ibid. Vol. 3, pt. II, f. 90.
203. Beng. Pub. Consult., Range I, Vol. 2, f. 189a.
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violence he prevented the merchants from offering their goods
at rates lower than what he had fixed; he engrossed
provisions of all sorts and sold them to the ships1 captains
at exorbitant rates for his private ends; he instigated
local officers and rulers to extort presents of money from
the Company and secretly spread a rumour against the
Company!s rupees coined in Madras owing to which they
20 ^
were unduly depreciated in Bengal. ”No wonder”,
the Court of Directors wrote to the Bengal Council in
January 171*+, !,that the late broker Janardan declares
himself worth several lack of rupees who but a few years
ago was Mr. Beard1 s servant and not worth one hundred 
205
rupees”. However, after Janardan1s death, his brother
206
Benarasi Seth was appointed as the Company1s broker.
But the Court of Directors regarded him, too, as the chief 
source of all the mischief leading to the bad quality and 
high price of their investments from Bengal. They alleged 
that the broker had too much influence on some members of 
the Council who were much more devoted to his interest 
than that of the Company. Again, they complained, not 
without substance behind it, that Benarasi was not only a
20*+. D.3., 9 Jan, 1710, Vol. 96, ff. 677-8; 5 Jan 1711, 
Vol. 97, f .125; 2 Feb. 1713, Vol. 97, ff.80l+-5;
13 Jan, 171*+, Vol. 98, f. 202.
205. Ibid. 13 Jan, 17m, Vol. 98, f.196.
206. Beng. Pub. Consult, Range 1, Vol. 2, f.l89a: Coast & 
Bay Abst. Vol. 1, f.3^2.
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broker, but 1 by himself and creatures1 sold most of the
207
goods provided for the Company. Benarasi soon lost his
job, it appears, mainly due to the antagonism of Robert
Hedges who was then governor in Bengal. Hedges reported
2 208 
that Benarasi and his family provided 3 all the goods,
and influenced the pricing and sorting, and that till this
was 1 cured1, the Company could not get goods so cheap as
otherwise it might. He further wrote that he was not in
favour of removing Benarasi Seth entirely but for
restricting his power and that it was not in the Company's
interest that the chief merchant should also be the broker,
209
for, if so, goods would 'come dear'. However, following
the Court's order, Benarasi was replaced in April 171? by
Bamkrishna Khan, another merchant of repute and influence 
210
in Calcutta. After Bamkrishna1s appointment, the
Calcutta Council was optimistic and wrote that it would encourage
all merchants to bring in their goods and 'to price all 
211
truly*• The Court, too, seemed happy at the dismissal 
of Benarasi and the appointment of Bamkrishna. "We see the
207* D.B., 12 Jan, 1715, Vol. 98, f.i*62.
208. As a matter of fact the various lists of investment in 
Calcutta show that the Seth family provided a little 
more than ^  of the total investment, vide,Beng. Pub. 
Consult., Range 1, Vol. 2, ff. 302, 3°2a, *+33—^37;
Vol. 3, ff. 38-Wa.
209. Coast & Bay Abst, Vol. 1, f.l+72.
210. Bengal. Pub, Consult, Range 1, Vol. 30, ff. 26a, 31a; Coast 
& Bay Abst., Vol. 2, f. 28.
211. Coast & Bay Abst, Vol. 2, f. 28.
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difference," they wrote, "already not only in the
investments but likewise in the quicker returns brought us
since Bamkrishna Khan hath been your established broker"•
At the same time they gave caution to the Calcutta Council -
"Take care likewise that this broker or whoever succeeds
be in no way concerned in investment directly or indirectly
or in consequence in the goods he prices! as the former
was, of whom we are told that his family and relatives sold
212
two thirds or at least half the goods yearly provided". 
Ramkrishna could not enjoy the coveted office for long 
and died in November 1716 when Haranath was made the new
213
broker on the recommendation of Hedges. But as Haranath,
who was primarily a servant of Hedges and was considered
^unskilled in the goodness or value of muslins and of mean
capacity and no repute1, the Company had to price goods
21*+
for 2 years without his assistance. In April 1719 the
Calcutta Council declared in a long minute that Haranath
was altogether unsuitable for his job and the only competent
man then in Calcutta for the office of the broker was the
215
much abused Benarasi Seth. In this minute the Council 
exposed that Hedges turned out Benarasi 'for no other reason
212. D.B., 18 Jan. 1717, Vol. 99, ff. 76-77.
213. Coast & Bay Abst., Vol. 2, ff. 79, 175.
21*+. Ibid. Vol. 2, f. 79.
215. Beng. Pub, Consult, Range 1, Vol. *+, ff. *+6. *+6a; V/ilson, 
op. cit., vol. 3, p. 113.
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than wrong information, some secret jealousy or rather
to promote his own servant1. All the allegations by Hedges
against Benarasi, as the Council wrote, were 'his own
inventions and out of mere prejudice at that juncture as
afterwards plainly appeared by entrusting Benarasi Seth
only with the management of all his private dealings until 
216
his death.1 However ,. Benarasi was again made broker in
1719 but neither he nor his son would receive any dadney
nor could he provide any goods directly or indirectly
for the Company either in his own name or in the name of
any other person whatsoever. As for the rest of the family,
as the Council reported, they had been separated for the
last two years and every man acted for himself 'endeavouring 
one 217
to outvej/the other as any merchants whatever'• Touching
on the reasons for reinstating Benarasi Seth, the Bengal
Council wrote in 1722 - 'none but he could have influenced
the merchants and secured the last and this year's
investment on credit, he being bound with each merchant for
218
what they borrowed of the shroffs.' In fact, at that 
time, the Seths were the only merchants competent to
216. Coast & Bay Abst., Vol. 2, f. 276; Beng. Pub. Consult.,
Range 1, Vol. if, ff. if6. 46a; Wilson, oo.cit., Vol.3,f. 113 
217* Beng. Pub. Consult., Range 1, Vol. if, ff. 46, *+6a; Wilson, 
op. cit., Vol. 3, p.113.
218. Coast & Bay abstr. Vol. 2, f.320.
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manage properly the Company1s investments at Calcutta*
C.R. Wilson rightly observed - 11 As specially qualified
agents, then, the Seths deserved to be paid highly;
as employers of labour they were right to fix fair prices
for the goods they sold to the Company* And their prices
were fair. It is on records that goods bougit at Calcutta,
in 1711, for could be sold in France for more than
£150,000$ and it cannot be denied that the Company made
enormous profits in consequence of its monopoly* The
broker and his friends made profits too, but what of that?
■Jo one but the Court of Directors would maintain that the
whole duty of man should consist in dritliaing good bargains
219
for the Honourable East India Company"*
Organisation of Industry
The Company had to organise certain aspects of 
those industries producing some of its exports, specially 
raw silk, taffeta and saltpetre for controlling the quality 
of goods from Bengal. As it was mainly catering for consumers 
in England and on the Continent, it had always to procure 
goods according to the taste and liking of the buyers there. 
Hence the Company had to be careful regarding the size, 
colour and glossiness of the different piece-goods, raw
219. Wilson, op* cit, Vol. II, pt. 1, p. LXIV.
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silk and taffeta procured for the export market. Again, as 
the Company1s silk had to compete with Italian and French 
silks, it had to be careful so that Indian silk would 
compare favourably with its competitive products from 
Italy or France. As a result, the Court of Directors sent 
regular instructions as to the manner of colouring and 
weaving the silk and taffetas. So far as saltpetre industry 
was concerned, the Company had to arrange sometimes for 
its refining. As the crude variety of saltpetre was of 
little use while the customs duty on it was the same as for 
the finer sort, the Company preferred the latter variety 
and refined it sometimes under its own auspices.
The techniques in the organisation of industry, 
adopted by the English Company, conformed in all essentials 
to those already prevalent in Bengal. The Company had, 
however, introduced a new element in the familiar pattern. 
While the Portuguese and Asian merchants before the English 
continued to buy from the manufacturers the best they could 
get at any given time, the English - forced as they were 
to trade for a high margin of gross profit per unit - 
insisted on supplies conforming strictly to samples and 
thus introduced the idea of specific standardisation 
which was apparently an innovation in this region. It is 
significant that the local industries could easily adjust them­
selves to the new situation, though only on the inducement 
of a greater charge being paid. The Balasore factors
259
reported as early as 1669 - uthe sannoes, ginghams etc.
provided about this place cannot be made of length and
breadths beyond those now sent, unless the price be
augmented in a larger proportion than the dimensions,
since use and customs amongst the weavers is not to be
220
altered without a charge”•
The Court of Directors frequently sent instructions
as to the quality and colour of silk and taffetas which
had to compete with the continental varieties in the
consumer market. In 1659 the Court asked the Bengal
Council to observe the following requirements in the
weaving of silk and taffetas - 1 that the silk be first spun
or throwne'ji then boiled to get out the gum and then weaved
for those formerly sent for England, only the woof (the
thread that runs through the staff) is boiled and the warp
(or thread that runs from end to end) is dyed in the gum by
which means that which is boiled is glossy and pliable,
and the other stiff and dull coloured which renders them fit
for very few uses, whereas were both warp and woof boiled before
dyed and according to pattern sent herewith, they would serve
221
in most cases instead of Italian silks1• A similar
220. Fact. Records, Hisc, Vol. 3, f.99.
221. D.B., Jan 28 1659, Vol. 8**, fAll.
instruction was given in 1663 and the Bengal Council
was asked to 1 cause all taffetas to be made as near to
222
the Italian fabric1 as they could. As the weavers in
Bengal could not always produce silk and taffetas conforming
to the specification of the Company, the Bengal Council
asked the Directors to send dyers, throwsters and weavers
223
to instruct the people in that art. The Court of
Directors soon realised that if the manufacture of silk and
taffetas could be modified as to length, colour and
fineness, there would be a good market for them in Europe
and hence sent in 1668 Roger Fowler, 1 an able, skilful
dyer1, with several ingredients and materials 1for the
224
better carrying of this work1 . Then onward the Company
often sent many dyers, weavers, etc. to Bengal to organise
silk and taffeta industry there according to the Company1s
requirements. In 1679 the Directors reported that the
1 increase and improvement1 in the dyeing of black taffetas
and other colours which the English dyers had introduced
225
there, were of extraordinary advantage to them. But at
222. D.B., 2 Jan. 1663, Vol. 86, f.202
223. D.B., 21 Dec. 1664, Vol. 86, f. 459.
224. D.B., 20 Nov. 1668, Vol. 87, f. 202.
225* D.B., 3 Dec. 1679, Vol. 89, f* 130. The Bengal weavers1 
fancy was upon mixed colours.' 1 and they had no skill 
to dye good black and green or other colours which the 
Company required most. Vide. D.B., 18 Dec. 1671, Vol. 87, 
f. 506.
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the same time they expressed some fears that the English
weavers and dyers would not, once they had tasted the easy
life of Bengal, concentrate on their business as the
luxurious life in Bengal would breed pride and laziness 
226
among them. They further wrote that after several
years1 experience and consideration they thought that there
was no way to carry on the dyeing business to any
considerable effect in India without obliging the English
dyers to teach their art of dyeing black and greens to some
of their indigenous merchants whose parents or'ancestors had
227
for many years been retainers to the English factories.
But even after stating this view, the Company continued
228
occasionally to send out weavers and dyers to Bengal.
The refining of saltpetre was a matter of direct 
concern to the Company from the beginning of its trade 
in Bengal. As early as 1652, the factors reported that 
though saltpetre might be procured more cheaply and in 
larger quantities at Balasore and Hugli, the great 
difficulty was in refining it for want of 'convenient 
coppers and pans'• So they asked for those boilers which 
were sent to Assada for boiling sugar there. ftIn the
226. The observation of the Court of Directors is worth quoting 
here -"But such are the temptations and avocation from 
business of that luxurious country and such is the high 
pride and laziness of many of our countrymen, when they go 
abroad to ease and plenty dominion and command over slaves, 
that they seldom prove intent upon their businessm although 
they did work hard for their bread at home and many times 
could not find to earn their bread by". Vide. D.B., 3 Dec. 
1679, Vol.89, f.130.
227. D.B., 3 Dec. 1679, Vol. 89, f.130.
228. Home Misc., Vol.803,f.429;0.C.,18 Feb.1701,no.7449,f.12,Vol.60
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absence of such implements*1, as the factors wrote, 1 the 
saltpetre must go hote raw, increasing the charges for 
freight, customs etc". The general practice of refining 
saltpetre was by boiling the crude variety in great 
earthen pots but the task was rendered tedious and 
troublesome by the fact that these pans often broke in 
the process. On one occasion, as the factors reported,
229
200 pots fell to pieces in refining 600, bags of saltpetre.
In a letter to St. Helena, the Court described a method of
refining saltpetre other than by boiling at Patna (by a simple
process of filtration and then drying in the sun) which the
230
Bengal factors reported was never practised there. At the
end of the period under review, the Company tried to refine
saltpetre at Fort William but abandoned it soon as it was 
too
found to be/expensive, andct&cided to refine it at the place 
of mailing (i.e. Patna) where it might be1 easily done with
229. O.C., 11+ Jan. 1652, no. 22*+6. Vol. 22$ E.F.I., l6?l-?lf,p.95
230. D.B., 1 Aug. I6831 Vol. 90, f.192; Fact. Records, Hugli,
Vol. 10, f.ll6. A peculiar and interesting account on 
the refining of saltpetre by the Dutch was given by 
Tavernier in the 1 sixties of the 17th century. According 
to him, the Dutch established a factory or 'depot* at 
Chapra and refined saltpetre there. They imported
boilers from Holland and employed refiners to refine saltpetre 
for them but did not succeed because the people of the 
country 'seeing that the Dutch wished to deprive them
of the profits of refining, would not supply them any 
longer with whey, without the aid of which the saltpetre 
cannot be bleached1. Vide. Tavernier, op.cit..
Vol. 2, p. 12.
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care and a little advance in the price1•
In an effort to reduce the charges of different 
factories in the 'Bay* and to minimise the possibility of 
bad debts, the Company at one time attempted to set up a 
silk and taffeta industry in Madras or in Hugli where the 
position of the Company was much more secure than in 
Kasimbazar, the main centre of these industries. In 1661 
the Court of Directors wrote to Bengal that the Company* s 
* advancing money beforehand to such a needy generation 
as the weavers are, specially where we have no power, may in 
the end make then (silk and taffeta) dear unto us'. They 
made certain propositions to the Bengal Council and asked 
them, if possible, to follow any one of them. First, 
whether it was possible to make contract with some Kasimbazar 
merchants to deliver the goods in Hugli so that there would 
be no need for maitaining a factory at Kasimbazar. Secondly, 
to try whether they could 'procure the making of taffetas 
at and about Fort 3t, George' by*bringing silk from the 
Bay and persuading the weavers to traisplant themselves from 
Kasimbazar to Fort St. George. If this could be done, as 
the Court observed, it would be highly conducive to their 
trade for obvious reasons. But if neither of the two
231. D.B., 3 Feb. 1720, Vol. 100, f.22*+
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propositions was workable, the Council could try a third
one - the making of taffetas in Hugli by inducing the
232
weavers to come and live there. The factors in Bengal 
reported that the first proposition was workable, but 
not the other two. As regards the making of taffetas 
in Madras, there were two difficulties. First, the cost 
of production would be very high since all provisions 
in Madras, when at the cheapest, were three times dearer 
than in Hugli or Kasimbazar, and consequently the weavers 
and other workmen employed therein could maintain themselves 
at 3 less than those that would be employed in Madras. 
Secondly, it would be impossible to persuade any weaver 
from Kasimbazar to come and settle in the Company's town and 
jurisdiction in Madras 'for their caste and lineage is such 
that they shall lose their birth right if they come upon 
salt water*• Similarly it was difficult, as the factors 
reported, to bring weavers from Kasimbazar to Hugli for 
1 the making of taffetas and working of silk* though an 
arrangement could be made with the merchants and weavers
233
to bring down their goods to Hugli. However, the Company 
maintained through most of the period its factory at 
Kasimbazar for the procurement of silk and taffetas.
232. D.B., 28 Jan 1661, Vol. 85, ff. 367-68; E.F.I., 1661-61*
pp. 62-63.
233. Fa^tj Re^^s^Fort6|t. George, Vol.XIV, ff .11*9,176-77;
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In 1691 the Fort General letter stated once again
that there was little chance of introducing the production
of taffetas in Madras as there was a 50 per cent
difference in the price of silk and wage rates between
23^
Bengal and Madras* In 1695 the Calcutta Council tried 
unsuccessfully to persuade two or three experienced 
silk weavers to go to Madras with some silk worms and
235
mulberry trees, . “These Bengal fellows1*, the factors 
wrote, “will not leave their native country notwithstanding
236
all the arguments we can use and promises of great wages*.•“
The structure and organisation of export trade was 
vital for the success of the Company*s trade in Bengal, 
v/hether in the question of financing the investment, 
procurement of return cargoes or organisation of some 
aspects of the industries producing export commodities, the 
Company had to pay special attention in order to make the 
Bengal trade a profitable venture. A close co-ordination 
between the Court of Directors and the Bengal Council was 
a necessary condition for the smooth running of the export
23^. Fact. Records. Misc. Vol. 3A, f.179
235. Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 6, pt. I, f.10.
236. Ibid.Vol. 6, pt. II, f.76.
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trade. The Council had to co-ordinate carefully 
between orders from England and the contracts for goods with 
the merchants. These merchant-middlemen, however, were 
generally disinclined to put down their own capital for 
providing Company1s investment. The advance which they 
received;from the Company was a sort of security that the 
goods would be bogght by the Company. The advance system 
indicates a general scarcity of working capital as well 
as the existence of a fairly limited outlet for-export 
commodities, because once the goods have been ordered, 
if they were cancelled just before the shipping season when 
other traders had already procured their required orders, 
it was obviously difficult to sell them. The production of 
some of the commodities had to be standardised but as they 
were produced at the level of cottage industry, the problem 
of standardisation was a complicated one. Again there 
was the problem of prices which the Company always tried to 
keep down and thus provide as much investment as possible for 
the given amount of capital. The vast increase in the 
Company's exports from Bengal during this period indicates 
that it was reasonably successful in overcoming these 
problems connected with the structure and organisation of the 
export trade.
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CHAPTER VI 
Export Commodities
The exports of the English East India Company 
from Bengal comprised a variety of commodities which were 
mainly of two categories * bulk goods, and textiles and raw 
silk. The bulk goods in the Company's export, list were 
chiefly saltpetre, sugar, borax, turmeric, cowries, red­
wood and gumlac of different types. Some of these 
commodities, specially saltpetre and sometimes also sugar,, 
turmeric, redwood or lac were taken as saleable ballast 
while several goods like raw silk, silk and cotton yarn, 
borax etc. were carried as make-weights. Throughout the 
period under review, textiles, rawsilk and saltpetre formed 
the most important items of the English Company's export 
from Bengal. In the early years of its trade in Bengal, the 
Company was, however, more interested in saltpetre trade than 
that in raw silk or piece — goods. But from the 'seventies 
of the 17th century, it concentrated more and more on the 
export of raw silk and by the 'eighties, there was a 
phenomenal rise in its export which far out shadowed saltpetre 
and other bulk goods. Similarly, the Company's trade 
in Bengal textiles comprising mainly silk and cotton piece 
- goods was insignificant up to the Seventies of the 
17th century. But from the beginning of the 'eighties,
26
there was a tremendous growth in the export of textiles 
which in its turn resulted from the great popularity of 
and the demand for cheap Bengal piece — goods throughout 
England and Europe# Prom then onward,as the demand for 
Bengal cloth grew steadily in the European markets, there 
was a corresponding growth in the export of textiles by 
the Company and this became a significant feature in the 
structure of the Company1 s export trade*.
Long Term Trend of the Total Value of Exports#
An analysis of the total value of the Company^ 
annual exports from Bengal reveals that the main trend 
was one of steady expansion throughout the period, with 
the exception of a few years when the export trade was 
interrupted by a number of factors such as wars in Europe 
and India, and unstable political condition, leading
! , l a  ,  i f i e
sometimes/to^stoppage of the Company1s trade in Bengal. 
The increase in the total value of annual exports by the 
Company during the period under study can be seen from 
the fact that in 1652 the total amount intended for 
investment in Bengal was only ETyOOO1 while the value of
1. 0#C, 14 Jan, 1652, no. 2246, Vol. 22; E.P.I., 1651 -
54, p. 97.
2
exports in 1719/20 amounted to £536,973* In other words, 
the total value of the export, from Bengal at the end of 
our period was roughly about fifty times more than that 
in the beginning of the period. Of course, it should be 
noted that the tremendous increase in the value of export 
trade was not an uninterrupted progress. There were two 
main periods of depression,first during 1690/91 to 1694/95 
and again in the years 1702/3 to 1706/7.^
In the absence of any precise quantitative data, 
it is not possible to enumerate the total value of the 
Company's annual exports from Bengal during the 'fifties 
of the 17th century. Our main source of information 
regarding the Company's exports - the Journals and Ledgers 
of the Company which give us the total quantities as well 
as invoice prices of Bengal goods shipped to London-begin 
only with 1663/64. Though the series continue up:to the 
end of our period, there are a few gaps in between. However, 
as the Company's trade in Bengal was in its infancy in the 
’fifties, it can be assumed that the total value of annual
2. Most of the information regarding the English East 
India Company's exports are collected from various 
volumes ( see Bibliography ) of the Accountant Goaeral’s 
Department, Range 11. In computing the value and 
volume of exports from Bengal, I have taken twelve 
months from July to June following as one year because 
most of the ships arrived in Bengal after July and 
left before June. In other words, the year 1719/20 
means the year from July 1719 to June 1720.
3. Eor the annual value of English export, from Bengal see 
Table 1 in Appendix.A
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export was not at all significant: quantitatively. As a 
matter of fact, the precise figure which we get from 
another source indicates that the total value of export 
for 1656/59 was only about £10,218.^
There was a marked increase in the total value 
of exports in the 'sixties. The highest figure recorded 
was for 1663/64 and amounted to £24*199 while the lowest 
was £14*537 during 1668/69. The value of annual export 
during the ’sixties was, on an average, about £18,000.
In the ’seventies, however, there followed a sharp rise 
in the total value of the Company’s export from Bengal,
and the export during this decade more than doubled over
one.
that of the previous/ In 1671/72 exports rose to £53,123 
and it seems that the value of annual export in the 3670 
ranged between £50,000 and £60,000, the available figures 
for 1675/76 and 1676/77 being £52,297 and £58,547 
respectively. In 1678/79 there was a sharp rise again 
in the total value of the Company’s annual export which 
stood at £88,351.^
4. Rawl. C. 395* ff.l7,25a. Here in these pages we find 
the list of cargoes carried by two ships, Love and 
Blackmore but the invoice of the latter is not ccmpMe. 
The total cost of sugar is not mentioned there. I 
have calculated the price of each bag of sugar from 
the invoice of the ship Love, and then found out the 
cost of the sugar bags carried by Blackmore. In all 
calculations, I have left out fractions and takeh the 
approximate figures.
5. B.IvI. Addl. Mss., 34, 123, ff. 30a, 31.
But it was the ’eighties of the 17th century 
that witnessed the real boom in the total value of the 
Company’s annual export from Bengal, and formed a peak 
in the Companyrs trade in Bengal before the war in 1686- 
88*. The exports in 1681/82 were valued at £142,977*
Next year it went up as high as £162,763* But in 1683/84 
it slided down a bit, though was quite high at £146,,668* 
The following year the total value of exports reached 
the final peak before the war and amounted to £210,063 
while in 1685/86 it slipped down again to £181,785*
The Company’s export from Bengal in the early 
years of 1690's was quite unimpressive compared with that 
of the earlier decade* The English, as we have already 
noted earlier, withdrew from Bengal in 1688 and came 
back in 1690. So obviously they needed sometime to 
reorganise the trade in Bengal which, coupled with the 
French wars during 1690-96, explains the low level of the 
total value of exports during these years. In 1690/91 
the Company sent only one ship from Bengal with cargoes 
valued at £40*639*- Next year no ship left Bengal as the 
Court of Directors did not send any ship to Bengal before 
March 1691 which arrived there only at the end of 1692*
6. Supra, chapter 111
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One of these three ships, Berkley Castle, was captured
7
and sunk by the French.1 The other two, Sampson and 
Charles the second, did not leave Bengal before January 
1694* As a result, a small ship, the Tongueen Merchanty 
which came probably from the East Indies, was sent to 
England with a cargo of only £11*770* In 1693/94 the 
total value of exports amounted to £53*944* The small 
amount in this year can be explained by the fact that 
two ships sent by the Company to the Coast and Bay were 
lost - Prince of Denmark taken by the French and Royal
Q
lames and Mary wrecked in Bengal. In the next year,1694/5 
the actual value of exports to reach England was only 
£30,425, though the Bengal factors had loaded three
Q
ships in that year with a cargo worth £123*298, but
only one, the Hawke, reached England with her cargo
while others were captured by the French.^0 In 1696/97,
though only one ship Martha came from Bengal, the total
value of export amounted to £90,490 The average
two
annual value for the next/years was about £73,000*
But the second period of boom in the Company* s export.
7. B*M. Addl. Mss., 38,87.2, f.ll.
8. Ibid., f. 12.
9. Fact. Records, Misc., Vol. 3A, f* 298.
10. B.M. Addl. Mss., 38,872. f. 12.
11. In a letter to the Court of Directors, the Surat 
factors wrote in June 1696 that two ships, Martha 
and Sarah were despatched from Bengal to England in 
January"1696, the latter with a cargo of Rs.800,000 
(£100,000); vide, O.C. 19 June 1696, no.6231, Vol.52. 
But I could not trace the ship Sarah in the A.G-.D.
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trade began in 1698/99. In that year, the cargoes
exported from Bengal were valued at £163,053 rising
to £190,275 £280,672 in 1699/1700 and 1700/01
respectively. The total value of exports was again
quite high in 1701/02 and amounted to £228,042.
But the Company*s exports suffered a maiked
decline for a few years from 1702/3 till 1706/7. The
average value of exports during these years did not
rise over £70,000, the lowest being £54,713 in 1702/5
while the highest was £84,902 in 1706/7. Several
factors contributed towards this depression in trade.
In Dec. 1702 a prohibition was imposed in India on
all trade of the fhatmenf as a reprisal against piracy
committed by Europeans on Indian ships on the Western 
12Coast. Again, the war of Spanish succession which
began in 1702 also contributed to the slump in trade ►
But there also were more specific reasons for the decline
of export trade from Bengal; as the Court of Directors
stated in Jan. 1706, heavy duties were imposed on all
sorts of East India goods in England, followed by a
dullness of markets for imported goods and a general
13scarcity of bullion. However, the total value of the 
Company*s annual exports began to rise steadily from
12. O.C., 24 Dec. 1702, no. 8097, Vol. 65.
13. D.B., 18 Jan. 1706, Vol. 95, f. 512.
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1707/8. The increase in the total value of cargoes can 
be seen from the following table*14
Years Total value of Exports from Bengal
1707/8 £135,662
1708/9 £148,995
1709/10 £208,892
1710/11 £228,474
1711/12 £233,859
1712/13 £259,593
In 1713/14, however, the value went down to £175,387, and
fell to £158,752 in 1714/15* But next year it rose to 
£221,697 only to slide down to £178,821 in 1716/17* The 
next three years, however, witnessed again a steep rise 
in the total value of the Company1s annual export from 
Bengal. In 1717/18 the total value was £244,918, rising 
to £259>279 next year and in 1719/20 it reached £336,973, 
the highest figure during the whole period under review. 
The adjoining graph shows the fluctuations in the total 
value of the Company’s annual exports from Bengal.
Saltpetre
From the beginning of the Company's trade in 
Bengal, Saltpetre was an important article of export to
14. The amount for the year 1708/9 is inclusive of the 
value of the cargoes in the ship Anne which is to 
he found in Bengal G-eneral Ledger and Journal, Yol.
80, f. 102. But I failed to trace this ship in A.G-.D.
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England and Europe* As an essential ingredient of gun­
powder, it was in great demand in the West. Besides, as 
saltpetre could he used as saleable ballast, its export 
was of additional advantage to the Company which otherwise 
had to take the uneconomic method of using iron as ballast 
to make the deep sea ships sailworthy. It was only in the 
early 'twenties of the 17th century that the shortage of 
saltpetre in England and the increasing difficulty in 
obtaining supplies of gunpowder had turned the attention 
of the Company to the possibility of importing this chemical 
from India. The first supply, however, reached England 
only in 1626.^ And once established, the saltpetre 
trade displayed a consistent growth, though the real 
expansion did not take place till after the civil war.
But the Company's interest in saltpetre 'did not stretch 
beyond what was considered an essential obligation to 
national needs' because of two factors - first, the 
undeveloped state of market in England and secondly, 
the official restrictions on its free export and import
both in India and England due to its being a strategic
16
raw material for warfare. After 1635 all private
15* Court Book,T3t, 320, 5 Jan. 1627; quoted in K.N.
Chandhuri, op.cit., p.189.
16. The English and Butch factors were imprisoned at
Agra in 1628 for exporting saltpetre clandenstinely, 
vide, Balkrishna, Commercial Relations Between India 
And England, 1601-1757, p.101; For prohibition of 
eixports from India, see, Fact. Records, Surat, cii, 
f.580; O.C., 24 April 1629, no. 1292, Vol.Xll. The 
Company had to seek permission from the Privy Council 
for exporting 50 tons of saltpetre;cf. Court Book, XV,
221, 29 April 1655, ref erred tbinK.N .Chandhuri,op.cit,p.l 90
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manufacture of gunpowder was prohibited in England and
it was declared a royal monopoly. The Company undertcok
to sell all the imported saltpetre to the King at a price
17of £4 per cwt.
The chief sources of saltpetre supply till the
beginning of the ’forties were mainly Coromandel and
Gujarat. Thevenot, the French merchant, recorded in 1666
the process of its manufacture in iljmer from whence it
was carried to the seaports of Y/estern India and purchased
by the Europeans to ’ballast their ships and to sell 
18elsewhere'. But Coromandel seems to have supplied the
main bulk of this commodity to the Europeans before the
1640rs. In 1624 and 1625, 270,000 lbs. (Butch) and
286,434 lbs. (Butch) respectively of saltpetre were exported
to Batavia from Coromandel* In the late ’thirties, however,
19Bengal saltpetre supplemented those from the Coast. From 
the ’fifties Bengal definitely replaced Coromandel as the 
chief source of supply.
In Bengal again saltpetre was produced mainly
in the regions around Patna where it was available in
abundance. The discovery of this source revolutionised 
the Company’s saltpetre trade and led to its tremendous 
expansion in the secondbalf of the 17th and 1st half of 
17* K.H. Chaudhuri, op.cit., p. 190.
18. S.N. Sen (ed), Indian Travels of Thevenot and Careri, p*74<
19* T. Ray Chaudhuri, op.cit., pp* 168 - 69*
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the 18 th century# It, is cur ions that the commercial
expedition of Hu^es and Parker to Patna in 1620 did
not mention the great possibility of saltpetre trade
from that region, The reason might be two fold; the
first explanation is that the commodity was not sought by
the Europeans in those early years of their trade and
secondly, perhaps saltpetre industry did not yet start
to grow in the region of Patna, The saltpetre procured
at Patna, however, was considered the best in quality for
the manufacture of gunpowder. Moreover, the price of Bengal
20saltpetre was cheaper than that of other places. It 
was reported in 1650 that saltpetre cost only Re, 1 per 
maund at Patna, though the customs and freight for bring­
ing it to Hugli could raise the price to Re, 1, 12 annas 
21per maund. Again from the point of transportation 
Bengal saltpetre enjoyed another advantage. The cheaper 
and more convenient transport, down the Ganges enabled 
the Company to despatch cargoes of saltpetre from Patna
to Hugli for lading the Europe - bound ships and also
for supplying Madras with ballast for its vessels. All
20, It was stated that the cost of a md, of 74 lbs, at 
Patna was about the same as for a md, of 37. lbs, at 
Ahmedabad or just the half price; Moreland, Prom 
Akbar to Aurangzeb, p,121. Again the cost of a ton
of saltpetre was reported to be £8 or £9 at the Coast 
while at Hugly it was to be procured at £6 per ton, 
vide, D,B,, Jan. 28,1659, Vol. 84, ff, 411-12; Ibid., 
TT"Sept. 1660, Vol. 85, f, 334.
21. O.C., 15 Dec. 1651, no. 2188, Vol. 22.
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these considerations, coupled with the enhanced demand
from England and Europe,encouraged the Company to drive
an extensive trade in Bengal saltpetre.
There were generally two varieties of saltpetre-
the refined one called culmy and the crude variety temed
22cutcha or raw. The European Companies generally exported
refined saltpetre as it otherwise could not he used for
making gunpowder. Moreover, the export of raw or crude
variety was uneconomic as it increased the freight, charges
while custom duties remained the same on hoth refined and
22
crude varieties. The Companies often undertook the 
refining in their own factories. The Dutch East India 
Company procured large quantities of saltpetre from Patna 
and shipped it direct to Batavia after refining it at 
Hugli or Pipli. As a matter of fact, as early as 1640-41, 
the Dutch set up a refinery at Pipli with copper kettles 
imported from Holland.^ Tavernier stated in the 'sixties 
of the 17th century that the Dutch refined saltpetre at 
a 'large village called Chapra, situated on the right
25hank of the Ganges', about, twenty miles ahove Patna* '
22. Pact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 10* f. 225*
22. "You must take considerable care all the saltpetre you 
provide he as fine as possible... the freight and customs 
being the same whether fine or coarse. But the difference 
here is considerable at the candle D.B, Vol.95, f.222.
24. T. Ray Chaudhuri, op.cit, pp. 169-70.
25. Tavernier, op.cit., Vol 1, p. 122.
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The English Company too, it seems, refined its saltpetre
O r
at: Singhee or Patna♦ The refining, in order to remove
impurities, was usually done by the Indian methods of
were
evaporation in which earthen vessels/used* But as we
27
have seen earlier, the English factors reported m  
1652 that, the great difficulty in refining was for want 
of convenient copper pans* Refining in great earthen 
pots was tedious and troublesome because those pots very 
often broke in the middle of processing* As suitable 
copper pans were not locally available, the Company 
decided to divert to this purpose appliances which had
28been sent out for making sugar at Assada in Madagascar*
The cost of refining, however, was very small being only
29
i of an anna per maund. As noted earlier, the English
Company once attempted to refine saltpetre at Calcutta
but abandoned the experiment as it was found to be too 
30expensive.
26. It seems that the English Company preferred a factory 
at Singee, which lies 10 or 12 miles north of Patna, 
rather than at Patna. For reasons, see Fact. Records, 
Misc., Vol. 39 f*63; Fact. Records, Misc., Vol XIV, 
ff.. 531 -_32.
27* Chapter V .
28. O.C., Jan 14, 1652, no. 2246, Vol.22> E.F.I., 1651-54, 
p. 95.
29. Bengal Public^ Consultations, Range 1. Vol. 6, f.488a*
30. See Chapter V.
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An examination of the orders for saltpetre sent 
from England reveals that the quantities ordered depended 
on two main factors. First, in times of war the quantities 
required to be sent from Bengal obviously went up while in 
peace time they were greatly reduced. Secondly, the 
quantities ordered depended on the requirement of the dbips 
for their rkint:eledgef. Saltpetre was used as ballast not 
only for Bengal ships but also for ships sailing from Madras^  
Masulipatam, Bantam or Bencoolen. The order for Bmgal 
saltpetre increased steadily from the foundation of English 
factory in Hugli in 1651 till 1681 when for tine first time 
there was a sudden decline in the quantities ordered. There 
were two obvious reasons for this reduction in the order. 
There was then little demand for saltpetre in Europe which 
by then was temporarily relieved of war,, and, secondly, it 
was from 1681, as we shall see in due course, that there 
was a sudden boom in the demand for Bengal silk and piece- 
goods which shifted the emphasis in the Company’s export 
trade in favour of the latter commodities.
In the early years of the Company’s trade in 
Bengal, saltpetre definitely ranked as the primary object 
of commerce, and not merely a make-weight. In 1651, the 
factors in Bengal were instructed to invest half of their 
capital in saltpetre alone and in case the factors ran up
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debts the Corn'll gave special instruction that rlet it. be
31for this commodity*• In 1653/54 the Company ordered
32200 tons of saltpetre from Bengal. But the Court, of
Directors increased the quantity in 1657/58 to 600 tons
and wrote that if Bengal factors could furnish the full
quantity of saltpetre, it would be "more pleasing unto
33us and render your services more acceptable". The order
sent out in 1658/59 further raised the quantity to 800
tons which the Directors hoped could be procured at about
£6 per ton. In the same letter the Company directed the
Bengal Agency to send £5,000 yearly to Patna rto lie there
as stock beforehandf in order to buy this commodity in
the best time of the year when it might be bought at, 40
to 50 per cent cheaper than at Hugli. The fact that only
£4,000 was directed to be sent annually to Kasimbazar for
provision of silk, taffetas and cotton y a m  indicates that
throughout the • fifties of the century the Company's main
emphasis was on saltpetre trade. The Company further
asked the factors in Bengal to provide 100 or 200 tons of
saltpetre to be sent yearly to Masulipatam for using as
34ballast of the Europe bound ships. In 1660 the Court
31• O.C., 19 Peb. 1651* no. 2208, Vol. 22; Ibid, 25 Peb.
1651, no. 2210, Vol. 22. E.P.I., 1651 - 54, pp. 45,47.
32. E.P.I., 1651-54, p.196; D.B., 12 Sept, 1653, Vol. 84,f.21&
33. D.B., 31 Dec. 1657, Vol. 84, ff. 385-86, 388.
34. D.B., 28 Jan. 1659, Vol. 84, ff. 411-12.
of Directors reprimanded Bengal factors as the latter
failed to send any saltpetre by Blackmore* The factors
pleaded that their inability was due to the fact that
'the Prince had seized on that commodity for his own
use** But the Directors alleged that a number of private
ships brought large quantities of saltpetre which, they
believed, were procured by these factors. However,they
asked their factors to provide about 750 tons of saltpeire
yearly at Patna. '
But in September 1660, the Court of Directors
wanted to shift the centre of saltpetre trade from Patna
to the Coast of Coromandel. Binding that saltpetre pro­
of ten
vided at Patna wasxdetained and could not be brought dcwn
quickly to Hugli for lading Europe ships because of the
frequent stoppage of saltpetre boats at various places
ori the river by local officials, the Directors ordered
the factors to buy the commodity at the Coast where it,
was reported to be available at £8 or £9 per ton- They
asked the Beigal factory not to provide more than 200
tons at Patna and send none to the Coast for kinteledge
56
of Europe ships. They wrote to Port St. George in Jan. 
1661 that considering the decline in the demand for
35* D.B., 22 Peb. 1660, Vol. 85, ff.276,283? E.P.I. 1655-
60, p. 397*
36. D.B., 14 Sept 1660, Vol. 85, ff. 334-35.
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saltpetre, they thought ahout 600 or 800 tons of saltpetre 
from all parts of India would he sufficient for their 
markets,Of this quantity again, they must, of necessity 
bring 100 tons from Surat as kinteledge for those ships 
sailing from there. They also advised the factors at Port 
St. George that even if the saltpetre at the Coast would 
’come out something dearer in its prime cost than that, 
in the Bay, yet considering we were keeping a factory for 
it purposely at Patna and our ships going thither to fetch 
it, we conceive it will be nothing to our disadvantage*. 
They further ordered the factors to send 150 tons of 
saltpetre annually to the South Seas for kinteledge of 
Europe bound ships which in the absence of any other 
suitable ballast in those parts usually carried sugar,
37gingers etc. which brought little profit to the Company.
This plan of providing saltpetre at the Coast merely proved
to be a display of well meant intentions, and was never
put into execution. As a result, the main bulk of saltpetre
throughout the period was exported from Beng al.
The orders for saltpetre sent out from England
during the years 1662 to 1664 amounted to 500 tons a year,
38
or according to the requirements of the ships. Even
57* D.B., 28 Jan, 1661, Vol. 85, ff. 365-67.
58. D.B., P6b. 1662, Vol. 86, f.84; 2 Jan 1665, Vol 86, 
ff. 202; 16 Dec. 1665, Vol. 86, f. 556.
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during the second Anglo - Dutch wax of 1664 - 67, when
shipping was uncertain and risky, the factors were directed
to *keep up dealing with saltpetiteiiienand to buy from 500 to
500 tons yearly lest ’it would wholly get out of’ their
hands and be engrossed by the Dutch* "To lose the commodity",
wrote the Directors "would be great damage to the kingdom
39
as well as to the Company"* They further adced Bengal
factors to send 150 to 200 tons yearly to the Fort so that
it could be carried to Jambee or Bantam for kinteledge of
40ships sailing from ihose parts* In November 1670 the
Court, wrote that the full quantity of saltpetre they needed
41was 800 to 1000 tons yearly. But during the Anglo-Dutch
wax of 1672-74* they asked the factors to procure 500 tons
42yearly in order to keep the saltpetremen employed* The 
order sent out during 1674 to 1676* however* was for about 
600 tons annually.^ But the quantities ordered rose 
sharply in 1677 and the figure remained unaltered up to 
1681* Throughout these years the Company sent regular
44orders for 1000 tons of saltpetre and more if procurable.
59. D.B., 18 Sept. 1665, Vol. 86, ff.504-5; 18 Dec. 1665, 
Vol. 86, ff. 522-25? 14 Sept, 1666, Vol. 87, f.59.
40. D.B., 26 Aug. 1667, Vol. 87, f. 97.
41. D.B., 29 Nov. 1670, Vol. 87, ff.401,405.
42. D.B., 15 Dec. 1672, Vol. 88, f. 22; 7 July 1675, Vol.88,
f. 48; 15 March, 1674, Vol. 88, f.100.
45. D.B., 15 March 1674, Vol. 88, f.101; 25 Dec 1674, Vol. 88, 
f. 154? 24 Dec, 1675, Vol.88, f.259? 28 June 1676,
Vol.88, f. 507.
44. D.B., 7 Sept.1677, Vol.88, f.448;5 Jan. 1679,Vol. 89,£36? 
5 Dec. 1679, Vol.89, f.151-2; 16 Sept.1680,Vol.89,f244;
5 Jan. 1681, Vol.89, f.265; 18 Nov. 1681, Vol. 89r f.414.
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In 1681, however, the Directors wrote to Bengal that the
less saltpetre the ships hring the better since they were
f plentifully stored with that commodityf • But at the same
time they asked the factors to see that none of the ships
returned 'dead freightf implying thereby that they would
prefer to have saltpetre or any other commodity rather than 
45having none.  ^ The market for saltpetre seems to have 
improved next year as we find that the Directors ordered
1500 tons in Aug. 1682, the highest quantity so far in 1heir
46order* Next year, too, it remained the same. But in
1684 the quantity was reduced to 1000 tons again and further
47slided down to 500 tons next year* In 1688 the Directors
again wrote to Bengal that they were overstocked with
them
saltpetre and asked/to invent some other 'Kinteledge commodity', 
weighty and low in price, and 'that would cover freight'for 
which they mentioned shellack and borax
After 1690 the Company asked for as much saltpetre 
as was necessary for kinteledge of the ships only. In 1698 
the Court of Directors informed Bengal that saltpetre was a 
dull commodity and that 'great stores' were lying 'dead' 
with them* In October that year the Directors further wrote 
that saltpetre was then 'a very drug' and could hardly be
45. D.B*, 18 Nov.. 1681, Vol. 89, f. 405.
46. D.B., 28 Aug., 1682, Vol. 90, f. 25; 21 Dec. 1685,
Vol. 90, f. 248.
47. D.B., 50 Sept. 1684, Vol. 90, f. 571; 18 Neb. 1685,
Vol. 90, f. 451.
48. D.B., 27 Aug. 1688, Vol. 91, f. 575.
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49
sold on any terms. There was again a boom in the
order for saltpetre from 1703 with the outbreak of
war in Europe. The Company directed Bengal factors
in Feb. 1703 to send a good quantity of saltpetre
which would 'turn to good account in Europe because
of war1** The Directors further asked Bengal to send
a sufficient quantity to Fort St. George to kinteledge
ships sailing from there and also to enable them (Fort)
to supply Bencoolen therewith so as to kinteledge the
pepper ships because in default thereof the Company had
to pay half freight for store or be obliged to send out-
iron kinteledge from England at one third freight which
50either way was a dead loss to the Company. For the next,
few years the order seems to have amounted to about 800
51tons or more. But from 1708 onward the quantity demanded
was only as much as required for ballast of the ships.
In 1713 the Directors wrote that the price of saltpetre
had gone down considerably and doubted whether the govt.
would demand 500 tons annually as it did previously,
while they had 21,686 bags lying in the warehouses.. The
51
yearly rhome consumption1 being only 200 tons they asked
the factors not to send anymore than was necessary for
49. D.B., 26 Jan. 1698, Vol.93, f.25; 28 0ct*1698,Vol.93,f.120,
30. D.B., 26 Feb. 1703* Vol.93, f.615.
51. D.B., 2 Dec. 1703, Vol. 95, f.66; 21 Jan. 1704, Vol. 95.
f. 237, ff.lfl533-34.
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kinteledge/ ~ Again in 1717 the Directors wrote that
the government fof late made no demandr on them for
the usual 500 tons yearly while their sales did not,
vend more than 700 or 800 bags a year. Moreover, the
commodity stood them in a great deal for warehouse,
and wasted insensibly. So they advised the Bengal
factors that as they were overstocked with saltpetre,
they obliged all Coast and Bay ships by charterparty
53to carry out 8% in iron kinteledge. But next year
they reversed this order and resolved that the ships
should carry out no iron but bring home as usual their
5416c/o in saltpetre or other kinteledge goods. The
Dutch East India Company’s order for saltpetre from
Bengal for Holland itself far surpassed that of the 
English Company throughout the period, and the former 
also supplied its other Asiatic factories, specially 
Bantam and Ceylon from Bengal. In the first two decades 
of the 18th century the demand for Bengal saltpetre for 
Holland only, stood consistently between 3,000,000 to 
3,500,000 Dutch lbs.^
53. D.B., 30 Oct. 1717, Vol. 99, ff. 288 - 89.
54. D.B., 17 Oct. 17.18, Vol. 99, f. 539.
55. For the list of Dutch Company's orders for Bengal goods 
see K.A* Vols. 1556, 1581, 1584, 1622, 1636, 1653, 1669 
1688, 1720, 1734, 1746, 1776, 1804.
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The supply condition in saltpetre trade was 
more or less smooth enough for securing an extensive 
trade in that, commodity. The only inhibiting factor 
was the occasional attemts by local officials to monopoLise 
the trade. As we have noted previously, such attempts 
at monopoly were made by Mir Jumla and ShdL&sta Khan but
56
were never pursued either vigorously or systematically *
The saltpetre was generally procured through assomies or
57petremen to whom money was advanced in the right season. 1
Often merchant middlemen were also employed for procuring
saltpetre. In May 1683 the Company contracted for 4120
mds. of saltpetre (at Re. lj p.md.) with three able ’petrsmen^
TBucktmallf, ’Muluckchand1 and 'Siabray* who had provided
all the Company’s saltpetre in the previous year, and now
gave good security against fulfilment of the contract.^
But official rapacity occasionally made the petremen hide
out in which case the Company had to deal with the mercbant-
middlemen who demanded a greater price than the ordinary
petremen or assomies. Thus in 1684 the Patna factors
reported that they dealt with one merchant, namely Probhat
(’Perevotf) who would not deal at the same price as the
assomies on the ground of 1iie trouble given by the nawab
59and his officers. In general, the competition in the
56. See Chapter 111.
57. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 10, f. 194.
58. Fact. Records, Patna, Vol. 1, pt.TV, f. 18.
59. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 10, f. 194.
saltpetre market was confined mostly among the European 
Companies, specially iiie English and the Dutch. Both 
these Companies were apprehensive - not. without much 
reason behind it - that the other would try to engross 
the saltpetre trade. As a consequence - as we have 
already referred earlier - the English Company asked 
their factors to carry on with the investment in saltpetre 
even in the time of war when thqy could hardly send the
60commodity for want of shipping. This competition
amongst, the Europeans had often its impact on the prices.
As already noted, the English factors once claimed that
the price of saltpetre was much reduced when the Dutch
61had left Patna. The Interlopers, too, were keen 
competitors in the market specially in the ’eighties of 
the 17th century. In 1684 the Patna factors reported 
that Purusuttom Das and Jadu Das - who were formerly 
Dutch gomasta, and provided the Interlopers with saltpetre 
in 'the previous year - again procured for the Interlopers 
great quantities of refined saltpetre which made the coarse 
variety scarce and raised their price. But when the 
Interlopers failed to come, the two merchants, hard pressed 
by the creditors for money, tried to sell the commodity for
Supra, p.285* __
61. Pact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 11, pt.ll, ff. 2-3.
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what ever price they could get. But the English and
the Dutch Companies ’plagued them sufficiently’ and
agreed not to buy an ounce of them so that ’they might
be sufficient losers and be made examples to prevent
62others’ from following their steps in future.
An analysis of the price of saltpetre shows
a general upward trend throughout the period, though
63with exceptions during certain years. Of course, it 
is difficult, to find out precisely the cost price of 
saltpetre as it depended on certain factors - ag. the 
place and time of purchase as also on the variety bought.
As we have already noted, the price of saltpetre at Patna 
in Dec. 1650 was Re. 1 p.md. while with charges for freight, 
it amounted to Re. It at Hugli. But the English bought 
the same variety for the ships despatched that year at
64Re p.md* In other words,, the EngLish had to pay 
50cjo more for the commodity during the shipping season.-
The price at Patna was about 40 to 50$> cheaper than that
in Hugli.  ^ In 1659/60 the English factors procured
saltpetre at Re. 1-g- p.md. at Patna which indicates a
6 612■£$ rise in price than that in 1650/51* At the end
62. Pact. Records. Hugli, Vol 10, f. 255.
65. See Table TX in Appendix.A.
64. O.C., 15 Dec. 1650, no. 2188, Vol.22; B.P.I., 1651 - 54 
PP. 557 - 53.
65. D.B., 28 Jan, 1659, Vol.84, f. 414.
66. O.C., 15 Dec. 1659, no. 2855, Vol. 26; E.F.I., 1655 - 60
p. 29.
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of our period, ie. in 1719/20 the average price of 
saltpetre was about Rs.5 P*md. This was generally 
the price in Hugli and definitely it shows a rise of 
about. 300$? from that in the beginning of our period.
This tremendous rise in the price over the period can 
only be explained by the competition among the European 
Companies and "their heavy demand on 1he supply. When 
the English first began their trade in saltpetre in 
1650/51, there was only the Dutch Company who used to 
export the commodity from Patna. So the former found 
saltpetre very cheap. But with the growth of the English 
trade and the heavy demand by the Europeans on the market, 
the price soared accordingly. The other contributory 
factors for fluctuations in prices appear to be the 
occasional attempts at monopoly by local rulers as also 
the uncertain weather conditions. It was reported that
more saltpetre was procurable in dry seasons than during
+V, • 67the rams.
During 1663/64 and 1664/65 the price of saltpetre 
was Rs 3 p.md. while the treble refined variety cost Rs 3i* 
It ranged between Rs 2 to Rs 3*2 p.md.from 1668/69 to 1675/ 
76, with a sudden rise to over Rs. 4 during the years 1676/ 
77 and 1676/79* In the feighties, however, the average
67. O.C., 1 Sept. 1665, no. 3069, Vol. 29*
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price was about Rs* 2, with the lowest figure of Rs. 1*6 
in 1682/83. But in the f nine ties the average price was 
over Rs. 3 p* md. During the 1st decade of the 18th century 
it went up high and stood at more than Rs. 4 . p.md, which 
was the trend in the second decade too, only with the 
exception of 1712/13 when the price went up as high as 
Rs. 6 p.md. Of course the cost price did not seem to have 
any great impact on the demand by the English Company as 
we don't find any reference in the records of 1he Company 
that it either increased the quantities ordered following 
a slump in price or vice versa.
The quantities of saltpetre actually exported 
by the English Company from Bengal over the period under 
review show fluctuations though the general trend was one 
of expansion, reaching the peak in the ’eighties and then 
sloping down in the ’nineties only to rise gradually again 
in the subsequent years. These fluctuations depended on 
various factors which can be generalised as the demand 
from England, the available supply and the Company’s 
shipping from Bengal. In 1663/64 iiie Company exported 
943*650 lbs* of saltpetre which rose to 990,450 lbs. in 
1664/65. There was a phenomenal rise in 1668/69 when 
1977*300 lbs. were exported from Bengal. Next year* 
however, the quantities of saltpetre exported fell to as 
low a level as 712,950; lbs. and sloped further down to
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650,900 lbs. in 1670/71. In 1671/72 it rose again to 
957,500 lbs, and went up further to 1551*400 lbs. in 
1675/76. Next year the total quantity exported stood
68
at 1255*250 lbs. and rose to 1876,800 lbs. in 1678/79*
The boom in the export of saltpetre started in 1681/82 
and continued upto 1685/86. The following table will 
indicate the fluctuations in the export of saltpetre 
from the •eighties till the end of the period under review.
Quinquennial Totals:Saltpetre export.
Years Quantitie s Average
1681/82 - 1685/86 6298,208 Its. 1259,641 Its
1690/91 - 1695/96 
(Excluding 1691/92) 2652 ,964
It 530,592 It
1696/97 - 1700/01 2226 ,132 II 445,226 It
1701/2 - 1706/7 
(Excluding 1703/4) 3785 ,486
II 757,097 II
1710/11 - 1714/15 4202 ,514 II 840,502 II
1715/16 - 1719/20 5352,689 If 1070,537 If
The hutch East India Company exported a far
greater quantity of saltpetre from Bengal than its,
English counterpart. In 1669/70 the hutch export to
Holland and the Asiatic factories amounted to 5445*440 
69
hutch lbs. Even in the first two decades of the
68. The figure for 1678/79 is to be found in B..M. Addl.
Mss, 54*125* f. 50a.
69* K.A., 1164* ff. 580-382vo. The hutch lb. is equivalent 
to 1#09 English lb. approximately, cf. T.Ray Chaudhuri,, 
op.cit., p. 225*
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18th century the hutch export to Holland far surpassed
that of the English, huring the three years 1701/2r 1702/
5* 1704/5 the hutch exported to Holland 8494fr754 lbs* (hutch)
at an average of 2581*918 lbs. yearly. The average annual
export to Holland during the quinquennial, periods 1705/6 —
1710/11 and 1711/12 to 1715/16 was 2999,789 lbs. (hutch)and
5884*405 lbs. (hutch) respectively which indicate that the
hutch trade in Bengal saltpetre was by far greater than that
of the English.^0
Though the quantities of saltpetre exported
annually by the English Company seem to be impressive*
the total value of this annual saltpetre trade in proportion
to the value of total annual exports of the Company was not
so. In the * sixties the total value of saltpetre exported
annually from Bengal constituted about 20 to 25 p#c. of the
total value of export, rising to 50Jb in 1668/69# But its
share during the slump which began in 1681/82 ?/as only 4cjo
of the total value of the Company's exports from Bengal*
though that year witnessed a boom in the absolute quantities
of saltpetre exported by the Company. This decline in
value continued till 1685/86 when it formed only 1*5ci° of
the total value of the exports. There was a sudden rise
in 1704/5 when it stood at 22*7$ but gradually went: down
again. Then onward it varied between 5 to 4 p#c. of the
70. Eor the list of Butch export from Bengal, see. K.A. Vols. 
1556, 1581, 1584, 1622* 1656, 1655, 1669, 1688, 1720r 
1754* 1746, 1776, 1804.
71total value of the Company*s exports*
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Sugar
It was only in the 1650*s that the English East
India Company was interested in the export of sugar to
England from Bengal and even then on a limited scale*
Prom then onward it hardly exported large quantities of
sugar to Europe vdiere West Indian and Brazilian sugar
held the market* Bergal sugar, however, continued to he
an important commodity - at least for sometime — for the
Company*s Inter - Asiatic trade, specially to Surat and
Persia* But here too it was soon ousted by Java sugar,
exported by the Butch during the second half of the 17th
c e n t u r y . ^ 2  Though sugar was a typical ballast commodity,
the Company in course of its trade in Bengal, preferred
saltpetre or other heavy goods to it as obviously the
latter was not a profitable commodity for export to Europe*
The English Company’s interest in Bengal su^tr
can be traced to a much earlier period of its trade in
Bengal* As early as 16 54 it was reported that sugar was
of much better quality in Bengal and cost not more than
two and a half pence ’the English pound with all charges 
75abroad’*  ^ In 1649 the EngLish factors at Swally Marine
71* See Table 111 in Appendix A.
72* K. G-lamann, Butch Asiatic Trade, p. 152*
73. O.C., 25 0ctT“T534, no. 1535, Vol. 15.
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wrote that if large quantities of sugar were to he
required in future, they must he obtained from Agra
and its neighbourhood, hut probably fthe Company will
desire to he supplied from Bengal where it is better
74and cheaper acquirable* • In the same year these factors
informed the Court of Directors that they had made fno
purchases of sugar as that from- Bengal was better and
c h e a p e r * .^5 In December 1650 James Bridgeman wrote to
the Company that sugar in great quantities could yearly
be procured in Bengal in February or March at Rs.V-g- or
Rs. 8. per bale but during the monsoon or shipping season
76
would cost Rs. 11 or 12 ne. about 50 p.c. more. However,
the Bay factors were instructed in 1651 to invest V6 of
77their capital in sugar. But due to the lack of any
/
quantitative data, we are in complete ignorance eilher 
regarding the total an aunt of sugar investment or the 
quantities exported by the Company to Europe in Hie 1 fifties
of the 17th century* As regards the list of order for 
Bengal sugar, we find the Company asked in Decemlteer 1657 
for 500 tons*7® Next year, however, there was a sudden
74. O.C., 31 Jan , 
p.255.
1649, no • 2113, Vol. 21; E.P.I., 1646-50
75. 0. C., 5 Apr! 1
p.258.
, 1649 , no . 2121, Yol. 21; E.P.I., 1646 -50
76. O.C., 16 Dec, 
pp. 337-8.
1650, no • 2188, Yol. 22; E.F.I., 1651-54,
77. O.C., 19 Feb, 
p.45.
1651, no • 2208, Yol. 22; E.E.I. 1651-54,
00 • D.B., 31 Dec. 1657, Yol . 84, f. 388*
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increase in the demand for Bengal sugar. In January 1659»
the Court of Directors asked Bergal factors to provide 700
79tons of *whitest and driest1 sugar. But this hoom in the 
demand for Bengal sugar was only temporary. In February 
1660 the Directors reduced the quantity to 400 or 50Q tons 
and that too if it could be procured at £10 or £12 per inn, 
otherwise none at all. The reason for such reduction in 
the order was obvious. The ’Home marketsr for sugar was 
fvery full* by the large cLuantities brought from several 
plantations which had caused rit to be exceeding cheap in
80so much that we have no encouragement to have any sent us*.
The same discouraging note by the Directors was despatched
in September 1660. They asked Bengal factors to discontinue
any investment, in sugar eiiher for England or Persia as the
price of sugar had fallen to such a low rate that it weuld
81hardly return any profit. From then onward, it seems, 
the English Company stopped any investment in sugar for 
exportation to England. The only figure for sug ar export, 
we get was for 1658/59* In that year two ships, Love and 
Blackmore were despatched from Balasore with 5595 bags of 
sugar, containing 7.652*5 mds. or 572,440 lbs. valued at 
Rs. 55,165 or about £4,145.^
79. D.B., 28 Jan. 1659, Vol 84. f. 412.
80. D.B., 22 Feb. 1660, Vol. 85, f. 284.
81. D.B., 14 Sept. 1660, Vol. 85, f. 555; 28 Jan.1661, Vol. 85, 
f. 567.
82. Rawl. C. 595, ff. 17, 25a.
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Other Commodity Exports
Of the English Company's other export commodities
tincall or borax, turmeric, cowries, redwood and lac alone
were of any importance and even these, compared with piece-
goods, silk or saltpetre, were of little significance as
their exportation remained irregular over the whole period*
These commodities were not very profitable commercially,
but the Company exported them in order to fill up the vacant
space of the returning ships and to provide ballast* Of these
various commodities again, some were imported to Bengal from
other parts ag. sticklac from Pegu and cowries from the
Maldives* The Company in its turn, exported cowries from
Bengal to England for reexportation to the African settlements
where it had a good market and could be exchanged for slaves
required in the different plantations* In the early years
the order for cowries did not exceed more than 5 or 10 tons,
though later on it went up to 100 tons* Sticklac was
procurable in Bengal too, but the Company preferred 'best
and blackest' Pegu sticklac, the order for which varied
between 50 and 100 tons. Tihcall or borax too, like other
bulk goods, were provided irregularly, the demand from
England varying between 100 and 150 Duppers, each Dupper
containing 2 mds. The Directors ordered in Feb. 1685,500
Duppers, if to be procured at Rs. 8 p.md. otherwise none
at all, as they lost 69°/o on the commodity in the previous 
85year*
85. D.B., 18 Feb. 1685, Vol. 90, f. 451.
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Besides saltpetre, Patna provided another hulk
commodity namely, turmeric. The Company's demand for this
item was small in the 'fifties of the 17th century, being
84-only 5 or 10 tons in 1657, rising to 50 tons in 1659*
But with the increase of shipping in the early 'eighties, 
it went up to 250 tons, though only for a few years.. In 
September 1685 “the Directors wrote that it was a 'veiy dull 
commodity'. Even in 1691 they asked Bengal factors not 
to send any turmeric as they were already overstocked with 
that commodity for the last seven y e a r s . P r o m  the 'eighties 
the Company became interested in another bulk commodity, 
ehellack, 'the best and finest sort' procurable in Kasinbazar. 
In August 1682, the Directors ordered for 50 tons which was 
roughly the quantity in the list of order throughout the 
'eighties. They wrote towards the close of 1688 thait 
she H a c k  was 'a sure commodity' and asked Bengal factors to 
send what they could. Again in 1691 they wrote that the 
transparent shellack of - Kasimbazar was a 'very good commodity'
and that whatever quantities the Bengal factors could send,
86would not be ftoo much for the Company's sales*» But it;
84. D.B., 51 Dec. 1657, Vol 84, ff. 585-86; Jan 28, 1659,
Vol. 84, f. 412. 1681
85. D.B., 5 Jan. 1681, Vol. 89, f. 265; 18 Nov,/Vol. 89, f414;
5 Sept.1685, VoL 90, f. 218; 18 Feb, 1691, Vol. 92, ff .147 -
48.
86. D.B., 28 Aug. 1682, Vol. 90, f. 26; 50 Sept. 1684, Vol. 90 
f. 575; 27 Aug, 1688, Vol. 91, f. 575; 18 Feb. 1691, Vol. 
92,ff. 147 - 8.
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seems that the order for shellack never exceeded 50 tons
a year and was actually reduced to 10 tons a year towards
87
the close of the period.
Cotton Yarn
Cotton yarn formed an important, commodity in the
structure of the Company1s export trade from Bengal. As it
could he used as ballast and stowage, the Company often
found its export quite advantageous, perhaps only next to
that of saltpetre. It was procurable mostly in Balasore
and the adjacent areas, though at the end of our period it
88
was ordered to be procured from Kasimbazar. The quantity
demanded from England over the period was not uniform and
varied from time to time according to market conditions in
England and Europe, and the space to be filled up in the
Europe bound ships. In the early years of the Company’s
trade in Bengal, the quantity ordered was small. In 1657
only 10 tons of cotton yarn were ordered to be sent to 
80
England. * But in 1659 the Directors asked Bengal factors
to send 400 bales ’in short skeins, not cross reeled’, each
bale containing about 5 mds. The very next year, however,
the order was reduced to 100 bales, as the commodity had
90’grown out, of request’. In the ’sixties the Directors
87. See list of order for 1717/18 to 1719/20 in D.B., Vol.99,
ff. 291 - 93, 541 - 544; Vol.100, ff. 161 - 64*
88. Beng. Bub. Consult., Range 1, Vol. 1, ff. 189-90.
89. D.B., 51 Dec. 1657, Vol. 84, ff. 585 - 86.
90. D.B., 28 Jan, 1659, Vol#84, f. 412; 22 Feb. 1660, Vol. 85,
f. 284.
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generally ordered for 200 bales which they hoped could
be procured at Rs. 16 p.md. They wrote that the cotton
yarn received from Bengal was ’coarse reeled and too
great skeins and too hard twisted’ and asked the factors
to see that it should be in ’small skeins and reeled
91straight and softer twisted’. But there was a total 
slump in the Directors1 order made in November 1670, 
because it was said that they had lost 30 to 40 p.c. on 
what was sent earlier and hence no more cotton yarn was 
to be sent till further order.92 jn December 1677 they 
asked the factors to send 50 or 100 bales if other 
commodities for ballast or stowage were not procurable.^
In the ’eighties, however, there was a certain boom in 
the order for cotton yarn. Though in January 1681 the 
Company asked for 100 bales only, in December of the same 
year it ordered 400 b a l e  s . 94 As a matter of fact, the 
demand for cotton yarn was growing in England and Europe 
from the ’eighties. In December 1683 the Directors wrote 
that cotton yarn had ’grown a noble commodity’ and that 
about 500 or 1000 tons yearly would sell in the market.
They also noted that it was a ’brave commodity to fill up’ 
their ships with, and asked for 500 bales to be sent to
91. D.B. , Eeb. 1662, Vol. 86, f. 84; 16 Dec. 1663, Vol.86, 
f.356? 26 Aug. 1667. Vol. 87, f. 97.
92. D.B., 29 Nov. 1670, Vol. 87, f. 401.
93. D.B., 12 Dec. 1677, Vol. 88, f. 522.
94. D.B., 30 Dec. 1681, Vol. 89, f. 437.
304
95England, Next year, however, the quantity ordered
slipped down to 400 hales and further to 200 in 1685,
96
eventually rising to 500 hales in 1688. In thernineties 
again there was an absolute slump in the demand for cotton 
yam. In October 1698 the Directors asked Bengal factors 
to send no cotton yarn except *it he upon necessity to
97
fill our ship in which case it is better than dead freight.* 
The orders for the first two decades of the 18th century, 
too, remained low, irregular and insignificant.
The prices of cotton yarn generally declined 
over the period. ^  In 1665/64 the price of cotton yarn 
was about Rs. 19*4 while at the end of our period i.e. in 
1719/20 it fell to Rs. 14*1 p.md. In other words there 
was a decline of about 50 p.c. in the price of cotton 
yarn in the span of about 60 years. The lowest price 
of cotton yarn was Rs. 12*8 in 1697/98 while the highest,
Rs. 19*9,.was reached in 1669/70. The general trend of 
the decline in the price of cotton yarn, though it appears 
strange under the circumstances, can perhaps be explained.
First, the demand from England as we have already seen was
irregular and generally on the decline despite a sudden 
boost in 1685* Secondly, though it could be expected - as
95. D.B., 21 Dec. 1685, Vol. 90, ff. 244, 248.
96. D.B., 50 Sept. 1684, Vol.90, f.571? 18 Eeb 1685, Vol.90, 
f. 451; 27 Aug. 1688, Vol. 91, f. 581.
97. D.B., 28 Oct. 1698, Vol. 95,. f. 121.
98. See. Table TT in Appendix A.
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a result of the heavy demand for piece — goods on Bengal
market. — that the price of cotton yarn would go up, the
large quantities imported from Surat, mainly hy Indian
merchants, perhaps more than eased the pressure on the
99cotton yarn market* The traffic in Bengal — Surat trade 
which was mostly in the hands of Surat merchants appears 
to have increased considerably in the second half of the 
17th century as a result of twin developments* The sea 
became comparatively freer following the decline of the 
Portuguese supremacy and the consequent rise of the Butch 
and the English Companies with whom, it seems, the Indian 
merchants felt more secure. More ships and bigger ones 
were now available for charter from the Companies as well 
as other facilities such as the services of pilots etc* 
Moreover the European Companies and their servants took 
part in this branch of trade, and cotton yarn formed an 
important return cargo from Surat. Thirdly, the Butch 
demand for and export of cotton yarn was too small to have 
any impact on price and eliminated any chance of competition 
between the two rival Companies. Though the Butch order
99* An idea of the quantities of cotton yarn imported from 
Surat by the Indian merchants can be formed from the 
following table collected from various volumes of K.A. 
1682/83 - 1,500 mds*
1701/02 - 14*037 "
1706/07 - 1*085 packs
1708/09 - 2,162 mds
1709/10 - 5,010 •»
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ranged between 10,000 to 15,000 lbs* (Dutch) in the 1st 
decade of the 18th century, rising to 20,000 lbs.in the 
second decade, it was very irregular and seldom complied 
with by the factors in Bengal, thus the export remaining 
very low throughout the first two decades of the 18th 
century*
The quantities of cotton yarn exported annually 
by the English Company varied from year to year according 
to the demand from Europe and the vacant space to be filled 
up in the returning ships. In 1665/64 the Company exported
26,100 lbs. of cotton yarn, rising to 51>950 lbs.next year 
and further to 55,100 in 1668/69* But during the next 
three years, 1669/70 to 1671/72, the quantities of cotton 
yarn exported showed a gradual decline. In 1669/70 only 
28,800 lbs. were exported which went down next year to as 
low as 2,475 lbs. but rose to 20,250 lbs. in 1671/72. Gheie 
was actually no exportation of cotton yarn during 1675/76, 
1676/77, 1678/79 and 1681/82. But in the reighties there 
began a general boom in its export. In 1682/85 the 
quantities exported stood at 45,425 lbs.,next year sloping 
down to 18,426 lbs. and eventually rising to 105,004 lbs. 
in 1684/85, the highest figure of export for cotton yarn 
during the period under review. Next year, however, the 
quantity slided down to 52,410 lbs. Prom the ’ninnies,
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specially from 1695/94, upto the end of the period, the 
quantities exported though irregular, ranged between
30.000 and 40,000 lbs. Sometimes of course the quantity 
rose quite high as in 1705/6 when the figure stood at- 
92,059 lbs. and at other times none was sent at all for 
several years. As a matter of fact, the Company exported 
no cotton yarn for four consecutive years from 1713/14 to 
1716/17* In 1717/18 the quantities exported were 37,714 
lbs. while next year again there was no export of cotton 
yarn, though in 1719/20, the export stood at 21,350 lbs.
The Dutch Company's export figures show that they exported 
far less cotton yarn than the English. Actually the fomer 
did not export, any cotton yarn from Bengal from 1700/01 to 
1706/7* In 1707/8 and 1708/9 their export ranged between
9.000 to 9,500 lbs. (Dutch). In the second decade of the 
18th century too, the Dutch exported cotton yarn irregularly 
and the highest figure of their export in this commodity 
was 12,000 Dutch lbs. in 1714/15*
Raw Silk
Next to saltpetre and textiles, raw silk was the 
most important and coveted article of export in the Compares 
trade in Bengal. In the early 17th century, English demand 
for raw silk was met by silk brought mainly from Italy, 
Prance, Persia and only to a limited extent by Chinese silk 
in which the Dutch Company drove a most profitable and
substantial trade. As the Chinese silk was of paramount
importance to the Dutch Company's trade in Japan, the
amount left over for export to Europe fluctuated sharply
and were often uncertain. The experience of the English
Company with Chinese silk proved unfortunate as their
sales returned little profit. The Dutch interest in Ifersian
silk, however, declined around the middle of the century
when the export of precious metal became the primary factor
of its Persian trade. The English Company, too, took interest
in the early years of the 17th century in Persian silk trade.
But by 1624 it expressed misgivings whether the trade in
Persian silk could ever be made profitable as long as the
Prench and Italians dominated the market at Aleppo and the
Company's failure to dislodge the latter gave rise to
intermittent opposition to the continuation of the Persian
trade. Moreover, the monopoly of the Shah of Persia in the
sale of silk,and the abuses and extortions practised by
local officers in its sale very much discouraged the English.
Thus towards the middle of the 17th century both the English
and the Dutch Company turned their attention to India,
particularly to Bengal for the supply of raw silk.'1’00
The search for Bengal silk by the English Company
can be traced back to the embassy of Sir Thomas Roe in 1&15•
He was specially commissioned to attempt obtaining trading
100. Balkrishna, op.cit. ,pp. 97-98; K. G-lamann, "Bengal and 
the World Trade about 1700", Bengal Past and Present,
Vol. LXXVI, pt.l, Jubilee No* 1957, p*33* K.N. ChaiLdhuri, 
, pp.203-5*
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privileges in Bengal and Persia for opening up the
silk trade, hut netting could he affected by him so
101
far as Bengal was concerned. The possibility of
a lucrative trade in Bengal silk was again reported
hy Hughes from Patna in 1620. As we have already 
102
noted, he had informed the Surat- council that; Bengal 
silk could he procured in large quantities at. Patna 
at a price 35 p.c. cheaper than at Agra, and that in 
M u r s h i d a h a d t h e  fchoc£est stuffr could he provided 
in infinite quantity, at least 20 p.c. cheaper than in 
any other part of India. But this attempt to explore 
the possibility of a trade in raw silk had failed again. 
Similarly Peter Mundy's commercial expedition to Patna 
ended in failure. However, in 1634 it was reported that 
silk could he procured there at 4 to 5 fanams the English 
pound ie. 2i shillings p. Ih. or about a rupee. The two 
hales of Bengal silk sent about this time as a sample in
103
the Mary were disposed of at 20 s. per lh. for trial only.
But it was only after the opening of the Hugli factory 
in 1651 that the English began an extensive trade in 
Bengal silk.
101. See Chapter 11
102. Ibid.
103* O.C. 25 Oct. 1634, no. 1556, Vol*15;' Balkrishna, 
op.cit, pp. 9 6 - 9 9 *
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The chief centre of production of Bengal silk
was Kasimbazar and its neighbourhood, including Murshidabad.
Tavernier commented that Kasimbazar could furnish about
twenty two thousand bales of silk annually, each weighing
104a hundred pound. There was indeed a great production
of raw silk in and around Kasimbazar in the second half
of the 17th century. Streynsham Master wrote in 1676-,fAll
the country or great part there of about Kasimbazar is
planted or set with mulberry trees, the leaves of which
are gathered to feed the worms with and make the silk fine
105
and therefore the trees are planted every year.”
Bengal raw silks came in various qualities* We 
learn from an account written in 1661 by John Kenn, then 
chief of Kasimbazar, that silk was wound into three sorts - 
’head’, ’belly1 and ’foot’ which meant first, second and 
third quality respectively. The English Company used to 
buy generally the first two sorts in the proportion of 
5:4. This silk was called ’Putta’ or of short skein.
There was another sort of silk which was of superfine 
quality called puttany, costing Rs. 5i to Rs. 6i per seer. 
The sort, of silk which was bought by the indigenous merchants 
for Agra was called ’Dolleria’ , a name given to the sort
104. Tavernier. op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 2 - 3 ,
105. Master’s Diary, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 28.
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of silk in which ’head1, ’belly* and ’foot’ were all
105
mixed together. The Dutch Company used to denote
the three sorts of silk (’head’,’belly’ and ’foot’) by
the Portuguese terms of quality - cabessa, bariga and
pee respectively. Later on the Dutch began to export
a superfine quality called tanny which was, it seemsr
of the same quality as English puttany, a short-threaded
reel of the best part of the cocoons. The Dutch order
down to 1670* s was confined exclusively to cabessa,bariga
and pee, specially the first two qualities. The tanny
silk first emerged in the order for 1676 and in a very
short time surpassed other sorts and became the most
107markatable of all Bengal silks. The orders sent out
from 1700 onwards were exclusively for tanny, bariga and 
cabessa. One finds reference to other kinds of silk such 
as florelta yarn, Punia silk, Punjah silk,. G-oragant silk 
etc. in the records of the two Companies. The English 
Company came to knov; about the floretta yarn, ’a kind of 
white silk’, from the cargoes of the ships of the Dutch 
Company, captured in 1673 and ordered some samples from 
Kasimbazar in December 1673
"T.T.
106/Addl. Mss. 34,123, f* 42; Wilson, op.cit, Vol.l, p.376
107. K. G-lamann, Dutch Asiatic Trade, op. cit., P. 124.
108. D.B., 4 Dec. 1673, Vol. 88. f. 81.
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An analysis of the orders for Bengal silk
reveals that on the whole they fluctuated concurrently
with the price in Europe and were attuned to the supplies
of other silks received hy the European Companies for
their home markets. Bengal silk was the cheapest of
all Asiatic silks and even though in the course of time
the price rose, it remained throughout the greater part
of the 17th century much cheaper than either Chinese or 
109Persian silk.  ^ Its trade once established displayed a
consistent growth. Commercially, the high rate of profit
and the increasing demand in Europe acted as a stimulous
to the tremendous growth of silk export from Bengal. As
early as 1653/54 the Dutch Company realised a gross profit
of about 200fo on the silk from B e n g a l T h e  English
Company, too, found the trade in Bengal silk extremely
profitable. In the sale of a consignment of silk brought
by Martha in 1695/96 the Company’s gross profit exceeded
111
well over 250^.
109* K. Glamann. Bengal Past and Present, op.cit., p.34.
According to G-lamann £ibid, p.34) the price of Bengal, 
silk was 2*82 fl. in 1649 and rose to 4*11 and 4*09 
in 1669 and 1670 respectively. For the phenomenal 
rise of price in 1681/82 and 1682/83, see, Table Tl 
in Appendix.L.A.
110. K. G-lamann, Dutch Asiatic Trade, op. cit., p. 122.
111. In 1696 Martha brought 149 bales of silk at the invoice 
price of £11,232 which were sold for £40,023, vide, 
A.G-.D. Range 11, Vol. 43, f. 71. 82-84.
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The orders from the English Bast India Company
for Bengal silk was quite insignificant till 1673• £he
Dutch Company’s order for 1650, however, can be regarded
as the beginning of the first boom in its demand for
Bengal silk. The Dutch order in the ’forties was moderate
and generally confined to 15,000 to 20,000 lbs.(Dutch).
But in 1650 the Directors of the Dutch Company increased
it to 50,000 lbs. The phenomenal increase in the Dutch
demand showed itself in 1654 when they ordered ''-I'. 200,000
lbs. (Dutch) or as much as could be procured in Bengal upto
112the value of 1 million fl. The English, however, asked
their factors in 1651 to invest only 6 of their small
113
capital in silk. In 1657/53 the Court of Directors
asked Hugli Agency to invest £3,000 in silk and in January
1659 a permanent order was given to provide 10Q bales per
114annum at the cost of Rs. 90 to Rs. 100 p. md. But next
year it was curtailed to 30 or 40 bales only, and these,
too, were to be provided if obtained from 6s. 7d. to 7s. 6d.
11*5per lb. of 24 ounces. J In hov.1670, however, the order 
was again raised to 100 bales per year, though the Company 
was not happy with the quality of silk sent from Bengal.
The Court of Directors wrote in December 1670 that the silk 
received was useless for the manufacturers in England and
112. K. G-lamann, Dutch Asiatic Trade, op. cit., p. 122.
113. O.C., 19 Feb. 1651, no. 2208, Vol.22; E.F.I., 1651-54,p.54
114. D.B., 31 Dec. 1657, Vol.84, ff.385-86; 27 Feb. 1658, Vol. 
84, f. 403; 28 Jan.1659, Vol.84, f. 412.
115. D.B., 14 Sept. 1660, Vol. 85, f. 335.
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hence the buyers were forced to ship it off to foreign
markets* The defect in the silk, as they pointed out,
was that it was reeled up too short and was of fixed
threads in several sizes of fine and coarse in every
skein* The remedy suggested hy the Company was that.
every skein was to he reeled ahout a yard long and of
no more than one thread and ’ every several size of fine
116
and coarse in several skeins’ •
It was from ahout the middle of the ’seventies 
of the century that the English Company hegan to pursue 
the silk trade vigorously* As early as 1671 the Company 
prohibited all its servants and other English merchants 
from dealing in Punia silk. The silk trade was of so 
great a profit that in 1678 all the Company’s servants 
were prohibited from dealing in Chinese silk and wrought 
silks. Again in 1682 it prohibited all Englishmen from 
dealing in all kinds of raw silk as it was asserted that 
they had lately enhanced the prices and reduced the 
Company’s investment in India. Thus the Company’s monopoly
11
in raw silk from Bengal was made more extensive and severe. 
However, the order sent out in 1675/4 shows the first boom 
in the demand for raw silk from Bengal. In that year the 
Directors ordered about 470 to 570 bales, while the orders
116. D.B*, 29 Nov. 1670, Vol.87, f. 404; 16 Dec. 1670, Vol.
87. f. 410.
117. Balkrishna, op. cit., p. 145; D.B., 18 Dec, 1671, Vol. 
87, f. 508; 6 Nov7~1678, Vol. 89, f.6; 5 Jan* 1679, Vol.
89, f. 27; 15 Jan.1682, Vol.89, f.452; 15 Feb. 1682,
ff.456. 471;
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varied between 600 to 900 bales during the years 1674/75 
to 1678/79. Then onward the demand for Bengal silk rose 
very sharply. In 1679/80 the order stood at 1,200 bales 
indicating an increase of about 50$ than that of the 
previous year while in 1680/81 it went upto 1,800 bales, 
showing a rise of 50$ than that of 1679/80. For the next 
two years the Directors ordered 2,100 bales per annum*
The phenomenal rise in the order occurred in 1681/82. In 
that year the Company asked for 10,000 bales, each bale 
containing 160 seers which indicated an increase of about 
5 times on the order of the previous year. Next year the 
order was further increased to 11,500 bales while in 1685/
84 it stood at 11,200 bales.
As a matter of fact the Directors were urging
more and
Bengal factors from the middle of the ’seventies to invest//
more in Bengal silk. In 1675 they asked Hugli Agency to
take up £20,000 by exchange and invest it in raw silk and
118repeated the instruction in their letter in 1676* This 
special emphasis on silk meant a change in the pattern of 
the Company’s trade in Bengal and ultimately altered the 
relative balance between various commodities exported from 
Bengal. In January 1681 the Directors sent £80,000 to
118. D.B., 24 Dec. 1675, Vol. 88. f. 258; 18 Dec. 1676, Vol.
88, f. 391.
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Kasimbazar only, an amount which fis far greater than
119ever yet was sent to that place1* Repeated instructions
were sent to Bengal, particularly, to increase the investment
in silk to as great an amount as could be procured. Por
instance, in July 1681 the Directors emphasised their needs
in the following words — "Our principal design in this
express is further to enforce our former orders upon you
to be always buying and getting in what quantities you can
of Raw Silk for which when you have no money we do hereby
authorise you to take up money by way of Exchange and draw
your bills on us or to take up at interest whatsoever shall
be necessary for the carrying of that investment11 • In the
same letter they further wrote - "Y/hatsoever Raw Silk you
can procure of the sorts we formerly advised you without
limitation to quantity and whatsoever bulk it may grow to,
while our Europe ships are with you, let it all be laden
on board though you take out and lay by in our Y/arehouses
120
Peter and Turmeric in lieu thereof". The Company's
motives behind such a vigorous pursual of silk trade in 
Bengal were reflected in its letter of 22 April, 1681*
The Directors wrote ,f... we do lay the greatest charge 
upon you to enlarge our investment in all the coarsest 
kinds of Raw Silk because we judge it not only the most
119* D.B., 5 Jan. 1681, Vol. 89, ff. 278 - 79.
120. D.B., 22 July, 1681, Vol.89, ff. 362 - 63.
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gainful but the Most National commodity we can bring
for England, being a commodity to be manufactured which
sets our poor on work, greatly augments our navigation
121and works upon the Trade of our emulous neighbours"•
The point was further elaborated by the Directors in the 
same letter-: "We shall tell you that our purpose with 
God’s assistance is to increase our navigation as much 
as our trade that as our fleets grow yearly richer they 
may proportionately grow stronger in which we find our­
selves upon the dilemma. If we bring our great quantities 
of Turmeric, Lacs or other gross goods, we soon clog the 
market to that degree, that they will not return us our 
freight, on the other hand, if we enlarge our trade 
altogether in fine goods which are most profitable, our 
tonnage will be so little that the force of our fleets will 
be too weak for the Treasure of their loadings. Such 
deliberations as these have brought us upto the resolution 
of driving the Silk Trade thoroughly, silk being a commodity 
of such univeral use in all parts of Europe especially the 
coarsest sort of it, that if you should load 2 or 3 of our 
biggest ships with it (which we are assumed is not impossible),
the vastness of the quantity would not sink the price
122materially to our damage". The extent to which the
importance of silk trade had grown in
121. D.B., 22 April, 1681, Vol. 89, f. 330.
122. D.B., 22 April, 1681, Vol. 89, ?. 331.
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the 1 eighties can he seen from the fact that in Nov,
1681, the Company gave liberty to the factors in Bengal
to take -up £100,000 at interest fwith this limitation
that what you so take up at- interest (little more or
less) be all invested and sent us home in Raw Silk by
123this yearrs shipping1 • The orders of the Dutch Company,
too, showed a remarkable increase around the middle of
the 1 eighties and in a decade, as the result of a rise
124in prices in Europe, surpassed the level of 1654*
There was, however, a sharp decline in the
English order in 1684/85 and the demand for Bengal silk
upto 1687/88 ranged between 1530 and 1690 bales, Following
the depression in the rHome. markets1 , the Directors wrote
in August 1688 that raw silk fis much fallen in price1 and
asked Bengal factors to get at least 20 p,c, abated of old
125rates or otherwise to send very little quantity. But 
with the outbreak of the European war the demand for Bengal 
silk increased considerably. The Court of Directors wrote 
in October 1693 that Bengal silk was the ’very best 0010110^ 1^
that could be sent from India as it fetched an excessive
price rby reason of the obstructions which the present war
-1 og
hath given to Turkey Trade*. The orders sent out in 1693
123. D.B., 18 Bov, 1681, Vol. 89, f. 419.
124. K. Glamann, Dutch Asiatic Trade, op.cit., p. 125.
125. D.B., 27 Aug. 1688, Vol.91, f. 575.
126. D.B., 27 Oct. 1693, Vol. 92, f. 297.
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and 1694 required "the factors to send as much silk as
could be procured. Altogether the years about the turn
of the bentury was characterised by greater possibilty
of sale and by higher prices in Europe. The war in
which Italy was involved for sometime eliminated presumably
the greatest supplier of silk in Europe just as the Turkish
trade was interrupted by the French war. In August 1698
the Directors pressed Bengal factors to provide a fgreat
quantity* as they expected, following the failure of silk
crop in France, Italy and Turkey, that *Raw Silk must,
continue a commodity of great price as it is now in all
127
parts of Europe* * But the orders in the first two 
decades of the 18th century was not consistent and fluctuated 
sharply.-^ 28 Dutch orders in the first two decades of
the 18th century for Bengal silk unlike the English ones, 
did not show violent fluctuations. And indeed the Dutch
127. D.B., 26 Aug 1698, Vol. 95, £. 102.
128. The English orders for raw silk during the 1st two 
decades of the 18th century - six year period.
1702/5 - 
1703/4 - 
1704/5- 
1705/6 - 
1706/7 - 
1707/8 -
60.000 lbs. 
190,000 
190,000 
50.000 
75,000
160,000
11 111
1708/9 - 110,000 lbs. 1714/15
1709/10- '50,000 ,f 1715/16
1710/11- 20,000 " 1716/17
1711/12- 40,000 " 1717/18
1712/13- 180,000 « 1718/19
1715/14- 120,000 ” 1710/20
600 Bales 
600 
600 
300 
300 
150
725,000 lbs- 
ie. an average of
120,000 lbs.
520,000 lbs. 2550 Bales
ie. an average of ie. an average of
87,000 lbs. 425 Bales or 121,000
lbs. taking each
bale to contain 4 mds. 
each md. of 75 lbs.
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129
demand for silk was far greater than that of the English.
The supply condition in the silk market was not
as good as in the case of some other commodities, and it
was in the silk trade that the European Companies had to
meet the greatest competition from indigenous merchants. 
Besides the English and the Dutch, merchants from other 
parts of India :.and Asia drove an extensive trade in Bengal 
silk. Indeed throughout the period under review, the 
indigenous merchants were formidable rivals of the European 
Companies in the silk markets. Tavernier wrote - l!The 
Dutch generally took either for Japan or Holland 6,000 to
7,000 bales of it (silk) and they would like to get more 
but the merchants of Tartary and of the whole Mogul Empire 
opposed their doing so, for these merchants took as much 
as the Dutch and the balance remained with the people of 
the country for the manufacture of their own stuffs. All 
these silks are brought to the Kingdom of G-ujarat and the
129* The Dutch order for raw silk during the first two 
decades of the 18th century six year period
1 11
1704/5 - 270,000 lbs.(Dutch) 1711/12 - 168,000 lbs.(Dutch)
1705/6 - 262,000 " " 1712/15 -164,000 "
1706/7 - 275,000 " 1 1715/14 - 162,000
1707/8 - 260,000 " ” 1714/15 - 209,000
1708/9 - 204,000 » " 1715/16 - 197,000
1710/11 - 164,000 " 1 1716/17 - 246,000
1455,000 tr " 1146,000 " "
ie. an average of 259,166 lbs. ie. an average of 191,000 lbs 
Dutch. Dutch.
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greater part come to Ahmedabad and Surat where they are
130woven into fabrics" . The great significance of the
silk trade from Bengal to Northern and Western India was
that both the silk market and the money market was affected
by it* John Kenn reported in 1661 — "According' as this
silk ('Dolleria* from Bengal) sells in Agra, so the price
of silk in Kasimbazar riseth or falleth* The exchange of
money from Kasimbazar to Patna and Agra riseth and falleth
131
as the said silk findeth a vent in Patna or Agra”. In 
1683 the Bengal factors reported that 10,000 bales of raw 
silk were carried annually by land from Kasimbazar to 
Sui^ and they expected that more would thus be transported 
as fthe manufactory increases* #^32 grea-t demand by
the indigenous merchants coupled with those by the Butch 
and the English Companies on the supply market often raised 
the purchasing prices of silk. Besides this triangular 
competition, occasional failure of silk crop also enhanced 
its price. Thus in 1680 the Kasimbazar factors reported a 
sharp rise in the price (fmore than one rupee in the seer 
than last year*) following the bad harvest of silk crop
130. Tavernier, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 2 — 3*
13lWAddl. Mss. 34,123* f. 42; Y/ilson op.cit., Vol.I, p*376. 
132. Fact. Records, Misc., Vol. 3A, f. 74*
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due to bad weather as also' owing to the fact that the
Butch were buying up great quantities, and the *Gujarat
133merchants buying up what fine silk* they could find.
On the other hand, the factors reported in April 1682
that they did not expect a rise in price despite the
crop failure as the ’Gujarat merchants had no orders to
134make investment for Hindus than* • Y/hen the Company
ordered for *a vast quantity of silk* to be procured in
1682, the Hugli factors wrote to Madras it will
certainly cause all manner of silk to rise, at least
keep its price which otherwise might and was appearingly
falling, the Gujarat merchants at present holding their
135hands by reason of the troubles.."#
The price of raw silk over the period shows 
sharp fluctuations, which in the absence of any direct, 
evidence, is difficult to explain. The main obstacle 
in tracing the precise movements in the price of raw 
silk is that there were various qualities of silk depending 
on the fineness which was not mentioned in the records. 
However, it may be said in general that the competition
133, Fact. Records., Kasimbazar, Vol.l, Biary, 7 Sept.1680. 
134* Ibid, Vol.2 Consult. 17 April, 1682#
135. Home Misc., Vol .803* ff. 366 - 67
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amongst the English, Dutch and the indigenous merchants
coupled with had or good harvest of silk crop wag.'
primarily responsible for fluctuations in the price of
raw silk in Bengal. Despite the fluctuations, the price
of silk over the period shows in general an upward trend,
, 136
rising to a maximum in 1682/83* James Bridgeman nsparted
in Dec. 1650 that raw silk was procurable in Hugli at
Rs. 85 or Rs 90 p.md. but in the shipping season it was
Tcommonly very dear and little to be bought but what is 
137adulterated*• In 1682/83 the price of raw silk rose
to Rs. 298 p.md. In other words, during these years the
price of raw silk went up by 300 p.c. The Company bought
138
raw silk at. Rs. 120 per maund in 1658/59? While in 
1663/64 it had to pay Rs. 155 p.md. From then onward 
the price of raw silk soared unabated till it reached 
the highest mark in 1682/83. The price was considered too 
dear by Hugli factors who ordered in Aug. 1682 that the 
investment at kasimbazar shoijld not exceed £150,000
139’considering Raw Silk is so much dearer as 50 p.c.1
136. See Table 11 in Appendix A.
137. O.C., 15 Dec. 1650, no. 2188, Vol.22; E.F.I., 1651 - 54 
pp. 337 - 38*
138. Rawl. C. 395*, f. 17. __
139. Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol.3, pt.ll, f. 88.
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But. during 16Q3/B4 and 1684/85 the price slided down to 
as low as Rs. 167 and Rs. 168 respectively. Such a sudden 
slump in price might he due to the fact that the Gujarat 
merchants lay off their hands ahout this time,, and also 
might be due to a probable bumper crop. In 1685/86, however, 
the price again soared to Rs.222 p.md. During the * nineties 
the price varied between Rs.140 to 190, with the exception 
of 1696/97 when it went down as low as Rs. 155 p.md. The 
price trend in the first two decades of the 18th century 
also displayed fluctuations, varying mostly between Rs.
150 and Rs.200 p.md. though in 1701/02 it went up to Rs.
236 p.md. But then onward the average price was well under 
Rs*. 200 p.md. The accompanying graph illustrates the 
fluctuations in the price of raw silk over the period under 
review.
If the prices of raw silk fluctuated violently, 
so did its quantity annually exported by the English Company 
from Bengal. It was not till the f seventies that the annual 
export of raw silk acquired any significance quantitatively. 
In 1671/72 the total quantity exported by the Company was
18,100 lbs. while in 1675/76 it stood at 22,749 lbs.
14021,142 lbs. next year. The introduction
140. In all computations of the quantity of raw silk I have 
converted for the sake of -uniformity, all great lbs.(of 
24 ounces) to ordinary lbs. (of 16 ounces). The task is 
rendered difficult as in some invoices the quantities 
of raw silk are given in great lbs. while in others 
simply in lbs. Sometimes, as for the years 1699/1700 to 
1705/6, the quantity of raw silk and floretta yarn is 
occasionally noted in lbs. simply, though a thorough 
checking indicates that they are actually weights in 
great lbs.
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to the first boom in the English export of raw silk seems to
have begun in 1678/79 when the Company exported 837 bales
141containing about 125>550 lbs* This boom in the export of raw 
silk continued till 1685/86 when it suddenly slumped down to 
56,452 lbs* The following quinquennial table will give an 
idea of the fluctuations in Hie annual export of raw silk from 
Bengal during 1681/82 to 1719/20*
Years T o ta l Q u a n tity Average
1 6 8 1 /8 2 -1 6 8 5 /8 6 701,511 lb s . 140 ,502  lb s
16 95 /96 -1 6 99 /17 0 0 391,047 M 7 8 ,2 0 9  "
1700/ 01- 1705/6 476,285  " 95,256  "
1 7 1 0 /H - I7 1 4 /1 5 259,292  " 51 ,8 5 8  "
1 7 15 /1 6 -1 7 1 9 /2 0 655 ,225  " 127,045 ”
L arg es t S m allest
Q u a n tity  in  Q u an tity  in  
one y e a r one y e a r
176 ,994  lb s .  56,452  lb s .  
in  1684 /85  in  1685 /86  
118,515 lb s .  6,596  lb s .  
in  1698/99 in  1697/98 
206,256  lb s .  16 ,785  lb s .  
in  1700 /01  in  1 7 0 5 /6 .
62 ,701  lb s .  20 ,529  lb s .  
in  1712 /15  in  1711 /12  
181,949 lb s .  61 ,618  lb s .
in  1717 /18  in  1 7 1 9 /2 0 .
It is evident from the above table that the peak period in the
annual export of raw silk was 1681/82 to 1685/86, and the
quinquennial totals as well as the average annual export during
these years had never been surpassed in the rest of the period
under review* There was a second boom from 1698/99 onward, and
the highest figure of annual export, 206,256 lbs*, was reached
in 1700/01* There was again a slump in the average annual 
export_in_ the_ quinguenni al
141* B.M. Addl. Mss. 34,125, f*30a., The quantity in a bale 
varied widely throughout the period, and as such it is 
difficult to find out the precise quantity in this case* 
Generally up to 1682; the bales contained 2 to 2ir mds. each 
md. of 75 lbs*
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period 1710/11 to 1714/15, and the highest quantity of
annual export during this period was only 62,701 lbs.
in 1711/12. But in the last quinquennial period, there
was a sharp rise in the average annual export and the
highest figure of annual export was 181,949 lbs. in
1717/18 which even surpassed the highest quantity of
142
annual export in the ’eighties of the 17th century.
The Dutch export of Bengal silk to Holland
143far surpassed that of the English. During the three
years 1701/2, 1702/3 and 1704/5 the Dutch exported a
total of 634,814 lbs. (Dutch) ie. an average of 211,605
lbs. (Dutch) annually. The following table will indicate
the fluctuations in Dutch exports in the first two decades
of the 18th century and will also show the magnitude of
the Dutch trade in Bengal silk.
1705/6 - 1710/11 1711/12 - 1715/16
(Excluding 1709/10)
1 11
Total Quantity —: 607,610 lbs.(Dutch) 827,871 lbs.(Dutch) 
Average 121,522 lbs.(Dutch) 165,574 lbs.(Dutch)
In the two years 1716/17, and 1718/19 the Dutch exported
357,650 lbs. (Dutch) to Holland ije. an average of 178,825
lbs. per annum. Considering the fact that the Dutch exported
quite a substantial quantity of silk to Japan, it can rightly
142. For annual export of Bengal silk by English Company, 
see, Table IV in Appendix A.
143. For annual Dutch export, see, K.A. Volumes cited earlier.
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be asserted that the Dutch had a far greater share of
the trade in Bengal silk than their rival Company.
It is interesting to see how the total value 
export
of annual raw silk/compared with that of the total export
144by the Company from Bengal. In 1663/64 the total value 
of silk exported by the Company only formed -4$ of the total 
value of export. It varied between 7 to 13$ till the close 
of the ’seventies. From 1678/73 it began to take an 
impressive share of the total value of export as a whole.
In that year it comprised 34$ of the total value of export, 
eventually rising to 45$ in 1682/83. Then onward, however, 
it showed violent fluctuations and never reached the level 
achieved in the ’eighties. In 1704/5 the total value of 
raw silk comprised 31$ of the total value of exports - the 
highest percentage in the first two decades of the 18th 
century while in 1697/98 it was only 2$ of the value of the 
total exports.^5
Textiles
Turning our attention to an examination of the 
single manufactured article on the Company’s export list, 
namely textiles from Bengal, we find that in the overall
144. See Table 111 in Appendix. A.
145. Ibid.
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picture of the Company’s export trade, textiles were 
most important both in value and volume. It is a eommon 
knowledge that the European Companies began to display an 
interest in the Indian textile trade in the early seventeenth 
century for the purpose of bartering cotton piece - goods 
in the Indonesian Archipelago for pepper and spices. And 
the direct trade in textiles between Europe and India 
developed as an essential by - product of this ’earlier 
and more urgent necessity’. The most striking feature of 
the English East India Company’s textile trade from Bengal 
was a boom in export which began in the early 1680’s under 
the stimulous of a rapid expansion in demand for calicoes 
in the European markets, and it continued, with the exception 
of a brief interruption following the Bengal war, vigorously 
into the following decades.
The multiplicity of the types of textiles exported 
from Bengal renders their identification and proper division 
into different categories an exceedingly difficult task.
One finds at least 75* if not more, different names of piece- 
goods in the contemporary records. It is not easy to identify 
some of them such as Umbers, Mahmudiaties, Atchabannies, 
Abrowahs, Bulchols, Coopes, Doodamies etc. However, this 
limitation /'notwithstanding, the piece - goods exported by 
the Company can be divided into three main types - first, 
silk piece - goods, secondly, mixed piece - goods ije. piece-
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goods of mixed silk and cotton, and thirdly, cotton
piece - goods, plain or painted. In addition there
was another category of miscellaneous goods consisting
of quilts, tablecloths, plushes, velvets etc. Sometimes,
however, some of the piece - goods such as romalls and
lungees could be of pure silk or cotton or, even of mixed
cotton and silk.
Bengal silk piece - goods were known to the 
term
English by they’taffatie’ or ’taffeta* and the Butch temed
' 146
it farmosijnen’* The word ’taffeta’ was current in
mediaeval Europe in a rather vague sense to imply fine
cloth, usually of a silky and glossy quality. When the
Europeans introduced the term into India, it became mixed
up with Persian ’tafta’, ’a glossy twist’, already in use
as a term for silk, host of the Bengal taffetas were
produced mainly in the areas; round Kasimbazar. Some of
the different types of taffaties were known by such names
as Restaes (striped taffaties) or gold pumbers (a sort of
taffaties of deep gold colours, and made of thicker silk
147than ordinary)* Among other silk piece - goods exported 
by the English Company were Sarcenetts, Jamwars, and silk 
lungees produced mainly in Kasimbazar area, silk romalls 
and neck cloths, Atlasses woven mostly in Hugly and Balasore
146. Meen Indische sijden stof; taf".
147. D.B., Vol.89, ff. 266; Vol. 93, ff. 32-36.
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area. Silk romalls were also procured in Dacca. Taffaties, 
though the most important single item in the list of the 
Company’s export from Bengal in the second half of the 17th 
century, lost its predominance in the first two decades of 
the 18th century. It seems thatthroughout the period under 
review, mixed fabrics and cotton goods comprised the largest 
bulk export. The mixed piece - goods exported by the Company 
were mainly *Allabanees*, ’Cuttanees*, 1Carridaries’ (or 
’Choradarries’),’Chucklaes’,’Cherconnaes’,’Cushtaes’,’Doreas’,
’Elatches’,’Ginghams’, ’Jamdanees’, ’Nehallewars’,’Nillaes’ ,
148
’Peniascoes*, ’Sooses’,’Seersuckers’,’Mandilla’ etc. Of 
these, ginghams and nillaes, woven in the neighbourhood of 
Hugli and Balasore, enjoyed a predominance in the Company’s 
export list during the second half of the 17th century while 
’Doreas’, woven in Hugli and Malda region, outshadowed other 
mixed piece - goods in the first two decades of the 18th 
century.
But it was cotton piece - goods which numerically 
far surpassed other piece - goods whether of silk or mixed 
varieties in the Company’s export list. Of the calicoes again, 
plain cotton or plain muslin goods comprised the bulk of the 
Company’s export. The cotton painting generally known as 
chintz goods began to be exported only in the last decade
148. For description of different piece - goods, see, Appendix 
B and for Geographical distribution of cargoes from
Bengal, see, list of order in Appendix C.
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of the 17th century when the European demand for Indian 
Chintz of all kinds was at its peak.^9 Tlie ’Chintz’ 
came mainly from Patna and were of a cheaper and ccmperatively 
inferior grade than those from Coromandel and Gujarat♦Patna 
also provided such cotton piece - goods as ’Emerties’ and 
’Luckowries’. Among other cotton piece - goods exported 
by the Company were ’Chillaes’ , ’Baftas’ , ’Dungarees’ (the 
hutch Dongerijs) ’Dimities1,’Photaes’,’Orungshies’/Chandanees’ 
’Puttas’ or birds’eye etc. But it was the more well known 
muslins that enjoyed a supremacy in the Company’s export 
list. The Company, however, did not export much of the 
very finest and the most expensive Bengal muslins, famous 
from the Roman times, perhaps partly because the limited 
supply was monopolised by local merchants for exclusive 
sale to the nobility and partly perhaps because of the
149# Irwin’s contention (John Irwin & P.R. Sehwartz, Studies 
in Indo. European Textile History, p.45) that ’Chints 
goods were of insignificant importance in Bengal trade’• 
does not seem to be quite tenable in the light of the 
fact that in the second decade of the 18th century the 
English Company exported quite large number of chints, 
only surpassed numerically by such cotton piece - goods 
as Baftas, Cossaes, Emerties, Gurrahs, hulmuls, Romalls, 
and Tanjeebs only. In 1711/12 the Company exported 
21,597 pcs. of chints at the invoice price of Rs 85*050. 
The Dutch Company ordered during the first two decades 
of the 18th century roughly about 10,000 pcs. yearly on 
an average. It might be true, however, that Bengal 
chints could never compete in importance with those of 
Western India and the Coromandel.
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unsuitability of this material for the climate in 
Europe*. The muslins exported by the Company comprised 
such different varieties as tAllaballeest, fAddatiesrr 
tC|pwtars,, ’Cossaaes’, • Serhaudconnaes* , ’Orurrahs* , •Humhums’ 
’Mahmudbannies’, ’Mulmuls*, ’Nainsook’, ’Sannoes’* rTanjeebs ’ 
’Terrendums’, ’Seerbands’, ’Rehings’, etc* Most of these 
muslins were woven in areas around Dacca and Malda, though 
some like mulmuls, mahmudbannies were also produced in the 
nieghbouring regions of Hugli, and sannoes around Balasore* 
The embroidered piece - goods were mostly worked on the 
finer ground of muslins like mulmuls, tanjeebs, cossaes 
or humhums* The quality of the different types of muslin 
woven in different areas varied widely as did their prices*
As such we refrain from an attempt at classification of 
the various sorts of muslins according to their fineness 
and based on the criterion of maximum prices paid* Such
an attempt is fraught with the danger of producing 
misleading results
150. Irwin classified the muslins * according to the 
maximum prices paid1 in the f following order of 
fineness: ’tanjeebs*, ’mulmuls*, ’nainsooks*,
* terrendums*, f aliballies*,f seerhaudconnaes*, etc. 
(op.cit., pp. 49 - 50># But this classification 
seems to be completely erroneous if we look at the 
contracts made by the Company with Calcutta merchants 
in the first two decades of the 18th century (cf. 
Bengal Public Consultations Range 1 Yols. 1 - 4)* 
Seerhaudconnaes which finds sixth place in Irwins 
classification was actually the most expensive, 
and hence deserves the first, place, if as Irwin 
claims, maximum prices paid is to be the criterion 
of fineness of cloth. Both in 1710 and 1711 the 
Company paid Rs.26 per piece of Serhaudconnaes 
(42 co. x 2 co.) while for tanjeebs (Santose,
42 co. x 2i co.) the maximum price paid during 
these years was only Rs.7^ per piece (B.P.C.Range 
1, Vol. 2. ff. 11-17, 81a - 85a}# The price of 
ordinary tanjeebs whether from Dacca or Santose 
(sizes varying between 40 co. x 2 co. and 40 co. 
x 2i co.) throughout the second decade of the 18th 
century ranged between Rs.6.14 ans. and Rs.8.8 ans. 
while the maximum price paid for flowered tanjeebs 
woven with silk was only Rs.20 per piece (40 co. x 
2 co.) Even for the mulmuls the Company had to pay 
more than it did for tanjeebs. The maximum price 
for mulmuls sevagepore (40 co. x 2t co.) was Rs.8.12 
ans. and Rs.16. for mulmuls Dacca (.40 co. x 2 co.) 
and mulmuls Santapore (40 co. x 2i co.) And for . 
flowered mulmuls woven with silk the Company paid 
Rs.22 per piece (40 co. x 2 co.). So it is clear 
that mulmuls were more expensive than tanjeebs and 
as such should precede tanjeebs in order of fineness. 
Again in Irwin*s classification even nainsooks, 
terrindams were preceded by serhaudconnaes while 
actually they should come only after the latter if 
maximum price paid is the criterion of fineness.
While a piece of serhaudconnaes (42 co. x 2 co.) 
cost Rs#26 in 1710, a piece of *tansook* or’ ’Nainsook* 
(42 co. x 2i co.) and *terrindam* (40 x 2\ co.) did 
only Rs.18 and Rs.l2:8 ans. respectively.
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An analysis of the Company’s orders for Bengal
piece - goods reveals that in the early years the demand
for silk and cotton piece - goods was insignificant in
the overall structure of the Company’s export trade from
Bengal. In February 1651 the factors in Bengal were asked
to invest only /^6 of their small capital in cloth, mainly
151sannoes and atlasses. An indication of the first hoom
in the demand for Bengal textiles is to be found in the 
order sent out in 1675/76 for 93,ODD pcs. while in 1669/70 
the order was only for 26,850 pcs. In other words, within 
the span of six years, the order for textiles had increased 
by four times. But it was from about the beginning of the 
’eighties that there was a phenomenal rise in the demand of 
textiles from Bengal. In the year 1680/81 the Company 
ordered for 206,400 pcs. which went up to 229,200 pcs. next 
year and eventually rising to 662,800 pcs. in 1682/85 and
682,500 pcs. in 1685/84• This however, was followed by a 
slump in the demand. But from about the middle of the 
’nineties there was again a sharp rise. In 1695/96 the 
Company ordered 417*500 pcs. and upto 1716/17 the order 
ranged between 250,000 to 500P00 pcs. Again a boom began 
in 1717/13 when 415,000 pcs. were ordered, and which rose 
to 480,000 pcs. in 1719/20. The Dutch order, too, was
151. O.C., 19 Feb. 1651, no. 2208, Vol. 22; E.F.I. 1651-54 p.45
O.C., 25 Feb.1651, no. 2210, Vol.22; E.F.I. 1651 - 54 p.47
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considerable and seems to have ranged between 250,000
to 300,000 pcs. per year in the first two decades of
the 18th century.
An obvious question that arises is - what
were the precise underlying factors for the phenomenal
growth of textile exports from Bengal at the beginning
of the ’eighties of the 17th century? The plausible
answer is that it was partly due to the greater competitive
power of the Indian piece - goods in prices in comparison
with the traditional fabrics manufactured in Europe, and
partly due to a revolutionary change in the consumer taste
in the Continent and England. A contributory factor , was,
however, the act of 1678 forbidding the importation of
French silks and cloths together v/ith French wine, salt 
152and paper'.*• Though, Bengal silks and piece - goods 
did not compare favourably in quality with French and 
Italian fabrics, the former had the advantage of being 
very much cheaper and hence available to a larger section 
of the people. However, there was a deliberate attempt 
on the part of the Company to make Bengal piece - goods, 
specially taffetas look like Italian silks or fabrics.
As early as 1659 the Directors wrote to the Bengal factors
Vol73.
152. Lipson. op. cit.,/p. 104.
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that taffetas would he gummed in England which fwould
153then be as glossy as Italian silks1* Again in 1665
they asked the factors to * cause all taffaties to he
154made as near to the Italian fabric as you can1 • So
far as the change in consumer taste was concerned, the
rIndian crazef set in about the 1680*3, and the last
decade of the 17th century was characterised by this 
155craze* It is unnecessary to describe this trend in 
156
fashion here. but we only point it out as an active 
economic factor. The nature and extent of this fashion 
is revealed by J. Cary's pamphlet of 1695 - "It was scarce 
thought about twenty Years since that we should ever 3ee 
Calicoes, the Ornaments of our greatest Gallants (for 
such they are, whether we call them Muslins, shades or 
anything else) when they were then rarely used, save in 
Shrouds for the Dead, and chiefly among the Poor who 
could not go to the Price of finer Linnen, and yet, were 
unwilling to imitate the Rich* but now few think them­
selves well dresst till they are made up in Calicoes, 
both Men and Women, Calico Shirts, Neckcloths, Cuffs, 
Pocket — Handkerchiefs for the former, Headdresses,
153. D.B., 28 Jan. 1659, Vol. 85. f. 199; E.F.I. 1655-60r 
pp. 275 - 76.
154. D.B., 2 Jan. 1663, Vol. 86. f. 202.
155. K. Glamann. op.cit., p. 142.
156. For description of fashion, see, Slomann,, Bizarre 
Designs in Silks.
338
Nightroyla, Hoods, Sleeves, Aprons, Gowns, Petticoats 
and what not; for the latter, besides India — Stockings
157
for both Sexes'1. No less revealing than this was the
speech by Pollexfen before the Board of Trade in 1696
describing the state of IiLdian ■ commodities in 1681
As ill weeds grow apace,, so these manufactured goods
from India met with such a kind reception that from
the greatest gallants to the meanest Cook Maids, nothing
was thought so fit to adorn their Persons as the Eabrick 
158
from India'.1 The European Companies were well aware
of this great change in consumer taste, and there began
a race for procuring novelties. "Note this for a constant
and general Rule", wrote the Directors of the English
Company in 1681" that in all flowered Silks you change
the fashion and flower every year as much as you can,
for English Ladies, and they say the French and other
Europeans will give twice as much for a new thing nob
seen in Europe before though worse, than they will give
for a better silk of the same fashion worn the former 
15Qyear". J In July 1682 the Directors perhaps made the
most pointed remark about the change in fashion .....
"nothing pleases so much as "variety everyone desiring
157. J. Cary. A Discourse Concerning the Bast India Trade,p.4.
158. India office Tracts. Vol. 85, Tract no. 7. p. 50.
159. D.B., 20 May 1681, Vol. 89, f. 552.
339
160
something that their neighbours have not like it".
The English Company not only traded in silk,
mixed and cotton piece - goods from 1680’s but also in
such miscellaneous commodities as Plushes, Velvets,
Satins, Quilts etc. In April 1681 the Directors wrote
to Hugli Agency "Set your weavers’inventions on work to
make Plushes, Velvets, and Satins as fine, rich and as
strong as the best usually worn and of the same breadths;
this is nothing so difficult but may be effected where
the material silk and midwife labour are so cheap as
with you".^^ In December that year the factors were
asked to send Flanders and French Diaper - commonly used
in England - which ’may be made and brought from India
upon much easier term than from any place of the world
and that would be a national advantage, also as a profit
to us and an increase of the English navigation if we-
could introduce into common use the Indian Diapers for
Napkins and Tablecloths’ Next year the Company asked
the Bengal factors to send 500 silk quilts yearly as ’the
use of Rugs and Blankets grows out of request’ ’by reason
16*5of moths and the increase of the riches of our nation’•
160. D.B., 5 July, 1682, Vol.90, f. 7.
161. D.B., 22 April, 1681, Vol.89, f. 551.
162. D.B., 50 Dec. 1681, Vol.89, f. 457.
165. D.B., 5 July, 1682, Vol.90, f. 7.
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In the same letter the Directors asked the factors ’for
the setting" -afoot of a linen manufacture in the Bay
for sailcloth and such kind of cloth as Lockerams, Dowlas,
Holland and other foreign kinds which this nation is
yearly supplied with from France, Germany, Flanders and
Holland to the great diminution of our wealth and the
increase of theirs, without any kind of benefit to the
164
English navigation’• All these only indicate that
the Company was eager to expand its trade in as many
varieties of textiles as possible from Bengal.
As we noted earlier, silk piece - goods, mainly
taffetas, held an undisputed supremacy in the Company’s
export list from Bengal throughout the second half of
the 17th century. In 1684 the Court of Directors wrote
to the Agent and Council in Iiugli - "Plain taffeti.es of
all sorts are certainly the most staple commodity India
affords and it is impossible for you ever to send us too
165many of them". They wrote in the same vein four years
later - "Your taffeties are a poble commodity of which you
166
can never send enough being- well made and well bought".
It was only from the begining of the 18th century that
I64. Ibid.
165 D.B., 50 Oct., 1684, Vol.90, f. 382.
166. D.B., 27 Aug. 1688, Vol.91, f. 575.
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silk piece - goods as well as mixed ones lost their
predominance in the Company’s export, following the
167Act of 1700 prohibiting such goods in England* The
national concern, however, over the large importation
of silks and piece - goods and its impact on English
domestic industries was gainargground from about the
beginning of the 1680fs. We shall not enter into the
details of the increasing opposition against importation
of silks and manufactured goods or the impact of such
importations on English silk and weaving industry which
168had already been discussed by Shaffat Ahmed Khan* Y/e 
just note a few things only to indicate the nature and 
extent of the opposition against importation of Indian 
manufactured silks and how the Company answered these.
167. The Act of 1700 laid down that ”from Sept* 29, 1701
all manufactured silks, Bengals and stuffs mixed with 
silk or herb'a^ ., of the manufacture of Persia, China 
or East Indies and all calicoes painted, dyed,printed 
or stained there which are or shall be imported into 
this Kingdom of England, dominion of Wales and Town 
of Berwick on Tweed, shall not be worn or'., otherwise 
used within this Kingdom and also of £200 penalty on 
the persons having or selling any of them”, cf* D.B.,
' Vol. 93, f. 271.
168* S.A. Khan, Bast India Trade in the Seventeenth Century*
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As early as 1677 Col, Birch thus emphasised his concern
over the rapid increase in Indian imports - ,fOne commodity
more ruins us and that, is Calico which destroys more the
169
use of YYool than all things besides" • Similarly in
1680 a pamphleteer tried to pinpoint the grave danger to
the English silk industry resulting from the phenomenal
rise in the import of Indian textiles - "The result is that
masters break; Journeymen runaway, having no Trade,, Some
fly to the Mint and Privileged places. Some to Holland;
some to Ireland, Some starve to death at home with their
Y/ives and Children, Multitudes turned upon the parishes,
170Houses empty. Prisons full". The Company, however,
tried to justify the importation of wrought silks by
pointing out that a great part of these were again reshipped
out to France, Holland and other foreign countries. Wrought
silks, the Company argued, were moreover the * strongest
cheapest and the most durable thaf come from any part of
the world*1, Nor did their wearing hinder, as it, was argued,
the silk manufacture in England; fthey do only hinder the
importation of the like quantity from France and Italy*.
Still the Company was forced to confess that ’wrought silks,
169* Quoted in S.A. Khan, op.cit., p. 163*
170, Quoted in 3.A., Khan, op.cit., p. 159*
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flowered or striped, do a little impede the growth of
171
silk manufactures in England* ♦
The Company justified the importation of calicoes
on the ground that it *is a most useful and necessary
commodity and serves instead of the like quantities of
French, Dutch and Flanders Linens*. It argued that the
nation thus saved not only Ttwo to three 100 thousand
pounds in its expense? hut also as it hinders so far the
enriching those Neighbour — Nations, from whose greatness
172this Kingdom might fear most prejudice*. However, the 
result of the Act of 1700 prohibiting the importation into 
England * of wrought silks, Eangals and Stuffs Mixed with 
silk or herba’ was an increase in the importation of white 
calicoes and muslins which were then printed in England.
The Act no doubt caused concern among Eengal factors who 
wrote in 1702 - "All white goods are so very cheap in 
England and goods worked with silk and cotton being forbid 
to be worn, sells for loss so that we know not what to order
173
about Cloth Investments until we received our Mastel's advices".
171* Childe, The East India Trade is the most National of
all Foreign Trades, 1681, India office Library Tracts,
Vol.85, Tract no. 1, pp. 18-19i Reply to the Allegations 
of the Turkey Co., quoted in S.A. Ehan, op.cit, pp.153-59 
172. Papillon, The East India Trade a most Profitable Trade
to the Kingdom, p.10. __
173* Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol.8. pt. 11, f. 149
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But the Act does not seem to have vitally affected the
export of textiles from Bengal, except for a few years
immediately following its enactment. Therefore in 1720
another Act was passed prohibiting the use or wear of
printed calicoes in England* But as these articles were
allowed to come to England on condition of their being
re-exported, the export of cotton and silk piece - goods
174
continued to increase steadily even after 1720.
On the supply side, the competition was again a
triangular one ammongst the English, Butch and indigenous
merchants. The main centres of supply of Bengal textiles
175were Kasimbazar, Bacca, Falda, Hugli, Balasore and Patna, 
where indigenous traders were already driving an extensive 
trade in piece — goods long before the advent of the European
174# S. Bhattacharya, op. cit., pp. 158-59.
175.
Geographical analysis of piece - goods in the Company1s
orders for Bengal.
Orders sent out Orders sent out Orders sent out 
Nov. 1681 Aug. 1682 Bee. 1685
208,000 pcs +
Areas-
Kasimbazar 84,100 pcs
Hugli
Balasore
Bacca
Malda
25.500 "
72.500 "
21.500 ” 
27,800 ”
229,200 pcs 
(Compiled from B.B., Vol. 89 and 90)
222,600 pcs -h
20 Bales 20 Bales
110,200 pcs 158,500 pcs
162,000 pcs + 158,000 pcs +
16 Bales 16 Bales
81.500 pcs + 71,500 pcs +
12 Bales 12 Bales
86.500 pcs + 86,500 pcs +
______ 20 Bales  20 Bales
662,800 pcs + 682,500 pcs *
68 Bales 68 Bales
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Companies, Even in Ivlalda - as Richard Edwards reported
in lb7b, a few years before the establishment of the
English factory there - the chief trade was driven by
the fFactors of Agra, Gujarat and Banaras Merchants who
176
yearly send them fifteen to twenty five Batelas whose
[lading consists of cossaes, mulmuls ♦♦♦ and mundeels
and elatches of all sorts, valued at about one Lack each
Patela and about the half of that amount by landing said
goods and raw silk*. Besides, about three Lacks of Rupees
yearly went to Bacca in elatches and coarse cloth and about
the same value to petty merchants of Rajmahal and Rurshidabad
177and other places below* 11 It was cpuite natural that 
indigenous merchants, besides the Butch,should have offered 
keen competition to the English in all the centres of supply.
It is difficult, to ascertain the impact of this triangular 
competition on the market prices of textiles. However,from 
incidental references it can be said in general that the 
presence of too many buyers enhanced the prices, It was 
reported in 1676 that the Butch who were in 1'alda before 
the English were able to buy muslins at a much cheaper rate 
than when English demand afterwards had increased the 
competition. Thus pieces meastiring 10 yds. by 1^ yd. cost;
176* A large flat bottomed boat.
177* Maker's Biary, op* cit., Yol. 1, pp. 599-400; Fact.Records, 
Misc, Yol.XIV, ff. 554 - 56.
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at first Rs. 6 to 10 per piece against Rs. 9 to 15 in
Paster’s time (about 1676) That means the rise in
178
price was about 50 per cent. But sumetimes congregation 
of too many weavers in one place resulted in lowering of 
the prices of their products, the heavy demand notwith­
standing. Mathias Vincent reported in 1676 that the 
English factory set up at Kasimbazar induced a large 
number of weavers to congregate there which resulted in 
the lowering of prices of taffaties. A piece of taffatie, 
as Vincent stated, which used to cost Rs. 15 about 12 or
13 years ago, was then ’made and sent home’ at about 6 or
. 179
7 rupees i,e. the price fell by well over 50c/b. The
English factors, however, often complained of dearer prices
of textiles resulting from competition by other merchants.
We have seen earlier how the English Company was apprehensive
180
that their weavers would be lured away by the Dutch. In
1684 the Dacca factors reported that Mathuradas, Raghunath
and Ramnarain - all Company’s merchants - sent many ^ ents
to Dacca and the neighbourhood and that they feared the
weavers would raise the price of goods ’to see so many 
181
buyers'. The rivalry and competition between the Old.
and New Company also led to a sharp rise in the prices of
178. Master’s Diary, op.cit. , Vol. 1, pp.139,399; Pact.Records,
Misc. Vol. XIV, ff. 335-6 __
179* Master’s Diary op.cit., Vol.l, p. 139; Vol.11, p.11; 
Fact. Records, Misc., Vol.XIV, ff. 327-8
180. Supra Chapter V_
181. Pact. Records, Hugli, Vol.10, f. 207*
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textiles in the early years of the 18th century. The 
factors of the hew Company reported in*1700 that ’goods 
became exceeding dear at the aurungs even beyond what 
usual for tho* they did use to be dear at- the ports in 
time of shipping yet now many goods were dear or dearer
182
at the marts for investments, the demand was so great*. 
There is little doubt, that the Indian merchant-middlemen 
found the trade in piece - goods quite profitable and 
were sure of a market for what they could provide, and 
that was the reason why at the end of our period even
the shroffs ’fell into the dealing so largely in piece-
* » 185 goods*•
As indicated earlier, it is not possible to 
build up a coherent history of the price movements of 
textiles and their fluctuations, if any, throughout, the 
period under review. Textiles were manufactured in Bengal 
at this time at the level of cottgje industry and the 
technique of weaving varied from one place to another.
The Company’s exports were composed of a wide range of 
varieties which differed from one another in size, quality, 
texture and colours. This multiplicity of types was 
naturally reflected in an equally wide range of prices.
182. O.C., no. 7211, Vol. 58.
183. D.B., 3 Feb. 1720, Vol. 100, f.222.
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Consequently it is not very easy to estimate what effect
the movement of prices had on the purchases by the Company
could
since the same type of clotlydisplay a wide variation in
price even in one particular year depending on size,quality
184and the place of production# However, it seems from the
contracts between the Company and Calcutta merchants in the
second decade of the 18th century that the price of different:.
calicoes (the size and the place of production being constant)
185
did not show much fluctuation* Of course it is certain 
that the Company derived quite a good profit from the textile 
trade and was not concerned much even if the purchase
prices went up. As early as 1670 the Directors wrote to 
Bengal — "We find the Calicoes in your parts to be dearer 
than in other places, yet we are unwilling wholly to leave
•j o n
of the trade thereof in the Bay" •
Turning to the actual exports, we find that the .
textiles exported by the Company upto the ’seventies were
significant neither quantitatively nor financially. In
the two years 1665/64 and 1664/65, the Company exported
only about-24*000 pieces on an average at the invoice price
of £14,681. The quantity was reduced to 8085 pcs. costing
£5,549 in 1668/69, rising eventually to 20,556 pcs. next.
184. See Appendix D.
185* Ibid
186. The Company realised a profit of about 450c/ from the 
sale of the piece-goods brought by the ship Tavistock 
in 1704/5, see. Appendix E.
187. D.B., 29 Nov. 1670, Yol. 87, f. 404.
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year and valued at £10,253• A remarkable increase in 
the export of piece — goods is to be found in the export 
list of 1670/71 when 37,739 pcs* were despatched to 
England at the cost price of £23,577. The next year 
both the quantity and value were almost doubled,; the 
number of piece - goods exported being 75»975 costing 
£41,739*. It seems that from then onward, the quantities 
and total values of textiles exported by the Company 
remained almost steady till the beginning of the reighties* 
In the two years 1675/76 and 1676/77, 81779 pcs. were 
annually exported on an average at the value of £40,698*
In 1678/79 the Company exported 75>408 pcs* valued at 
£50,363* But the tremendous growth in the total quantity 
of piece - goods as well as their value began in the 
reighties of the 17th century which continued, though 
with interruption caused by various factors discussed 
earlier, throughout the period under review* The following 
table will illustrate the continuous growth of textile trade 
from Bengal*
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Quinquennial Tables of Textile Export from Bengal
Total no of Average no Average
Years pcs. Total Value of pcs. total value
1681/82 - 1685/86 1040,491* £561,988 208,098 £112,597
1694/95 - 1698/99 - £355,055 - £ 66,607
1699/1700-1704/05 - £569,435 - £115,887
(Excluding 1703/04)
1705/6 - 1709/10 - £450,043 - £ 90,005
1710/11 - 1714/15 1246,907 £914,446 249,381 £182,889
1715/16 - 1719/20 1538,972 £970,759 307,794 £194,152
* Excluding the no. of pcs. exported by Persian Merchant in
1685/86 which is not mentioned in the invoice. In this
year two ships were despatched to England. The other 
ship, Eagle, carried 203,37,2 pcs. of piece - goods.
It is clear from the above table that the general tendency 
in textile export, despite the two periods of slump during 
1694/95 to 1698/99 and 1705/6 to 1709/10, was one of steady 
growth both in total quantity and value. We do not know 
the total value of the Dutch export of textiles from Bengal 
during this period. But from the number of pieces exported 
by the two Companies, it is apparent that from about the 
beginning of the second decade of the 18th century, the 
English surpassed the Dutch at least in textile trade from 
Bengal. The Dutch during this decade exported on an average
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about 203,853 pcs* annually while the English export stood
188
at 278,588 pcs.
Finally it is interesting to see what percentage 
did the total value of annual textile export constitute to 
the total value of the English Company's annual export from 
Bengal. With the exception of a few years (eg. in 1668/69 
and 1704/5 when the percentage slided down to 38*5), the 
total value of annual textile export formed roughly about.
189TO to 90 p.c. of the total value of the Company rs exports.
So it can rightly be asserted that throughout the second 
half of the 17th century and the first two decades of the 
18th century, textiles constituted the most important article 
in the structure of the English Company's export trade from 
Bengal.
.
188* Speaking generally of the textile trade about the close
of the 17th Century, K.Glamann (Butch Asiatic trade,p.!44) 
observes- "The Butch Company still maintained its leading 
position but; it, was a near thing.The competition was 
severe".
189# See. Table Id in Appendix A.
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Chapter VXL 
The Company in Bengal* a Commerce
(i) Imports to Bengal
An expansion in the Company's export, trade
from Bengal - as is evident from the discussion in the
previous chapter - meant a corresponding increase in
its imports to Bengal* Indeed, if in the economy of
Bengal during this period the one outstanding feature
was a tremendous growth of the export trade and
consequently of production, a sharp rise in the imports
was one of the results of that development* The
significant point, is that the expansion in the export:
trade primarily meant an increasing flow of bullion and
specie as the commodity market for imports was strictly
limited and does not seem to have undergone any substantial
expansion during the period* For both the English and
Butch Companies, the main object in the import trade
to Bengal was to increase the supply of capital required
for European investment* As such the imports were
significant chiefly as providing the necessary working
1
capital* We have noted earlier how the export of large 
quantities of precious metals gave rise to a tremendous
1. Supra, Chapter V
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clamour against it in England, and how at last, the 
Company was obliged by the Act of 1702 to send one 
tenth of its total exports in the product and 
manufacture of England* The Dutch, though not free 
from merchaniaList inhibitions,, were not bound by any 
such restrictions on their import trade to the East*
It should, however, be noted that the Dutch trade in 
Bengal was financed to quite a substantial extent by 
profits realised in Inter - Asiatic trade, thus easing 
the problem of exporting treasure from Holland*
The imports of the English Company comprised 
four main categories - bullion and specie, woollens and 
broadcloth, merchandise, and, stores and miscellaneous 
commodities* Of these various imports, bullion and 
specie constituted the main bulk throughout the period. 
Until 1682 when Bengal was made an independent Presidency, 
all the ships with their cargoes from England were sent 
direct to Madras which distributed treasure and merchandise 
for investment in Bengal, though we do not always know in 
what proportions. However, it will be interesting to see 
the proportion in terms of the percentages of various 
import commodities to the total value of imports, sent 
to Coast and Bay before the reighties of the 17.th century* 
As an example we just note the imports for two years,
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1668/69 and 1677/76, when the value of total imports
for Coast and Bay was £151,634 and £226r735 respectively
2
and distributed in the following manner -
1668/69 1677/76
Bullion
Gold £104,812 or 69*4# ..... £148,826 or 65*7$
Silver £ 32,047 1 2 1 * l i.... £ 61,259 " 27*0$
£136,85$ " 90*5> ..... £210,085 " 92* 75b
Broadcloth.... £ 6,557 fr 4*2$.....£ 1,255 " *6%
Merchandise*.. £ 7,809 n 5*1^ ..... £ 14,320 ft 6*2$
Stores & Misc. £ 409 • 2 $.... £ 1,075 w *5%
£151,634 £226,735
It is clear from above that the value of precious metals
imported was more than 90 per cent of the total value of
imports. Of the treasure again, gold formed the main bulk
though its proportion in percentage of bullion was gradually
on the decline. As a matter ©f fact, the import of gold to
Bengal was much reduced in the reighties and afterwards it
was totally stopped. It will be appropriate at this stage
to look at the imports to Bengal and the proportion in
percentage of various commodities to the total value of
imports. In the following table we take into account three
years, namely 1682/83, 1699/1700, 1718/19 as typical examples
of the Company*s imports to Bengal with their breakdown ~
2. All the statistical data regarding Company* s imports 
are taken from various volumes of Accountant. General* s 
Dept., Range 11*
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1682/8.J 1699/1700 1718/19
Bullion-: £ £ £
Gold 3W,hi\l or 35.0Of3 nil nil
Silver 173.188 " 64.35S 168,903 or 94. l i 169,560 or 90.C$
267,505 "
Broadcloth 466 » •17% 4,665 If 2.% 11,310 « 6. 0g
Merchandise 786 " .2% 1,481 It 4,700 • 2.%
Stores & Misc. 543 " • 20f& 4,271 It 2.% 2,817 *
£269,300 £179,322 £187,387
As in the previous table the general preponderance 
of bullion had not diminished by the end of our period, 
though by then silver had entireJjr substituted gold.
Since the Company had to suffer losses, often ranging
3
between 20 to 30 per cent by the sale of imported gold, 
the factors repeatedly asked the Directors not to send any 
gold to Bengal. As a result, the Court of Directors 
resolved in 1686 to send only silver to Bengal and no 
gold, and from then onward gold was never again imported 
to Bengal by the Company. It was not only the English 
but also the Dutch Company incurred losses by importing 
gold to Bengal. In 1708/9, the Dutch account shows that the
5
Company lost f.17,737 in selling 50,000 gold ducats.
3* Supra, Chapter V.
if. D.B., Ik Jan. 1686, Vol. 91, f. W .
5. K.A., 1669, Bengal, pt. II, ff. 280-85.
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So it seems that even the market for bullion and 
specie was limited, the demand being confined^ mainly 
to silver.
The import of bullion by the European 
Companies underlines two related facts - the flexibility 
of demand for this commodity and the close link between
this market and the state policy with regard to coinage.
/
The effective demand for bullion was to a large extent
equivalent to the local demand for the purpose of minting
and the precious metal preferred for coining at, any given
time enjoyed a booming market. As the silver coins were
in general use in Bengal and as such Bengal mint was more
busy in coining silver than gold, the former enjoyed a
steady demand in the market while the latter suffered
from periodic depression, the use of gold being confined
to more or less non - commercial use. Moreover as Bengal's
revenue was sent to the central treasury in the form of
sicca rupees, the demand for silver continued throughout 
6
the period. Again it seems that most of the ruling
6. The revenue of Bengal, including Bihar and Orissa, in 
the second half of the 17th and early decades of the 18th 
century seems to have amounted roughly to about 268 lacks 
of rupees annually (taking 40 dams for a rupee), of which 
Bengal seems to have contributed 151 lacks, Bihar 102 
lacks, and Orissa 35 lacks. Eor 'Jama and Hasil' 
statistics for Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, see, Irfan Habib, 
The Agrarian System of Mughal India, pp.400 - 402; 
Moreland, op.cit., pp. 180-81. According to Salimullah 
(op.cit., pp. 63-64), Murshid Quli used to send 130 lacks 
of rupees annually to Delhi as revenue for Bengal.
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nobility in Bengal - who came on temporary assignments
for a few years and as such had little interest in anything
else other than amassing a fortune - transferred their
wealth mostly in silver currency which helped to make
7
the demand for silver stable in Bengal.
As the demand for silver in Bengal appears to
have been linked up with the state policy with regard to
coinage, it is worth digressing for a moment to have a
brief look at the currency system in Bengal during the 
8period. It seems that the currency system was one of 
free coinage»i.e. it was ©pen to everyone to take bullion 
to the mint- and get it converted into specie. The basic 
unit for cash transaction was the silver coin or rupee *
A. peculiarity of the currency system was that a coin lost 
its value simply on account of its age. The year in which 
it was minted was inscribed on ^it, along with the name ef
7. It was reported by the English factors in June 1673 
that Shaista Khan presented the King with 2 crores of 
rupees and was thus again confirmed in his governorship
of Bengal, vide. Pact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 4* pt*I, f.54* 
Again in Nov. 1679 he was reported to have regained his 
governorship by giving 3 crores of rupees to the Kingr 
vide, Home Misc., Vol. 803* f* 154* He was governor in 
Bengal for more than 20 years. When he died at Agra in 
Dec. 1693*. the English factors reported that he was worth 
45 million of pounds sterling, most of which, it could 
be assumed, he amassed during his viceroyalty in Bengal*
8. Por currency system in Mughal India, see, Irfan Habib, 
op.cit.. pp. 380-87* Hodivala, Historical Studies in 
Mughal Numismatics.
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the mint and the titles of the reigning emperor*. According
to their age, the silver coins were of three varieties ~
the newly coined rupees were known as sicca which bore a
premium over those struck in the preceding years of the
same reign which were known as peth. It was reported in
1686 that rthe siccas have always (while they continue such)
9
1-Jr to 3°b and more esteem and value than the peetr ♦ The
third variety was called somala^or Khazana which were
current from former reigns* The Court of Directors wrote
in 1686 that rthey are worn and abused and wont weigh (but
are or ought to be of the same fineness with the siccas)
and therefore they are always esteemed 6 or 7 p.c. or more
11
worse in payment than the rest* • The gold mohar was not
in general commercial use but mostly employed for hoarding
purposes, specially by the aristocracy* The main copper
coin was known as paisa or pice*
Turning to other commodities imported to Bengal by
the Company, we find they comprised woollen goods — broadcloth,
worsted and other lighter fabrics; metal — lead, copper, tin;
minerals - quicksilver, alum, brims tone; paints - white and
red lead, vermillion; and miscellaneous goods for presents
9. D.B., 14 Jan. 1686, Vol. 91, f. 49.
10* Ibid*
11. Ibid.
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such as looking glass, glasswares, pistols etc* Most
of those merchandise was provided, in fact, as part of
the price to he paid for the goods to be bought for the
12return cargo* But as we have noted earlier, the Companyfs
wares were seldom sold at a profit due to the limited market:
for these articles in Bengal* As broadcloth and other
woollens formed the staple of the English industry, the
Directors repeatedly asked Bengal factors to boost their
13sale by all possible means*. But it was not always in
the factors* power to take any radical measures to expand
the market for import commodities and hence they frequently
requested the Company to send only i of the imports in goods
and % in bullion*. As early as 1664 the Directors received
reports from Bengal that a great quantity of Europe goods
was lying unsold in Bengal which would *not sell in some
15
years and some never except to loss1* They did not, 
however, accede t© the request of the Bengal Agency in 
1674 £°r 'forbearing to send goods in order to keep the 
price1, because it was said, fthat will bring the Dutch and 
other nation to supply the markets, our principal design 
being the consumption of our cloth and other English
12* supra, Chapter V.
13. Ibid,
14. Pact. Records, Misc., V©1. 3* f.100; E.P.I., 1668-69* 
p.311; O.C. 3389, Vol. 30.
15. D.B., 21 Dec. 1664, Vol. 86, f. 458.
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16
manufactures r. On the contrary, they accused the
Bengal factors in 1675 of positive disregard for the
C©mpanyrs interest. They wrote that one ©f the reasons
for the Company's cloth lying unsold was that some
factors bought cloth which 'went out in private trade
and held it up at high rate leaving the Company's cloth
17
to lye by and that high rate discouraged the buyers'.
But in 1677 the Court of Directors resolved that they
would send but half the quantity of Europe goods because
of 'the great inconvenience in disposing of them either
18
in sale or barter'* It does not seem, however, that
the Company greatly reduced the quantity of English goods
and manufactures in the import list in subsequent years
and the factors, on their part, most frequently complained
of the lack of finance for investment as the import commodities
lay unsold* The problem was accentuated in 1702 when the
Company was obliged by the new Act to export 10 p*c. of
19
its investment in English manufactures and goods*
The market for non-precious metals, minerals or 
paints had not undergone any substantial expansion during 
this period* The demand for these, commodities already very 
limited, was adequately met in the past by the Portuguese
16* D.B., 17 Aug* 1674, Vol. 88, f* 150*
17. D.B., 24 Dec* 1675, Vol. 88, f* 252*
18. D.B., 7 Sept. 1677, Vol. 88, f. 449.
19* D.B., 26 Feb. 1705, Vol. 95, f. 49.
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and Asian merchants trading with various parts of Asia.
As a result, the arrival of the English and the Dutch 
with their fresh imports caused a slump in the market*
Of the various metals and minerals imported, lead, copper 
and tin were in some demand hut the large import of these 
commodities by the Dutch and the indigenous merchants from 
the East Indies made it difficult for the English Company 
to dispose of their wares* The price of the various metals 
fluctuated sharply according to the available supply in 
the market* The price of lead was Rs.9*4 per maund in 1677
but went down to Rs.7 per maund in the early ‘eighties and
20again jumped to Rs*9 per maund in February 1682. There
was a great slump in the price of lead in 1705 vshen it. was
21sold at Rs. 5*11 — 12 ans. Similarly copper was being
sold in Sept. 1680 at Rs* 30 per maund while the price rose
22to Rs .36*4 ans* in Jan. 1681. The same sort of violent
fluctuation was to be found in the price of tin. While
in Jan. 1678 it was sold at Rs.26*8 ans.per maund, the
23price fell to Rs.22 in April 1679* There was a similar
pattern, in the price movements of vermilion, quicksilver,
tutenague etc* These facts bring into bold relief that the
20* For prices of lead in early ‘eighties, see, Fact. Records, 
Balasore, Vol.l; Fact. Records, Kasimbazar, Vol. 1, Diary 
13 Aug. 1677; Vol. 2, Diary, 13 Feb* 1682.
21* O.C., 25 Jan. 17Q3f no. 8110, Vol. 65.
22. Fact. Records,Kasimbazar, Vol.2, Diary, 24 Sept. 1680. 
Fact. Records,Balasore, Vol. 1, Diary, 1 Jan. 6 Jan*1681.
23. Fact. Records, Kasimbazar, Vol.l, Diary,5 Jan*167&;
Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 2, pt. I, f. 37.
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market for import, commodities in Bengal throughout, the
period remained strictly limited and whenever there was
a large importation of a particular commodity, a consequent
slump in its price followed.
As Kasimbazar was the greatest mart for export.
commodities, so was it for imported goods, and the Company
sent the largest amount of treasure and goods to this factory
Upto the ‘eighties of the century, Balasore came next to
Kasimbazar in importance in the list for the distribution
of bullion and merchandise. It will be interesting to note
the distribution and proportion of treasure and goods sent,
to the different factories in Bengal. In 1682 a total stock
of £134,050 - of which £120,840 was in treasure and £13,210
in Europe - goods - was thus distributed among various 
24.factories -
Factories Amount, in Treasure Amount in goods
Kasimbazar......  £73,395,    £7,964
Patna   £ 7,601 ....  £ 824
Malda   £ 7,863 ....  £ 953
Balasore    £16,776   £1,820
Dacca   £ 8,652.. ....  £ 938
Hugli ........ £ 6,553 ........  £ 711
£120,840 £13,210
24* Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 3, pt. H, f.87* I have 
omitted all fractions.
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However, the most striking fact about Bengal’s 
import: trade during this period was the relative stagnation 
of the market for import commodities* Of course, the same 
can be said perhaps about India’s import trade in general 
but the stagnation seems more apparent in Bengal than in any 
other part of India* As a matter of factf Bengal consumed 
the least amount of merchandise in comparison to other regions 
in the Company’s trade complex. This is evident; from the 
’proposal for the number of ships’ tonnage and value to set 
ou*t* in 170Q which gives the distribution of tonnage and 
total value of outward cargoes as also their Value in silver 
and manufacture in the different parts of the East as noted 
below —^
Places Ships Tons Total Value in Value in
Vafua Silver Manufacture
Bombay,)
Surat, ) 5 2500 £250,000 £200,000 £50*000
Persia }
Port St*
Coast* ) 2} 700) £200>000 £170,000 £50,000
The Bay 5 1200 £200,000 £180,000 £20,000
China 1 500 £ 70,000 £ 50,000 £20,000
Eencoolen
& St .Helena 1 300 £ 8,000 £ 5,000 £ 3,000
It is clear from the above table that the percentage portion 
of merchandise sent to Bengal was the smallest compared to 
that for other regions*
25. Rawl^ D. 747, f. 256.
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So the fact remains that Bengal's increasing 
export trade failed to secure any significant increase 
in the inflow of consumer's goods or raw materials* As 
a result, the increase in import - as a natural corollary 
to the increasing export - was mainly equivalent, to the 
increase in the flow of bullion and specie which affected 
the producer and production only in so far as it enlarged 
the volume of money in circulation and that too only in a 
limited way* Because a significant proportion of the imported 
bullion, if not the bulk of it, went into luxury consumption 
or hoarding* The expanding export trade - despite the 
appropriation of the bulk of the surplus by the European 
Companies and Indian merchant ~ middlemen ~ almost certainly 
meant an extension of employment and an increase in real 
income for the producer* But such increase, however, was 
not enough for substantial expansion of the import market*
(ii) The Company and the 'Country Trade*
The prospects of a lucrative port to port trade 
from Bengal was reported by the factors as early as 1654.
They wrote to the Court of Directors - ,f*** besides for the 
shipping Your Worships shall design to return for Europe, 
there may be sufficient to emply to Persia, the Red Sea,; 
Achin, Pegu, Tenasserim, and Ceylon places which all of 
them return good profit from and are all of them within
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the monsoons of this11* They were further of opinion
that- such a trade would not only reimburse the expenses
of maintaining factories in Bengal but would also leave
substantial amount to procure investment for Europe. The
Company's main objective, as noted earlier, in port te
port trade in Asia was twofold - first, to save the
demurrage of the ships while in India and secondly, to
ease the problem of financing the investment out of the
profit from such ventures* So from the early years of
its trade in Bengal, the Company engaged itself in Inter-
Asiatic trade mainly to and from Surat and Persia, though
of course such coastal voyages were not always very regular*
later on in the 17th and 18th century,' the Company became
more aware of the importance of the port to port trade in
India. The Court of Directors wrote to Bengal in 1703 -
"We esteem it a Duty incumbent upon us, to England and our
posterity to propagate the future interest of our nation
in India which can hardly be done but by encouraging the
27trade thereof from port to port1'* • •
The goods carried to Persia by the English 
Company as also by the Dutch and the Indian merchants 
comprised mainly sugar and different types of calicoes
26. O.C*, 28 Dec. 1654, no. 2435, Vol. 24j E.F.I., 1651-54, 
p* 304*
27. D.B., 2 March, 1703, Vol. 9&, f. 63.
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while the return cargo consisted chiefly of specie in 
the form of silver abhasis and gold ducats, besides 
such commodities as shiraz wines, rose water, dry fruits, 
hing, pearls etc* The profit on such voyages to Persia 
was quite considerable and often varied between 50 to 60
O Q
p.c. ° The Company9 a interest in this branch of trade 
was so keen that; it was decided in 1681 to send one ship 
yearly from Bengal to Persia with cargoes valued between 
eight and twelve thousand pounds, and in order to encourage 
the persons concerned, the Company decided to give a share 
of £ to the Agent in Bengal, i to Beard (second in Bengal) 
and ^16 to the Agent in Persia.*^ Despite this it does no*t. 
seem that the Company sent ships regularly to Persia during 
this period* The staple commodities in Bengal - Surat 
trade, which was mostly in the hands of the Surat merchants, 
were sugar, raw silk and calicoes while the return cargoes 
comprised chiefly cotton, tobacco and other commodities that 
came from Persia*
The Company did not involve itself directly in 
any trade voyage to China, Japan, Achin or other parts of 
the East Indies from Bengal, though it often discussed in 
various deliberations the possibilities of deriving a 
lucrative trade in those parts* However, it seems that the
28. O.C., 16 May 1682, no. 4820, Vol.42; B.M. Addl.Mss., 
22,842, f. 7a.
29. D.B., 28 Dec. 1681, Vol. 89, f. 436
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Company engaged itself in Japan trade from the Coast at
least by 1671 and in June that year asked Bengal factors
to buy raw silk to the value of £5,000 to he sent to the
30Coast for Japan* In May next year the Kasimbazar factors
reported that they were f about to agree for the silk for
31the Japan investment* • The English were no doub’fc inspired
to explore the Japan trade by the example of the Butch whd
carried a most, lucrative trade in those parts* The English
factors reported in 1672 - "This Japan trade by the Butch* s
confession is the best they have in these parts *..• Besides
silk, the Butch carry hence to Japan fine nillaes of several
sorts which we are informed they sell at very great rates
and they make return hither by way of Betavia in Japan
gold and copper to a very great value" Bespite all these
encouragements given by Bengal factors for carrying on the
Japan trade from Bengal, the Birectors wrote in 1673 that
they were unwilling to send any ship for that place because
*of the present, posture of affairs in Europe1, though they
33promised to consider it afterwards*. But nothing was done
later on in our period to open a trade with Japan directly
from Bengal*’ In the beginning of the 18th century, the
Bengal factors pressed the Birectors to open China trade
30. B.B., 23 June 1671, Vol. 87, f. 464-*
31 • Pact* Records, Hugli, Vol. 7, pt* I, f. 64*
32* Pact* Records, Hugli, Vol*4^ f*ll*
33* B.B., 31 Oct. 1673, Vol. 88, f. 76.
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from Bengal but only in vain* The factors pointed out
that besides the advantage of 40 to 50 p.c. by the China 
34
voyage, it would also help to ease the problem of
financing investment in proper time. They urged the
Directors to send an early ship to China with a stock of
about forty thousand pounds fto be invested in tutenague,
copper, quicksilver, vermilion, Chinaware to load her
and the rest in gold to arrive here in the middle of
February which will be a reasonable stock at a proper
time to carry on a Bengal investment**^
The Dutch Company drove a very lucrative trade
from Bengal to various parts of Asia* The rate of profit
was ofteir huge and a substantial part of their investment
in Bengal was financed by this profit from Inter Asiatic
trade* They brought to Bengal various commodities from
different parts of Asia and sold them in the market, at a
great profit. A quick look at the following table, lowing
the varieties, quantities, cost and sale price as also the
rate of profit of the Dutch imports ^to Bengal in 16XG
36
from other parts of Asia will illustrate our point*
34* Pitt wrote to John Beard in 1700 that the China ships 
secured 50 to 40 p*c* even before their arrival in Fort 
St. George, vide, B.M. Addl. Mss, 22842, f*71»
35* O.C., 8 Jan. 1702, ho. 7B20, para 11, Vol. 65*
36. K.A., Vol. 1164, f* 397vo. I have left out all fractions*
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Commodities Quantities Cost Price; Sale Price Rates of
Profit*
Pepper 313,708 lbs* f .48,242 £.86,018 78#
Tin 200,937 ti II 69,148 “116,482 68#
Copper 67,386 in III 26,835 III 71,897 168%
Spelter 15,065 lit ir 4,950 It. 12,400 17.0&
Cans (Bell 
Metal) 8,400
IX it 3,907 II 7*063 30%
Bitgans (?) 18,410 III it 3,067 II 5,874 31%
Lead 102,625 If! it 13,093 It 24,198 84#
Quicksilver 1,526 Ilf it 2,058 It 4*753 55#
Vermilion 4,292 Hi m 7,005 II 13,127
CO
Sandalwood 9,302 it it 3*448 It 5,420 57#
Clove 7,516 »i it 5,040 II 35,427 602#
Nutmeg 5,485 in it 639 It 7*748 1112#
Cinnamon 3,863 It: ii 2,188 til 9*326 326#
Arrack from 
Ceylon 344,518
II it 20*332 III 45,868 125#
Elephants — 6 it 11,439 It 15,204 33#
Mace l,0431bs. tt 1,009 II 5', 234 421#
As a matter of fact, the Dutch Company engaged itself in
Inter-Asiatic trade throughout the period under review*
Even as late as 1716 it imported various commodities to
(f* 2^3912)
Bengal from other parts of Asia valued at Rs* 169*274/and 
sold them for Rs*401,037 (£*601,556) realising a gross
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profit of Ra.231,762 (f.347,644>*37
Besides Inter-Asiatic trade, the European 
Companies also engaged themselves in freight trade 
from Bengal specially to Surat and Persia* This branch 
of trade was quite profitable and helped the Companies 
to recover the demurrage of ships in Asia* The English 
Company generally carried goods of the indigenous merchants 
on freights to Surat and PeisLa. Sometimes the merchants 
chartered Companyrs ships for an agreed sum* Most of 
these merchants who chartered ships of the Eurppean Companies 
or freighted goods therein appear to have been Armenians,
70
though, of course, other merchants too dijd the. same* The 
Company, it seems, preferred to carry goods on freight, 
rather than to let its ships on charter as the former was 
more profitable*. Thus in 1699 it rejected Khoja Surhaudfs 
offer of Rs.35,000 for the ship East India Merchant fto be
37* K.A.* Vol. 1776, pt. I, f. 217.
38. Por Armenian merchants who chartered Company1 s ships 
or freighted goods therein, see, Beng. Pub* Consult*
Range 1, Vol. 2, ff* 268-268a, 284a, 399~399a* The Seths 
too freighted goods in Company*s ships* Bisnodas Seth 
paid the Company Rs*26,283 in 1715 for freight, of goods 
to Surat in the Bouverie, vide, Bengal General Ledger &: 
Journal, Range. 174, Vol. 92, f. 124* Jgain in 1714, the 
Seth merchants, Bisnodas Seth, Jadu Seth and Kishore Seth 
paid Rs.29,492 for freight of Cotton from Surat in the 
ship Hanover, vide* Bengal General Ledger & Journal,
Range 174, Vol* "92,: f *28; Even Surat merchants like Haji 
Mohammed and Mahmud Bakr freighted goods in English ships, 
vide, Pact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 1, pt* U,ff# 12-13
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let out wholly to him* since the Company hopes tx> get 
freight for about Rs.36,000 besides the * advantage of
Kinteledging the ship with 20,000 mds. of rice and shooting
mds.
near 20,000/more which may sell in Persia for 8 or 10,000
rupees and we shall receive profit- of salt, tobacco, wines,
39horses etc. that may be brought back*.
The main hindrance in deriving a lucrative freight:
trade for the English Company was the keen competition
offered by the Dutch and the indigenous merchants* As early
as 1684 the factors at Swally Marine reported that the ship
which made Rs.18,000 two years ago could now make but Rs.8,000
because the Dutch were * employing many ships of their own
40that way and hire several others** The competition from
indigenous ships often made it difficult for the Company to
get full freight for its ships. In 1690 the Surat factors
reported that though they managed to get freight for the
ship Royal James and Mary for Persia and Basra amounting to
Rs.40,000 or Rs.50,000, they failed to secure any for the
ship Kemuthorne which came so very late that the freight-
which they secured for her was taken away by several muslim
ships at half the rate charged by the English.4*1 Again in
1699 the Company in Bengal was obliged to accept freight at
Rs.8 p.md. for the ship East India Merchant in view of the
39* Pact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 3, pt. H, f. 225*
40. O.C., 26 April-1684, no. 5147r Vol. 44.
41* O.C., 28 April 1690, no. 5709, Vol. 48.
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fact that an Arab ship offered to take freight goods
at Rs* 6 p*md* and there were 1 three other ships putting
42in for goods for Persia*. Even as late as 1718 Calcutta
factors reported that the ship Bouverie was despatched to
Persia with only 515 bales on freight at, Rs*9 p*md* because
45
an Arab ship *took in freight goods1 at Rs*6 or Rs.7 p*-md*
The one striking fact in freight trade was the
lowering of the freight charges whether for passengers or
goods in the later years compared to that in the beginning
of the period, as a result it seems, of the keen competition
among the English, Butch and indigenous merchants* shipping.
In 1642 a private English ship Hopewell carried passengers
at Rs*40 per head and goods at Rs.15 p.md. (of 64 lbs) to 
44
Persia. But in 1688 the freight to Persia declined to
45
Rs*50 per passenger and Rs.10 p*md. (of 74 lbs) for goods.
The rates of the English Company further climbed down to
Rs.8 or Rs.9 p.md. in the first two decades of the 18th *
century while the indigenous ships carried goods to Persia
46at Rs.6 or Rs.7 p.md. Such a marked fall in the freight 
rate might have been due to a decline in Bengal - Surat or
42. Pact. Records, Calcutta, Vol. 3, pt. It, f. 225*
43* Coast & Bay Abstract, Vol. 2, f. 144*
44*- O.C., 14 Aug. 1642, no. 1784, Vol. 18*.
45* B.M. Addl. Mss. 34,123, f.36a.
46. Coast & Bay Abstract, Vol. 1, f• 448; Vol. 2, f.144; Beng 
Puh. Consult. , Range 1, Vol. 3, f .463a, In 1685 it was 
reported that the Company secured freight for Persia at 
Rs.50 per passenger, and Rs. 16 p.md. for fine goods,, 
Rs.20 p.md. for coarsegoods, vide, G.C.* 31 Bee. 1685, 
no. 5452, Vol. 45.
374
Bengal - Persia trade, but as there is no evidence to
support, such a contention,, the fall in freight rates can
wholly be attributed to the keen competition among different
European Companies and indigenous merchants* It is
significant to note that even European merchants sometimes
freighted indigenous ships* Thus in 17Q5 Captain Hamilton
hired the ship Vintegurry (Venkatgiri ?) of about 600 tons
for his own account from a Surat merchant, Venidas Temidas,.
for a trading voyage to Bengal* In this ship he brought to
Bengal 6 bales and 2 chests of silk, and four hundred sixty
seven bales of cotton for his own account, besides freight
47goods belonging to the muslim merchants of Surat*
(iii) Private and Interloping Trade
The Company was much concerned throughout the 
period about private and Interloping trade which hindered 
its own investment in Bengal* The participants in private 
trade were chiefly the Company* s servants and free merchants. 
The factors who participated in such trade naturally 
sacrificed the Company rs interest to their own and often 
appeared in the role of commercial rivals to the Company*.
At times these traders would offer higher prices to the
middlemen and buy up from the weavers cloth for which the 
Company had already advanced money and thus deprived the 
Company of its legitimate return cargo*.
47* Beng* Pub* Consult., Range lf Vol. 1, f* 220*
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Prom the early years of its trade in Bengal, 
the Company tried to check the private trade of its 
servants. The Madras Council complained in the ’fifties 
of the 17th century that the sum which the factors had 
paid in Bengal for exemption from customs would benefit
46their private trade rather than the Company's investment.
In fact Bridgeman and his colleagues in Bengal were heavily 
engaged in private trade. The Butch factors wrote in January 
1656 that, three private English yachts came to Bengal and 
that ’the only business the English do is on commission from 
Private traders who have come from England and we feel sure
49that they will manage to get well paid for their services’..
The Company, however, soon prohibited the private trade of its 
s e r v a n t s . £ Ut despite this, it failed to prevent the 
factors whether in Bengal or in any other part of India 
from engaging in such private voyages. The Birectors 
complained to Surat in April 1660 that, they had information 
that ’some of the factors (notwithstanding our prohibition 
of all private trade); have assumed that liberty to themselves 
as to freight and employ vessels upon their own particular 
accounts from port to port’ • They reiterated that they were 
resolved ’not to permit any person whatsoever to drive on a 
48. Bruce, op.cit.» Vol. 1, p. 485
49# Translation of Butch Records, Vol.21T, no. BC 52, £*1»
50# Bruce, op.cit.» Vol. 1, p. 532$ Wilson, op.cit., Vol.lr 
p* 53# The factors were not to trade privately in any of 
the Company*s commodities which seem to be saltpetre, raw 
silkr and a few categories of piece-goods like taffeta, 
nillacs etc. but were free to trade in other commodities.
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private trade which has been and (if not; suppressed)
51will he destructive to our public*.
Most of the factors engaged in private trade
made large fortunes* It was reported in 1666 that, Blake,
the then chief of Bengal, made about Rs.130,000 by private
trade only in four years and * extracted out of nothing* •
His trading voyages were confined mainly to Persia,. Siam
and the Islands of Maldive and he was engaged in inland
trade too* On his arrival in Bengal be bought spices from
the Butch for Rs*12,000 and sent those to Patna for his
own account*^Even Gerald Aungier, President, of the Company* s
affairs in India (stationed at Surat) sent his ship Recovery
53with freight goods to Gombroon and Persia in 1670* The
Birectors even complained of the abuse of private trade
indulged by Streynsham Master who came to Bengal in 1676
54.to reorganise the factories* The next Agent in Bengal,
55
William Hedges, was similarly engaged in private trade*
Later on, Edward Littleton, a member of the Council of the
old Company and afterwards the President, of the Hew Company
56in Bengal had extensive private trade operations* But
51. B.B., 9 April, 1660, Vol. 85, f. 295.
52* Pact* Records, Misc., Vol. 3, £.43» E.P.I., 1665-67,
pp* 261—62*
53. O.C., 30 March 1670, no. 3416, Vol* 31.
54. Home Misc., Vol. 803, f. 275.
55. O.C., 3 May 1683, no. 4942, Vol. 43.
56. Por Edward Littleton*s Private trade, see, O.C., 25 Hov* 
1701, no. 8592, Vol. 63; 27 Bee. 1701, no* 7808, Vol. 63; 
11 Bee. 1703, no. 8213, Vol. 66; 30 Jan. 1705, no*8433, 
Vol. 68; 17 Bee. 1707, no* 8527, Vol* 69.
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perhaps the great name in private trade activities was 
that of Thomas Pit*fe, the great Interloper and later on 
the governor of Port at. George. He had extensive
57
operations from Bengal down to China, Japan and Achin.
Though the Company failed to stop the private 
trade of its servants, it tried to check the abuses of 
this branch of trade which were contrary to its ©wn 
interest. In Dec. 1671 the Court of Directors wrote to 
the factors that they gave their servants liberty to trade 
for Persia or other parts of India except Bantam, Jambee,; 
Japan, Tonqueen, Pormosa and other places in the South
58
Seas where they *have or should have settled factories* .
Pour years later they extended the liberty to any parts or
59places in the East Indies except Tonqueen and Pormosa. But
at the same time they prohibited two piece — goods - cossaes
and mulmuls - and made these, the Company*s commodities. The
Directors asked Bengal factors *to take care that the
comm add era- of ships or others do not lade any of these
60
commodities aboard for their own account*. There were 
further restriction on private trade in 1679* The Company, 
being * greatly prejudiced by the great quantities of calicoes 
and silks that are. yearly brought home on account of private
57. Por Pitt*s private trade, see, B.M.Addl .Mss, Vols.22842- 
22850*
58. D.B., 18 Dec. 1671, Vol. 87, f. 511.
59. D.B., 24 Dec. 1675, Vol. 88, f. 226.
60. D.B., 24 Dec. 1675, Vol. 88r f. 236.
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traded, prohibited calicoes and silk and other goods made
61
of or mixed with cotton or silk* Again in 1682 the
Company prohibited all persons in its service from trading
62
in raw silk of the Bay* At, the same time, in order to
secure the Company*s investment from the inroads of private
trade, the chief and Council in Bengal^passed several orders 
6 3in 1679* First, the factors in different factories were 
to endeavour to secure all the Company*s annual investment; 
and ’suffer* no one to give out money to any weavers who 
would usually undertake dadney from the Company or to any 
on prohibited goods* Secondly, no Englishmen or their 
gomastas should keep any particular house §part from the
factory in the town for advancing money to weavers, picars
"fco 64or to receive goods from them/be sorted or priced there*.
Thirdly, no gomasta should invest any money in Kasimbazar,
Murshidabad *etc. places* where the Company*s weavers inhabit
without acquainting the chief therewith who was to direct
them not to give money out to such weavers as were employed
by the Company. But despite all these, private trade
-flourished unabated. The Court of Directors complained in
61* D.B., 3 Jan. 1679, Vol. 89, f. 27*
62. D.B., 15 Feb. 1682, Vol. 89, f. 456.
63« Fact. Records, Kasimbazar., Vol. 1, Diary, 4 May 1679*
64* In April 1679 a complaint was made from Kasimbazar that 
a particular house was kept in that town in an English 
name and advance was made to the Company* s weavers which 
’hindered their receiving the Company’s money*, vide, 
Fact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 2, f. 36*
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January 1681 that the Company’s trade was much hindered
hy private trade and that the factors in Bengal were
•overmuch crowded and encumbered with the burden of private 
65
trade’. They wrote -,fr*** it is against reason and our 
intent that our indulgence to them of univeral Trade in 
India (which the Butch never did and we suppose will never
allow their people); should turn to our excessive hurt and
66damage, as we have just cause to fear it lately did’*
As a matter of fact the Court of Directors complained in
1681 that ’one of the reasons that slackened and lessened
67our investments in the Bay is Private Trade’•
A. major problem connected with private trade
and one that gave concern to the Company was the fact that;
often the factors traded with the Company’s own money or
often borrowed it from local merchants who were connected
with the Company’s investment* In order to prevent this, the
Company wrote to Bengal in 1703 - "(we) give due encouragmenfc
to all our factors and servants who are employed and desirous
to improve their private fortune in the fair way of tradd
allowed by us whether it be from port to port- or Inland
traffic, provided always that no person presume to trade
with any of the Company’s money or goods or with their own
stock so as to interfere or prejudice the Company’s affairs
65* Home Misc*, Yol. 803, ff. 275,27.8 
66* D.B., 5 Jan* 1681, Yol. 89, f. 270.
67. Home Misc*, Vol. 803, £• 278*
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68
in any manner of way But thia could hardly
check the evil practice. Edward Littleton, the President;
of the new Company in Bengal was indebted to the Company
for Rs.227,572 which he borrowed both in his own name and
in the name of local merchants (sometimes fictitious) to
69persecute his own private trade* Borrowing from indigenous
merchants for private trade by the Company1 s servants was a
common practice. In 1711 the Directors complained that the
late President Weltden ’had demanded several sums of money’
from indigenous merchants, particularly fifty thousand rupees
7ofrom Janardan Seth for carrying on his private trade. (The
practice became so widespread and hazardous to the Company’s
business that in 1716 it ordered - "Whoever of our servants
either in their own or others’ name shall at any time borrow
money of the Broker or other Native shall no longer continue 
71therein". However the volume of private trade in Bengal 
remained quite significant even at the end of our period.
In 1718 the Company imposed a 2 per cent consulage on all 
private trade exported from Calcutta and it amounted to
68. D.B., 26 Feb. 1703, Vol. 95, f. 54.
69. O.C., 5 Dec. 1706r no. 8305, Vol. 68; 26 Dec. 1706,. no.
8408, f. 52, Vol. 68; 17 Dec. 1707, no. 8527, Vol. 69.
For details regarding Littleton’s private trade and the 
sum he borrowed from the Company in his own name as well 
as in the names of indigenous merchants, see, O.C., 26 
March 1703, no. 7957, Vol. 64; 11 Dec. 1703, no. 8213* 
Vol. 66; 30 Jan. 1705, no. 8433, Vol. 68; 8 Jan. 1706, 
no. 8394, Vol. 68.
70. D.B., 28 Dec. 1711,, Vol. 97, f* 462.
71* D.B., 15 Feb. 1716, Vol. 98, f. 788.
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72Rs#21,941 for that year# In other words the total
value of private trade from Calcutta in 1718 was about
Rs*1097f,050# The consulage (at 2 p.c.) amounted to
Rs.4,000 at Patna only in 1719 i.e; the value of private
73
trade at, Patna was about Rs#200,000#
The Interloping trade was no less a concern
for the Company specially in the last two decades of the
17th century. The Interlopers who frequented Bengal during
this period hindered the Company's business in more ways
than one# They procured their return*? cargo often with
ready money from the Companyrs merchants who, despite
receiving dadney from the Company for these goods, sold
them to the Interlopers for a higher price. Sometimes
the Company's servants worked in collusion with the
Interlopers and helped the latter in the procurement, of
the return cargo, much to the detriment of the Company's
interest#. Moreover, the Interlopers were always ready to
pay the customery 3i P*c# duties on all goods exported or
imported which often put the Company into embarrassment as
it claimed an alleged freedom of trade without, paying customs
duties. So naturally the Company tried its best to put an
end to the Interloping trade but seldom with success#
72. Beng. Pub. Consult, Range 1, Vol. 4, f* 75*
73* Pact. Records, Misc#r Vol. 7, f» 113*
382
As early as 1680 the Company warned the
Balasore merchants not to have any dealings directly
or indirectly with the Interlopers fupon the pain ofT
incurring the Companyrs displeasure and forfeiting their
employments* It also urged them to use their endeavours
in like manner to hinder and obstruct all other merchants
74from trading with the Interlopers* Despite such warnings, 
the Companyrs chief merchants and brokers like Khemchand 
and Chintaman in Balasore, Mathuradas in Hugli, Chaturmal 
in Kasimbazar frequently traded with them* In order to 
thwart the Interloping trade, the Company even took, severs 
action against its own servants who helped the Interlopers 
in the procurement of their cargos* In 1683 the Kasimbazar 
factors reported that Naylor, a dyer, was confined . to the 
limits of the factory and Ellit. (Elliot ?) was dismissed 
from the Company* s service as they were found guilty of
75holding correspondence and trading with the Interlopers*.
It seems that Naylor had big transactions on behalf of the
Interlopers* In Nov* 1683 he was said to have paid Rs.2,740
76
as custom duties at the rate of 3f P*c* In other words, 
the goods for which he paid customs were valued at about 
Rs*73fOOO»
74* Pact. Records, Balasore, Vol* 1, Diary & Consult*, 2nd 
Oct* 1680*
75* Pact* Records, Hugli, Vol* 9, f. 54*
76. Ibid*, f* 173.
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Sometimes the Company was very much alarmed
hy the Interlopers* readiness to accept certain conditions
for the right to trade in Bengal* In 1684 Davis, an
Interloper, was ready *to give the Nawab a Mahazar77 that
he would be content to have all his goods (that go to and
fro) opened, a particular account taken thereof and valued
by the King*s officers and pay custom accordingly*. The
Dacca factors immediately wrote - "'If he does (that), it
will be very destructive to the Honourable Company for
possibly the said officers will be demanding the same of _0I o
us, which if we must be forced to, there will be no trading'1. 
The Company was, however, successful in preventing the 
Interloper from obtaining a parwana for building factories
n 79xn Bengal.
The Company took recourse to various measures to
hinder the trade of the Interlopers. It often bought goods
from the merchants with ready money even when it was *low
80
in cash* and the investment was complete. It even paxd 
money to important merchants and their friends in the local 
Court to influence the administration from barring the. 
Interlopers from trading in Bengal. Thus in 1693 the
77. an -undertaking
78. Pact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 10, f. 101.
79* Pact. Records, Hugli, Vol. 10, ff. 87, 88,98.
80. Pact. Records, Balasore, Vol. 1, Diary, 15 Dec. 16851;
D.B., 28 April 1693, Vol. 92, f. 268.
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Directors asked the Bengal Agency to give Mathuradas a
present, of four or five thousand pounds *for his expenses
and for the assistance of his friends*, if he was sincere
81
and successful in defeating the Interlopers* Again, the
Company often tried to persuade the local authorities by
solicitations and sometimes even by threat to discourage the
Interloping trade in Bengal* With the arrival of Thomas
Pitt, and Catchpole *in an Interloper of 500 tons called.
Segimore* in Nov* 1693, the Company sent Captain Dorrill
to the governor of Hugli to inform him that, Captain Pitt,
was an Interloper who came to Bengal earlier and fthe
consequence of it was a war* and that rif the governor
gave him entertainment or suffered the merchants to trade
with him, we must be forced to another war for the Interlopers
82
and we could not be or abide in one place*. However, the 
problem of Interloping trade was much reduced after the 
passing of the new charter in 1693* The Directors wrote 
in January 1694 - "We have agreed with the principal 
Interlopers concerned in the two Interloping ships now 
abroad * * * and they have written the like value into our 
new stock and that we hope is the end of all our quarrels
81. D.B., 28 April 1693, Vol. 92, f. 268.
82. O.C., 4 Nov. 1693, no. 5886, letter no. 43, Vol. 50.
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83and contentions11. Then onward the Interloping trade
84was much reduced though not completely eradicated.
83. D.B., 3 Jan. 1694, Vol. 92, f. 316.
84. In 1697. an Interloping ship came to Bengal and despite 
the fact, that the English procured the Nawab*s parwana 
forbidding the Interlopers trade, It procured goods- 
through the French, vide, Fact. Records, Calcutta, Vol.6*
pt. I, f. 54.
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Chapter vTlT 
Conclusion
The English East, India Company's trade 
objective in Bengal was mainly to provide the Europe- 
investment and not the procurement of cheap Bengal cloth 
for barter trade with the East Indies which was the main 
purpose behind early Butch and English settlements on the 
Eastern Coast of India* In the early years the English 
Company was mostly interested in the procurement of three 
commodities namely, saltpetre, sugar and silk* But in 
course of its trade, the Company shifted the emphasis to 
the trade in raw silk and textiles* Prom the reighties 
of the 17th century, Bengal piece-goods outshadowed other 
commodities in the export list of the Company both in value 
and volume. The Companyrs investment was, however, 
insignificant; in the early years, never exceeding a few 
thousand pounds* But gradually the value of investment 
increased and at the end of the period under review, it 
was well over an annual average of £200,000* Throughout 
the main part of the second half of the 17th century, the 
English trade in Bengal was much less significant than that 
in Madras or Surat. But towards the close of the 17th 
century and definitely in the first two decades of the 18th
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century, the Bengal trade became more important in the 
pattern of the Company* s trade complex and far surpassed 
the Madras or Surat trade both in volume and magnitude.
The Bengal trade was often described by the factors as 
the *best flower of the Companyfs garden* or as the ‘choicest 
jewel*• A. factor wrote towards the close of the 17th century 
that Bengal *is the most considerable to the English nation 
of all their settlements in India*
Prom the beginning of its trade in Bengal as alsa 
throughout the period, the Company was plagued by many y
i
difficulties - chronic shortage of working capital, official
rapacity, private trade of the Company*s servants, Interlopers
and wars. But despite all these hindrances, it was able to
drive an extensive trade. The main concern of the Company
throughout the period was combating the chronic shortage of
working capital which it tried to solve by borrowing in the
local credit marketr raising money from other Europeans,
mainly the Butch, against bills of exchange payable in
Europe, and the profits from Inter- Asiatic trade and freight
voyages. As there was a limited demand for the English
manufactures and products, the Company had to finance the
Bengal trade mainly by importation of bullion and specie.
1. B.M. Addl. Mss., 34,123, £• 40a; B.B., 2 July 1684,
Vol. 90, f. 350; Rawl. A. 257, f. 254*
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In the early years, gold formed the larger part of the 
imported bullion but later on the treasure imported to 
Bengal consisted entirely of silver.
Apart from these economic factors, another 
difficulty in the trade of the Company was an unfavourable 
instutional framework - unfavourable not only to the foreign 
Companies but to all economic activities possibly curtailing 
expansion in production or a rise in the producers’ standards 
of consumption. Rapacity of local officials or revenue farmers 
- who had no interest in the economic future of the people or 
region they governed except: squeezing them - was a part of the 
administrative system. Extortionate demands on local merchants 
are too familiar a thing in the 17th century to need any 
special emphasis. The English Company tried to establish 
exclusive and preferential trading privileges, in the face of 
multiform bureaucratic exploitation, by various nishans and 
farmans from the ruling authorities. Quite often the bonafide 
and interpretation of these documents were challenged by local 
officials thus leading to frequent, stoppage of the Company’s 
trade. An important aspect of the conflict between local 
officials and the Company was that it was essentially one of 
trade rivalry. Most of these local potentates were actively 
engaged in both inland and overseas trade during the period and often
*7
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tried to monopolise some sectors of the province's trader 
much to the detriment of the Company's interests.
The Company procured its export commodities 
mainly through merchant, - middlemen as it could not deal 
directly with the producers. It had to give dadney or 
advance to the middlemen who in their turn paid advances 
to weavers and artisan in the proper time of the season.
Often these merchant-middlemen possessed vast resources 
and participated both in inland and overseas trade on a 
fairly large scale. They also acted asnbankers and shroffs. 
The Company, it seems, could not qtuite realise the power 
and the multifarious activities of these middlemen, and 
often mistook them as mere brokers. It tried to coerce 
them into submission in case of a dispute regarding trade 
transactions but not always with success. It failed in its 
attempts to organise them into a joint, stock which would 
have invariably curtailed their bargaining power and also 
the risk of bad debts for the Company. Such a joint stock 
of merchants would also have relieved the Company of the 
difficulties arising out of the shortage of working capital 
as the joint stock merchants would have provided part of 
the investment with their own money. Though successful in 
Madras, the Company's endeavour to organise a joint stock in 
Bengal was abortive. The practice of employing a broker became
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an integral part, of the Companyfs machinery for the 
procurement of return cargoes*.
The vast expansion of the Company* s export 
trade from Bengal necessarily meant an increase in the 
volume of imports, though this primarily consisted of 
an increased supply of bullion and specie*. The demand 
for imported commodities was generally very limited and 
inflexible, though in the context of the poverty of the 
masses, the total volume and variety of imports were not 
negligible* Treasure, specially silver - used for minting 
coins, hoarding and purposes of display - was chiefly in 
demand, though there was a ready market for a limited 
quantity of metals like lead, tin and copper etc*. The 
additional imports of bullion was not beyond the absorptive 
capacity of the country and they produced no marked change 
in the general level of price* The import of miscellaneous 
commodities merely touched the fringe of the economy* The 
only significant import was that, of bullion and specie, and 
that too„ in so far as; it contributed to monetisation* It 
was a social waste to the extent it went to hoarding*
In the internal economy of Bengal, the activities 
of the European Companies undoubtedly gave an impetus to 
production* There was evidently an expansion in the 
production of raw silk and textiles to meet, the increasing 
orders of the European Companies, though it is not possible
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*to measure this in any concrete terms* It is significant, 
that, the increase in production could he made without any 
fundamental change in the technique of production* This 
obviously points to the existence of possible overcapacity 
in the textile industry oyer short period or the creation 
of new supplies of skilled labour which was the most 
important factor in the production system* This is further 
confirmed by the fact that when the English settled down in 
Kasimbazar, there was such a great: congregation of weavers
2
there that it resulted in the lowering of prices of cloth*
Industrial production in Bengal, as in other parts
of India, was organised mainly at the level of cottage
industry - by individual weavers in their own homes* The
poor artisan or weaver, provided with little capital, had
to depend on cash advance (as also sometimes on advance in
kind) from the middlemen who could thus dictate the nature,
quality and quantity of goods produced* Any system involving
deep penetration of capital into production had, however,
not yet emerged* The merchant - middlemen who provided a
part of the advance was only interested in the finished
product and remained outside the production organisation*
The rudimentary character of the production organisation and
the poverty of the artisan allowed little scope for the
2* Eact. Records, Misc. Vol. XIV, ff. 527-28, Master’s Diary, 
Vol. H, p. 11.
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growth of inventories# Despite the increased demand 
and competition among buyers, both Europeans and Indians* 
it seems that: the weavers had hardly any bargaining power 
which remained mostly in the hands of the merchant-middlemen.
It seems that the mobility of labour was less
in Bengal than that in Coromandel where the weavers were
3
said to be ’surprisingly mobile’* Despite the promise 
of ’great wages’, the English Company failed to persuade 
the Bengal weavers to go and settle down in Madras* ’Such 
was their caste and lineage’ that they feared by crossing 
the saltwater, they would lose their birth right* The 
Company even failed to persuade the taffeta - weavers to 
move from Kasimbazar and settle in Hugli* But the Bengal 
weavers never lacked in enterprise. The English factors 
reported that the weavers were willing to engage in any 
new sort- of work though they demanded higher price for any 
cloth other than those made traditionally. On various 
occasions they demanded payment of the cost of alteration 
in their looms for meeting the specified dimension of cloth 
required by the Company.
The English Company found the local credit market.: 
highly efficient and organised for its purposes. The 
specialised activities of a class of merchants namely* the 
3» Irwin, op.cit*, pp* 31-32*
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shroffs, and the refinement and development of the 
existing financial machinery for credit and exchange 
indicate that merchant capital and commercial organisations 
were capable of quite sophisticated operations. So far 
as the activities of Bengal merchants were concerned, 
business was the concern of individual rather than of 
groups acting together, though joint ventures by several 
merchants were not altogether absent. But in general the 
merchant operated with his own capital and there was hardly 
any link bet ween the merchant and the public which was 
developing fast in contemporary Europe,
The rate of interest was very high in Bengal, 
often higher than that in orther parts of India, It is 
difficult to ascertain whether this high rate of interest 
was due to an absolute scarcity of working capital or an 
excessive demand for it. Theoretically a high rate of interst 
does not necessarily suggest the existence of low rates of 
saving and therefore a chronically capital starved economy 
as, it can be the result of a high demand relative to supply. 
But. under Indian conditions it is highly probable that an 
absolute shortage of investible surplus was in fact responsible 
for the generally high interest rates. It is also possible, 
that tradition and existing economic condition gave the 
merchant a larger mazgin of profit on trade goods than in any other
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type of investments so that it was possible far him 
to pay a high rate of interest for borrowed money.
The European Companies in Bengal were responsible 
for introducing some innovations in the organisation of 
production and commerce though not, on an extensive scale.
The Asian and Portuguese merchants before the European 
Companies used to buy from the manufacturers as best as 
they could get at any given time. But the English insisted 
on supplies conforming to musters and this introduced an 
idea of specific standardisation vfoich was an innovation 
in the region. Again, -though the dadney system was in 
vogue long before the advent of the European Companies, 
the Asian merchants never fixed a definite price beforehand 
and did so only when they received the goods. The European 
Companies, however, fixed tbe price according to samples 
before the advance was given and this was again a noveliy 
in the organisatjbn of commerce introduced by the Europeans. 
They also sometimes set up establishments for the processing 
of cloth — specially ; bleaching and dyeing- and brought 
throwsters, weavers and painters from Europe who also 
instructed the indigenous artisans in , those artsr and thus 
tried to improve the quality as well as colour of the textile* 
Such organisations were rare in Mughal India. Though the
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royal. Karkhanas were there, they catered mostly for 
imperial household and the needs of the nobility* So 
these establishments introduced a new element in the 
organisation of industries in Bengal*.
It is not possible to measure the impact of 
the European trading activities on the internal economy 
of Bengal. But a glance at the export lists of the 
European Companies will indicate that there was definitely 
an expansion of the export, trade from Bengal and as such, 
a corresponding increase in production, specially in the 
silk and textile industry. Leaving aside the free merchants 
and other European Companies whose trade was perhaps not 
very significant, the annual exports of the English and 
Butch Companies alone exceeded more than 40 or 5Q lacks 
of rupees on an average in the first two decades of the 
18th century while in the beginning of our period it was 
almost negligible* This sum was a significant percentage 
of the revenue from Bengal vhich was about 130 lacks during 
the period* Naturally it, might have been expected that the 
increased export would better the condition of, at leastr
the weavers who were responsible for the production of the ^
(
>^ulk. of export commodities* But from the various reference \ 
in the records of the Company, it seems that the lot of j 
the poor weavers)remained the same despite the increase in j 
production and competition among the buyers. The plight,
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of the weavers are amply illustrated by the factors1 
correspondence which often described it in such phrases 
as - * weavers cannot subsist or lie long idle*, or 
*weavers live from hand to mouth* or *such needy a 
generation as the weavers are**^ Even making allowance 
for the inevitable exaggeration in the observation of the
/
k /
factors, the poverty of the weavers can hardly be refutedr7 
It seems reasonable to argue that the broker system was 
responsible for the extreme poverty of the weavers# Other­
wise it is difficult, from any other point of view, to 
reconcile the weavez^ poverty with the fact so often apparent, 
that: the Companies were buying in a seller*s market#. The 
power of the broker was such that he was apparently able 
to dictate prices both to the Company and the weaver#
Moreland concluded that * sudden extension of the 
trade in Bengal resulted in that, market being brought, more 
nearly on a level with the conditions prevailing elsewhere 
on the Coast,* * His thesis was that upto 1650 prices in 
Bengal was abnormally low compared with those in other 
regions on the Coast of India as the supply of silver had 
previously been inadequate compared with what was available 
on other parts of the sea board so that silver price was
Pact. Records, Malda, Vol. 1, Diary, 25 Oct# 1680; Home 
Misc., Vol. 803, ff. 84-85$ D*B. 28 Jan* 1661, Vol. 85r 
ff. 367-68.
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depressed and commodities were cheap* The basis of his
inference was that the factors, vdio wrote in about 1650
that, provisions in Bengal could be procured "all at. half
price or little more than that they are in other parts* ,
complained in 1658 that provisions had trebled in value*
He tried to explain the Portage of silver in Beigal in
the working of the revenue system in which land revenue.
was paid in silver and much of it remitted to the Mughal
Court in the same form* As a result, the amount of imported
silver retained in Bengal was inadequate to satisfy local
demand so that silver was normally expensive, or in other
words, commodities were cheap* And the sudden influx of
silver in the wake of European trading activities was
sufficiently large to effect a material alteration in the
monetary position in Bengal and it was brought into line
5>with the rest of 1he Coast*
But we have enough evidence that Bengal was never
brought into the same level with other parts of the Goast
so far as prices of provisions were concerned* Provisions
were much cheaper in Bengal throughout, the period than in
other parts of India* It might be that with the influx
5* W.H. Moreland, op.cit., pp* 179-81r 298*
6* "The cheapness of provision is one reason for the
difference of Europe investment in Bengal and Madras11*, 
vide, D.B., 4 Feb. 1709, Vol. 96, f*454j ^A rupee in Bengal 
will go as far as a pagoda at the Port?1*!! Pagoda * 3#5 
rupees approx.), vide, B*B., 28 Dec. 1711, Vol.97, f*461; 
f,gre& difference in Bengal and Bombay", vide, O.C*, 22 May 
1698, no* 6566, Vol* 54*
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of silver prices went up slightly,, though it was difficult 
to measure this rise* The English factors perhaps took 
this opportunity in the late ffifties of the 17th century 
to increase their allowances, and to justify it, made a 
gross exaggeration in saying that, prices of provisions had 
trebled. The cheapness of provisions in Bengal was well 
beyond doubt* Throughout the period, provisions were 
exported to various parts of the Indian Coast incllading 
Coromandel and Surat as also to the East Indies* The 
fertility of land and good yields may explain to some extent 
this cheapness in Bengal* The influx of silver - worth at 
least 50 lacks of rupees a year, and which might be expected 
to push the prices up - had no appreciable impact on the 
prices of provisions* The probable explanation is that 
the greater part of the silver was drained out of the country 
towards northern and western India. That the drain from 
Bengal to upcountry during this period reached a new and 
great dimension cand hardly be denied* The revenue , however, 
did not seem to have increased to any great extent* But the 
numerous grantees and even big merchants who were mostly 
from northern and western India remitted huge sums to Agra 
or Delhi in the form of cash* The Companyrs records provide 
a rough idea of the vast sum amassed and remitted by numerous 
transferable officials and revenue farmefs* A. single
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enormous
illustration will signify the/size of the drain* It
was reported that Bahadur Khan who succeeded Shdtista
Khan in Bengal collected 20 million rupees in only one
7year of office. Even making allowance for the obvious 
exaggeration, it brings into bold relief the nature and 
extent of the drain from Bengal* And this drainage 'towards 
upcountry perhaps explains to some extent the cheapness 
of provisions in Bengal. But despite this cheapness, 1he 
lot of the poor weavers and artisans was miserable* The 
European Companies imported silver which hardly filtered 
down to the producers to any substantial extent, the surplus 
being mostly expropriated by only a small section - the 
merchant - middlemen*
During the period Bengal reached a high degree 
of commercialisation witain the broad framework of an 
agrarian economy. The activities of the European Companies 
definitely pushed forward this process of commercialisation 
and created a belt of specialised industrial and cashcrop 
production linked to the foreign markets - a process which 
becomes more apparent in the later period which is beyond
7* A. Martineau (ed*>, Memoires de Francois Martin, Vol. HI, 
p. 50*
Appendix A 
Table I
Total Value of the English East India Company’s annual
export from Bengal
Years Value
1663/64..................  £ 24,199
1664/65.................. £ 19,501
1665/66   N.A*
1666/67    N.A.
1667/68   N.A.
1668/69.................. £ 14,537
1669/70.................. £ 16,900
1670/71.................. £ 29,076
1671/72 ...............  £ 55,123
1672/73    N.A.
1673/74   N.A.
1674/75   N.A.
1675/76 ............... £ 52,297
1676/77 ............... £58,547
1677/78   N.A.
1678/79 ............... £ 88,351
1679/80   N.A.
1681/82 ............... £142,977
1682/83 ...............  £162,763
1683/84 ............... £146,668
1684/85- ...............  £210,063
1685/86   £181,788
1686/87   N.A.
1687/88   N.A.
1688/89    N.A.
1689/90   N.A.
Table I (continued)
Years
1690/91
1692/93
1695/94
1694/95
1695/96
1696/97
1697/98
1698/99
1699/1700
1700/1
1701/2
1702/5
1705/4
1704/5
1705/6
1706/7
1707/8
1708/9
1709/10
1710/11
1711/12
1712/13
1713/14
1714/15
1715/16
Value
£ 40,369 
£ 11,770 
£ 58,944 
£ 30,425 
£90 ,490 
£ 76,894 
£ 68,911 
£163,053 
£190,275 
£280,672 
£228,042 
£ 54,713 
N.A*
£ 66,091 
£ 73,689 
£ 84,902 
£135,662 
£148,995 
£208,892 
£228,474 
£235,859 
£259,595 
£175,587 
£158,752 
£221,697
Table I (continued)
Years
1716/17
1717/18
1718/19
1719/20
Value
£178,821 
£244,918 
£259,279 
£336,973
(Source A.G.D., Range 11, Vole. 28,, 30, 32, 37, 41, 43, 
46, 49, 52, 55*, 58; Ibe figures for 1678/79 are to be 
found in B.M. Addl. Mss., 34123- All fractions have been
left out. N.A* = Not available.)
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Table It
Prices of Saltpetre, Cotton Yarn and
Raw Silk
Years Saltpetre Cotton Yarn Raw Silk
1662/64 Rs * 5 :p.md. Rs. 19*6 P* md. Rs.. 155 p.md,
1664/65 i 5 Il li in 19*6 tr IT N.E
1668/69 ti 2*5 it; II n 18*7 it 11 N.E.•
1669/70 ti; 2*5 II;II ii 19*9 in If: Rs* 196 p.md.
1670/71 it 2*5 III tr n; 19*1 tr IU ii 177*311 "
1671/72 Hi 5*2 It' it it 17*9 it Hi ti 152 u tt
1675/76 If! 2*3 li in N.E. it 191 tr it
1676/77 Tt 4*5 II Hi N.E. Hi 217 Hr H
1678/79 III 4»1 II it; N.E. II 165 II IK
1681/81 Hi 2*2 Hi it N.E. I 268 I It
1682/83 I 1*6 it; it; Rs. 16 • 5 P* md. 11 298 I It
1682/84 it; 1*9 Iti li ii 16*7 It it II 167 1: U
1684/85 it 2*5 I in tl; 17*8 l< t« III 168 11 I.
1685/86 tr 2 . 2 Hi it it. 15*5 Hi lli II 222 It It
1690/91 II 2 II Hi II 17 111 II II 182 lli IU
1692/95 II 2*8 II II! Hi N.E. N.E,
1695/94 II 2*5 II TI Rs. 15 P. md. Rs 187 p.md.
1694/95 Hi 5*5 lli II ft; 14*2 It: H in 182 II H>
1695/96 It 5*2 11 I 11! 14 111 U< in 160 It If
Table H  (continued)
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Years Saltpetre Cotton Yarn Raw Silk
1696/97 Rs. 3 p.md. N.E. Rs. 115 p.md
1697/98 tn 3*4 " 1 Rs* 12*8 p.md. It! 144 " I.
1698/99 " 3.2 w ” rt 12.9 » » I 164 11 tt
1699/17.00 fn 3*2 I|: 11 n« 13 »! m 182 « in
1700/1 1 4*3 tr 1 N.E* It 201 " tt
1701/2 '* 4*8 1 ” N.E. If: 236 " in
1702/3 1 *7 »* » Rs. 14 p.md. II 203 ” it
1704/5 1 4,7 1* »i 1 I4.7 .1; i» If 154 “ 14
1705/6 m 5*3 ,f ,f: in 18*2 ,|! M I 174 " it
1711/12 I 4 #Q I I 11 16 M 1 I 187 " 11.
1712/13 in 6 tf 1 i> 16.5 i» 1 ir 171 " 11
1713/14 H 4,3 ti 1 N.E,. it 171 it
1714/15 1 4*3 ,r 1 N.E* it 172 " it
1715/16 i 4*4 1 1 N.E. it 162 " it
1716/17 1 4.2 »» »* N.E* 1 169 " it
1717/18 1 4,4 n 1 Rs. 15 p.md. 1 169 “ in
1718/19 i 5*2 u " N.E* 11 171 " it
1719/20 If Ip It 11 Rs. 14*1 p.md. 11 155 " 11
( Source See note in Table I ) 
N.E, = Not Exported
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Table HI
Percentage of Export Commodities in Total Export. 
Value from Bengal.
Years Saltpetre Raw Silk Texti'
1663/64 20# •4# 71#
1664/65 2% nil 67#
1668/69 50# nil
CO
1669/70 17# 15# 62#
1670/71 9# 7# 85#
1671/72 9# 8# 77#
1675/16 11# 12# 71#
1616/77 14# 11# 71#
1678/79 12# 54# 52#
1681/82 4# 58# 55#
1682/83 5# 45# 50#
1683/84 2# 50# 67#
1684/85 2# 24# 71#
1685/86 1# 11# 85#
1690/91 6# 8# 85#
1692/95 5# nil 85#
1695/94 8# 24# 62#
1694/95 4# 5# 85#
1695/96 5# 17# 77#
1696/97 1# 21# 77#
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Table HI (.continued)
Y ears Saltpetre Raw Silk. Texti
1697/98 2# 2$ 91$
1698/99 2$ 20$ 77$
1699/1700 1$ 19$ 77$
1700/1 2$ 25$ 71$
1701/2 1$ 22$ 71$
1702/3 3$ 14$ 71$
1704/5 23$ 31$ 38$
1705/6 ii$ 6$ 7.7$
1706/7 4$ 12$ 59$
1709/10 N.A. 13$ 83$
1710/11 N.A. 6$ 91$
1711/12 3$ 3$ 91$
1712/13 4$ 7$ 83$
1713/14 3$ 10$ 83$
1714/15 4$ 11$ 83$
1715/16 4% 10$ 83$
1716/17 4$ 28$ 66$
1717/18 4 $ 21$ 71$
1718/19 3$ 14$
K'V00
1719/20 % 5$ 91$
C Source See note on Table I ) 
£UA* = Not available.
Table IV
Animal Exports of Raw Silk by the 
English Company
Tears Quantito; Value
1663/64 357 lbs. £88
1664/65 nil. nil
1668/69 nil nil
1669/70 6*637 lbs. £2,177
1670/71 7,050 “ £2,055
1671/72 18,100 “ £4*588
1675/76 22*749 " £6 *594
1676/77 21,142 " £6*709
1678/79 125,550 " £52*415
1681/82 140*270 l,: £54*506
1682/83 167,185 " £7.5,918
1683/84 160*630 “ £44*469
1684/85 176 *994 " £49,816
1685/86 56*432 " £20*125
1690/91 11*346 ,r £ 5*442
1692/93 nil nil
1693/94 45,960 " £14*546
1694/95 4*956 “ £ 1*500
1695/96 67,521 '• £15,499
1696/97 81*480 '* £15*912
Table IV (continued)
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Years Quantity Value
1697/98 6,396 Its. £ 1,527
1698/99 118,515 '* £32,321
1699/1700 117,135 " £25,470
1700/01 206,256 £68,899
1701/02 137,212 " £51,120
1702/02 27,375 " £ 7,487
1704/05 88,657 " £20,473
1705/06 16,783 " £ 4,320
1709/10 90,272 '* £28,006
1710/11 48,270 "■ £14,624
1711/12 26,067 '* £ 7,956
1712/13 62,701 " £17,294
1713/14 60,450 " £17,293
1714/15 61,804 '* £17,584
1715/16 82,497 " £22,217
1716/17 180,088 " £50,892
1717/18 181,947 “ £51,199
1718/19 129,075 " £36,809
1719/20 61,618 " £15,958
(Source t— See note in Table I )
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Appendix £U 
A brief glossary of textiles from Bengal?
Addaties -
Allaballies
Allabannees
Arundi
Amerees
Atchabanees
Atlasses
Baftas
Buckshaws
Bulchuls
plain cotton piece - good or muslin, usually 
of fine quality woven around Dacca, Malda and 
Kasimbazar*
a very fine quality muslin or cotton piece-good 
mixed silk and cotton piece-good", probably 
striped, woven chiefly around Hugli. (not in 
Malda * Kasimbazar area, as Irwin holds}•
A coarse* cheap and exceedingly strongecloth 
woven of one of the wild silks of Bengal, namely 
Tussur and Muga,, produced mainly in Kasimbazar 
area*
cotton piece-good provided mainly in Hugli*
probably fine cotton piece-good*
silk stuff worked with threads of gold and
silver, woven mainly around Hugli.
plain cotton piece-good*
cannot be identified; a muslin ?
cannot be identified; a muslin ?
x Based mainly on Irwin, op*cit*; various references in 
Despatch Books, Original Correspondence, Factory Records; 
Master*s Diary, Peter Mundy, Vol* 2; R.C•Temple, Indian 
Antiquary, 1914,. pp*69-83r 97-111; W*K* Firminger, flThe 
Malda Diary and ConsultationsMi, J*A«S*B» New Series, Vol* 
XIV, 1918; Hobson - Jobson*
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Chare onnaes
Chandanees
Camcanys - plain cotton piece—good woven near and
around Patna,
Carridaries, Choradarries — striped or chequered woven
cloth, probably of mixed silk — and - 
cotton.
— mixed silk - and - cotton piece-good 
provided in Hugli (and not woven in Orissa 
only as Irwin says),.
— fwhite drugget piece-good*, provided 
chiefly in Hugli area.
Chanderbannees — probably silk piece-good woven in Kasimbazar
area.
Chillaes — probably cotton piece-good; sometimes
described also as cotton handkerchief.
Chints - painted or printed calico, provided at
Patna and its neighbourhood.
— plain white cloth, woven chiefly in Hugli 
area (not only in Western India as Irwin says)
— mixed silk - and - cotton piece-good, usually 
striped, woven in Hugli and its neighbourhood.
— plain muslin, usually of superior or fine 
quality, woven chiefly in Dacca and Malda 
areas.
Coopes - cannot be identified.
Chowtars
Chucklaes
Cossaes
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Cuttanees
Dimities
Doodamies
Doreas
Dosooties
Dungarees
Cushtaes - striped or chequered cloth, possibly of
mixed cotton - and - silk*
- mixed silk - and - cotton piece-good*
(woven in Bengal too, though Irwin suggests 
only in Western India)
— cotton cloth provided mainly in Hugli*.
- cannot be identified*
— striped or chequered cloth of mixed silk - 
and - cotton, woven chiefly in Kasimbazar, 
Malda and Hugli regions*
- probably cotton cloth*
— strong coarse calico; woven in Bengal too* 
though Irwin suggests only in the Western 
Coast*
— striped cloth of mixed silk - and - cotton, 
woven mainly in Hugli and Malda regions but 
not in Kasimbazar as Irwin suggests*
Emerties, Ambertees — white cotton cloth woven in Patna area* 
Earrendines — silk piece—good provided chiefly in
Kasimbazar area; fto be made thinner, more 
glossy and perfect black*, vide, D*B*, Vol.6, 
f. 57.
- mixed silk - and - cotton piece-good, 
provided mainly in Balasore area.
Elatches
Ginghams
412
Gold lumbers
Gurrahs
Humades
Jamdanies
Jamwars
Jelolsles
Buckowries
Lungees 
Mahmudb ame e s 
Mahmudiatees 
Mulmuls
Mundilla
N ainsook
- fa sort of taffetas of deep gold colour 
and made of thicker silk than ordinary*. 
Vide, D.B., Yol. 93, ff. 32-36.
- plain, coarse cotton cloth exported in 
large quantities in the first two decades 
of the 18th century.
- cannot he identified.
- muslin or cotton piece-good, brocaded in 
white or coloured silk or cotton, usually 
with floral pattern.
- silk piece-good, woven generally in Malda - 
Kasimbazar area*
- probably muslin piece-good.
- white cotton cloth woven in Lakhawar, Bihar; 
a synonym for ernerties.
- silk or cotton loin cloth.
- fine muslin provided mainly in Hugli area.
• cannot be identified.
• fine muslin woven chiefly in and around Hugl 
Dacca and Malda.
- striped stuff of mixed silk - and - cotton 
woven chiefly in Malda area.
» plain muslin of fine quality; sometimes 
referred as Tansook also.
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Nehallawars - striped piece-good of mixed silk - and —
cotton woven in Hugli area.
Nillaes — mixed silk - and — cotton piece-good woven
in Balasore area.
Orungshies ~ Aurangshahi (?); cotton piece-good woven
in Hugli area.
Peniascoes — mixed cotton - and - silk piece-good,usually
striped and provided mainly in Hugli.
Phoolgarrees - probably silk piece-good, usually with floral
design; woven chiefly in Kasimbazar area.
Photaes — cotton cloth provided in Bengal, and not
only in Western India as Irwin suggests*
Putta or Birdfs eye — fine muslin woven in Malda area*
Rehings — fine muslin woven in Malda area.
Restas - striped taffetas, woven chiefly in Kasimbazar
area.
- thin silk piece-good with handkerchief pattern 
woven in many parts of Bengal; sometimes 
simply of cotton, or of mixed silk - and - 
cotton.
ordinary cotton cloth.
Sallampores - ordinary cotton cloth.
Sannoes — plain cotton piece-good of ordinary quality
woven chiefly in Balasore area.
Sarcenetts — probably silk piece-good woven chiefly in
Kasimbazar area*
Romalls
Sailcloth
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Seerbands — muslin woven chiefly in Dacca and Malda area*.
Serbettes — probably cotton, piece-good*
Seerhaudconnaes — fine muslin; the most expensive of all
the muslins in the English Company* s export list 
Seersuckers - mixed silk - and - cotton piece-good, usually
striped; woven in Malda area.
Shahzadies - probably silk piece-good woven in Kasimbazar
area*
— cannot: be identified*.
— mixed silk — and — cotton piece—good woven in 
Hugli and Balasore areas, and not in Kasimbazar 
— Malda areas as Irwin suggests*
— silk piece-good woven in Kasimbazar area.
— fine muslin woven chiefly in Dacca and Malda 
areas*.
— a type of chintz, or painted or printed calico*
Shalbafts
Souses
Taffetas
Tanjeebs
Tepoy
Terrindams — fine muslin woven chiefly in Dacca district*
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Appendix C
A Typical order from the Court of Directors for 
Bengal goods to he provided in the different 
factories in the Bay CD*R» 28 Aug.,1682* ff*22-26)
To be Provided at Balasore
Ginghams, coloured of finest sort..........20,000 pcs*
Silk Romalls  20,000 *
Nillaes of good colours   36,000 u
Sannoes *......... .............. ......... 30,000 "
Herba Taffetas of cloth 2q q00 «
colours & lively colours
Herba lungees*..............................20,000 1
Sousies of several colours   4,000 1
Tesser or Herba thread or y a r n ............  200 bales
Cotton Yarn     200 “
Sticklac   100 Tons
Cowries...................................  100 1
Broad blue Ginghamsr ordinary sort......... 10,.000 pcs*
Herba stuffs  ......................... 2,000 rt
any sort of new stuffs, of Herba,
cotton or silk for trial................... ^  bales
To be provided at Patna
Saltpetre, what more you can g e t    1,500 Tons
Turmerick      200 rt
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To be provided at Hugli
Silk Rom alls *.  20,000 pcs*
Satins of several colours ............. *.♦ 6,000 1
Mahmudbannies * * *......................... 500 "
Allabannles................***** * * 2,000 n
Phota Lungees   2,000 M
Chareonnaes Fine  5,000 11
Do ordinary............•*.*  4,000 ”
Aznerees .........................*  1,600 rt
ELatches *..............*................  2,000 “
Peniascoes    5,000 “
Chucklaes ..................*  6,000 "
Sousies........ **•     4,000 1
Striped mulmuls fine (Boreas) *...... **•• 4,000 ,J
Mulmuls with fine needlework.............  5,000 "
Do striped and flowered   1,000 "
Atlasses, coloured & striped,
fuller of silk and stronger ............. 8,000
Do flowered white ..............*  1,000 "
Silk neckcloths *..................... •••• 4,000 11
Any sort of new stuff of
silk, or silk and cotton  ^  hales
Diapers finest and strongest   1,000 pcs.
Tablecloth  100 "
Dimities finest •***•*••••..... *  1,000 **
Opium..............................*....  24 Duppers
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To be provided at Hugli (continued)
Seeling W a x ............................ 2 tons
Silk Quilt    1,000 pcs.
Chandenees   1,000 11
Orungshies    4,000 **
Nehallawars....................    2,000 n
Chowtars ...............................  10,000 “
Umber Chareonnaes    8,000 “
Umbers ................................. 4,000 1
To be provided at Dacca
Cossaes fine .........................    13,000 ”
Mulmuls of all sorts, fine or coarse •••• 15,000 M
Tanjeebs fine  ......................... 6,000 "
Seer bands fine    10,000 1
Seersuckers...........................  5,000 “
Huznhums fine  ............    16,000 "
Fine Addaties .........................   15,000 ”
Silk Romalls •. •  .................... 10,000 Ir
Mulmuls with fine needlewDrk............  4,000 1
Do Striped.............................. 1,000 f>
Any new sorts of goods for trial....... 12 bales
White silk what quantity could be got.
418
To be provided at Malda
Cossaes fine   15,000 pcs.
Mulmuls of all sorts fine & coarse •••••. 15,000 11
Tanjeebs fine •••••••••................  10,000 1
Seerbands fine • •••.................   5,000 ft
Seersuckers .........................    4,000 1
Rehings.....    5,000 "
Pine humhums........................... 4,000 "
Pine Addaties .......................... 1,500 1
Silk and Cotton Striped
stuff called Mandilla .................  10,000
Puttaes or Bird*s eye ..................  2,000 11
Striped do   5,000 "
Striped mulmuls fine Boreas  4,000 11
Silk and Cotton Elatches   12,000 11
Any sort of new stuffs of silk
or silk & cotton....................... bales
To be provided at Kasimbazar 
Taffaties Sa<L, Cloth colours half
& light colours half*................... 90,000 pcs.
Changable colours ............     4,000 11
Taffaties black.......................   15,000 "
Bo green  ............................. 1,500 11
Bo Sky ................................. 1,500 ”
Taffaties R a w .........................   10,000 "
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To be provided at Kasimbazar (continued)
Taffaties white     6,000 pcs*
Striped Chain Taffaties      16,000 1
Striped Taffaties or Restas   12,000 M
Farrendines Black  .....    ♦ 500 1
Silk Lungees   20,000 “
Chander6armies   6,000 "
Shahzadees    2,000 1
Pholgarees flowered      8,000 M
Sashes or girdles •   4,000 n
Sarcenetts white  ............. .... 10 r000 1
Do Black............................... 10,000 1
Any sort of new stuffs of
silk or silk & cotton   20 Bales
Cold and silver stuff 50 pcs. of each sort. & 
pattern for a trial.
Plushes &: Velvets of each sort.........   100 pcs.
Raw Silk head and belly ............. what quantity you can
get
Enlarge the investment of raw silk .*.to 10,000 Bales
16 seers to the Bales
Ploretta yarn of finest sort.  ........  1,000 Bales
Arundi Cloth Blew . ..........  2,000 pcs.
Bo Brown........    20,000 u
Arundi y a m   ......    100 Bales
Throwne silk  .............    200 "
Shellack the best and finest sort of
Kasimbazar............... ........... . 50 tons.
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Appendix D
Contracts with Calcutta merchants showing the different
varieties of three principal muslins and their prices
for four years* ( Vide* Beng. Pub* Consult, Range lyVols*2-4)
1710 1713 1716 1719
u
n
t t
» it
t
Co,,X Co. Rs. As. Rs. As. Rs. As. Rs.As.
40 X 2±*. .*9—12.« ..9-12.. ..9-12.. ..9-12
40 X 2x» •* * 6—10.* ..7-0...
40 X 2 ..••9-8 •*
40 X 3 • •.*13—0 *«..13—0*. ..13—0.. ..13-0
40 X 2-%. •* * — *... — ...*10—8.. . .10—8
40 X 2-^r. .• •10—8 * *.*10-8*. . . — . ... —
40 X 2 **..13-12. . . — . .. * — . *.» —
40 X 2£. •.. 8-12. .. — *... 8-12. .. —
40 X 2*.. ..13-8). ..14-12) ..14-12) ..14-12)
16-0). ..11-12) ..11-12) ..11-12)
!»
t
t
t
ft
22-0 )..13-4 ) 
M • • • • 40 X 3 • • • • *• •••• 20—0•••• — . ... 16-0
Dacca ....40 X 2 ....16—0*...13—0«... — »•*• 0—0
Dumree ....40 X 2^r..«.12—0**** — •••• — •••• —■
Cossajura. .40 X 2 •*•*13-6....12-0...*12-0*••*12-0 
Coincola.••40 X 2  •••• — ••••11—12•*• — •••• —
flowered
with silk*.40 X 1 .... - ...*22-0..*. - ..*• -
n flowered with
silk thread.*40 X I  *.*«16—0* *.•15—0....15—0....15—0
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Appendix D (continued)
1710 1715 1716
Co.X Co. Rs»Aa. Ra As.
Tanjeebs Santose....40 X 2£....7—12.*•.7-12...• - ♦. 
** Dacca ... .40 X 2^ ~»...8—8 .... — .... • ..
** ** •..• 40 X 2 *..#7—0 ....7—0 f• • • •• ..
11 Flowered
with silk.. .... •* ... .20-0.... *• ..
n Flowered with
silk, thread ...40 X I  .... 15—0.... 15—0.... ■* ..
1719 
Rs. As,
..6-14 
.. — 
..7-0
..20—0
..15-0
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Appendix E
Cost price and Sale proceeds of piece-goods carried 
by Tavistock in 1704/5* (vide A.G-.D, Range 11, Vol. 
49, ff* 23, 55).
Name of piece - goods Quantity Cost ; . i a Sale proceeds
Cossaes - 3684 pcs..£2928:3:2 ....£15135:18:-
Tanjeebs - 3207 *' ..£2322:6:- ....£12236: 9:-
Adaties - 819 " ..£ 284:13:5....£1548: 1 :6
Humadees «*► 212 '• ..£ 325: 4:4....£1304: 7: -
Mulmuls - 2889 " ..£3389:11:10...£13576:13:-
Curraha - 2948 " ..£ 597: 1:5....£ 3740:19:10
Choradarries - 637 " ..£151 : 9:!....£ 307:17:4
Doreas • 1447 '• ..£1508: 5:7....£11045:13:-
Neckcloths - 166 " ..£ 139: 9:4....£ 344: 9:-
Humhums - 535 " ..£ 451:16:10...£ 1583: 4:~
Dimities - 417 ” ..£ 247: 1:5....£ 628:18:6
Luckowries 1350 " ..£ 227:16:3....£ 1070: -: —
Sooseys - 582 " ..£ 550: —:—....£ 1378: 6:~
Cuttannees - 447 “ ..£ 310:14:10...£ 611:13:-
Taffaties «*• 821 " ..£ 669: 4:10...£ 1743:16:-
Lungees 327 " ..£ 89:18:2....£ 163:10:-
Alibannees - 861 1,1 ..£ 371: 2:10...£ 968:10:—
Photaes 428 11 . . £ 141: 1:3... .£ 365:10:5
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Appendix E (continued)
Name of piece-goods Quantity Cost y .: e Sale proceeds
Romalls — 3568 pcs.**£ 800:14:8#•••#£1245:8:4
(for 1,971 pea* 
only)
Chints — 750 H f* • • • 3U140:12:6.....£ 450:12:6
Nillaes - 1200 1 £* • • *1# 560: 8:9.....£1087:10:-
Ginghams - 461 Hi & • • 122:14:6.... £ 223: -:1
Musters — 13 »*■ • • 11: 2:10....£ 50: 2:6
(for 11 pcs*only)
£s• 16^ 1,41: 3:10 £ 710*10:9t
i*e. A. gross profit of more than 
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ILLUSTRATION II.
Bill for 6,000 rupees, executed by Ehernchand 
and Chintaman, payable to Bros. Douglas (?) with interest 
dated A.H* 1094 ( A.D. 1683 ).
The manuscript has impressions of seals of the 
executants, each bearing the date A.H. 1095 ( A.D. 1682 )
The signatures of the executants are torn one.
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